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BITCOIN AND THE BLOCKCHAIN AS POSSIBLE
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE TOOLS: STRENGTHS AND
WEAKNESSES
Fiammetta S. Piazza*
Bitcoin and similar virtual currencies are rapidly evolving and gaining traction in today’s economy.
However, legislators in the United States and abroad are still assessing the legal status of cryptocurrencies
and often pursuing quite different approaches in their regulation. On the other hand, the blockchain, the
technology underlying Bitcoin transactions, offers itself as a great tool that should be implemented in the
corporate governance field because of its recording certainty features. The blockchain, through the
distributed ledger, allows users within a network to perform peer-to-peer digital transactions while accessing
and monitoring changes in the ledger as they occur. The ledger also offers an opportunity to maintain
information securely, by encrypting and allowing access only to holders of cryptographic “keys”.
Because of its lack of a centralized issuer and absence of securities deriving from a national apparatus and
definite legislation, Bitcoin presents a series of uncertainties that prevent implementation as a corporate
governance tool. Instead, the blockchain’s capacity to maintain confidential information securely, such as
corporate strategies to be voted on by a board of directors or shareholders, within a network of allowed
users and to record transactions or events with certainty should be explored and implemented in the
corporate field. This article analyzes the current legal status of Bitcoin and blockchain technology; the
relationship between the two; and advantages and disadvantages of implementing either or both
technologies for transparency of ownership, corporate voting, accounting, and self-executing, “smart”,
contracts purposes. This article suggests that while neither should be implemented for accounting and
ownership reporting purposes, blockchain could prove a useful tool for corporate voting.
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I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid evolution of the Internet and the transition to
the Web of a diverse array of infrastructure and systems, virtual
currencies have quickly developed. Today, virtual currencies play a
key role in the transformational change affecting the world economy,
reflecting the expanded venues available to consumers to access
goods and services.1 Indeed, unlike traditional currencies, virtual
currencies offer a peer-to-peer exchange mechanism eliminating the
need for intermediaries and central clearinghouses.2
While virtual currencies are not afforded legal tender, they may
still have equivalent traditional currency value.3 Within this category,
Bitcoin has developed and attained primary market status among
virtual currencies that can be exchanged for traditional currencies.4
Bitcoin’s main feature is the so-called blockchain: a ledger where the
parties to each transaction report their exchange. Accordingly, while
the features and characteristics of each Bitcoin exchange may vary
tremendously, it is possible, within the exchange and with the
necessary access authorization, if any, to monitor transactions.
However, this does not translate in complete transparency because
some exchanges permit users to create anonymous accounts. While
this is no longer possible in the United States following the recent
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) guideline
making it clear the Banking Secrecy Act applies to Bitcoin even
though it has not been recognized as currency, anonymous foreign
exchanges may still impact American corporate governance because
of the global nature of today’s economy and the ease of access to
those foreign exchanges.5

International Monetary Fund, Virtual Currencies and Beyond Virtual
Currencies
and
Beyond:
Initial
Considerations,
5,
available
at
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2016/sdn1603.pdf.
2 Id.
3 Sarah J. Hughes & Stephen T. Middlebrook, Feature, Advancing a
Framework for Regulating Cryptocurrenciy Payments Intermediaries, 32 YALE J. REG. 495,
504 (2015).
4 Id.
5 Dep’t of the Treasury Fin. Crimes Enforcement Network, Guidance
Paper FIN-2013-G001, Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to Persons
1
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Section II of this paper discusses, in subsection A, the general
realm of virtual currencies and Bitcoin’s supremacy. Subsection B
distinguishes between Bitcoin, blockchain technology, and distributed
ledgers. Subsection C analyzes the mechanics of Bitcoin’s
transactions on the blockchain. Lastly, subsection D, surveys the
current regulatory framework regarding Bitcoin in the United States.
Section III examines the consequences of implementing
Bitcoin or the blockchain in the governance of companies.
Specifically it examines the potential benefits and disadvantages of
both as tools to enhance transparency, conduct corporate voting and
accounting, and enter “smart contracts.” Ultimately, this paper
suggests implementation of blockchain, but not of Bitcoin, may be
viable in some of those areas.
II. VIRTUAL CURRENCIES, BITCOIN, AND THE BLOCKCHAIN
A. Virtual Currencies and Bitcoin: Evolution and Problems
Satoshi Nakamoto – an alias6 – has long been thought to be
the creator of Bitcoin when a technical paper was posted on the

Administering, Exchanging, or Using Virtual Currencies (2013) available at
https://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/guidance/pdf/FIN-2013-G001.pdf.
6 While Bitcoin has developed since Nakamoto first published its
protocol, the true identity of its designer (or designers) is still unknown. After
posting the protocol, Nakamoto, other than for a few messages, has disappeared
and, in his words, “[has] moved on to other things.” Who is Satoshi Nakamoto?, THE
ECONOMIST
(Nov.
2,
2015
23:27)
http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2015/11/economistexplains-1 (discussing how, among other things, Nakamoto’s own funds have
remained untouched). Several individuals and agencies, spanning from John Nash
to the NSA, have been thought to be the “face” behind the Nakamoto mask, but
no ultimate finding has been made. See, e.g. Justin OConnell, 10 People who have been
Called the Inventor of Bitcoin, Satoshi Nakamoto, CRIPTOCOINSNEWS (Aug. 21,
2015), https://www.cryptocoinsnews.com/called-the-inventor-of-bitcoin-satoshinakamoto/ (discussing the ten people who have been thought to be the inventor).
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Internet describing the protocol in 2008.7 However, recent
developments around the identity of Bitcoin’s creator identify in
Craig Wright the true “father” of Bitcoin. 8 Regardless of the identity
behind Bitcoin, the protocol was first implemented in 2009 and, since
then, several versions of the cryptocurrency have been created and
are easily available for download.9
Before explaining the functioning of Bitcoin and its role in
today’s economy, it is helpful to remember that traditional currencies
are defined as a system of money used and generally accepted in a
country (or union of countries as in the European Union’s eurozone)
as a form of payment.10 Traditional currencies are also known as fiat
currencies from the Latin term fiat meaning “let it be done” or “so it
shall be” in the sense of a governmental decree or order. This is so
because, different from commodity-based money like gold, silver or
copper-backed coins, fiat currencies do not have an intrinsic value.
Instead, the national government, as issuer, declares its value as legal
tender and, in the words of Milton Friedman, “[t]he pieces of green
paper have value because everybody thinks they have value.
Everybody thinks they have value because in his experience they have
had value.”11 Indeed, fiat currencies are part of multi-layer national
infrastructure inclusive of a national bank or system of banks (e.g. the
United States Federal Reserve) and an agency or department

7 P. CARL MULLAN, THE DIGITAL CURRENCY CHALLEGE –
SHAPING ONLINE PAYMENT SYSTEMS THROUGH U.S. FINANCIAL
REGULATIONS 85 (Palgrave MacMillan eds., 1st ed. 2014).
8 Following years of speculation, Australian Craig Wright has come
forward claiming to be the original creator of Bitcoin. As proof, he “digitally signed
messages using cryptographic keys created during the early days of Bitcoin’s
development. They keys are inextricably linked to blocks of bitcoins known to have
been created or ‘mined’ by Satoshi Nakamoto.” Australian Craig Wright Claims to be
Bitcoin Creator, BBC.COM (May 2, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology36168863.
9 MULLAN, supra note 7, at 86.
10 Article, Ralph E. McKinney Jr. et al., The Evolution of Financial
Instruments and the Legal Protection against Counterfeiting: A Look at Coin, Paper, and
Virtual Currencies, 2015 U. Ill. J. L. TECH. & POL’Y 273, 274.
11 MILTON
FRIEDMAN & ROSE FRIEDMAN, FREE TO
CHOOSE: A PERSONAL STATEMENT 249 (1980).
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entrusted with the production of currency (e.g., the United States
Department of the Treasury Bureau of Engraving and Printing.) 12
A virtual currency is a “medium of exchange existing entirely
in intangible form that is not legal tender but which can substitute for
legal tender.”13 Within the broader category of virtual currencies
often used for online games and social media are cryptocurrencies,
Bitcoin being the most popular example.14 Cryprotcurrencies are
distinguishable from other virtual currencies in that theyare “internetbased virtual currenc[ies] in which the ownership of a particular unit
of value is validated using cryptography.” 15 Accordingly, Bitcoin is a
virtual currency with equivalent value in real currency but no legal
tender status, at least in most jurisdictions.16
The American Constitution reserves to the Federal
Government the power to coin money and regulate its value.17
However, laws prohibiting the circulation and use of unauthorized
instruments meant as currency or generally means of payment, have
not been interpreted to prohibit new types of money.18 Instead, these
laws have been applied for prosecuting counterfeited US dollar bills
and coins.19 Nonetheless, many countries have taken a direct stance
and have explicitly ruled that Bitcoin cannot be used as legal tender
within their borders.20 Even so, private parties can agree, in contract,
to use Bitcoin as method of payment for their transactions. Thus, the

Id. at 277.
Hughes & Middlebrook, supra note 3, at 504.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 In Re Coinflip, Inc. et al., CFTC Docket No. 15-29 (CFTC Filed Sept. 17,
2015), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-14-21.pdf.
17 U.S. Const. art. I, §8(5).
18 U.S.C. §336.
19 Julie Andersen Hill, Virtual Currencies & Federal Law, J.
CONSUMER & COMM. L., 49 (2015).
20 European Central Bank, Virtual Currency Schemes – A Further Analysis,
24 (2015),
available
at
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/virtualcurrencyschemesen.pdf.
12
13
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biggest hurdles Bitcoin faces are volatility and absence of a
supporting institutional infrastructure.21
Between March and April 2013, “Bitcoin’s dollar exchange
rose from about $50 to $350 and then fell back to near $70. Bitcoin’s
price rose even more sharply during the fall of 2013, rising from near
$50 in September to more than $110 by early December. During
2014, Bitcoin’s price showed large day-to-day variations but generally
trended down. By mid-January 2015, a Bitcoin was priced near
$200”22 then, as of July 2015, Bitcoin was trading at an exchange rate
of $279.32 per Bitcoin.23 However, it should be noted that Bitcoin’s
volatility has been declining steadily and Bitcoin has maintained lower
levels of volalititly compared to unstable reserve currencies like the
Russian Ruble and the Brazilian Real.24 Specifically, Bitcoin’s volatility
between March and May 2016 has been about 1.23% and around
1.45% between April and May 2016.25 For comparison, and to better
grasp Bitcoin’s level of risk, volatility of gold averages at around
1.2%, while major currencies average between 0.5% and 1.0%.26
Furthermore, “while gold has decreased by around 11% amid the
[F]ederal [R]eserve’s announcement of new interest rates
implementation, the price of [B]itcoin has increased to around
US$430.”27 In 2017, in the midst of uncertainties surrounding what
Since most countries have abandoned the gold standard – the
guarantee that anyone could trade a country’s currency in return for equivalent
amount of gold – the value of national currencies derives from social acceptance,
trust, and confidence in that country’s economy. The Global Monetary System – Not
Floating,
but
Flailing,
THE
ECONOMIST
(July
5,
2015),
http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21606322-after-150years-monetary-experimentation-world-remains-unsure-how.
22 Craig K. Elwell, M. Maureen Murphy & Michael V. Seitzinger, Bitcoin:
Questions, Answers and Analysis of Legal Issues, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERVICE
REPORT,
7
(Jan.
28,
2015)
(available
at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43339.pdf).
23 Id.
24 Joseph Young, Volatility of Bitcoin Price Consistently Declined since 2010,
BITCOIN
NEWS
SERVICE
(Jan.
3,
2016,
4:00
PM),
http://www.newsbtc.com/2016/01/03/volatility-of-bitcoin-price-consistentlydeclined-since-2010/.
25 The
Bitcoin
Volatility
Index,
BITCOIN
VOLATILITY,
https://btcvol.info/.
26 Id.
27 Young, supra note 24.
21
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policies will be implemented regarding Bitcoin by the new
administration, “the cryptocurrency rose 3.1% to $1,164.10
. . .topping the all-time closing high of $1,137 set in November
2013.”28 February 2017, as a response to the newly inaugurated
presidential administration, has indeed marked the longest Bitcoin
has traded at over $1,000.29 This is because commentators expect
“the Trump administration to be at least more accepting of the
cryptocurrencies, even if they will not necessarily embrace them.” 30
This stems, at least in part, from the fact that Trump’s transition
team includes “Bitcoin supporters” like Peter Thiel, co-founder of
PayPal and investor in several Bitcoin companies, and Mick
Mulvaney, an outspoken supporter of Bitcoin and founder of the
bipartisan Blockchain caucus.31 Mulvaney, Director of the Office of
Management and Budget, has created the bipartisan caucus aimed at
educating Congress about Bitcoin and blockchain technology. 32 This
is a significant step, regardless of political views, to foster regulation
and thus certainty around cryptocurrencies and blockchain
technology. Mulvaney has also stated that “[b]lock chain technology
has the potential to revolutionize the financial services industry, the
United States economy and the delivery of government services, and
I am proud to be involved with this initiative.”33
Hypothetically, and national debates aside, if Bitcoin’s
acceptance becomes more widespread, its volatility may decrease and
this, in turn, may result in increased global acceptance of Bitcoin as a
28 Olga Kharif, Bitcoin Price Sets Record on Trump Policy Uncertainties,
BLOOMBERG
(Feb.
23,
2017
10:35
AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-02-23/bitcoin-price-setsintraday-record-on-trump-policy-uncertainties.
29 Charles Bovaird, Bitcoin Price Tops $1,000 for Longest Stretch in History,
COINDESK (Feb. 21, 2017 20:32), http://www.coindesk.com/bitcoin-price-tops1000-longest-stretch-history/.
30 Neha Thakur, Will Trump and Bitcoin be Good Partners, NEWSBTC (Jan.
23, 2017 9:35 AM), http://www.newsbtc.com/2017/01/23/will-trump-andbitcoin-be-good-partners/.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Shivdeep Dhaliwal, Donald Trump Inauguration Special: Make Bitcoin Great
Again!,
THE
COINTELEGRAPH
(Jan.
20,
2017),
https://cointelegraph.com/news/donald-trump-inauguration-special-makebitcoin-great-again.
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means of exchange. 34 However, without a national infrastructure
backing the virtual currency, Bitcoin’s success can merely be
temporary as in the case of mortgage-backed securities and other
financial instruments in the past.35 Indeed, it has been argued that
Bitcoin may become the subject of a financial bubble as it “seems to
fit the basic definition of speculative bubble – that is, a special kind
of fad, a mania for holding an asset in expectation of its
appreciation.”36 News regarding price increases both publicize and
amplify bubbles’ effects.37 They often justify the current bubble
phenomenon by attributing it to an inspiring “new era” story aimed
at attracting more attention as the prices rise. 38 In Bitcoin’s case, the
narrative was that “a computer whiz invented a new kind of money
in the form of electronic currency units, as part of decentralized
computer-driven system for a world economy that extends beyond
the reach of any single government.”39 Indeed, commentators have
speculated Bitcoin has already been the subject of a bubble in China
in 2013.40 There, the Government has issued laws both banning the
use of Bitcoin and prohibiting transfers out of the country of
currency in amounts higher than $50,000.41 Interestingly, on
November 3, the price of Bitcoin rose to its 2015 peak of US$377.36,
amounting to a 75% increase since August of that same year. 42
Supporting the speculation that Bitcoin was the subject of a Chinese
bubble, while the price rose globally, Chinese Bitcoin exchanges were

34 Kevin V. Tu & Michael W. Meredith, Rethinking Virtual Currency
Regulation in the Bitcoin Age, (Aug. 22, 2014) (available at SSRN 2485550).
35 David Min, Understanding the Failure of Market Discipline, 43 (Mar. 3,
2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2403988).
36 Robert J. Shiller, In Search of a Stable Electronic Currency, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 1, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/02/business/in-search-of-astable-electronic-currency.html.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Anthony Cuthbertson, Bitcoin Price Hits 2015 Peak Amid Speculation of
‘Second Bitcoin Bubble’,
INT’L
BUS.
TIMES
(Nov.
2,
2015),
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/bitcoin-price-hits-2015-peak-amid-speculation-secondbitcoin-bubble-1526956.
41 Id.
42 Id.
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trading the virtual currency at leading prices, “sometimes trading at
$10/bitcoin higher” than other exchanges world wide. 43
Historically, national central banks have been entrusted with
the mandate of protecting their national currency by “seeking to
match the supply of money to the needs of the economy and thus
maintain[ing] price stability.”44 This result is usually achieved by
attempting to make inflation rates as close as possible to set
benchmarks. Those benchmarks are usually low, as in the 2% target
of the United States, to avoid the uncertainty about the future and
the corrosive effects on currency value that would be caused by high
inflation. 45 In fact, trust that a national currency is a reliable store of
value derives from the confidence that the currency will be honored
at a value reflecting public expectations.46 Accordingly, be it directly
by setting interest rates,47 or indirectly by issuing public
communications “prepared for the purpose of shaping economic and
monetary conditions prospectively, as instruments of persuasion,”
central banks play a pivotal role in managing currency stability.48
Bitcoin’s independence from countries’ currency systems has been
claimed to be its strength, however, while this may be somewhat true
for highly unstable economies, it is not an automatic conclusion for
more stable and confidence-inspiring ones. Indeed, regardless of the
actual level of a country’s economic stability, it does provide
consumers with an interface to relate to and that is neutral from
private interests. Distinguishably, Bitcoin’s anonymous creation and
the private ownership of all Bitcoin exchanges create a reality where

Id.
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Why Does the
Federal Reserve Aim for 2 Percent Inflation Over Time?, available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/economy_14400.htm. Similarly, in Europe,
the ECB has a targeted inflation rate below, but close to 2%. See ECB, Monetary
Policy, available at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/html/index.en.html.
45 Sarwat
Jahan, Inflation Targeting: Holding the Line, IMF,
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/basics/target.htm.
46 Hilary J. Allen, $ = € = Bitcoin?, (Aug. 13, 2015), Suffolk Law School
Research Paper No. 15-33, 15, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2645001.
47 Morgan Ricks, Regulating Money Creation After the Crisis, 1 HARV. BUS.
L. REV. 75, 77 (2011).
48 Douglas R. Holmes, Communicative Imperatives in Central Banks, 47
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 15, 17 (2014).
43
44
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Bitcoin stability depends on the interrelation of conflicting private
interests.
Interestingly, according to its own website, Bitcoin’s value
derives from the fact that it is “useful as a form of money.”49 This
circular reason strengthens the fear that while the public is currently
interested in purchasing Bitcoin because of trust in its development,
if this belief disappears no central bank or government can provide
support to users. A sudden end to the acceptance of Bitcoin as a
payment method would translate into chaotic erosion of its value
and, ultimately, Bitcoin would lose its status as currency.
The lack of a neutral institution devoted to price stability can
explain, at least in part, Bitcoin’s volatility and riskiness. In contrast
to public sovereigns, Bitcoin exchanges have a private corporate
nature and relatively easy access to bankruptcy procedures that could
leave subscribers, as creditors, unprotected to a higher degree than
they would be if a bank were to be insolvent. However, as mentioned
above, Bitcoin is an interesting alternative in unstable economies
where the national currency is completely distrusted. For example,
Argentina is increasingly gaining interest in Bitcoin.50 Nonetheless,
Bitcoin may not be the best option even in those economies. An
example of a more structured and more reliable alternative currency
is the Unified System for Regional Compensation (“SUCRE”). 51
SUCRE started as a virtual currency for transaction between Ecuador
and Venezuela. It was intended as a medium to replace the US dollar
as means of exchange in order to limit and decrease the US influence

Bitcoin, Why Do People Trust Bitcoin?, https://bitcoin.org/en/faq#whydopeople-trust-bitcoin.
50 See J.M.P. Montevideo, Bitcoin in Argentina: If it can’t Make it there, THE
ECONOMIST
(June
12,
2014,
13:36),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/schumpeter/2014/06/bitcoin-argentina;
Nathaniel Popper, Can Bitcoin Conquer Argentina?, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Apr,
29,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/03/magazine/how-bitcoin-isdisrupting-argentinas-economy.html?_r=0.
51 Mercedes Alvaro & Jeffrey T. Lewis, Who Needs Bitcoin? Venezuela has its
“Sucre”,
(Jan.
2,
2014
6:51
pm),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304202204579256062854362716
.
49
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and control over Latin American trade and, at the same time, increase
stability of those markets.52
While theoretically appealing, Bitcoin lacks the full faith and
credit that has allowed national currencies to successfully function
and resist crises.53 “No private issuer enjoys the same extent for its
markets, the same capacity to coerce demand for its liabilities, or the
same psychological association with confidence in society.”54 This is
not to say that currencies alternative to national fiat currencies cannot
successfully exist. However, it is of extreme importance that virtual
currencies, by nature, tend to be unstable and extremely sensitive to
new events requiring past commitments to be readjusted.55
Consider the fate of bank-issued money in the United States
prior to the establishment of the US dollar as the common currency.
Many state banks issued their own IOUs with nothing but their own
assets to back them. Predictably, they failed whenever too many
claimants sought to make good on their claims at the same time. This
follows from the hierarchy of finance and the fact that non-state
entities, by definition, have limited resources. Critically, their ability to
mobilize fresh resources may falter precisely when it is most needed,
namely in times of crisis.56
Accordingly, Bitcoin and other similar virtual currencies’ are
too unstable to implement an overreaching corporate governance
system like that applicable to companies. Doing so could potentially
expose shareholders to greater risks than traditional transactionrecording methods do without a countervailing benefit.

Id. See also generally, Caroline R. Hurtado, Note, Fiscal Policies as Decisive
Solutions for Troubled Economies: Differing Legislative Enactments in Argentina and Ecuador,
24 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 391 (discussing the dollarization process
undergone Latin American countries to obviate to economic instability).
53 FELIX
MARTIN,
MONEY:
THE
UNAUTHORIZED
BIOGRAPHY, 75 (2014).
54 Id. at 114.
55 Katharina Pistor, A Legal Theory of Finance, 41 J. COMP. ECO. 315, 322
(2013).
56 Id.
52
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B. Distinguishing Distributed Ledgers, Blockchain, and Bitcoin.
Blockchain and Bitcoin are too often incorrectly used
interchangeably because of the strong association between the two.
However, the blockchain is merely the technology through which
Bitcoin functions and making the distinction between the two is
fundamental to understanding the potential independent use in
corporate governance of the blockchain, but not of Bitcoin,
proposed by this paper.
The blockchain is a particular type of distributed ledger and
represents the technological evolution of a tool as old as commerce.57
Indeed, in ancient times transactions were recorded on papyrus and
paper, today, the same recording occurs in computerized form. 58
What distinguishes distributed ledgers from the traditional form of
recording is that, through algorithms, the ledgers can be
collaboratively created by all of those sharing it in a network
consisting of multiple sites, geographies, and institutions.59
Distributed ledgers allow all users within the network to access and
visualize changes to the ledger as they occur while maintain the
information safe from unauthorized access via cryptographic “keys”
and signatures, controlling users’ relative powers.60 Indeed,
underlying the distributed ledger technology lays the blockchain,
which accomplishes peer-to-peer digital cash transaction in Bitcoin,
or otherwise.61 This is further analyzed in the next subsection.
Distributed ledgers, as contrasted to Bitcoin, offer an
interesting tool to implement in corporate governance because of
their potential positive effect in at least some field of governance
which is discussed in Section III of this paper. Compared to current
data management methods, distributed ledgers offer a more secure
alternative given their resistibility to hacks. Unlike centralized
57 UNITED KINGDOM GOVERNMENT CHIEF SCIENTIFIC
ADVISOR,
Distributed
Ledger
Technology:
Beyond
Block
Chain,
5,
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file
/492972/gs-16-1-distributed-ledger-technology.pdf.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 See infra Subsection Section II-c.
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systems, a successful cyber-attack on a distributed ledger would have
to contextually target all shared copies.62 While not completely
immune from hacks, this technology is also resistant to unauthorized
changes or malicious tampering because users can immediately spot
those changes.63 The technology represents an opportunity for
evolution in various fields given its adaptability to various uses:
distributed ledgers are capable of applicability to most transactions
given their ability of “guaranteeing and tracking assets as they move
from one ledger to another.”64 Interestingly, various governments
globally, are already moving towards the implementation of
distributed ledger technologies paralleling the private corporate
world.65
C. Mechanics of Bitcoin Transactions on the Blockchain
Given Bitcoin’s nature, mathematical formulas and
cryptography respectively control its issuance and use. 66 While users’
software store a public record of all transactions – the blockchain –
the actual identity of the transacting parties remains anonymous, as
no personal information is required to create an account on the
platform or exchange Bitcoins.67 Elimination of a third party
intermediary, such as a bank, ensures anonymity within Bitcoin
transactions.68 Anonymity is furthered by the absence of reporting
UNITED KINGDOM GOVERNMENT CHIEF SCIENTIFIC
ADVISOR, supra note 57, at 6.
63 Id.
64 Money
with
no
Middleman,
THE
ECONOMIST,
http://www.economistinsights.com/technology-innovation/analysis/money-nomiddleman/tab/1, (last visited May 10, 2016).
65 UNITED KINGDOM GOVERNMENT CHIEF SCIENTIFIC
ADVISOR, supra note 57. Five countries (United Kingdom, Estonia, Israel, New
Zealand, and South Korea, have also created a network of digitally advanced
government with the goal of strengthening the digital economy. See UNITED
KINGDOM CABINET OFFICE AND GOVERNMENTAL DIGITAL
SERVICE, D5 London: About D5 Member Countries, (Dec. 9, 2014),
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/d5-london-about-d5-member-countries.
66 MULLAN, supra note 7, at 86-87.
67 Id. (noting that Bitcoin’s issuance is capped at 21M units).
68 Federal Reserve Board, Bitcoin: Technical Background and Data Analysis, 5
available
at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/feds/2014/files/2014104pap.pdf.
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requirements and regulatory agencies, such as central banks and
taxing authorities.
In the absence of a third party clearinghouse, participants are
free, but not bound, to voluntarily record each transaction on the
blockchain.69 However, the effectiveness of this recording method is
disputable: users who record their transactions are rewarded with
newly minted Bitcoins.70 Conversely, no penalty follows from failure
to record. 71 This incentive-based policy explains, at least in part, the
steady growth of Bitcoin systems.72
The blockchain is comprised of a series of transactions each
consisting in a “block”.73 Each block indicates the asset and
consideration exchanged, the time of the transfer, and the identity (or
at least the pseudonym) of the transacting parties.74 Each block is
“chained” to the preceding and the subsequent one through headers
that report information (using codes) regarding the content of the
previous transaction block.75 Thus, through the codes reported in
each block’s header one can retrieve the preceding transaction block
and so on until the original transaction is reached.76 However, while it
is possible to trace Bitcoin transactions back to the original
acquisition of assets, depending on the type of exchange used, it is
potentially impossible to trace the transaction back to individuals. 77
Furthermore, depending on the visibility options set by the exchange,
blockchain records may be publicly visible or restricted to authorized
users and subscribers only.78 In the alternative, an intermediate
solution has developed whereby a company uses a private blockchain
accessible to authorized users only to record its daily transactions but
then periodically updates and reports an aggregate version of those
Id.
Id. (explaining that minting refers to the creation of new Bitcoins).
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 PAOLO TASCA, Digital Currencies: Principles, Trends, Opportunities and
Risks,
Deutche
Bundesbank
research
report
(2015),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2657598.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id.
69
70
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transactions on a publicly accessible blockchain. 79 This intermediate
solution is called, given its mechanics, a side chain.80
Regardless of the accessibility options, to execute a
transaction, both a private and a public key are necessary.81 Each
party to the transaction has a private encryption key that provides
access to their personal account and that, when paired with the public
key, allows transactions to go through. 82 Specifically, a transaction
requires a “pair of interlocking encryption keys” acting as peer-topeer signatures.83 The use of digitally encrypted signatures to
authenticate transactions is threefold in that it ensures the
authentication, non-repudiation, and integrity of payment messages.84
Moreover, Bitcoin transactions are final and irreversible:
voluntary refunds are the only way to revert the effect of the
transfer.85 Because there is no administrator, no transaction can be
blocked or penalized.86 Furthermore, Bitcoin users have the option to
either keep a Bitcoin wallet (also called dark wallet when kept on dark
web87 exchanges), on their own or through third parties, or convert
the currency back to their local currency.88 The latter option may,
depending on the method used, entail a potential for identity

Id.
Id.
81 MULLAN supra note 7, at 86.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Federal Reserve Board, supra note 68, at 8.
85 MULLAN supra note 7, at 87.
86 Id.
87 The dark web is a layer of the web accessible only through specific
software and where users can maintain nearly absolute anonymity. Stuart Dredge,
What is Tor? A Beginner’s Guide to the Privacy Tool, THE GUARDIAN, (Nov. 5, 2013
07:47
AM),
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/nov/05/torbeginners-guide-nsa-browser (last visited Nov. 24, 2015).
88 Steve Kovach, What It’s Like Using an ATM that Automatically Turns
Your Cash into Real Bitcoins, BUSINESSINSIDER (Mar. 10, 2014 5:00 PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/bitcoin-atm-2014-3 (on how to buy and cash
Bitcoin).
79
80
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discovery.89 Indeed, it should not come as a surprise that a commonly
heard phrase in the Bitcoin industry is “buyer beware.”90
As mentioned, Bitcoin further differs from traditional
currencies in that no central bank controls the amount of currency
available and no jurisdiction guarantees it.91 Instead, a mathematical
protocol with no central administrating or monitoring authority
generates the Bitcoin.92 Given its math-based issuance and incentivebased transaction recording, while Bitcoin’s current cap of $21M
should not be reached earlier than 2140, each Bitcoin unit can be
divided into fractional units thus enhancing the currency’s presence
and spread.93 The cap of Bitcoin availability tends to suggest a
commodity-like nature, which will be discussed more in depth in the
following section about Bitcoin regulation alternatives. However,
unlike traditional natural commodities, Bitcoin’s cap is only
mathematically enforced and thus easily transformable, which adds a
further layer of unique complexity.
Furthermore, software and services like TOR (necessary to
access the dark web), the “dark wallet” (Bitcoin wallets stored on the
dark web), and Bitcoin-laundering services which are intentionally
designed to obscure the source of a Bitcoin transaction, enhance
Bitcoin’s already anonymous character and further complicate
traceability.94 Indeed, in the case of laundering services, the chain of
transactions on the blockchain is obscured by “linking all transactions
in the same [B]itcoin address and sending them together in a way that
makes them look as if they were sent from another address.”95 Other
services pursuing the same goal instead “comingle” different series of
This paper does not go into detail as to Bitcoin use in the dark web but
suffices it to say that there Bitcoin’s anonymous features are extremely enhanced by
additional layers of encryption. Id.
90 MULLAN supra note 7, at 87.
91 FATF Report, Virtual Currencies Key Definitions and Potential AML/CFT
Risks
(June
2014),
http://www.fatfgafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Virtual-currency-key-definitions-andpotential-aml-cft-risks.pdf.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 As mentioned above, use of Bitcoin in the dark web offers further
opportunities to avoid and evade regulation. Id.
95 Id.
89
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transactions, rendering the identification of the user to whom the
sender intended to direct the funds impossible.96
To further understand Bitcoin’s instability, it should be noted
that Bitcoin acceptance peaked in 2013 with over 64,000 businesses
around the globe accepting it as form of payment. 97 However even
lucrative businesses suffer from this instability, for example Mt. Gox,
the largest Bitcoin exchange, filed for bankruptcy in 2014, after
Bitcoin valued at around US$500 million mysteriously disappeared.98
This example, considering the anonymous features of the currency,
illustrates the great volatility and risks associated with the trading of
Bitcoins.
Enforcement agencies picked up on Bitcoin early, and,
relatively soon after its creation, the FinCEN intervened issuing an
interpretative guidance which is discussed in the next subsection.
D. Current Regulatory Framework for Bitcoin in the United States
Similarly to other virtual currencies, no Bitcoin-specific
regulation has been enacted, nor does this paper suggest that it is
necessary. However, a definitive categorization of Bitcoin as a
specific financial instrument is necessary for market confidence in
terms of legal certainty and clarity regarding applicable statutes and
regulations. Indeed, while this article focuses on the dichotomy of
Bitcoin and blockchain technology as potential corporate governance
tools, it is important to understand that depending on the definition
of Bitcoin as a certain financial instrument or another, its regulation
may change considerably. Specifically, depending on the path
followed, Bitcoin may function as a reliable governance tool. While
legislatures are globally moving towards regulating Bitcoin use and
exchange, regulation is not uniform as countries are following
different approaches.
This article suggests that, notwithstanding what the applicable
regulation is, Bitcoin is not a suitable corporate governance tool
96
97
98

Id.
Federal Reserve Board, supra note 68, at 5.
Id. at 2.
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because of externalities that render the virtual currency unstable and
unreliable. However, to overview the current regulatory framework in
the United States is helpful in understanding how unripe the legal
system is to accept Bitcoin as corporate governance tool. Instead, this
article suggests that, for at least certain aspects of corporate
governance, distributed blockchain ledgers may represent a feasible
and practical tool as discussed below in Section III.
Given the lack of a universal definition of Bitcoin, its status
and consequent regulation greatly differs depending on whether it is
categorized as a form of money, a security, or a commodity. 99
1.

Current Applicable Law

FinCEN has clarified in its 2013 guideline that, because of
their anonymous features, Bitcoin users and exchangers are subject to
the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”).100 Specifically, the guideline clearly
states the BSA applies “to persons creating, obtaining, distributing,
exchanging, accepting, or transmitting virtual currencies”, but does
not go as far as classifying Bitcoin’s status. 101 Pursuant to the BSA, a
“money transmission service” is a two-step service of “acceptance of
currency, funds, or other value that substitutes for currency from one
person and the transmission of currency, funds, or other value that
substitutes currency to another location or person by any means.”102
Following the FinCEN 2013 guideline, Bitcoin administrators
and exchangers, in their capacity as Money Services Businesses
(“MSB”), must comply with the appropriate Treasury Department
registration process.103 Conversely, Bitcoin users do not fall within
the guideline MSB definition and are outside the Treasury
For further and deeper analysis of Bitcoin’s regulation see, Fiammetta S.
Piazza, Bitcoin in the the Dark Web: A Shadow over Banking Secrecy and a Call for Global
Response,
100 Guidance Paper FIN-2013-G001, supra note 5.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id. (emphasis in original); Money Services Business (MSB) Registration,
FINCEN,
https://www.fincen.gov/financial_institutions/msb/msb.registration.html,
(last
accessed Feb. 5, 2016).
99
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Department scope of authority, at least for registration purposes. 104
The guideline also defines and clarifies that Money Transmitting
Services (“MTS”) are within the scope of the USA Patriot Act of
2001, which, among other addressed issues, imposes fines for, for
example, failure to register and obtain a Money Transmitter license.105
FinCEN’s conclusion that the BSA applies to Bitcoin
represents a major turn towards a thorough regulation of Bitcoin and,
by extension, of other similar cryptocrurrencies.
2.

Status as a Form of Money

“[Bitcoin] can be used to purchase goods or services, and
[. . .], to pay for individual living expenses.”106 Based on this
reasoning, a Texas District Court ruled on a matter of first instance
and held that “[i]t is clear that Bitcoin can be used as money.” 107
While relatively limited in terms of market acceptance, Bitcoin “can
also be exchanged for conventional currencies, such as the US dollar,
Euro, Yen, and Yuan.”108 Accordingly, the Texas court found that
“Bitcoin is a currency or form of money.” 109 The ruling is dated July
2013, only four months after FinCEN’s guideline publication.
While avant-garde and based on a sound reasoning, the Texas
court ruling should be carefully approached. Indeed, even though
Bitcoin is exchanged and used as money, unlike national currencies, it
lacks the support of a central authority like the United States
Treasury for the US dollar and it does not have intrinsic value, as do

Id.
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot ACT) Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-56.
106 Id.
107 SEC v. Shavers, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110018 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 6,
2013). (Addressing the issue of whether jurisdiction under the Securities Acts of
1933 and 1934 applied to the facts of the case involving a Bitcoin Ponzi scheme).
108 Id.
109 Id. (The court’s ultimate finding was that investors wishing to invest in
BTCST provided an investment of money).
104
105
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commodities.110 Because of the differences between traditional
national currencies and Bitcoin, it has been argued that Bitcoin lacks
at least one of two required characteristics to be considered a true
currency.111 Specifically, although Bitcoin may be a means of
exchange it is not a store of value.112
Furthermore, in evaluating whether Bitcoin can be brought
within the definition of currency, it is of remarkable importance to
remember Bitcoin’s lack of national infrastructure, as opposed to fiat
currencies. Indeed, other than in exceptional cases, a national
currency can always be exchanged for and accepted as form of
payment. Instead, Bitcoin could vanish both because of the
combination of Bitcoin being the result of an Internet mathematical
protocol, the absence of a physical “paper-trail” backing up the
blockchain, and the Internet and computers being subject to
viruses.113
3.

Status as a Security

The issue of “whether the Bitcoin itself could be a security”
has yet to be addressed by a court.”114 Indeed, while Shavers
acknowledges it as an option, the court there did not delve into an
analysis of whether Bitcoin can be considered a security instrument.
The issue is even more intricate considering that, while there is
agreement regarding the fact that a security is, in economic terms, a
110 Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., Bitcoin Is Evil, NEW YORK TIMES (Dec. 28,
2013), http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/12/28/bitcoin-is-evil/?_r=0.
111 John Authers, Time to Take the Bitcoin Bubble Seriously, FIN. TIMES
(Dec.
11,
2013),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4ad1bba0-61fa-11e3-aa0200144feabdc0.html#axzz3sNu5guRP.
112 Id.
113 An example of a more structured and more reliable alternative
currency is the Unified System for Regional Compensation (SUCRE). SUCRE
started as a virtual currency for transaction between Ecuador and Venezuela and
was intended as a medium to replace the US dollar as means of exchange to limit
and decrease the US influence and control over Latin American trade and, at the
same time, increase stability of those markets. Alvaro & Lewis, supra note 51. See
also generally, Hurtado, supra note 52. (discussing the dollarization process
undergone Latin American countries to obviate to economic instability).
114 Daniela Sonderegger, Note, A Regulatory and Economic Perplexity: Bitcoin
Needs Just a Bit of Regulation, 47 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 175, 195.
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form of investment, there is not a uniform definition. Instead,
different countries’ legal definitions vary, sometimes significantly,
covering a broad spectrum of alternatives. In the United States, the
Securities Act of 1933 comprehensively defines the term and
provides, in relevant part, that “security means any note, stock,
treasury, stock, security future, security-based swap, bond . . .,
investment contract . . . or, in general, any interest or instrument
commonly known as a ‘security’. . . .”115
Over the years, American courts have developed and used the
Howey test to determine whether an interest is a security pursuant to
the Securities Act of 1933.116 In Howey, the court, beginning with a
textual analysis of the law, reasoned that the preliminary issue to
solve to understand what is a “security” is determining what is
intended by “investment contract.”117 Specifically, the Howey test
analyzes whether, at the time the interest is issued, the “investment
contract,” and consequently the security, is “a contract, transaction or
scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise
and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or
a third party.”118 For purposes of applying the Howey test, whether
the shares in the enterprise are evidenced by formal certificates, or by
nominal interests in the physical assets employed in the enterprise, is
irrelevant.119 However, Bitcoin’s analysis in light of the Howey test is
ineffective, at least in part because Bitcoin’s features do not suit
themselves.120 Specifically, while Bitcoin users may invest Bitcoin, the
cryptocurrency itself does not generally represent a share of a
common enterprise the investor believes will prove fruitful through
the efforts of a third party. Thus, although Bitcoin may be used as a

15 USCS § 77b.
SEC v. Howey Co., 293 U.S. 293.
117 Section 2 (1) of the Act defines the term “security” to include the
commonly known documents traded for speculation or investment. This definition
also includes “securities” of a more variable character, designated by such
descriptive terms as “certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing
agreement,” “investment contract” and “in general, any interest or instrument
commonly known as a ‘security.’” Id. at 297.
118 Id. at 298-299.
119 Id.
120 Sonderegger, supra note 114, at 195.
115
116
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security if the mentioned conditions are met, it remains unclear
whether it does, unequivocally, qualify as such.121
4.

Status as a Commodity

Classical political economy defines a commodity as product
or service produced by human labor and available for sale on the
market.122 Regardless of school of thought, it is generally agreed that
a commodity is a good, easily interchangeable with other
commodities of the same type also used in commerce.123 Indeed, an
essential characteristic of commodities is that their quality is
essentially uniform across producers and are uniquely fungible. 124
Specifically, to be commodities, goods must be: (1) standardized; (2)
usable upon delivery; (3) and their price must vary enough to justify
creating a market for the item.125 As an illustration, agricultural goods
like wheat, corn, oil, and coffee, energy-related goods like coal, oil,
and gas as well as precious metals like copper, silver, and gold are
typical commodities.126
Unlike the unexplored status as a security, the US
Commodity and Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) issuance of
its first action against an unregistered Bitcoin option-trading platform
in 2015, confirms that Bitcoin, and similar digital currencies, fall
within the definition of commodities and are thus subject to the
Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”).127 While the CFTC’s action
apperars to show a clear intent to regulate Bitcoin as a commodity, it
might be an effort to at least pose some restrictions and promote its
regulation.
Id. at 196.
KARL MARX, CAPITAL: VOLUME I 38 (Int’l Publishers, 1967).
123 Commodity,
INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/commodity.asp (last visited Feb. 6, 2016).
124 Id.
125 Commodity,
INVESTING
ANSWERS,
http://www.investinganswers.com/financial-dictionary/commodities-preciousmetals/commodity-1035 (last visited Feb. 6, 2016).
126 Commodity,
BUSINESS
DICTIONARY,
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/commodity.html (last visited Feb.
6, 2016).
127 In Re Coinflip, Inc. et al., supra note 16.
121
122

284

2017

Piazza

5:2

It is important to note that, significantly differently from
traditional commodities, Bitcoin’s availability is potentially limitless.
However, taking into account Bitcoin’s potential status as a form of
money and its lack of an infrastructure typical of national currencies,
Bitcoin’s availability is limited. This is because of the long-standing
belief that currencies, typically currencies of countries possessing
significant quantities of commodities or other natural resources, have
been endorsed as commodities.128 Additionally, Bitcoin is notably
different from traditional commodities, as it is extremely volatile.129
For these reasons as well as Bitcoin’s virtual nature, leading to its
unknown supply because of its algorithmically coded scarcity and
future demand, some argue Bitcoin is more dissimilar to traditional
commodities than it is similar.130
In light of the general uncertainty surrounding Bitcoin, the
CFTC has clarified “commodity” as a term to be broadly construed
to include “all services, rights, and interests in which contracts for
future delivery are presently or in the future dealt in.”131 Regardless,
scholars are perplexed about the CFTC’s finding and suggest its
implications may shake Shaver’s holding that Bitcoin can be a
security.132 In the words of New York Law School Professor
Houman Shadab,”[t]he [CFTC order] puts to rest any notion that
virtual currencies qualify as securities. Otherwise, the Securities and
Exchange Commission would be bringing this action, not the
CFTC.”133 Unfortunately, no light is shed in the general gray fog
surrounding Bitcoin even in this context because neither the SEC nor
128 Brian
Perry, Forex Currencies: Commodity Pairs (USD/CAD,
USD/AUD,
USD/NZD),
INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/university/forex-currencies/currencies8.asp
(last
visited Feb. 6, 2016).
129 Bitcoin’s volatility is further discussed in Section II-A of this article.
See supra p. 268. See, also, e.g., Young, supra note 24.
130 Danny Bradbury, Why Bitcoin’s Volatility is Unique among Commodities,
COINDESK (Apr. 29, 2014, 11:11 A.M.), http://www.coindesk.com/bitcoinsvolatility-no-other/.
131 7 U.S.C. 1(a)(9). See, e.g., Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. SEC,
677 F. 2d 1137, 1142 (7th Cir. 1982).
132 Pete Rizzo, CFTC Ruling Defines Bitcoin and Digital Currencies as
Commodities, COINDESK (Sept. 17, 2015 22:06), http://www.coindesk.com/cftcruling-defines-bitcoin-and-digital-currencies-as-commodities/.
133 Id.
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the CFTC have issued any disclosures following issuance of the
CFTC order. Consequently, while it is undisputed that Bitcoin falls
within the scope of the definition of commodity, no final
determination can be made regarding its status as security.
5.

The Federal Reserve, the Internal Revenue Service, and Other
State and Federal Regulators

The Federal Reserve Chairwoman Janet Yellen expressly
stated during testimony before the Senate Banking Committee that
the agency “doesn’t have authority to supervise or regulate Bitcoin in
any way.”134 This conclusion was heavily motivated by the absence of
a “central issuer or network operator,” which makes it “not easy to
regulate Bitcoin.” 135 The Chairwoman has not offered policy
guidance but has made clear that “[t]his is a payment innovation that
is taking place entirely outside the banking industry.”136
Taking a diametrically opposed approach, the Internal
Revenue Service (“IRS”) has affirmed its authority over Bitcoin.
Specifically, the IRS has clarified that it treats Bitcoin like property
subject to property tax and that “sale or exchange of convertible
virtual currency, or the use of convertible virtual currency to pay for
goods or services in a real-world economy transaction, has tax
consequences that may result in a tax liability.” 137 As a means of
comparison, the United Kingdom has moved towards a
comprehensive regulation of Bitcoin. 138 The HM Revenue and
134 Ryan Tracy, Yellen: Bitcoin ‘Doesn’t Touch’ Banks the Fed Oversees, THE
WALL
STREET
J.
(Feb.
27,
2014
12:32
P.M.),
https://www.wsj.com/amp/articles/no-headline-available-1393521584.
135 Charles Cooper, Fed Chief Yellen: No Power to Regulate Bitcoin, CNET
(Feb. 27, 2014 10:37 A.M.), https://www.cnet.com/news/fed-chief-yellen-nopower-to-regulate-bitcoin/.
136 Shelly Palmer, Bitcoin: Money, Currency or Something Else?, THE
HUFFINGTONPOST
(March
3,
2014
10:10
AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/shelly-palmer/bitcoin-money-currencyor_b_4889845.html.
137 IRS Notice 2014-21: Virtual Currency Notice at 1, March 25, 2014,
available at https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-14-21.pdf.
138 Sarah Saunders, Cryptic Currency, TAXATION (March 11, 2015),
https://www.taxation.co.uk/Articles/2015/03/10/332784/cryptic-currency.
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Customs (“HMRC”) has issued a policy brief on the treatment of
income received from, and charges made in connection with,
activities involving Bitcoin and other similar cryptocurrencies, for:
Value Added Tax (“VAT”); corporation and income tax; and capital
gains purposes.139 While the country’s recent vote towards leaving
the European Union will have consequences over this issue,
currently, the tax treatment in the United Kingdom is as follows:
acquisitions by mining are considered outside the scope of VAT;
Bitcoin is considered a foreign currency for corporation and income
tax purposes; and gains or losses on Bitcoin are chargeable or
allowable for capital gains tax if they accrue to an individual and are
not covered by trading profit rules.140
Domestically, states have moved in the direction of regulating
Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies through license systems. For example,
New York has proposed a “BitLicense” regulation plan aimed at
“help[ing] protect consumers and root[ing] out illicit activity.”141 So
far, five more states – California, Colorado, New Hampshire, New
Mexico, and Texas – have also moved toward a similar and favorable
regulation of the Bitcoin. 142 Implementation of these systems of
regulation, offer the benefit of ease of enforcement and monitoring
because they offer the opportunity to conduct upfront investigation
of Bitcoin issuers and exchanges.143

Id.
HM Revenue & Customs, Revenue and Customs Brief 9 (2014):
Bitcoin
and
other
Cryptocurrencies
(March
3,
2014),
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/revenue-and-customs-brief-92014-bitcoin-and-other-cryptocurrencies/revenue-and-customs-brief-9-2014bitcoin-and-other-cryptocurrencies.
141 Benjiamin M. Lawsky, Superintendent of Fin. Serv., Speech: NYFDS
Announces Final Bitlicense Framework for Regulating Digital Currency Firms
(June
3,
2015),
available
at
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/speeches/sp1506031.htm (discussing 23 NYCRR
§200.1
et
seq.
available
at
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/legal/regulations/revised_vc_regulation.pdf).
142 For more detail as to the specific actions of those states, see Daniel
Cawrey, 5 US States Poised to Promote Bitcoin Friendly Regulation, COINDESK (Aug.
31, 2014 11:00), http://www.coindesk.com/5-us-states-poised-promote-bitcoinfriendly-regulation/.
143 Id.
139
140
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III. BLOCKCHAIN AND BITCOIN: POTENTIAL IMPLEMENTATION AS
NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE TOOLS
This section analyzes the potential benefits and detriments
deriving from implementing Bitcoin together with or independently
from the blockchain technology in corporate governance. This paper
suggests that the present features of Bitcoin and its current underregulation do not necessitate its implementation because of the
extreme exposure to volatility risks and hacks. However, the paper
suggests the blockchain technology, as distinguished from Bitcoin,
may instead offer a viable tool in areas of corporate governance like
voting.
The following subsections explore the relative benefits and
disadvantages deriving from implementing Bitcoin or the blockchain
in the corporate governance of companies as tools for enhanced
transparency, voting, accounting, and self-executing contracts (smart
contracts).
A. Transparency of Ownership and Trading Value
Transparency and disclosure are at the base of good
corporate governance models in that they enable shareholders and
stockholders to make informed decisions and hold corporate
executives accountable, thus limiting the agency costs associated with
asymmetry of information.144 In line with this perspective, countries
globally have moved towards implementation of legislation aimed at
enhancing corporate disclosures in a broad attempt at curtailing a
greater role for shareholders in corporate governance.145

144 See, e.g., Benjiamin Fung, The Demand and Need for Transparency and
Disclosure in Corporate Governance, 2 UNIVERSAL J. MGMT 2, 72-80 (2014),
http://www.hrpub.org/download/20140105/UJM3-12101630.pdf.
145 For example, in the United States, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
requires publicity of information including roles of and responsibilities of board
and management executives and the Williams Act of 1968 requires disclosures
regarding tender offers. Sarbanes-Oaxley Act of 2002, 107 P.L 204 (2002); Williams
Act, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 90 P.L. 439 (1968).
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Transparency can be considered to be based on five pillars:
(1) truthfulness, (2) completeness, (3) materiality of information, (4)
timeliness, and (5) accessibility.146 Implementing distributed ledgers as
a corporate governance tool could, at a minimum, result in enhanced
timeliness and accessibility of corporate information. Indeed, as
discussed in the previous section, users given access to the ledger
would be able to track changes in the ledger as they occur thus
allowing for timely transmission of information to shareholders.
Shared ledgers would also address the accessibility pillar of
transparency in that information stored on the ledgers would be
readily accessible to all authorized users. The use of shared ledgers
does not directly affect truthfulness and completeness of shared
information, however they would allow users to easily monitor
transactions as well as recognize possible breaches to the system.147
Conversely, the same result may not flow from using Bitcoin because
of its anonymous features as further discussed hereunder.
Accordingly, this paper suggests use of blockchain, but not Bitcoin,
in corporate transaction recording to foster enhanced transparency.
In the United States, Bitcoin is undergoing regulation and
exchangers are thus implementing amendments to their systems to
comply with the BSA and, consequently, certain minimum identity
requirements are now necessary for subscription as an exchange
user.148 However, it is not mandatory for companies wishing to use
Bitcoin in their governance to use local exchanges only. Indeed, just
like a company may have international shareholders, it may decide to
use an international Bitcoin exchange that allows reduced identity
checks. Accordingly, because local regulation of Bitcoin exchanges
are highly diverse in type and thoroughness, if any, using a foreign
blockchain may result in non-transparent ownership. This would be
so because of lack of disclosure requirements as well potential
anonymous accounts.
Use of local exchanges respecting the BSA could still not be
sufficient to ensure complete transparency of ownership. Possible
implementation of closed blockchains, accessible to authorized users

146
147
148

Fung, supra note 144, at 75-76.
See, supra, Section II-B, at 274.
See supra, Section II.
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only, or of side chains, would de facto frustrate the goal of inspiring
shareholders and investors’ trust in the company by way of allowing
transparent and easy access to ownership arrangements and
instantaneous changes thereof.
Assuming full transparency is implementable, it would have
remarkable effects on the behavior of players such as managers,
investors, and shareholder activists. Using executive compensation as
an illustration, this paper discusses the consequences of complete
transparency. Specifically, regardless of the driving forces producing
the final arrangement, managers’ compensation is often a
combination of salary and equity.149 Currently, public companies are
required to file with the SEC disclosures including executive
compensation, however those filings do not necessarily come in a
format easily comprehensible to non-sophisticated investors.150
Implementation of blockchain technology could render executive
compensation more easily traceable and quantifiable for lay investors
because of its user-friendly interface. Indeed, while theoretical
problems regarding whether executive compensation is optimal or
whether the specific boards are beholden to the executives in their
choices, complete transparency coupled with easier understanding
would at least allow shareholders real time monitoring. This would
enhance the shareholders’ role of serving as a check on both board
decisions, generally, and executive compensation, specifically.
Depending on the percentage distribution of each
component, managers’ incentives tend to flow towards, more or less,
shareholder-centered strategies. Indeed, acquisition and liquidation of
managers’ equity in the company have become of central importance,
especially after the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002.151
Among other things, the act has reduced filing periods for managers
to disclose their acquisition and disposition of company shares. 152
Indeed, while originally managers had to make such disclosures
149 Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Pay without Performance: Overview of
the Issues, 30 J. CORP. L. 647, 443 (2005).
150 See generally, Press Release, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission,
SEC Adopts Rule for Pay Ration Disclosure (Aug. 5, 2015), available at
https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-160.html.
151 Sarbanes-Oaxley Act.
152 Id.
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within ten days from the acquisition of disposition, the SarbanesOxley Act has reduced this disclosure window to two business
days.153
While enhancing shareholders awareness, registration of
company shares on a public ledger could undercut the effectiveness
of equity-based compensation because trades observable in real time
would have a lower value to executives as they could lose trade
leverage or edge as a consequence.154 This might result in increased
salary-based compensation of executives given the loss of value of
their equity compensation.155 Furthermore, registration of shares on
the blockchain would also result in higher consciousness by
shareholders of when company shares are pledged as collateral for
loans or in connection with derivative hedging product.156 These
typical managerial moves may seem alarming to an inexperienced and
uninformed market observer even when fully sound according to
business judgment and could thus result in unwarranted market
drops. Accordingly, while registration on the blockchain and the
heightened transparency flowing from it can increase the role of
shareholders in the governance of companies, it may also result in
inefficiencies and obstacles in a board’s execution of its strategic and
managerial role within the company. 157
On the other hand, assuming full transparency is achieved by
implementing direct public blockchain systems, as opposed to side
chain, the positive effects of transparency could still be undermined if
Bitcoin is used. In fact, using Bitcoin to assess the value of
transactions, here of compensation, and given the volatile value of
Bitcoin, it would be quite possible to circumvent true reporting
simply by assessing the transaction during low Bitcoin value trading.
This would effectively enhance likelihood of circumvention of
accounting fraud and misreporting frustrating the purpose of
Id.
David Yermack, Corporate Governance and Blockchains, (NYU Stern Sch.
of Bus. & Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. w21802, 2015),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2703207.
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 See, id.; Jill E. Fish, Taking Boards Seriously, 19 CARDOZO L. R. 265,
272-275 (1997).
153
154
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legislation such as the Sarbanes-Oaxley Act. Accordingly, while
intermediary fees usually associated with banking transactions may be
avoided, this would be at the cost of providing executives with an
additional method to circumvent honest accounting.
Lastly, regardless of the blockchain used (Bitcoin-based or
simple shared ledger) registering a company’s shares on the
blockchain, would possibly also translate into added management
costs, especially up front in the form of accountants and executive
training, and system transitioning. Implementation of the blockchain
could, at least initially translate in an additional layer of diversification
of the board. Indeed, while accountants may be tasked with the
mechanical registration on the ledger, the board should be aware of
the consequences of certain timing of transactions. However, these
costs do not seem justified given the high level of doubt surrounding
the effectiveness of blockchain for corporate governance purposes.
Accordingly, Bitcoin should not be used to record
transactions, specifically executive compensation, because of its still
unclear status and unstable nature. The blockchain technology behind
it instead may promote enhanced transparency. But this heightened
transparency may actually come at the detriment of shareholders,
especially in the case of inexperienced investors that may not be
familiar with typical corporate strategies and might misinterpret
perfectly innocent board decisions. Accordingly, given the limited
additional benefits of registration on public blockchain as compared
to the current disclosures required by the SEC, it is advisable the
blockchain too not be used, at least in this field.
B. Voting
Corporate elections, given diverse and spread ownership
structures, are commonly held through corporate proxy systems.
Currently, vote tabulation are subject to a considerable degree of
inaccuracy resulting in certain cases in the inability to verify the
question “who won?”158

Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, The Hanging Chads of Corporate
Voting, GEORGETOWN L. J. 96, 1227, 1279 (2008). See also, A Call for Change in
158
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Studies have found that proxy voting, while solving the issue
of reaching quorums even though shareholders may be absent from
the voting meeting, has flaws such as inexact voter lists, incomplete
distribution of ballots, and problematic vote tabulation. 159
Implementation of blockchain could solve these issues given its
accuracy and reliability levels deriving from availability of copies of
ledgers to all users. In practice, voting via blockchain would be
achieved by allocating eligible voters tokens (also called “vote coins”)
in a number that represents their voting power. 160 Voters would then
transmit to addresses on the blockchain their vote, which would then
be registered on the ledger. 161
Additionally, implementation of blockchain voting may defeat
empty voting practices. Empty voting occurs when “an investor uses
borrowed shares or certain combinations of derivative securities to
acquire voting rights temporarily, without economic exposure to the
cash flow rights connected to a share.”162 These voting strategies
mostly rely on secrecy and, while legally doubtful, the difficulty
connected to their monitoring and enforcement continues to enable
them. Accordingly, a transparent system like shared ledger would
effectively render empty voting impossible.
However, empty voting is not necessarily a negative tool.
Supporters highlight the efficient effects of the strategy in that it
effectively permits pricing of voting rights according to the marginal
benefit attributed to the highest-valued voter.163 Empty voting is also
a great tool for minority shareholders in that it provides them with an
opportunity to maximize their profit by selling or temporarily renting
their voting rights.164 This view assumes that shareholders’ interests
the Proxy Advisory Industry Status Quo 50-61 (Ctr. on Exec. Compensation (White
Paper
c11-07b,
Jan.
2011),
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/ProxyAdvisoryWhitePaper02
072011.pdf.
159 A Delaware attorney “estimates that, in a contest that is closer than 55
to 45%, there is no verifiab[ility]” of the election results. Kahan & Rock, supra note
158, at 1277-1281.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Yermack, supra note 154.
163 Id.
164 Id.
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are more focused on their profits per se than on actual active
participation in the decision making process of the company. Indeed,
whether empty voting is considered an acceptable practice also
depends on what level of shareholder participation in corporate
governance one believes appropriate.165
Opponents of empty voting, instead, point out the potential
undemocratic effect of disjoining ownership and voting rights, which
could, especially where it is the minority that rents or sells its voting
rights, turn against the very shareholders that are attempting to
benefit from the practice.166 Indeed, where minority shareholders
have, as it is common, opposite interests to the majority and control
shareholders, selling or renting their voting rights to those parties
may result in the support and passage of a resolution not in their best
interests.167 Accordingly, the benefit of empty voting is strongly based
on whether one considers shareholders’ interests to be those of
immediate profit making, or long term and active participation in
company governance.
Independently from how one views empty voting, given the
relatively straightforward use of the blockchain in the context of
voting, this could be an area in which the blockchain could be tested
for potential further implementation in governance. The removal and
independence of voting from share value avoids the evaluation issue
discussed above in the context of Bitcoin blockchains and could
render implementation of such model feasible too. In fact, the tokens
would be automatically assigned and would not be representative of
value. Thus, the analysis above regarding Bitcoin’s volatility would
not apply, rendering this specific use quite implementable even in the
regulatory status quo.168
Accordingly, voting via blockchain would effectively solve
ambiguities about election outcomes and thus reduce opportunities
to manipulate such results and would therefore be an advisable
corporate governance tool.
Onnig H. Bombalagian, Can Borrowing Shares Vindicate Shareholders
Primacy?, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1231, 1238-1257 (2009).
166 Yermack, supra note 137.
167 Id.
168 See supra Section II.
165
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C. Accounting
Commentators have suggested companies may successfully
transition to blockchain accounting and voluntarily post all their
ordinary business transactions on distributed ledgers. 169 This result
may be achieved both through use of Bitcoin as a means of exchange
for transactions or by reflecting the value of transactions via token
amounts using blockchain technology. However, neither method
implements a truly transparent system. Instead, both would allow for
managerial manipulation because of the value assessment issues
posed by Bitcoin and mentioned in Section III-A.
Implementation of blockchain accounting could reduce
accounting and auditing costs in that various units of a company
would be able to directly and centrally record transactions into the
ledger and thus there would be no need for an auditor to examine the
books of every unit to then assemble them ex post.170 Furthermore,
blockchain accounting would also lower the cost of auditing in that
auditors and governmental agencies would have direct access to the
ledger and be able to examine the regularity of transactions as they
occur. This system would thus require extended access to the ledger
by certain institutional players, such as taxing agencies, raising the
issue of who is entitled to access those records. Accordingly, the the
question of whose interests companies must pursue and what the
objectives of corporate governance are affect the resolution of this
issue. A possible solution to avoid overbroad access to confidential
records could be to grant access to only those market player that
would have access to SEC disclosures. However this could frustrate

Ryan Lazanis, How Technology Behind Bitcoin Could Transform Accounting as
We Know it, (Jan. 22, 2015), TECHVIBES, http://www.techvibes.com/blog/howtechnology-behind-bitcoin-could-transform-accounting-as- we-know-it-2015-01-22.
170 Oliver Staley, The Unsexy Future of Blockchain is Accounting, QUARTZ
(Mar. 3, 2016), http://qz.com/629662/the-unsexy-future-of-blockchain-isaccounting/; see, also, Blockchain Technology: A Game-changer in Accounting?,
DELOITTE,
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/de/Documents/Innovation/B
lockchain_A%20game-changer%20in%20accounting.pdf (last accessed May 10,
2016); Matthew Spoke, How Blockchain Tech will Change Auditing for Good,
COINDESK (July 11, 2015, 15:00), http://www.coindesk.com/blockchains-andthe-future-of-audit/.
169
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the very purpose of blockchain accounting by denying access to more
confidential information needed by taxing agencies.
Furthermore, commentators pushing for adoption of
blockchain accounting stress that this method would ensure complete
transparency as the entire ledger would be immediately visible,
assuming no restrictions to access are set by management, to all
stakeholders, from shareholders to creditors, and from lenders to
interested parties.171 While back-dating of transactions or amortizing
operation expenses over long periods is not feasible given the timestamped nature of the transaction blocks, forward dating can be
achieved by simply keeping a parallel undisclosed accounting
system.172 Indeed, parallel accounting, be it on a side ledger or in
paper form, would still offer companies an “under the table”
opportunity to circumvent reporting duties. Accordingly, this system
does not accomplish the result it purports to achieve: spotting and
impeding self-interested and fraudulent transactions.173 Indeed,
proponents of this type of accounting forget to take into account
human nature. They assume a perfect reality where voluntariness to
report all transactions at the moment they occur is the rule and selfinterests are nonexistent or not pursued. But how can a voluntary
reporting system ensure transparency in a system, especially in big
corporations, where ownership and management are quite separate?
Considering transition costs as well as the above-described pitfalls,
feasibility of blockchain accounting seems utopic and impracticable.
D. Smart Contracts
A smart contract is a “computerized protocol that executes
the terms of a contract.”174 Smart contracts are not a wholly new
concept, however, the advent of virtual currencies and Bitcoin have
offered a way to reinvent this transactional product. Given Bitcoin’s
rapid success among consumers, smart contract providers have

Yermack, supra note 154. See also, DELOITTE, supra note 170.
Id. at 17.
173 Id.
174 Nick Szabo, Smart Contracts, (1994) unpublished manuscript, available
at http://szabo.best.vwh.net/smart.contracts.html.
171
172
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quickly developed and offer user-friendly interfaces.175 Accordingly,
consumers may engage in smart contracts that vary from easy daily
sales to substantive investments without going through traditional
intermediaries.
Technically speaking, the same concept at the basis of smart
contracts applies from daily tasks like operating a mechanical soda
machine to more sophisticated exchange market operations. The
premise on which a smart contract is based is assuring
performance. 176 Applicability of this mechanism to blockchain
technology translates in execution of contracts based upon the
occurrence or non-occurrence of specific verifiable events varying
from the passage of time to sophisticated contingencies such as
financial outcomes.177
While smart contracts may succeed and prove valuable to
private individuals’ where timing and certainty of execution are key,178
they may not prove successful as corporate governance tools. While
smart contracts may reduce agency costs associated with debt, they
would impose on corporations, and thus on boards, tight boundaries
for strategic actions. As one commentator noted, the willingness of a
company to enter into a smart contract in regard to a loan may be
limited as it “represents a pre-commitment not to behave
opportunistically in the future and it would protect a lender against
fraud strategies by a debtor such as pledging the same collateral to
two borrowers.”179 This effect may also prove legally unfeasible
considering directors’ fiduciary duties to shareholders as in the
context of hostile takeovers and relative Revlon duties.180

See, e.g., SMARTCONTRACT, http://about.smartcontract.com/#1naming-and-description.
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 Sue McLean & Simon Deane-John, Demystifying Blockchain and
Distributed Ledger Technology – Hype or Hero?, MORRISON FOSTER (Apr. 5, 2016),
http://www.mofo.com/~/media/Files/ClientAlert/2016/04/160405Blockchain.p
df.
179 Allen, supra note 46.
180 Revlon, Inc. v. Mecandrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173
(Del. 1986).
175
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Furthermore, the private nature of smart contract providers
and consequent access to bankruptcy mechanisms for those
providers, in addition to Bitcoin’s volatility, increases the risks of
market bubbles and chaos were some of the providers to fail
suddenly. Accordingly, however efficient, smart contract use does not
necessarily translate into corporate governance benefits warranting
the risks associated with committing to a set and irreversible course
of action (once a smart contract is active and the set occurrences
happen, execution is automatic). Accordingly, without prior
regulation of the status of smart contracts within the realm of
investment instruments, companies should not engage in such
transactions so as to better safeguard shareholders’ interests as well as
the overall company’s stability. Lastly, the complete automation of
execution overburdens companies’ boards, thus, without a possibility
to provide for “fiduciary out” mechanisms, smart contracts are not
an appropriate corporate governance tool and should be left to the
realm of private transactions.
IV. CONCLUSION
Bitcoin’s current under-regulated status and the lack of
confidence deriving from the absence of assurances derived from a
centralized bank and government backing, renders use of Bitcoin as a
corporate governance tool unjustifiably risky. However, the
distributed ledger technology of blockchains, as distinguished from
Bitcoin, can, in some fields, represent an efficient solution. During a
question-and-answer session with the Commonwealth Club Chair
George Scalise, Federal Reserve Chairwoman Yellen herself
recognized that, while Bitcoin is not within the scope the Federal
Reserve’s authority,
“[Blockchain] is a very important, new technology
that could have implications for the way in which
transactions are handled throughout the financial
system. We’re looking at it in terms of its promise in
some of the technologies we use ourselves and many
financial institutions are looking at it. It could make a
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big difference to the way in which transactions are
cleared and settled in the global economy.”181
Chairwoman Yellen has consistently pointed out that
“[blockchain] could have very significant implications for the
payment system and the conduct of business.”182 Although the
Federal Reserve is not currently exploring regulation, Yellen has
explained that the Federal Reserve is, importantly, “trying to
understand the nature” of fintech” and that she believes “innovation
using these technologies could be extremely helpful and bring
benefits to society.”183 Accordingly, regardless of political views and
affiliations, the blockchain represents an opportunity to be
pursued.184 Indeed, this article argues that blockchain technology is
more suited than Bitcoin to be implemented in the realm of
corporate governance because of its more reliable nature.
In regard to the registration of shares to enhance
transparency of ownership and shareholders’ confidence, neither
Bitcoin nor the blockchain would better the current situation. Indeed,
companies may implement closed side chains to hide, at least
temporarily, some transactions and thus defeat the goal of enhancing
the respective managing and monitoring roles of boards and
shareholders.185 Furthermore, in the case of Bitcoin, its volatile value
does not create trust in that transactions may be conveniently
recorded during low trading value so as to allow executives to pursue
self-interests and gain on the edge.186 Moreover, while the blockchain
may avoid this edging issue, potential shareholders’ panic may still be
a problematic consequence of complete transparency.187 Thus, while
companies could create diversified access levels by creating different
Stan Higgins, Fed Chair Yellen: Blockchain is an ‘Important Technology’,
COINDESK (Jan. 18, 2017 22:00), http://www.coindesk.com/fed-yellenblockchain-important-tech/.; For the full speech, see, Commonwealth Club, Federal
Reserve
Chair
Janet
Yellen,
YouTube
(Jan.
18,
2017),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ktBgb4xHKGY.
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 See, above, part II(a) for Trump’s administration embracing attitude
towards Bitcoin and blockchain.
185 TASCA, supra note 73.
186 Yermack, supra note 154; see supra pp. 293-296.
187 Yermack, supra note 154; see supra p. 289.
181
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keys, transparency, the very benefit that the technology purports to
achieve would be capped at the outset similar to the status quo.
Accordingly, implementation of either Bitcoin or the blockchain in
this area is not warranted, as it does not enhance the current status of
the SEC, and other similar, disclosures.
The arena of corporate voting is, instead, one where
implementation of distributed ledgers, and possibly Bitcoin, may
bring about a better corporate governance model. Indeed, in this
area, the actual market value of shares is unnecessary in the
computation of shareholders’ voting rights. 188 Accordingly, the time
stamping and accuracy level guaranteed by block chain technology
would probably bring about a better voting system. While use of
Bitcoin in this area does not pose the risks and issues it poses in areas
such as transaction reporting and accounting where value is key,
Bitcoin’s use should, at least until further regulation is enacted, be
paused in favor of block chain technology not using virtual
currencies.
Accounting represents the most problematic area in which
block chain or Bitcoin could be implemented within corporate
governance. Bitcoin’s volatile value is detrimental to implementation
in at least two ways. First, fluctuations in Bitcoin’s value may actually
further illegal and evasive acts of boards attempting to circumvent
accounting laws instead of encouraging transparent and truthful
accounting.189 Indeed, registering transactions at a later date would
permit, through exchange rates, modification of the actual value of a
company’s assets and liabilities.190 Second, and this applies to
blockchain generally as well, this system of accounting is based on
the false premise that boards are made of individuals perfectly able to
withhold self-interests.191 Instead, managerial evasion of shareholder
monitoring would still be possible, especially given the voluntary
blockchain reporting mechanisms. Also, implementation of such a
radically different method of accounting would result in great costs,

188
189
190
191

Kahan & Rock, supra note 158.
Supra pp. 293-296.
Yermack, supra note 154; see also supra p. 294.
Supra p. 296.
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thus, its relative benefits are not warranted, regardless of whether
Bitcoin of mere distributed ledgers are used.192
Lastly, while blockchain-based smart contracts represent an
interesting evolution in the area of self-executing contracts,
implementation in the corporate governance arena is not warranted
because of board’s fiduciary duties issues. This is so regardless of
whether the smart contract is based on Bitcoin currency, though in
that case, implementation would pose the added dangers deriving
from value volatility and lack of supporting infrastructure discussed
with regards to accounting.
Accordingly, because of its private and unpredictable nature
as well as its current under-regulation, Bitcoin does not present great
enough benefits to offset the risks deriving from its implementation.
This is so especially in the American market and economy, which do
not suffer from lack of consumer confidence in the national currency
like other currencies. Instead, the block chain can achieve a
progressively relevant status as a corporate governance tool.
Accordingly, this paper discourages, at least in the current regulatory
atmosphere, implementation of blockchain accounting and
ownership reporting but does support blockchain as a corporate
voting instrument aimed at ending empty voting and enhancing
accuracy.

192

Supra p. 291.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A key characteristic of international financial law is the lack of
binding rules: Almost every aspect of the field has been created
through “non-binding” standards that states, banks and financial
institutions can implement on a voluntary basis through so-called
“soft-law”.
This regime was put to the test in the recent 2007-2008
financial crisis, and was found to be wanting, particularly in its ability
to coordinate all relevant actors. While there were many causes for the
crisis, it is clear that the financial institutions and their national
regulators played a key role in triggering it. 1 Therefore, there appears
to be a post-crisis consensus that financial institutions cannot only be
regulated through market forces,2 but rather that governmental
oversight is needed—as the failures and successes of countries in

1 See Joseph Stiglitz, The Anatomy of a Murder: Who Killed the American
Economy?, in WHAT CAUSED THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 139, 141–42 (Jeffrey Friedman
ed., 2011) (recognizing that although there are many actors and institutions
responsible for the crisis, “blame should be centrally placed on the Banks (and the
financial sector more broadly) and the investors,” because the former created the risk
they were supposed to manage by “engag[ing] in excessive leverage” and the latter
didn’t understand the risk involved); but cf. Richard Posner, Afterword: The Causes of the
Financial Crisis, in WHAT CAUSED THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, Id. at 279 (“there were two
main causes [for the crisis]: unsound monetary financial intermediation [and
inadequate banking regulation]”).
2 See José Fernández, Global Politics, 5 MEXICAN LAW REVIEW 333, 363–64
(2013) (arguing that the 2008 financial crisis ended the neoliberal free-market model,
thereby posing a global economic challenge difficult to overcome: “finding an
economic model to go beyond statism (Welfare state), and mercantilism (liberalism)”)
(emphasis in the original).
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weathering past crises attest3—and more coordination between parties
through regulation at the international level.4
In the aftermath of the crisis, a new entity was created to
address the lack of coordination: the Financial Stability Board (FSB).
Established in April of 2009 by the Group of Twenty (G-20)—an
informal forum for central banks’ governors and financial ministers of
nineteen economies and the European Union to discuss global
economic issues—the FSB has assumed the function of coordinating
all the regulatory and supervisory actions done at the international
level.5 As a successor of the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), which in
turn was created by the Group of Seven (G-7)—akin to the G-20, the
G–7 is a political forum for the most industrialized economies—the
FSB “has assumed a key role in promoting the reform of international
financial regulation.”6 However, unlike other creations in the
international financial legal regime, the FSB was not endowed with any

3 See, e.g., Karen Sigmond, Banking Regulation in Mexico: Lessons from Financial
Crisis, 4 MEXICAN LAW REVIEW 3, 31 (2011) (praising the creation of the CNBV in
Mexico during its 1995 crisis—the governmental entity entrusted with supervising
the whole financial system—and asking whether this could be made at the
international level); see also Geoffrey Miller, Is Deposit Insurance Inevitable? — Lessons
from Argentina, in ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: COMPARATIVE
AND EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES 392, 398–401 (Jagdeep S. Bhandari & Alan O. Sykes
eds., 1997) (arguing that one effect of the Mexican 1995 crisis was the bank runs and
burgeoning crisis that arose in Argentina during that year, which in turn led Argentina
to the creation of both a deposit insurance system and an entity that oversees its
functioning to counteract the crisis effectively; thus, despite the opposition of highranking officials in Argentina’s government to deposit insurance, that country
departed from its policy of controlling bank risk through only market discipline
because the political pressure of reinstating the deposit insurance system became
irresistible).
4 See Rosa Lastra, Do We Need a World Financial Organization?, 17 J. INT’L
ECON. L. 787, 805 (2014).
5 G20
2016 CHINA, About, (last visited May 1, 2016),
http://g20.org/English/aboutg20/AboutG20/201511/t20151127_1609.html;
Charter of the Financial Stability Board (June 19, 2012), art. 1, (last visited May 1,
2016), http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/FSB-Charterwith-revised-Annex-FINAL.pdf.
6 FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD, About: Our History, (last visited May 1,
2016), http://www.fsb.org/about/history/.
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real international legal personality,7 and therefore, its decisions are not
legally binding.8
In light of this “softness”, different proposals have emerged
that try to give more “teeth” to the international financial architecture,
particularly through “hardening” the existing norms into
internationally, legally binding ones, enforced through an international
organization.9 On the other side of the debate, there are calls to keep
soft-legal instruments and forums with greater flexibility, but
enhancing their effectiveness to accomplish what the pre-crisis regime
did not: more coordination of supervisory, standard-setting, and
enforcement authorities.10
Considering that debate helps establish a backdrop for the
present paper which will try to explain why the current international
financial legal regime has taken the shape it has, particularly as it
regards to the use of soft-law norms and institutional-creation in the
apex of the regime: the coordination level of the relevant actors in the
regime. Furthermore, it will be argued that path-dependency and the
powers zealously held by national financial regulators are two
7 Articles of Association of the Financial Stability Board (January 28,
2013), art. 1, (last visited May 1, 2016) http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wpcontent/uploads/r_130128aoa.pdf (“An association by the name of “Financial
Stability Board” . . . is hereby established pursuant to Article 60 of the Swiss Civil
Code.”).
8 Charter of the Financial Stability Board, supra note 5, art. 24 (“This
Charter is not intended to create any legal rights or obligations”); but cf. Suyash
Paliwal, The Binding Force of G-20 commitments, 40 YALE J. INT’L L. ONLINE 1 (2014)
(analyzing the bindingness of the commitments undertaken within the FSB as
unilateral declarations, custom, estoppel and reciprocity).
9 See Lastra, supra note 4, at 793 (“The IMF is the only institution (other
than the Bank for International Settlements and the World Trade Organization) that
has international legitimacy, an array of tools (surveillance, conditional financial
assistance, and technical assistance), appropriate financial resources, and staffing to
assume a formal role as global financial authority . . . . [O]nly the Fund can effectively
contribute to the enforcement of those standards through its surveillance function.”);
see also John Jackson, Global Economics and International Economic Law, 1 J. INT’L ECON.
L. 1, 22-23 (1998) (providing a laundry list of topics to address whenever designing
international institutions for the banking and financial sectors).
10 See Jan Wouters & Jed Odermatt, Comparing the ‘Four Pillars’ of Global
Economic Governance: A Critical Analysis of the Institutional Design of the FSB, IMF, World
Bank, and WTO, 17 J. INT’L ECON. L. 49 (2014).
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important factors that explain the current informal, “softness” of the
FSB.11 Through arguments that explore the unique and rapid
technological changes of the regime, the use of soft-law in international
financial law has been said to be preferred because of its flexibility and
expediency. However, on one hand, through these soft-law and
informal forums national regulators have been able to retain the power
they hold pursuant to their domestic legislative instruments, while on
the other, have found success in projecting these enhanced power and
enforcement capabilities on the international level. Contrary to what
would occur by ceding rule-making power to an international
organization—which allegedly would complicate the decision-making
process and diminish direct communication among national
regulators—the national regulators retain the ability to wield the rules
of the international financial game through soft-law standards that
conform to their points of view, and which countervail the need for
achieving consensus with more stakeholders12 that formal venues and
treaty-making would require.
Although not every national financial regulator is invited to the
game, this result is not necessarily negative, as the main priority and
value of the regime (financial stability) does not rely on the democratic
character of the rule-making process and institutions, but rather, on
the technocratic knowledge of its experts. But even when taking that
factor into account, the move from the “elite” membership of the FSF
to the FSB’s more democratic structure signals a positive step taken by
the controllers of the regime: the national financial regulators.
II. SOFTNESS IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL LAW
Many of the legal institutions and instruments underpinning
the international financial legal regime are neither treaty-based, nor
considered to be part of general international law. Conversely, they are
part of another subset of norms referred to as “soft–law” that are used
in the international financial legal world; particularly because of soft

See Pierre-Hugues Verdier, The Political Economy of International Financial
Regulation, 88 IND. L.J. 1405 (2013).
12 Like their national diplomatic representatives or other foreign
regulators.
11
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law’s tendency for flexibility and effectiveness vis-à-vis their “harder”
siblings.
A. Distinction Between “Soft” and “Hard” International Law
Under a rule-based approach to public international law, 13
legally binding norms are only those reflected in Article 38 of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice: international treaties,
custom, and general principles of international law;14 everything else is
legally irrelevant.15 Under this positivistic view, only rules created by
states are legally binding, and thus enforceable. 16
In contrast, different ways of regulating areas of international
relations have emerged on a transnational and global basis, thus leading
to the emergence of the so-called “soft-law” norms.17 The main
characteristic of these soft law norms is that they do not comply with
either of the requirements for “harder” norms: those being created by
states and conforming to one of the three primary sources of
international law. Therefore, they are not “legally” binding, but rather,
implemented on a voluntary basis without the ability to be legally
enforced or sanctioned at the international level.
Because soft-law does not require creation by states, it has
largely been international organizations, private entities, other nonstate actors, and even subsets of states’ governments creating them. 18

13 The main feature of this approach is the emphasis on the normative
aspect of public international law, conceptualizing the law as a system of rules
binding upon its subjects, which can be appreciated through an examination of the
three recognized normative sources of international law. MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI,
THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 39–41 (2011).
14 Statute of the International Court of Justice (entered into force 24
October 1945) 1 UNTS 993, art. 38 (1).
15 JOSÉ ÁLVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS
48 (2005).
16 Id.
17 Nico Krisch & Benedict Kingsbury, Introduction: Global Governance and
Global Administrative Law in the International Legal Order, 17 EJIL 1 (2006).
18 See Mauricio Del Toro, El Fenómeno del Soft Law y las Nuevas Perspectivas
del Derecho Internacional, 6 ANUARIO MEXICANO DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL
[Mexican Yearbook of International Law] 513 (2006) (advocating for the
conceptualization of soft law as a continuum of normative force to analyze practically
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Thus, this flexibility makes these alternative bodies suitable for
whenever there is deadlock or lack of consensus for a multilateral
treaty, or a need to harmonize the rules at the international level.19
When technocratic experts create soft law, the legitimacy of
these rules rely on their consensual basis to attain the common goal of
their creators, as well as the technocratic expertise involved.20
The use of soft-law has mainly been attributed to two of its
main virtues: flexibility and effectiveness, both of which have been
praised for their help in achieving greater rates of compliance in certain
areas, such as capital adequacy.21 Whereas soft-law can be rapidly
created without the need to seek state consensus or state participation

how the international legal system works and norms are created by actors other than
states).
19 See e.g., Andrea Bjorklund, Assessing the effectiveness of soft law instruments in
international investment law, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND SOFT LAW 51, 81
(Andrea Bjorklund & August Reinisch eds., 2012) (analyzing the forms of soft law
instruments and their usage for investment law, concluding that because of the
criticism to the regime and failed, past attempts to negotiate a multilateral instrument
without states’ participation—like the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development’s failed Multilateral Agreement on Investment—the “negotiation of a
multilateral instrument might be facilitated and influenced by a soft law instrument
that brings together investment law practice in an objective manner, that sets forth
areas of convergence and divergence and the choices that need to be made by
drafters, and that clearly sets out the policy implications of each of those choices”.
In other words, not a codification attempt, but rather “the distillation would more
likely take the form of a commentary, annotation or treatise, and would be directed
towards a wider audience than just States, though it could help to guide treaty
negotiators and decision-makers, including States and arbitrators”).
20 See Alejandro Rodiles, Coalitions of the Willing: Coyuntura, Contexto y
Propiedades. Un Primer Esbozo, 7 ANUARIO MEXICANO DE DERECHO
INTERNACIONAL [Mexican Yearbook of International Law] 675, 701-02 (explaining
that soft law norms compete with formal public international legal rules, as the
former do not claim legitimacy from their legal status, but rather from the political
consensus achieved by its participants—engaging in a normative process to regulate
a common right cause—and the technocratic nature of both the decision-process
and the standard created).
21 Bas Arts & Dieter Kerwer, Beyond legalization? How global standards work,
in LAW AND LEGALIZATON IN TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS 144, 160–62 (Christian
Brütsch & Dirk Lehmkuhl eds., 2007).
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at all, custom and principles require long periods of time and universal
consensus to emerge.
Likewise, whereas soft-law can be created by entities other than
states and does not require consensus by its creators or the ratification
of national legislatures to exist and be modified, treaties do require the
consensus of state entities or international organizations for their
creation, usually after a national legislature ratification process has
occurred, and can only be modified with the consensus of the involved
parties;22 all of which lengthens the creation and adaptation processes
and may hinder its effectiveness as a rule–making tool.23 When
informal forums, or what Vabulas and Snidal call “informal
international intergovernmental organizations,” (IIGOs) are preferred
over international organizations it is due to the following reasons:
States opt for less formality by using IIGOs when the
advantages of lower sovereignty and negotiation costs,
flexibility and speed outweigh the need for
enforcement commitment, consensus, and the
bureaucratic centralization.24
Accordingly, although soft-law lacks the status of harder law,
per se, “[it] is not necessarily inferior to legally binding obligations as a
See UNGA Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 22 May
1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331, arts. (2)(1)(a), 11, 39; see
also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International
Organizations or between International Organzations, arts. 2 (1)(a)(b), 11, 39.
23 Hanspeter Neuhold, Variations on the Theme of ‘Soft International Law’, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW BETWEEN UNIVERSALISM AND FRAGMENTATION.
FESTSCHRIFT IN HONOUR OF GERHARD HAFNER 343, 344 (Isabelle Buffard et al.
eds., 2008); but cf. Nico Krisch, More equal than the rest? Hierarchy, equality and US
predominance in international law, in UNITED STATES HEGEMONY AND THE
FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 135, 156–59 (Michael Byers & George
Nolte eds., 2003) (depicting the use of informal standard-setting—such as the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision—as a departure of the sovereign equality of
states, and thus as an opportunity for the United States to place itself above the law:
“the United States relies heavily on informal means of lawmaking and enforcement,
as this very informality allows it to disregard many of the constraints otherwise
imposed by sovereign equality.”).
24 Felicity Vabulas & Duncan Snidal, Organization without delegation: Informal
intergovernmental organizations (IIGOs) and the spectrum of intergovernmental arrangements, 8
REV. INT. ORG. 193, 219 (2013).
22
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means for solving problems in international relations [because, as
discussed previously] . . . it offers advantages, which in some cases may
outweigh its shortcomings [i.e., their lack of enforceability].”25 As
espoused by Chris Brummer, the use of soft law in international
financial regulation is bolstered by disciplining mechanisms that make
soft law more coercive: “reputational constraints inform the decision
making of regulators in the same way that reputation disciplines heads
of state who commit to international agreements”. 26
B. International Financial Architecture
The use of soft-law mechanisms can be seen throughout the
whole international financial regime. To illustrate this, the following
sections will analyze the three different levels or stages that comprise
the regime: standard-setting; supervision and coordination; and
enforcement and sanctioning.
1.

Standard-setting

International financial law has been regulated mainly through
soft-law norms, such as standards, which are implemented on a
voluntary basis by national financial regulators or financial institutions
and banks. Almost invariably, all members of the FSB27 have engaged
in international standard setting: states’ financial regulators;
international financial organizations;28 and other standard-setting
bodies that were conceived to standardize international finance and
that we could call standard-setting bodies strictu sensu.29

25
26

Neuhold, supra note 23, at 351.
Chris Brummer, How International Financial Law Works, 99 GEO. L.J. 257,

263 (2011).
See Charter of the Financial Stability Board, supra note 5, art. 5(1).
International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development, and the Bank for International
Settlements (BIS).
29 Such as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), the
Committee on the Global Financial System, the Committee on Payments and Market
Infrastructures, the International Association of Insurance Supervisors, the
International Accounting Standards Board, and the International Organization of
Securities Commissions.
27
28
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Perhaps the most effective production of soft-law, in terms of
compliance, has been BCBS’s work on standardizing the capital
adequacy of banks, which has been praised for the high number of
states that have implemented it (90 percent of all countries adhere to
Basel I’s capital requirement), and that effect has been attributed to the
BCBS’s departure from the rigidness of classic international law
making,30 in addition to its undisputed expertise in that area.31 An
additional example of highly valued soft-law is the Equator Principles
of the International Financial Corporation, a member of the World
Bank Group, which sets de facto standards for parties dealing with
project finance on a global scale by inciting financial institutions to
voluntarily adopt standards in order to implement normative and
business related rationales for the conduction of environmental and
social risk management.32 Likewise, this includes the
See Arts & Kerwer, supra note 21; see also Rodiles, supra note 20, at 693–
95 (defining the Basle Committee of 1975 as a “coalition of the willing”: defined as
a transnational network of actors that do not rely on the procedural or substantive
rules of public international law rule-making, but conversely engage into normative
creation processes through standards that depart from it and which are implemented
effectively because of the political consensus of its participants and the convenience
to accomplish a common goal).
31 See Arts & Kerwer, supra note 21 (“the Committee has a high reputation
of experts, no competition from other bodies that engage into standard-setting in
that area, and has effective third party enforcement mechanisms—national
authorities implement the law voluntarily or are obligated through loans from IMF
or other international lenders that require compliance with the standard”); but see the
critiques on Basel Rules’ role in the 2007–2008 financial crisis in Juliusz Jablecki &
Mateusz Machaj, A Regulated Meltdown: The Basel Rules and Banks’ Leverage”, in WHAT
CAUSED THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, supra note 1, at 200, 226 (analyzing the negative role
that Basel’s rules had by diminishing the financial entities incentive to regulate
themselves: “Capital-adequacy rules based on fixed risk measurements—and
designed (paradoxically) to protect the economy from excessive credit expansion—
were used in unanticipated ways, hiding the risks from the sight of supervisors and
investors alike and giving everyone an utterly false sense of security, confidence, and
stability.”); see also Posner, supra note 1, at 288 (“the American amendment to Basel I
adopted in 2001, and Basel II, adopted in 2004, underestimated the riskiness of
mortgage-backed securities by assigning them a minimal risk weight, and so gave
banks a green light to buy more of these assets than turned out to be safe for the
economy as a whole.”).
32 See Christopher Wright, Setting standards for responsible banking: examining
the role of the International Finance Corporation in the Emergence of the Equator Principles, in
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE
51 (Frank Biermann et al. eds., 2009); see also Susan Park, Socialization, the World Bank
30
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Recommendations on anti-money laundering by the Financial Action
Task Force.33
Although there are a lot of ways in which members of the FSB
engage in standard-setting, for purposes of the present paper, it
suffices to show that none of the standard-setting bodies strictu sensu
possess international legal personality.34 This explains why those
bodies are depicted as a different class of members than states’ national
regulatory agencies and international financial organizations, which do
possess an international legal personality within the FSB Charter.35
Likewise, it explains why they all work with the BIS’s assistance in

Group and global environmental governance, in INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE 91 (Frank Biermann et al. eds., 2009)
(appraising the International Financial Corporation’s proneness to incorporate
environmental norms into its work and contrasting it with the Multilateral
Investment Guarantee Agency’s reticence, also part of the World Bank; particularly
because the former has been opened to environmental networks that have socialized
the institution, thereby diffusing environmental norms through the International
Financial Corporation’s work, whilst the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
has resisted this effect).
33 See, e.g., Nicholas Turner, The Financial Action Task Force: International
Regulatory Convergence Through Soft Law, 59 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 547, 559 (2014) (“The
FATF demonstrates that under the right conditions, it is possible to achieve
substantial, albeit imperfect, legal and regulatory coordination across the globe.”).
34 See BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, Monetary & financial
stability - Overview, (last visited Mar. 1, 2016), http://www.bis.org/stability.htm (Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision Charter, §3 (“The BCBS does not possess any
formal supranational authority. Its decisions do not have legal force. Rather, the
BCBS relies on its members’ commitments . . . to achieve its mandate.”)); BANK FOR
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, Committee on the Global Financial System: mandate, id.
(“The Committee . . . is a central bank forum”); BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL
SETTLEMENTS, Charter of the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures,
id. at §3 (“CPMI does not possess any formal supranational authority”);
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE SUPERVISORS, (last visited May 1,
2016),
http://iaisweb.org/index.cfm?event=showHomePage&persistId=2F9C2180155D8
9A4065E749C0A3A37F0; INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD,
(last visited May 1, 2016), http://www.ifrs.org/About-us/Pages/IFRS-Foundationand-IASB.aspx; INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF SECURITIES COMMISSIONS,
About
Iosco,
(last
visited
May
1,
2016),
https://www.iosco.org/about/?subsection=about_iosco.
35 See Charter of the Financial Stability Board, supra note 5, art. 5(1).
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terms of venue, infrastructure, and resources.36 Finally, this premise
also illustrates why states use this approach: because they are a form of
IIGO, lacking a binding effect in their decisions.37
2.

Supervision and Coordination

This level of the international financial legal regime is shared
mainly between the FSB and the IMF.38 Whereas the former is
concerned with macro-stability, the latter has been said to be
concerned with the micro-stability of avoiding risky behavior by banks
and other financial institutions.39 However, considering that the IMF
participates within the FSB and the latter’s mandate in coordinating all
financial entities, it can be said that the FSB holds the coordination

36 See BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, Monetary & financial
stability – Overview, supra note 34 (describing the kind of assistance rendered by the
BIS); see also C.F. AMERASINGHE, PRINCIPLES OF THE INSTITUTIONAL LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 13, 75 (2d ed., 2005) (analyzing how the dual
personality of the BIS as a legal person in both international and Swiss law does not
affect its character as an international organization); see also ROLAND PORTMANN,
LEGAL PERSONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 228–32 (2010) (analyzing the BIS
litigation of Reineccius et al. v. Bank for International Settlement as a form of “actor
conception”—attaching legal consequences to an international actor without
justifying them—whereby a panel of arbitrators recognized the international legal
personality of the Bank and analyzed certain legal consequences deriving therefrom,
such as the applicability of the expropriation and compensation rules of international
law towards its actions vis-à-vis private investors).
37 But see Gregory Shaffer & Mark Pollack, Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives,
Complements, and Antagonists in International Governance, 94 MINN. LAW REV. 706, 765–
67 (2010) (arguing that many of the standards produced by standard-setting
organizations within the international financial legal world have been hailed for being
effective because the existing treaties and soft law instruments created acted
complimentarily, on account of the consensus generated by the powerful states that
participated actively in all of the standard-setting forums explained above: the
European Union and the United States).
38 But see Gary Hufbauer, Rules of the International Trade, Investment, and
Financial Systems: What they Deliver, how they Differ, the way Forward, 17 J. INT’L ECON. L.
833, 839 (2014) (citing Rosa M Lastra, ‘Do we need a World Financial Organization’,
Special Conference in Honor of Professor John Jackson and the Institute of
International Economic Law, Georgetown Law Center, 16 November 2012) (arguing
that the World Trade Organization also performs this role in the liberalization of
financial trade, and that the BIS and other standard-setting bodies share the FSB’s
role at the micro-stability level).
39 Id.
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role of all standard-setting and supervisory functions within the
international financial architecture:
The [FSB] is established to coordinate at the
international level the work of national financial
authorities and international standard setting bodies
(SSBs) in order to develop and promote the
implementation of effective regulatory, supervisory
and other financial sector policies. In collaboration
with the international financial institutions, the FSB . .
. address[es] vulnerabilities affecting financial systems
in the interest of global financial stability.40
Regarding the IMF’s supervisory functions, it is important to
note that its supervisory function was triggered by the abandonment
of the par-value regime in the 1970s.41 Consequently, the IMF went
from being an international monetary institution with a limited
mandate on exchange rate stability and convertibility to a financial one
with a much narrower mandate, redefining its three main functions:
surveillance, conditional financial support, and technical assistance. 42
This has led the IMF to address issues ranging from payment systems,
to financial reform, banking and other capital markets.43 Contrary to
the FSB and other actors, the IMF has been heavily criticized for its
stance on development, particularly through its function as the lender
of last resort for states in addition to the conditions typically imposed, 44
which allegedly straightjackets developing countries to follow a set of
economic policies that may not be the best for their development. It
also has been denounced for neglecting environmental and

Charter of the Financial Stability Board, supra note 5, art. 1; see also
Wouters & Odermatt, supra note 10, at 75 (“the FSB was not established to
harmonize rules or to impose international regulation, but rather to coordinate other
important actors involved in maintaining financial stability.”).
41 Rosa Lastra, The International Monetary Fund in Historical Perspective, 3 J.
INT’L ECON. L. 507, 514 (2000).
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 521–23 (“[Since the Mexican and Asian crisis in the mid-1990s,]
the IMF appear[ed] to . . . emerg[e] as a de facto international lender of last resort”
through its financial support to developing economies in stress.”).
40
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stakeholders’ interests, such as human rights, 45 that seem to constrain
basic sovereign regulatory spaces.46 Even compared to other
international financial institutions, the IMF has not been viewed as
receptive towards civil society and developing countries interests and
demands,47 contrary to the World Bank that created the Inspection
Panel for that purpose,48 for example. Be that as it may, today, the IMF
45 See, e.g., David Enríquez, El Derecho Internacional Económico. Apuntes para
una Crítica Contemporánea, 6 ANUARIO MEXICANO DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL
[Mexican Yearbook of International Law] 251 (2006) (advocating for an
interdisciplinary approach towards international economic legal issues that considers
stakeholders’ interests, including human rights and environmental concerns); see also
David Enríquez, Batallas en el Sistema Financiero Internacional. Críticas y Réplicas
Contemporáneas en torno al Fondo Monetario Internacional y al Banco Mundial, 11 BOLETÍN
MEXICANO DE DERECHO COMPARADO [BMDC] 467, 499–502 (2007) (arguing that
states parties to loan agreements with the IMF and the World Bank, as well as those
institutions, have an obligation to respect human rights).
46 See, e.g., ANTHONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE
MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 258–69 (2004) (arguing that the World Bank and
the IMF, through the promotion of “good governance” in their conditional loans—
a recipe for making governments accountable, transparent and democratic, which in
turn links human rights and development—reproduce colonial aspects of
international law by imposing upon Third World countries structural adjustment
programs that reshape their economic, political and financial systems, and that are
driven by the economic considerations of richer states, wherein the countries
regulated cannot participate in their elaboration).
47 See Enríquez, Batallas en el Sistema Financiero Internacional. Críticas y Réplicas
Contemporáneas en torno al Fondo Monetario Internacional y al Banco Mundial, supra note 45,
at 523–25 (contrasting the IMF’s and the World Bank’s receptiveness to civil society’s
criticisms and democratic deficits: whereas the IMF’s openness has been limited to
its co-partnership role in combating poverty and debt relief with the World Bank
because economic concerns—and the need to tighten orthodox economic policies—
have prevailed over other interests in order to secure the repayment of its loans, the
latter has been more receptive due to more criticism by civil society and because its
infrastructure financing projects directly concern social and environmental problems;
for instance, the World Bank has permitted civil society participation and has
changed its policies through the creation of the Inspection Panel).
48 Alix Gowlland-Gualtieri, The Environmental Accountability of the World Bank
to Non-State Actors: Insights from the Inspection Panel, in NON-STATE ACTORS AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 333 (Andrea Bianchi ed., 2009) (a positive outcome of the
World Bank’s Inspection Panel is its inclusion of environmental norms into its
procedures, thereby making states and the World Bank itself accountable through a
soft-law and flexible procedure for their loan activities vis-à-vis certain non-state
actors); see also Ellen Hey, The World Bank Inspection Panel and the Development of
International Law, in INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF TULLIO TREVES 727 (Nerina
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is one of the oldest actors in the field and the fact is that the IMF has
acquired a key place in the new financial architecture through its
surveillance powers, mainly.
Given the participation of the IMF in the FSB, and the
coordination of the latter in the international legal arena, both
institutions have cooperated very strongly to conduct Early Warning
Exercises for the analysis of systemic risk at the international level.49
3.

Enforcement and Sanctioning

The picture would not be complete without the governmental
actors that behold the monopoly of the enforcement and sanctioning
of financial institutions’ and banks’ deviations from the standards
created and consented to by the FSB and member institutions: the
national financial regulators. According to Gary Hufbauer, their
power, and thus the absence of an international or external examining
and disciplining scheme, can be attributed to two main reasons: First,
prescriptive rules in international finance are much more probabilistic
than trade or investment—in both of which regimes, dispute
adjudication has been delegated to international bodies—and thus
national regulators prefer to do so themselves because they have more
information about their national financial markets; and second,
because national financial regulators are not willing to cede their power
to an international body—contrary to what trade and investment
bureaucrats did—and their regulated financial entities prefer these
domestic, national bodies over foreign international regulators.50
This second reason could explain, in turn, the use of soft law
norms for the other two levels: since the standard-setting agencies’
regulations are not legally binding, and therefore cannot be imposed
upon states or financial institutions and banks, it seems reasonable that
Boschiero et al. eds., 2013) (appraising the World Bank Inspection Panel’s role in
promoting an administrative form of accountability wherein private parties’ access is
provided without the need of their home state, thereby departing from the classic
rules of international law).
49 See Charter of the Financial Stability Board, supra note 5, art. 2(h); see also
Wouters & Odermatt, supra note 10, at 70-74 (arguing that since the IMF and World
Bank are members of the FSB, they cooperate with it more than with the World
Trade Organization, who is not a FSB member).
50 Hufbauer, supra note 38, at 842.
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the supervisory and coordinating entities would also apply soft-law. By
doing so, they would have coordinating and supervisory functions
through a more-narrow mandate, leaving the sanctioning of deviations
to states once they voluntarily decide to implement the standards
consented to. This analysis is well-explained in the words of Rosa
Lastra:
The development of international financial law has
been a slow and patchy phenomenon because of three
reasons: (i) the lack of a clear legal mandate; (ii) a
reactive rather than a proactive character;51 and (iii) the
vested interests national governments have in the
supervision and regulation of their financial sectors. 52
Accordingly, (i) the absence of legally binding norms is
explained by the use of soft-law standards, which in turn helps fathom
the (ii) reactive character of the norms and the limited supervisory and
coordinating role that the IMF and the FSB have. Since they cannot
impose rules on states, reactive standards seem more suitable to be
implemented ex post financial crises; at a time in which consensus on
how to regulate the flaws for counteracting a crisis has emerged—as
well as the (iii) lack of delegation of adjudicative and sanctioning
functions for an international body.
III. THE FSB EXPLAINED
A. Path Dependency
Why would states seek recourse to an international
organization? Traditionally, through institutionalization, not only can
This aspect has been considered fundamental in explaining the reason
why the trade regime has scored better in its objective of liberalizing trade than the
financial regime has done to stabilize markets—although international financial
institutions have also promoted liberalization, whenever it enters into conflict with
stabilization, the latter will always prevail—particularly because GATT/WTO has
worked prospectively, whereas the IMF does so at the moment the crash occurs and
with “little power to compel appropriate macroeconomic policies and financial
practices”. Gary Hufbauer & Erika Wada, Can Financiers Learn from Traders?, 2 J. INT’L
ECON. L. 567, 569-73 (1999).
52 Lastra, supra note 4, at 796.
51
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states act collectively and overcome their coordination problems,53 but
they could also accomplish legally binding decisions derived from the
treaty that created the organization.54 Furthermore, through an
international organization they can also legitimize the whole rulemaking process, as they would have to be constrained by the rules of
international law that protect non-powerful states through the
sovereign equality principle.
However, the need for consensus, and even the ability to
afford the same voting rights to all states has changed, depending on
the international organization concerned. 55 And even in the aegis of
the United Nations, the Bretton Woods institutions did not foresee
equality of voting rights. Nevertheless, the legitimacy that being an
international organization accrues might differentiate them with other
informal venues, such as IIGOs. Dani Rodrik depicts this idea by
contrasting the contemporary globalization world with the
“multilateralism” that existed during the Bretton Woods system:
Multilateralism meant that rule enforcement and belief
systems would work henceforth through international
institutions—the International Monetary Fund, the
World Bank, and the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT)—rather than through naked power
politics or imperial rule. Even though the influence of
the United States was undeniable, multilateralism
endowed these institutions with a certain degree of
legitimacy independent of the American power that
backed them up.56

Wouters & Odermatt, supra note 10, at 52 (“While the whole
international community has an interest in a ‘stable’ global financial system,
individual states will continue to take steps that are in their own (short-term)
interests, even if they remain precarious for the system as a whole. It is for this reason
that states have looked to international institutions to help overcome this collective
action problem and promote greater global cooperation.”).
54 ÁLVAREZ, supra note 15, at 395.
55 Id.
56 DANI RODRIK, THE GLOBALIZATION PARADOX: DEMOCRACY AND
THE FUTURE OF THE WORLD ECONOMY 70 (2011); see also Robert Howse, From
Politics to Technocracy—and Back Again: The Fate of the Multilateral Trading Regime, 96 AM.
J. INT’L L. 94, 94–95 (2002) (arguing that Bretton Woods was “concerned with the
53
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Chris Brummer explains how the current globalization system
not only meant an erosion of the dominance of the United States in
the world arena—and thus of a more diffused world in terms of power,
where “[e]merging markets have generally been the big winners”—but
also that the current multi-polarity has made multilateralism more
difficult and costly, thereby “giving way to new, innovative modes of
cooperation” called minilateralism: strategic alliances with smaller
groups; states turning away from treaties towards more soft law; and
financial engineering in states’ dealings.57 Although effective, this new
economic statecraft raises issues of fairness and democratic legitimacy,
given its exclusive character and “sidestep[ping] [of] some of the
multilateral values of universality and due process”.58
Accordingly, Georges Baur argues that whereas international
organizations respected the equality of states and other rules of
international law through inclusiveness and consent, informal
international task groups do not, such as the FSF, because they impose
standards and sanctions that are created by the task group’s memberstates against other non-member states, with the purpose of advancing
the former group’s economic and political interests at the cost of the
latters’.59
Nevertheless, this is the current paradigm of global finance
today, and we cannot simply return to the Bretton Woods system.60
On the contrary, the financial globalization created by deregulation,
interdependency of different states’ trade and other economic policies—i.e.,
managing or constraining the external costs that states impose on other states by
virtue of their policies.”) (emphasis in original).
57 CHRIS BRUMMER, MINILATERALISM: HOW TRADE ALLIANCES, SOFT
LAW, AND FINANCIAL ENGINEERING ARE REDEFINING ECONOMIC STATECRAFT
16–19 (2014).
58 Id. at 20.
59 Georges Baur, Will New Developments in Global Economic and Financial Policy
Erode International Law and the Sovereignty of States? – The Example of Liechtenstein, in
PROMOTING JUSTICE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION THROUGH
INTERNATIONAL LAW: LIBER AMICORUM LUCIUS CAFLISCH 1017 (Marcelo G.
Kohen ed., 2007).
60 See Rolf Weber & Douglas Arner, Toward a New Design for International
Financial Regulation, 29 J. INT’L L. 391, 438 (“The Bretton Woods system was designed
to support global trade but not global finance. As a result, we cannot simply return
to the old system but must look towards the requirements of today’s reality.”).
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technology and financial innovation has changed the regulatory space
of the field.61 The reality is that states have decided to use the
minilateralism strategy of soft law in international finance, at least since
the Group of Ten (G-10)—composed of the most industrialized
nations of that time62—established the BCBS in the aftermath of the
failure of the German Herstatt Bank and the American Franklin
National Bank of New York in 1974.63 In the words of Pierre-Hugues
Verdier:
When the fixed rate system collapsed in the 1970s,
national regulators faced numerous new cross-border
challenges. With no international framework to
address them and no authority to create formal
institutions or binding agreements, they instead created
informal networks and non-binding standards.64
Thereafter, cooperative informal initiatives in other financial
sectors were created and their roles exacerbated in the demise of
Bretton Woods system, which had a very limited role for international
private finance where international capital mobility was not the norm, 65
and thus, “no provision was made for regulating private finance.”66
Contrary to arguments that espouse the rationality of using soft law in
international financial law as the ones depicted in the section above,
the use of IIGOs and soft law norms in the international financial legal
arena can be explained through what Verdier calls a historical path
dependency: 67
In the absence of an international institution, national
regulators took the initiative, but they faced several
constraints. Their options were limited by their
CHRIS BRUMMER, SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM:
RULE MAKING IN THE 21ST CENTURY 10 (2015).
62 See BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, G10, (last visited Mar.
1, 2016), https://www.bis.org/list/g10publications/index.htm.
63 BRUMMER, supra note 57, at 99–100.
64 Verdier, supra note 11, at 1408.
65 Id. at 1411–12.
66 Id. at 1416.
67 Id. at 1427; but cf. BRUMMER, supra note 61, at 108–09 (analyzing an
“institutional path dependency” in the structure and composition of the
organizations).
61
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domestic statutory authority, which they could not
easily change. They did not have a clear mandate to act
internationally, much less bind their state to legal
obligations. They did not have a forum in which to
meet; often they did not even know each other. In that
context, regulators proceeded incrementally by
creating informal networks to exchange ideas,
coordinate their actions, and agree on nonbinding
standards.
B. Regulatory Zealousness
Verdier’s explanation of a historical path dependency
constraining national financial regulators’ options is persuasive on the
central role that they have had in the field ever since the 1970s. Under
this account, national financial regulators have had a zealous attitude
towards “preserv[ing] their domestic autonomy, flexibility and
discretion” vis-à-vis the national legislatures that create them and other
international actors, including their own peers from other countries. 68
Accordingly, national financial regulators have tried to look for legal
tools that neither diminish their power nor grant additional ones to
other bodies that could supervise or check their work. “[F]rom the
regulators’ private perspective, soft law and TRNs [transnational
regulatory networks or IIGOs] reconcile their wish to achieve shortterm regulatory objectives with their desire to preserve their domestic
authority and flexibility.”69
This zealousness can be also seen in bilateral investment
treaties and free trade agreements, where although historically both
instruments “have covered financial services for decades, . . . they all
tread gingerly on national regulators’ turf, separating financial
liberalization from other investment and service commitments”. 70 For

68 Verdier, supra note 11, at 1430. Verdier also contends that powerful
states—such as the United States and the European Union—and private firms are
the other two veto players that shape the agenda and outcome, along with national
financial regulators, of the international financial legal regime.
69 Id. at 1457.
70 Anna Gelpern, Financial Services, in ASSESSING THE TRANS-PACIFIC
PARTNERSHIP: VOLUME 1: MARKET ACCESS AND SECTORAL ISSUES 91 (Peterson
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instance, “[n]either NAFTA nor other US bilateral trade and
investment agreements curbed the unlimited discretion of financial
regulators, so in this respect the TPP71 continues a well-established
tradition.”72
Likewise, it can even be fathomed in certain domestic contexts.
For example, the use of informal venues that coordinate already
existing institutions was pursued by the United States with the creation
of the Financial Stability Oversight Council through the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act73 as an umbrella
body that tightened cooperation among the existing federal banking
and financial regulatory agencies.74 Therefore, there seems to be
Institute for International Economics, 2016) (last visited May 10, 2016),
https://piie.com/system/files/documents/piieb16-1.pdf.
71 Trans-Pacific Partnership.
72 Jennifer Hillman, Dispute Settlement Mechanism, in ASSESSING THE TRANSPACIFIC PARTNERSHIP, VOLUME 2: INNOVATIONS IN TRADING RULES 101, 110
(Jeffrey Schott & Catleen Cimino-Isaacs eds., 2016), (last visited May 10, 2016),
https://piie.com/system/files/documents/piieb16-4.pdf; see also Gelpern, supra note
70, at 96 (“The TPP’s novel treatment of exceptions in dispute resolution evokes a
broader pattern of deference to financial regulatory authorities and financial
experts. . . . The TPP’s innovation is in the dispute settlement procedure that would
apply to determine whether a measure is, in fact, there “for prudential reasons” or
otherwise exempt. . . . In all, financial firms under the TPP are more limited than
firms in other sectors in the relief they can get from taking their grievances to ISDS
[investment system of dispute settlement].”).
73 DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER
PROTECTION ACT; FINANCIAL STABILITY ACT OF 2010; ENHANCING
FINANCIAL INSTITUTION SAFETY AND SOUNDNESS ACT OF 2010;
PRIVATE FUND INVESTMENT ADVISERS REGISTRATION ACT OF 2010;
FEDERAL INSURANCE OFFICE ACT OF 2010; NONADMITTED AND
REINSURANCE REFORM ACT OF 2010; BANK AND SAVINGS
ASSOCIATION HOLDING COMPANY AND DEPOSITORY INSTITUTION
REGULATORY IMPROVEMENTS ACT OF 2010; WALL STREET
TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 2010; PAYMENT,
CLEARING, AND SETTLEMENT SUPERVISION ACT OF 2010; INVESTOR
PROTECTION AND SECURITIES REFORM ACT OF 2010.; CONSUMER
FINANCIAL PROTECTION ACT OF 2010; IMPROVING ACCESS TO
MAINSTREAM FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ACT OF 2010; MORTGAGE
REFORM AND ANTI-PREDATORY LENDING ACT; EXPAND AND
PRESERVE HOME OWNERSHIP THROUGH COUNSELING ACT, 111 P.L.
203, Part 1 of 3, 124 Stat. 1377.
74 Robert Thompson, Financial Regulation’s Architecture within International
Economic Law, 17 J. INT’L ECON. L. 807, 811 (2014).
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continuity from the domestic unto the international level of creating
umbrella-coordinating forums for existing agencies, instead of creating
new institutions.75 Seen in another light: the zealousness of financial
national regulators to retain their power in the financial arena also
affects the institutional building of domestic institutions.
National regulators are the most important actors in the
financial legal arena: not only do they behold the gates to the
implementation of the rules, but they also participate in their creation
and supervision. In other words, this is a “departure from traditional
public international models of diplomacy, where political elites and
heads of state participate. It injects technocratic skill at the highest level
of the rulemaking process.”76 Even though they are ultimately
constrained by national regulators from other countries, on the one
hand, and their own domestic political organs, on the other,77 it is clear
that they inform the shape of the whole process, and that without some
external supervision, the regulators will not “internalize the costs of
their regulatory decision making”, thereby reducing the compliance
pull of international financial law.78 Accordingly, instead of retaining
the current voluntary monitoring and surveillance programs, calls for
third party enforcement of prudential standards have been raised.79
C. Diversity
As explained above, globalization and the subsequent
liberalization of finance saw drawbacks in capital movement controls
and financial crises, which for the most part occurred in the developing
75 See Id. at 808 (implying a continuity by arguing that the response to the
2007–2008 crisis began with national responses, such as Dodd-Frank in 2010, but
then saw the creation of the FSB “to play a coordinating role that seeks to meld the
technocratic expertise in various international standard setting and supervision
bodies and the political legitimacy from heads of government”); see also Robert
Howse, The end of the globalization debate: continued, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW
AND NATIONAL AUTONOMY 7, 18 (Meredith Kolsky & Susy Frankel eds., 2010)
(arguing that state responses to the financial crisis have not been devised to stop the
liberalization of capital movements, but rather to strengthen its regulation at the
global level through the FSB).
76 Brummer, supra note 26, at 274.
77 Id. at 274–75.
78 Id. at 326–27.
79 Arts & Kerwer, supra note 21, at 162.
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world.80 A tipping point occurred in the 1997 Asian financial crisis,
which led to the creation of the first overarching forum for financial
stability: the FSF.81
However, it was not until the 2008 financial crisis that a
coordinated architecture for the whole international financial regime
was created. The crisis highlighted the need to integrate the
international financial legal regime, on one hand, and that developed
nations could also be prone to catastrophic financial failures, on the
other; all of which led to the displacement of the G-7 by the G-20 and
the creation of the FSB.82
Through its more inclusive nature and stronger powers, the G20 and FSB’s combined efforts’ have enhanced each other’s legitimacy:
by “teaming technocratic pragmatism with democratic norms”. 83
Although there is a long way to go and the G-20 is still not universal,
the transition from only like-minded countries in the G-7 to a more
diverse membership in the G-20—in both the geographical and
development level in terms of economic importance—is to be hailed. 84

See, e.g., Stephen Zamora, Exchange Control in Mexico: Case Study in the
Application of IMF Rules, 7 HOUS. J. INT’L. L. 103 (1984-1985) (analyzing the
compatibility of Mexican exchange control measures after the 1982-83 crisis with
Article VIII of the IMF Agreement); see also Stephen Zamora, Recognition of Foreign
Exchange Controls in International Creditors’ Rights Cases: The State of the Art, 21 INT’L L.
1055 (1987) (analyzing different legal doctrines by which an American court could
give effect or recognition to the exchange controls of foreign governments in the
United States, and concluding that the cases demonstrate some limited recognition
of foreign governments’ acts on that regard, but noting that none of those cases used
article VIII of the IMF Agreement).
81 BRUMMER, supra note 57, at 102.
82 Id. at 107.
83 Id. at 193–98.
84 But cf. Weber & Arner, supra note 60, at 453 (“a goal of the international
financial architecture should focus on the increased integration of developing,
emerging, and transition economies into the international financial system. However,
this integration is not without its dangers and must be based on coherent sequencing
of liberalization preceded as a necessary first stage by the development of an
effectively functioning financial system in each country.”).
80
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IV. CONCLUSION
In regards to the recent international financial architecture
created after the financial crisis, Robert Thompson summarizes its
characteristics in the following manner: Focus on macro-prudential
regulation through FSB’s coordination; prudential regulatory
competition between states that puts them in a parallel position, as they
all want to regulate banks and financial institutions, thereby suggesting
that harmonization of national laws through soft law is a better strategy
than an inter-state dispute settlement approach; need for technocratic
experts at the national regulatory agencies; lack of enforcement,
accountability and transparency; and a possible de-legitimization
because of exclusivity in membership to the G-20.85 This sums up
many of the challenges that the system must address.
Although certain reforms have been advanced to harden the
regime, path dependency leads to the belief that states will only regulate
this area of the international legal system through soft law. Flexibility
is preferred over strict long-term rules that could forestall the need to
apply effective action in response to a crisis, as has occurred in the
past. Likewise, apprehension by national financial regulators of the
adjudicative, enforcement, and sanctioning procedures seems to
suggest an aversion by states of delegating those functions to an
international body, and thus losing their power. Probably for this
reason the FSB will remain an IIGO and not become an international
organization: the objective underlying its creation was to become an
umbrella-coordinating venue for all existing standard-setting bodies,
national regulators, and international financial institutions; not to
encroach the existing institutions’ mandate by imposing another layer
of institutionalization. G-20 member states explicitly denied granting
an international legal personality to the FSB; 86 they only wanted
coordination.87

Thompson, supra note 74, at 818–22.
See Charter of the Financial Stability Board, supra note 5, art. 24.
87 See Wouters & Odermatt, supra note 10, at 55-56 (highlighting the fact
that G-20 members have adapted and modified continuously the mandate of the
FSB, which would be difficult to accomplish had it been created through a treaty
charter).
85
86
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As of late, powerful countries have regulated this area of the
law and probably won’t cede that law-making power, particularly the
states integrating the G-20. Further, it is not necessarily certain that
rule-making in the international financial legal regime should be
“democratized” and subjected to other state participants outside of the
current G-20 members, as the safety and soundness of the
international financial system relies purely upon technocratic expertise
and legitimacy, not its democratic aspect. Hence, current G-20
member states may be more effective in addressing these issues than
other developing nations who struggle with structural problems, such
as lack of accountability and transparency in resolving crises.88
Nonetheless, the transition from the primordial role in the
international financial space that the G-7 had to the current one held
by the G-20 can be viewed as a positive step towards a more inclusive
regime that, eventually, could lead to even more diversity, and perhaps
even universality.

See, e.g., Sigmond, supra note 3 (contrasting the transparency and
accountability in the American bailout of banks and financial institutions in the
Obama administration with the opacity and corruption in the secretive bailout
process of the 1995 Mexican crisis by then President Zedillo’s administration; at a
time when Mexico was not considered that relevant, and thus was not part of the G20’s predecessor—the Group of Seven); but cf. Stephen Haber & Aldo Musacchio
These Are the Good Old Days: Foreign Entry and the Mexican Banking System, NATIONAL
BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 3 (2013), (last visited May 10, 2016),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w18713.pdf (contending that Mexico’s 1997
liberalization of financial ownership to foreigners, which led to the ownership of
more than half of the financial and banking industries to foreign capital very rapidly,
actually helped increased the supply of credit, further the stability of the system, and
not raise the credit cost).
88
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I. INTRODUCTION
When Benjamin Franklin pondered 1 “When will mankind be
convinced and agree to settle their difficulties by arbitration?” he probably did
not expect that after over 300 years of successful arbitration history 2
the world is still not convinced. The storm of protest from all
quarters of society and all corners of the world in regard to the new
investment arbitration chapters in the Trans Pacific Partnership
Agreement3 and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership4
suggest the opposite - a deep mistrust in at least one field of
arbitration: international investment arbitration.5 An illustrative
example is the editorial of Wellington’s Dominion Post6:

DAVE FARNHAM, SNIPPETS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN (2014).
For an overview of arbitration history (even predating 300 years), see
GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION §1.01 (Kluwer, Alphen
aan den Rijn, 2nd ed., 2014).
3 Text of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, NEW ZEALAND FOREIGN AFFAIRS &
TRADE,
https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/about-us/who-we-are/treaty-makingprocess/trans-pacific-partnership-tpp/text-of-the-trans-pacific-partnership
(last
visited Apr. 2, 2016).
4 Documents
and
events,
EUROPEAN
COMMISSION,
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/documents-andevents/index_en.htm#_documents (last visited Apr. 2 2016).
5 Leon E. Trakman, Investment Dispute Resolution under the Transpacific
Partnership Agreement: Prelude to a Slippery Slope? (2013); Leon E. Trakman Investor-State
Arbitration: Evaluating Australia’s Evolving Position (2011); Jess Hill, TPP clauses that let
Australia be sued are weapons of legal destruction, says lawyers, THEGUARDIAN (Nov. 9,
2015), http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/nov/10/tpps-clauses-that-letaustralia-be-sued-are-weapons-of-legal-destruction-says-lawyer (last accessed 4 May
2016); George Monbiot, This transatlantic trade deal is a full-frontal assault on democracy,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Nov.
4,
2013),
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/nov/04/us-trade-deal-fullfrontal-assault-on-democracy; The arbitration game; Investor-state dispute settlement, THE
ECONOMIST, Oct. 11, 2014; Martin Khor, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement
(TPPA): When Foreign Investors Sue the State, GLOBAL RESEARCH (Sept. 1, 2013),
http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-trans-pacific-partnership-agreement-tppa-whenforeign-investors-sue-the-state/5357500; Daniel Kalderimis, Investor/state arbitration,
the TPP and New Zealand, CHAPMAN TRIPP (July 28, 2015),
http://leanz.org.nz/uploads/presentations/Kalderimis_LEANZ%20Presentation_
280715.pdf; Bianca Mueller, The Devil in the TPPA – Investor State Dispute Settlement,
SCOOP (Mar. 22, 2015), http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL1503/S00196/thedevil-in-the-tppa-investor-state-dispute-settlement.htm (last accessed 4 May 2016);
1
2
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But the non-trade aspects of the deal are the most
worrying. The worst is the mechanism allowing
foreign companies to sue New Zealand in
controversial offshore tribunals. This raises serious
problems of sovereignty and fairness.
These tribunals are not courts as we understand them.
They are courts dedicated to the interests of investors,
rather than countries. Appeals are very limited.
Conflicts of interest among those on the tribunals are
not rigorously controlled. Judgments are not required
to be consistent.
Responsibility for the public’s mistrust in investor-state
arbitration lies partly with human rights lawyers’ and activists’
[“human rights lobby”] claims of lack of transparency, investor bias
and the disregard of citizens’ human rights. 7 The human rights lobby
has painted the investors as the big bad wolves. The state and its
citizens are red riding hood and the arbitral tribunals, as the Brothers
Grimm, are re-writing the happy end. The international arbitration
profession, on the other hand, has shied away from a thorough
engagement with human rights and seems to have a severe case of
“Berührungsangst”.8

Julien Chaisse, The shifting tectonics of international investment law - structure and dynamics of
rules and arbitration on foreign investment in the Asia-Pacific region, 47 GEO. WASH. INT’L
L. REV. 563 (2015).
6 EDITORIAL: It’s too soon to celebrate the singing of this “free trade” deal,
DOMINION POST, ed., Jan. 15, 2016.
7 UN experts voice concern over adverse impact of free trade and investment
agreements on human rights, UNITED NATIONS HOMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH
COMMISSIONER
(June
2,
2015),
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=160
31; Andrew Geddis, Of TPP’s, ISDS’s and the Constitution, PUNDIT (Oct. 5, 2015),
http://pundit.co.nz/content/of-tpps-isdss-and-the-constitution; Open Letter, TPP
LEGAL, https://tpplegal.wordpress.com/open-letter/ (last accessed 4 May 2016).
8 Bruno Simma, Foreign Investment Arbitration: A Place for Human Rights?, 60
INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 573, 576 (2011); see also Ciaran Cross & Christian SchliemannRadbruch, When Investment Arbitration curbs Domestic Regulatory Space: Consistent
Solutions through Amicus Curiae Submissions by Regional Organisations, 6 L. & DEV. REV.
67, 87 (2013) (et seq. which show that arbitral tribunals have not taken the
opportunity to clarify the role of human rights in investment arbitration); see also
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The widespread absence of a discussion of investors’ rights
by the human rights lobby and the general lack of willingness by the
international arbitration community to engage with human rights
issues is concerning. It is concerning because, in particular for
developing countries, sustainable economic development requires
both: foreign direct investment and the protection of human rights.9
The aim of this think piece is to provide a basis to fill the
gaps in both discussions by firstly describing the international human
rights framework and in particular discussing whether and which
human rights are available to investors and a state’s citizens. The
paper will then examine how a human rights analysis is relevant in an
investment arbitration and why there is no need for the investment
arbitration community to have “Berührungsängste”. By doing so the
paper proposes a framework that will allow for the consistent
inclusion of the International Bill of Human Rights (“IBR”) and
customary international human rights as a benchmark in investorstate dispute settlement. A consistent human rights benchmark is
important since investor state dispute settlement can take place in
competing jurisdictions, such as national courts, investment
arbitration, regional human rights courts, or the International Court
of Justice. There is therefore a need for promoting consistent human
rights benchmarking among diverse national, regional and worldwide
courts, and alternative dispute settlement proceedings.
The paper is also a contribution against the fragmentation of
international law.10 It is the thesis of this paper that the IBR and
customary international human rights provide the international
constitutional framework in which any investment treaty is situated
and in which international arbitral tribunals have to operate. To

Yannik Radi, Realizing Human Rights in Investment Treaty Arbitration: A Perspective from
within the International Investment Law Toolbox, 37 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 1107,
1116 (2011). However, as an exception to the rule discussion of art 14 International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, see Hersham Talaat v. Indonesia,
UNCITRAL (Dec. 14, 2015).
9 See Megan Wells Scheffer, Bilateral Investment Treaties: A Friend or Foe to
Human Rights?, 39 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 483, 483 (2011).
10 See Ursula Kriebaum & Christoph Schreuer, The Concept of Property in
Human
Rights
Law
and
International
Investment
Law,
http://www.univie.ac.at/intlaw/wordpress/pdf/88_concept_property.pdf.
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illustrate the difference, the proposed framework will make to the
discussion of investors’ rights versus citizens’ rights, the new
framework will be applied to a case scenario. It is noteworthy to
stress that the investment treaty perspective on human rights
significance is not the main focus of this paper, 11 albeit some
reference will be made.12
II. HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK
Human rights and fundamental freedoms are the
birthrights of all human beings; their protection and
promotion is
the
first responsibility
of
13
Governments.
There are several human rights frameworks which could be
used to determine the citizens’ and the investor’s rights: particular
domestic human rights frameworks, regional frameworks in some
parts of the world, and the international human rights framework.
The international human rights framework encompasses the IBR
containing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) and
the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights
(“ICESCR”). 14 As Stephen Gardbaum convincingly argues, the IBR
has to be seen as part of the international constitutional order. 15 It

11 See for very detailed discussion from the investment law perspective
Bruno Simma, Foreign Investment Arbitration: A Place for Human Rights?, 60 INT’L &
COMP. L.Q. 573 (2011); Yannik Radi, Realizing Human Rights in Investment Treaty
Arbitration: A Perspective from within the International Investment Law Toolbox, N.C. J.
INT’L L. & COM. REG. 1107 (2011); Vivian Kube & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann,
Human rights law in international investment arbitration, EUI Working Papers (Law
2016/02).
12 See below II.D.
13 Vienna Declaration, sec. 1.
14 Fact Sheet No.2 (Rev.1), The International Bill of Human Rights, OHCHR,
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet2Rev.1en.pdf.
15 Stephen Gardbaum, Human Rights as International Constitutional Rights, 19
EUR. J. INT’L L. 749 (2008); see also Erika de Wet, The International Constitutional Order,
55 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 51 (2006); see also, Andreas Paulus, The International Legal
System as a Constitution in JEFFREY DUNOFF & JOEL TRACHTMAN, RULING THE
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specifies the limits on how governments treat people within their
jurisdictions. It enshrines and clarifies the distinct normative basis for
the protection of fundamental rights as rights of human beings rather
than as rights of citizens. That means international human rights do
not make a difference between nationals and foreigners. The human
rights obligations contained in the ICCPR and ICESCR have erga
omnes effect to the extent that they have acquired customary
international law status.16 That means that those rights enshrined in
the IBR are applicable whether or not states are member states to
the IBR or its parts.17 As a result, the IBR is applicable in every
country around the world as part of the international constitutional
order,18 laying down a global human rights standard19 for every
WORLD? CONSTITUTIONALISM, INTERNATIONAL LAW & GLOBAL GOVERNMENT
69 (CUP, Cambridge, 2009).
16 JAMES
CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 642 (8th ed., 2012); Pierre-Marie Dupuy, L’unité de
l’ordre juridique international in RECUEIL DES COURS DE L’ACADÉMIE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL, vol. 297, 382-85 (2002); Erika de Wet, The International
Constitutional Order, 55 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 51, 61 (2006); for IESCR, see U.N.
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Substantive Issues Arising in the
Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Poverty
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N. Doc. No.
E/C.12/2001/10, para 16 (May 2001). Ernst Ulrich Petersmann states: “Human
rights have thus become part also of the general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations (Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice)” in Time for
Integrating Human Rights into the Law of Worldwide Organizations Lessons from European
Integration Law for Global Integration Law, NYU INSTITUTES ON THE PARK,
http://jeanmonnetprogram.org/archive/papers/01/012301-05.html.
17 Based on the global recognition of those rights as the essence of what
somehow natural right to every human being belongs just by being born as one,
those rights cannot leave out any single individual, regardless of their nationality.
See Horst Dreier, in: Dreier (Hrsg.), GG, Bd. 1, 2. Aufl., 2004, Vorb. Rdn. 25,
Gerhard Herdegen in Maunz/Dürig, Grundgesetz-Kommentar, 78. EL September
2016, Art. 1 Abs. 2, marginal no. 31, 32, Herbert Bethge in Maunz/SchmidtBleibtreu/Klein/Bethge, Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz, 49. EL Juli 2016,
BVerfGG Rn. 90, marginal no. 65.
18 Stephen Gardbaum, Human Rights as International Constitutional Rights, 19
THE EUR. J. OF INT’L L. 749, 768 (2008) (“international human rights law also
functions to enshrine and clarify the distinct normative basis for the protection of
fundamental rights as rights of human beings rather than as rights of citizens”).
19 Compare with Stephen Gardbaum, Human Rights as International
Constitutional Rights, 19 THE EUR. J. OF INT’L L. 749, 768 (2008); see also Lucas
Lixinski, Treaty Interpretation by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Expansionism
at the Service of the Unity of International Law, 21 THE EUR. J. OF INT’L L. 585 (2010).
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human being notwithstanding whether they are a citizen or foreigner.
The IBR provides the baseline global human rights protection. 20
Whether, or in which circumstances, (additional) human rights
enshrined in regional and/or domestic human rights standards have
to be taken into account in investor state dispute resolution, is not
within the scope of this paper.
How investment tribunals have to have regard to the IBR will
be discussed under II.C.2. In the following the paper will outline the
rights of the state’s citizens and that of the investor under the IBR.
A. The Rights of the State Citizens
The human rights lobby is claiming in particular the following
rights as being jeopardized by investor state relationships and the
resulting disputes: the right to health21, the right to water22, the right
As Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann points out “Dictatorial governments can
no longer freely ‘contract out’ of their human rights obligations by withdrawing
from UN human rights covenants or ILO conventions” in Time for Integrating
Human Rights into the Law of Worldwide Organizations Lessons from European Integration
Law for Global Integration Law, THE JEAN MONNET CENTER FOR INT’L AND REG.
ECON. L. AND JUST., http://jeanmonnetprogram.org/archive/papers/01/01230105.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2016) (That must be true not only for dictatorial
governments but generally in regard to the inability of states to contract out of
“human rights”).
21 The IECSR Committee has interpreted the “right to health, as defined
in article 12.1, as an inclusive right extending not only to timely and appropriate
health care but also to the underlying determinants of health, such as access to safe
and potable water and adequate sanitation, an adequate supply of safe food,
nutrition and housing, healthy occupational and environmental conditions, and
access to health-related education and information, including on sexual and
reproductive health. A further important aspect is the participation of the
population in all health-related decision-making at the community, national and
international levels.” The right to health encompasses the control over one’s health
and body, including sexual and reproductive freedom, and the right to be free from
interference, such as the right to be free from torture, non-consensual medical
treatment and experimentation; the right to a system of health protection which
provides equality of opportunity for people to enjoy the highest attainable level of
health, including, for example, access (non-discriminatory, economic, physical,
information) to functioning public health and health-care facilities [ICESCR General
Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Art. 12)
Adopted at the Twenty-second Session of the Committee on Economic, Social and
20
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to a sustainable or healthy environment 23, the right of indigenous
peoples to their ancestral lands24, and the right to development 25 of
Cultural Rights, on Aug. 11, 2000 (Contained in Doc. E/C.12/2000/4), paras 8, 11,
1). In regard to a comprehensive treatment of the right to health, see JOHN TOBIN,
THE RIGHT TO HEALTH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2012) and VALENTINA VADI,
PUBLIC HEALTH IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION
(2012).
22 The right to water encompasses, inter alia, sufficient, safe, acceptable,
physically accessible and affordable water for personal and domestic uses. States
need to take steps on a non-discriminatory basis to prevent threats to health from
unsafe and toxic water conditions. General Comment No. 15: The Right to Water
(Arts. 11 and 12 of the Covenant), Adopted at the Twenty-ninth Session of the
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, on Jan. 20, 2003 (Contained
in Doc. E/C.12/2002/11, paras. 2, 8). With regard to a comprehensive treatment
of the right to health, see EIBE RIEDEL & PETER ROTHEN, THE HUMAN RIGHT TO
WATER (Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2006).
23 The right encompasses the right to a non-polluted environment, which
does not endanger health, life and development. The right also comprises the
obligation of the state and the community of states to repair any damage done by
pollution. Gheorghe Durac, Granting the Right to a Quality Environment -A Premise of
Sustainable Development, 9 PESD 153, 154 (2015); John Lee, Underlying Legal Theory to
Support a Well-Defined Human Right to a Healthy Environment as a Principle of Customary
International Law, 25 COLUM. J. OF ENVTL. L. 283. (2000). For an overview of the
protection of the environment in regional and domestic human rights instruments,
see Alan Boyle, Human Rights and the Environment: A Reassessment, UNEP,
http://www.unep.org/environmentalgovernance/Portals/8/documents/Events/
HumanRightsEnvironmentRev.pdf (last visited Apr. 12, 2016).
24
UN Indigenous Peoples Declaration, Art 1(1): “Indigenous peoples
have the right to the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally
owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired.” The central right is the right to
the enjoyment of ancestral lands. Mihail Krephchev, The Problem of Accommodating
Indigenous Land Rights in International Investment Law, 6 J. OF INT’L INVESTMENT L.,
42; see generally JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(OUP, 1996).
25 Declaration on the Right to Development (1986), Art 1(1): “The right
to development is an inalienable human right by virtue of which every human
person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy
economic, social, cultural and political development, in which all human rights and
fundamental freedoms can be fully realized.” The Declaration in its 10 articles
requires states to guarantee rights in a manner applicable to globalisation, ie it
compels states to cooperate with each other to the best of their abilities and
resources to achieve development throughout the world: see for a general
discussion DANIEL AGUIRRE, THE HUMAN RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT IN A
GLOBALISED WORLD (2008); Stephen Marks, Beate Rudolf, Koen De Feyter, &
Nicolaas Schrijver, The role of international law in U.N., OFFICE OF THE HUMAN
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the citizens in the particular country.26 Those citizens’ rights, the
human rights claims, are given no weight by investment tribunals.
Tribunals were only concerned with the rights of investors.
The right to health and the right to water are enshrined in the
IBR.27 Thus, human beings have a right to health and to water
notwithstanding the country they live in. The right to a sustainable or
healthy environment and the right to development did not find their
way explicitly into the IBR. Today, both rights are afforded at least
near close to customary international law status.28 The right of
indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands is protected by the UN
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. The Declaration is

RIGHTS COMMISSIONER, REALIZING THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT: ESSAYS IN
COMMEMORATION OF 25 YEARS OF THE UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION ON
THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT 445, 454 (U.N. Publication, 2013).
26 In regard to general criticism, see Investor State Dispute Settlement- The
Arbitration
Game,
THE
ECONOMIST,
Oct.
11,
2014,
http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21623756governments-are-souring-treaties-protect-foreign-investors-arbitration;
Claire
Provost and Matt Kennard, The obscure legal system that allows corporations to sue countries,
THE
GUARDIAN,
June
10,
2015,
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/jun/10/obscure-legal-system-letscorportations-sue-states-ttip-icsid; Still not loving ISDS: 10 reasons to oppose investors’
super-rights in EU trade deals, CORPORATE EUROPE OBSERVATORY, July 14, 2014,
http://corporateeurope.org/international-trade/2014/04/still-not-loving-isds-10reasons-oppose-investors-super-rights-eu-trade.
27 ISECR Art 12, Art 11 (1); in addition, the U.N. General Assembly
recognised the right to water and sanitation as a human right specifically in
U.N.G.A. Res. 64/292, 64th Session A/RES/64/292 (July 28, 2010).
28 For the right to a sustainable environment see John Lee, The Right to a
Healthy Environment, 25 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 283, 338 (2000); see Susan Glazebrook,
Human Rights and the Environment, VUWLR: HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PACIFIC 293
(2009); Prue Taylor, From Environmental to Ecological Human Rights: A New Dynamic in
International Law?, 10 GEO. INT’L. ENVTL. L. REV. 309 (1997); For the right to
development see Isabella Bunn, The Right to Development: Implications for International
Economic Law, 15 AM. U. INT’L. L. REV. 1425, 1436 (2000). It also should be noted
that due to human rights law establishes a responsibility on part of the state toward
those under its jurisdiction, and not solely an obligation between states, the
Restatement has drawn a subtle distinction between the manner in which
customary human rights law is established from that which creates customary
international law in general. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
§ 701 (1987), reporter’s note 2.
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not binding law. The formulation of the rights therein, however,
reflects emergent customary international law.29
It is the nature of human rights law to create obligations on
the part of the state towards those under its jurisdiction. The IBR
clearly stipulates states’ obligations, for example, Article 2 (1) of the
ICESCR reads:
[T]o take steps, individually and through international
assistance and co-operation, especially economic and
technical, to the maximum of its available resources,
with a view to achieving progressively the full
realization of the rights recognized in the present
Covenant by all appropriate means, including
particularly the adoption of legislative measures.
Article 2(1) of ICESCR compels the community of states to
work towards attaining the best standard of health possible for its
citizens. It also requires every state to make every effort to provide
for sufficient clean water. Of particular interest are the states’
obligations in regard to the right to development. The right to
development encapsulates a resonance of the core principles of all
human rights including, primarily, equity, non-discrimination, active
and meaningful participation, accountability and transparency.30 For
the right to be effective, another core part of the right to
development is that states have a duty by themselves, and in
29 Mihail Krephchev, The Problem of Accommodating Indigenous Land Rights in
International Investment Law, 6 J. INT’L. INVESTMENT L. 42, 52 et seq. (2015); see also
James Anaya & Siegfried Wiessner, The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples: Towards Re-empowerment, JURIST.ORG (Oct. 3, 2007),
http://www.jurist.org/forum/2007/10/un-declaration-on-rights-ofindigenous.php; In regard to the general application under the American
Convention on Human Rights see, Norms and Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Human
Rights System-Indigenous And Tribal Peoples’ Rights over their Ancestral Lands and Natural
Resources,
INTER-AMERICAN
COMMISSION
ON
HUMAN
RIGHTS,
http://cidh.org/countryrep/Indigenous-Lands09/Chap.V-VI.htm (last visited Apr.
16, 2016).
30 See the reports of the Working Group on the Right to Development
on its: Fifth Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/23, para. 43(a); Sixth session, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/2005/25, para. 42; Seventh Session E/CN.4/2006/26, paras. 31, 40,
46, 67(g).
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conjunction with the community of states, to accomplish the utmost
possible within their available resources to attain the highest level of
development in their respective states, but also globally.31 The same is
true for the right to a sustainable and healthy environment. 32
Even though there is no unified global understanding of
whether and how an individual can assert the right to health, water, a
healthy environment, and a right to development (which are
categorized as second and third generation rights 33), there is no doubt
that in regard to those rights it is the state’s and the community of
states’ obligation to constantly work towards the highest fulfillment
and execution of those rights for its citizens and the global citizenry.
The right of indigenous peoples to their ancestral land is
different to the other rights discussed as it is first and foremost a
negative right. It obligates the states which are the home of
indigenous peoples to provide them with the protection not to be
deprived of their land. 34 It does not compel the particular state to
31 Ibrahim Salama, The right to development at 25: renewal and achievement of its
potential, in U.N., OFFICE OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSIONER, REALIZING THE
RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT: ESSAYS IN COMMEMORATION OF 25 YEARS OF THE
UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION ON THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT 485, 486
(2013 ).
32 John Lee, The Right to a Healthy Environment, 25 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L.
283, 338 (2000); see also Draft Declaration on Human Rights and the Environment,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/9, Annex I (1994), art. 22 (“All States shall
respect and ensure the right to a secure, healthy and ecologically sound
environment. Accordingly, they shall adopt the administrative, legislative and other
measures necessary to effectively implement the rights in this Declaration”).
33 See PAUL O’CONNELL, VINDICATION SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS:
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS AND COMPARATIVE EXPERIENCES (2012); HELENA
ALVIAR GARCIA, KARL KLARE, & LUCY WILLIAMS, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE: CRITICAL INQUIRIES (2015).
34 Compare Kaliña y Lokono v. Surinam, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Nov. 25,
2015), http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_309_esp.pdf (last
visited May 10, 2016) (The ACtHR found that Suriname had violated Art 3 ACHR
by failing to recognize the collective legal personality asserted by the indigenous
and tribal people in this case. It further noted that the lack of demarcation,
delimitation, and failure to award legal title of the territory of Kaliña and Lokono
violated the villagers’ collective right to property recognized under Art 21 ACHR),
The Ituango Massacres v. Colombia, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations,
and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No 148, paras. 169-200 (July 1, 2006) (The
Court concluded that the State violated Article 21 (right to property) to the
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progressively attain their ancestral land nor does the right require
states to work as the community of states to attain those rights.
In summary, the human rights at play on the side of citizens
are the right to health, water, a healthy environment, and the right to
development. It is generally recognized that in regard to those rights,
states have the obligation to safeguard their citizens against human
rights abuses, including those of (transnational) corporations. 35 In
particular, they are commissioned to work as part of the community
of states towards the highest possible attainment of the fulfillment of
those rights. The right of indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands
has been conceptualized as a negative right, thought of as rooted in
the right to property. Its justiciability is unquestioned. 36
B. The Right of the Investor
1.

Legal Persons as Human Rights Bearers

Human rights are generally conceptualized as a safeguard for
the individual against the state. If the investor is an individual there is
no doubt human rights will extend to the investor. 37 However, the

detriment of the fifty-nine victims because its agents collaborated with the
paramilitary group to destroy the victims’ homes and steal their livestock,
unlawfully depriving them of their property.).
35 Human Rights Council, Business and Human Rights: Mapping International
Standards of Responsibility and Accountability for Corporate Acts, U.N. Doc
A/HRC/4/035, para. 19 (Feb. 19, 2007) (prepared by John Ruggie): “..the state
duty to protect against non state abuses is part of the international human rights
regime’s very foundation. The duty requires states to play a key role in regulating
and adjudicating abuse by business enterprises or risk breaching their international
obligations.”
36 E.g., Kaliña y Lokono v. Surinami, supra note 34; Sawhoyamaxa
Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, para. 113(a) (Mar. 29, 2006); Yakye Axa Indigenous
Community v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 125, para 157(c) (June 17, 2005).
37 See, e.g., Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez v. Ecuador, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R.
(ser.
C)
No.
170
(Nov.
21,
2007),
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_170_ing.pdf (last visited
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extension of human rights protections to legal persons is less clear.
The IBR does not afford legal persons38 protection.39 The exclusion
of legal persons from the scope of the IBR, however, does not
necessarily follow from the IBR’s purpose.40 It does correspond to
the preamble though, which asserts that human rights derive from
the inherent dignity of the human person, and with the intention of
its drafters.41
Looking more regionally, the Inter American Convention of
Human Rights (“ACHR”) does not offer rights protection to legal
persons either. 42 On the other hand, the European Convention on
Human Rights (“ECHR”) 43 and the African Charter on Human and
Peoples Rights (“ACHPR”)44 have extended rights protection, at least
in part, to legal persons.45

May 10, 2016) (The individual investors were imprisoned and their property seized
due to being suspected of drug trafficking.).
38 The term “legal person” is used for the purposes of this paper in a
rather broad sense, as including all natural entities.
39 U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31, The Nature
of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, 9 (Mar. 29, 2004).
40 Louis Henkin, The Universal Declaration at 50 and the Challenge of Global
Markets, 25 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 17, 24-25 (1999).
41 Universal Declaration of Human Rights preamble reads “Whereas
recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all
members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in
the world,…”; see also Human Rights Council, Business and Human Rights: Mapping
International Standards of Responsibility and Accountability for Corporate Acts, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/4/035, para. 37 (Feb. 19, 2007).
42 ACHR, Art. 61(1); ACHR, Art. 1(2); Cantos v. Argentina, Preliminary
Objections, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., para. 22 et seq. (Sept. 7, 2001); Perozo v.
Venezuela, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R., paras. 74, 399 (Jan. 28, 2009).
43 ECHR, Art 34; see, e.g., Société Colas Est v. France, Eur. Ct. H.R. App.
No. 37971/97, para. 41 (Apr. 16, 2002) (right to privacy in Art 8 ECHR).
44 Art. 19 v. The State of Eritrea, Decision on the Merits, Afr. Comm’n.
on Human and People’s Rights 275/ 2003 (May 2007); Civil Liberties Organization
v. Nigeria, Decision on the Merits, Afr. Comm’n. on Human and Peoples’ Rights
101/93, para 37 (1995).
45 For a full discussion on the protection of legal persons under
international and regional human rights instruments albeit in regard to their
criminal liability, see Piet Hein Van Kempen, The Recognition of Legal Persons in
International Human Rights Instruments: Protection Against and Through Criminal Justice?, in
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There is recognition that legal persons, in particular
transnational or multinational companies, should be the bearer of
(international) human rights.46 That recognition is anchored in the
fact that two regional human rights instruments afford human rights
protection to legal persons and that human rights duties of
transnational corporations have developed through soft-law
mechanisms, such as the UN Guiding Principles on Human Rights
and Business47 and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises.48 Those soft law instruments contain express provisions
on the human rights responsibilities of transnational corporations. 49
However, efforts are under way to convert those soft law instruments
into legally enforceable standards. In 2014 the Human Rights Council
with Resolution 26/9 established a working group which is tasked to
develop an international legally binding instrument to regulate the
activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises
in regard to human rights.50 The Resolution clearly identifies the
responsibility of transnational corporations and businesses to respect
human rights.51 The European Union has directed that its member
states implement the UN Guiding Principles through national action

CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY: EMERGENCE, CONVERGENCE, AND RISK, 9,
355 (Mark Pieth & Radha Ivory, 2011).
46 See Peter Oliver, Companies and their Fundamental Rights: A Comparative
Perspective, 64 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 661 (2015); see also Louis Henkin, The Universal
Declaration at 50 and the Challenge of Global Markets, 25 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 17 (1999).
47 Guiding Principles On Business And Human Rights, UNITED NATIONS
HUMAN
RIGHTS
OFFICE
OF
THE
HIGH
COMMISSIONER,
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_
EN.pdf (last visited Apr. 12, 2016)
48 OECD
Guidelines
for
Multinational
Enterprises,
OECD,
http://mneguidelines.oecd.org/text/ (last visited Apr. 12, 2016).
49 Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, Principle 17;
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: Recommendations for
Responsible Business Conduct in a Global Context, Part I, Chap IV Human
Rights, No 5 (May 25, 2011).
50 Human Rights Council Res. 26/9, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/26/9
(July 14, 2014),
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/WGTransCorp/Pages/IGWGOnT
NC.aspx (last accessed April 17, 2016).
51 Id.
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plans and has incorporated the Principles in its external policy. 52 The
(growing) responsibility of transnational companies in regard to the
implementation of human rights must go hand in hand with their
right of being protected by human rights. In other words, the human
rights lobby cannot have their cake and eat it, too.53
2.

A legal person’s human rights

(i) General introduction
It is nearly trite to state that not every human right is
applicable to legal persons. The IBR rights that could be applicable to
legal persons are, inter alia, freedom of expression 54, freedom from
discrimination55, the right to freedom of movement, access to
justice56, fair trial rights 57, or the right not to be searched

52 European Commission,
Commission Staff Working Document on
Implementing the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights - State of Play,
SWD, 144 final (July 14, 2015).
53 See H.R.C. Res. 26/9, supra note 50 (acknowledging the double role of
transnational corporations and other business as having “the capacity to foster
economic well-being, development, technological improvement and wealth, as well
as causing adverse impacts on human rights”).
54 The Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No.
6538/74 (1979); Krone Verlag GmbH & Co. KG v. Austria (no. 3), Eur. Ct. H.R.
App. No. 39069/97 (2003); Matter of the “Golobvision” Television Station,
Provisional Measure Regarding Venezuela, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Nov. 21, 2007).
55 Church of Scientology Moscow v. Russia, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No
18147/02 (Apr. 5, 2007); Moscow Branch of the Salvation Army v. Russia, Eur. Ct.
H.R. App. No. 72881/01 (Oct. 5, 2006); also compare Alexkor Ltd. and Another v.
The Richtersveld Community and Others, S. Afr. S.C. (2003).
56 Access to justice encompasses the notion of denial of justice. Denial of
justice has been recognised as jus cogens independent from being a right contained,
as an aspect of access to justice, in the IBR. See Chevron Corporation (USA) and
Texaco Petroleum Corporation (USA) v. Ecuador, UNCITRAL, Interim Award, at
2-3 (Dec. 1, 2008).
57 British-American Tobacco Company v. the Netherlands, Eur. Ct. H.R.
App. No. 19589/91 (Nov. 20, 1995); Central Mediterranean Development
Corporation Ltd. v. Malta (no. 2), Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 18544/08 (Nov. 22,
2011); Mevopal SA v. Argentina, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 39/99 (Mar.
11, 1999).
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unreasonably.58 The probably most important right for any investor
is, however, the right to property. 59 The right to property is only
protected in the UDHR60; it is not directly protected in the ICCPR or
ICESR.61 Until recently, it was general opinion that a right to
property could only arise under national law.62 However, sweeping
economic and political changes in recent decades have laid the
foundation for recognizing a global right to property. The ideological
opposition against property rights has disappeared with China,
Russia, and other socialist states having transitioned to market
economies which are premised on private property. In addition, the
globalization of trade has enhanced international support for
protecting property rights. Furthermore, the increasing recognition of
(property) rights of indigenous people has also aided a change in

See Peter Oliver, Companies and their Fundamental Rights: A Comparative
Perspective, 64 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 661 (2015), for an in-depth comparative
discussion.
59 “And while one could argue that human rights treaties are
fundamentally different from investment treaties with regard to their purpose of
the protection of individuals compared to the promotion of friendly economic
relations between two states, it should not be forgotten that a fundamental investor
right under investment treaties is the right to property, which is itself a human
right, recognized in most international human rights conventions.” HELGE
ELISABETH ZEITLER, in STEPHAN W. SCHILL (ed.), INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW 199 et seq.
60 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N.
Doc. A/810, Art. 17 (1948) (“(1) [e]veryone has the right to own property alone as
well as in association with others” and “(2) no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of
his property”).
61 Eibe Riedel in THEORIE DER MENSCHENRECHTSSTANDARDS 39
(Dunker & Humbolt, Berlin, 1986) concludes that the travaux préparatoires
indicate that the non-inclusion of property rights in both Covenants originates in
the antagonistic ideological views of the Western and Eastern blocs, as well as
those of the North and South. See also John Sparkling, The Global Right to Property, 52
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 464, 469 (2014); Jacob Mchangama, The Right to Property
in Global Human Rights Law, Cato Policy Report (Washington, June/July 2011),
http://www.cato.org/policy-report/mayjune-2011/right-property-global-humanrights-law (last accessed Apr. 18, 2016) (article maintains a certain political angle).
62 Sparkling, supra note 61, at 464; see also Luis Valencia Rodriguez, The
Right of Everyone to Own Property Alone as Well as in Association with Others, 90 U.N.
Comm’n on H.R., UN Doc E/CN.4/1994/19 (Nov. 25, 1993).
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finding that property is a customary human right.63 The three regional
human rights treaties (the ECHR, the ACHPR, and the ACHR) all
protect property. 64 National constitutions and national laws
overwhelmingly protect the right to property.65 Importantly, even
though the right to property was not included in the ICCPR or the
ICESCR the omission did not equate with the states’ denial of the
right to property. As the Annotation to the Draft International
Covenant on Human Rights clearly declares, “no one questioned the
right of the individual to own property”. 66 A close reading of the
travaux préparatoires aids the conclusion that since the ideological
obstacles in regard to property ownership have been “overcome”, a
redrafted 2016 IBR would include the right to property; it would not
only exist as a principle in the UDHR.67 Therefore, as Golay and
Cismas conclude:68

In regard to the European Union countries, see: Case C-402/05 P and
C-415/05 P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi & Al Barakaat International Foundation v.
European Commission, 2008 E.C.R. I-06351, at 355.
64 Eur. Ct. H.R. Optional Protocol No. 1, art 1; African [Banjul] Charter
on Human and Peoples’ Rights, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58
(1982), Art. 21; American Convention on Human Rights, 1114 U.N.T.S. 123, art
21. That means that 2/3 of all nations are parties to regional human rights treaties
that contain the right to property.
65 In regard to extensive discussions on the protection of the right to
property under national constitutions, see: THEO VAN BANNING, THE HUMAN
RIGHT TO PROPERTY 139-46 (Intersentia, Antwerpen, 2002). See also TOM ALLAN,
THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY IN COMMONWEALTH CONSTITUTIONS 36-82(CUP,
Cambridge, 2000); Luis Valencia Rodríquez, The right of everyone to own property alone as
well as in association with others, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/19, at 64 et seq. (Nov. 25,
1993); Christophe Golay/Ioana Cismas, The Right to Property from a Human Rights
Perspective, International Center for Human Rights and Democractic Development,
at
2.3
(legal
opinion,
2010),
http://www.genevaacademy.ch/docs/publications/ESCR/humanright-en.pdf (last accessed Apr. 18,
2016).
66 See
U.N. Docs. E/CN.4/SR.230-232; E/CN.4/SR.302, 303;
E/CN.4/SR.413-418,
para.
197,
available
at
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/opinion/articles1920_iccpr/docs/A2929.pdf (last accessed Apr. 14, 2016). See also the concern expressed in U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/SR.413-418, para. 198 (“To omit [the right to property] might create the
impression that it was not a fundamental human right”).
67 U.N.
Docs.
E/CN.4/SR.230-232;
E/CN.4/SR.302,
303;
E/CN.4/SR.413-418,
para.
197-212,
available
at
63
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The review of provisions of international instruments,
regional treaties and national constitutions reveal the universal
recognition of the human right to property. It appears that
generalized and consistent State practice and opinio juris reflect the
customary nature of the first paragraph of Article 17 of the UDHR
‘everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association
with others’”.
(ii) The ambit of the right to property
An important question is what the right to property entails.
Any attempt to discuss the ambit of the right to property in a
comprehensive manner would go well beyond the scope of this
article.69 The following sets out the basic features of the ambit of the
right to property.
The UN General Assembly has stated that the right to
property extends to both “[p]ersonal property, including the
residence of one’s self and family”70 and “[e]conomically productive
property, including property associated with agriculture, commerce
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/opinion/articles1920_iccpr/docs/A2929.pdf (last accessed Apr. 14, 2016).
68 Christophe Golay/Ioana Cismas, The Right to Property from a Human
Rights Perspective, International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic
Development, at 2.4 (legal opinion, 2010 ) http://www.genevaacademy.ch/docs/publications/ESCR/humanright-en.pdf (last accessed Apr. 18,
2016); see also Sparkling, supra note 61, who extensively and detailed discusses the
right to property as a right recognized as international law. Denying the jus cogens
quality of the right to property, Joern Axel Kaemmerer, Der Schutz des Eigentums im
Voelkerrecht, (Apr. 20, 2016) (denying the jus cogens quality of the right to
property),
https://www.unitrier.de/fileadmin/fb5/inst/IRP/Bitburger_Gespraeche_Einzeldokumente/Bitbur
gerGespr_2004_I_Kaemmerer_151_175_geschuetzt.pdf.
69 See, e.g., URSULA KRIEBAUM, EIGENTUMSSCHUTZ IM VOELKERRECHT
(Duncker & Humbolt, Berlin, 2008); THEO VAN BANNING, THE HUMAN RIGHT
TO PROPERTY (Intersentia, Antwerpen, 2002); RUDOLF DOLZER, EIGENTUM,
ENTEIGNUNG UND ENTSCHÄDIGUNG IM GELTENDEN VÖLKERRECHT (Springer,
Heidelberg, 1985); Adolph A. Berle, Property, Production and Revolution, 6 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 1-20 (1965); generally, FRIEDRICH CARL V. SAVIGNY, DAS RECHT DES
BESITZES (Heyer, Gießen, 1803).
70 U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/98, para. 3 (Dec. 14 1990).
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and industry”71 In the absence of the right to property being
stipulated by the ICCPR, the Human Rights Committee has not dealt
with the right directly.72 The Inter American Court of Human Rights
and the European Court of Human Rights, on the other hand, have
filled the relative void under the respective Covenants.73 According to
their jurisprudence, the right to property encompasses a wide range
of economic interests like movable and immovable property; tangible
and intangible interests, such as shares, an arbitration award and
intellectual property;74 pension rights75; a business operation76; a
customer base77; vested, asset like, rights78; a license or concession79;
and the right to exercise a profession80

Id.
The Human Rights Committee dealt with the right to property in the
negative. E.g., Kéténguéré Ackla v. Togo, Communication No. 505/1992, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/505/1992, 1996, para. 6.3 (“the Committee noted that,
irrespective of the fact that the confiscation took place prior to the date of entry
into force of the Optional Protocol for Togo, the right to property was not
protected by the Covenant. Accordingly, the Committee decided that this claim was
inadmissible ratione materiae, under article 3 of the Optional Protocol”).
73 In regard to an overview of the jurisprudence of the European Court
of Human Rights, see: Helene Ruiz Fabri, Approach taken by the European Court of
Human Rights to the Assessment of Compensation for Regulatory Exprorpriations of the
Property of Foreign Investors, 11 N.Y.U. ENVIR. L. J. 148 (2012); in regard to the
jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: LAURENCE
BURGORGUE-LARSEN & AMAYA UBEDA DE TORRES, THE INTER-AMERICAN
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (OUP, Oxford, 2011).
74 Lithgow v. United Kingdom, 1986 ECHR 8 (1986); Ivcher Bronstein
Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 74 (Feb. 6, 2001), available at http://wwwl
.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/C/74-ing.html; Palamara-Iribarne v. Chile, Merits,
Reparations, and Costs, (ser. C) No. 135, para. 96 (Nov. 22, 2005); Salvador
Chiriboga v. Ecuador, Preliminary Objections and Merits, (ser. C) No. 179 (May 6,
2008).
75 Azinas v. Cyprus, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 56679/00 (Apr. 28, 2004);
Torres Benvenuto et al v. Peru (Five Pensioners Case), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
98 (Feb. 28, 2003); Acevedo Buendía et al (Discharged and Retired Employees of the
Office of the Comptroller) v. Peru, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and
Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 198, para. 80–91 (July 1, 2009).
76 Van Marle v. Netherlands, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 8543/79; 8674/79;
8675/79; 8685/79 (June 26, 1986)
77 Latridis v. Greece, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 31107/96, ECHR 1999-II
75 (Mar. 25, 1999).
78 Holy Monastries v. Greece, Eur. Ct. H.R., 20 EHHR 1 (1995).
71
72
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Importantly the ECHR has extended the concept of
protected property to rights arising from contracts and other types of
claims81, including, for example, claims to restitution under national
law82 Furthermore, the Court has held that a legitimate expectation
of a property right is protected under Article 1(1) Optional Protocol
to the ECHR. In Slivenko v Latvia the Court stated:83
[p]ossessions” can be “existing possessions” or assets,
including claims by virtue of which the applicant can
argue that he or she has at least a “legitimate
expectation” of acquiring effective enjoyment of a
property right.
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has summarized
the right to property as84

Tre Traktörer AB Garamond v. Sweden, Eur. Ct. H.R., A159, para. 53
(1989); Fredin v. Sweden, Eur. Ct. H.R., 13 EHRR 784 (Feb. 18, 2991).
80 Gospodinova v. Bulgaria, Eur. Comm’n H.R. App. No. 37912/97
(Apr. 16, 1998) (decision on admissibility); Jantner v. Slovakia, Eur. Ct. H.R. App.
No. 39050/97, para. 34 (Mar. 4, 2003); Kopecký v. Slovakia, Eur. Ct. H.R. App.
No. 44912/98 (GC) 2004-IX, para. 35 (2004); von Maltzan et al v. Germany, Eur.
Ct. H.R. App. No. 71916/01, 71917/01, 10260/02, para. 74 (Mar. 2 2005) (decision
on admissibility).
81 Compare, e.g., Pressos Compania Naviera SA v. Belgium, Eur. Ct. H.R.
21 EHHR 301 (1995) (tort claim); Monica Carss-Frisk, A guide to the implementation of
Artice 1 of the Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights, Human Rights
Handbooks, No. 4, para. 29 et seq. (Strasbourg, 2001).
82 Compare, e.g., Kirilova and Others v. Bulgaria, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No.
42908/98 et al: (June 9, 2005) (final, Sept. 9 2005), and (June 14, 2007) (final, Sept.
14, 2007).
83 Slivenko and Others v. Latvia, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 48321/99, (GC)
ECHR 2002-II, para. 121 (2002); see also, Vander Mussele v. Belgium, Eur. Ct. H.R.
App. No. 8919/80 (ser. A) 70, para. 48 (1983); Pine Valley Developments Ltd. v.
Ireland, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 12742/87 (ser. A) 222 (1991).
84 Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Judgment of
Aug. 31, 2001, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, para. 144; see also, Yakye Axa
Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (June 17, 2005); Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Merits,
Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Mar. 29, 2006); Saramaka People v.
Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 172 (Nov. 28, 2007).
79
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those material things which can be possessed, as well
as any right which may be part of a person’s
patrimony; that concept includes all moveables and
immovables, corporeal and incorporeal elements and
any other intangible object capable of having value.
What is not protected is the right or guarantee to acquire
property in the future.85
It is undisputed that the right to property protects the right’s
bearer from the direct expropriation of their property. 86 Right’s
bearers are also protected from a de facto deprivation of property. 87
As the ECHR observed:88
In the absence of formal expropriation, that is to say a
transfer of ownership, the Court considers that it
must look behind the appearances and investigate the
realities of the situation complained of . . . Since the
Convention is intended to guarantee rights that are
“practical and effective” . . . it has to be ascertained
whether th[e] situation amount[s] to a de facto
expropriation….
(iii) Summary
In the present day, not only individual investors but also
corporations have to be afforded human rights. The inclusion of
(transnational) legal persons in the protection sphere of international
human rights has to be the consequence of requiring corporations to
Marckx v. Belgium, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 6833/74 (1979); X v. the
Federal Republic of Germany, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 8410/78 (1979).
86 Ursula Kriebaum & Christoph Schreuer, The Concept of Property in
Human Rights Law and International Investment Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY
AND THE RULE OF LAW: LIBER AMICORUM LUZIUS WILDHABER 748 (Zurich,
2007),
available
at
http://www.univie.ac.at/intlaw/wordpress/pdf/88_concept_property.pdf
(last
accessed Apr. 18, 2016) (p. 5 of the linked publication)
87 Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 7152/75
(1982); Monica Carss-Frisk, supra note 81, para. 67 et seq.
88 Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden, supra note 87, para. 63.
85
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be protectors of human rights. The most important right for an
investor, the right to property, has attained customary international
law status. At this point in time the ambit of the right has to be
ascertained through the analysis of (especially) the European Court of
Human Rights and the Inter American Court of Human Rights
jurisprudence. Such an analysis reveals that the right to property
extensively protects the economic interests of corporations in regard
to direct, and importantly also de facto expropriation, and the
curtailment of the use and enjoyment of their property. 89 The right to
property protects the physical assets of a corporation but also its
intangible assets. Importantly, the right to property also protects the
business operation including legitimate expectations.
3.

Conclusion

Both citizens as well as investors are afforded rights under
international human rights law. However, at this point in time the
state’s citizens’ enjoyment of human rights is on more solid
foundations than those of legal persons in general and investors in
particular. Citizens’ rights most likely to be at stake in an investorstate dispute are so called second and third generation rights. Those
rights are enshrined in the ICESCR or rights which have attained
customary international law status. Even though generally their
justiciability is not without doubt, it is generally accepted that those
rights demand a constant progressive realization from states.90 For
most investors, their human rights protection will depend on the
acknowledgment that they can, as legal persons, be bearers of
international human rights, in particular the IBR. Since
(transnational) corporations are relied upon for the progressive
realization of human rights, those obligations must come with the
right to be a human rights bearer. A number of rights which have
89 See European Court of Human Rights, Factsheet: Companies-Victims or
Culprits (July 2013); Ursula Kriebaum & Christoph Schreuer, supra note 86
(discussing the differences between investment law and human rights law in regard
to the issues arising in the limitation of the investor’s economic interest. However,
the different treatment does not necessitates a different outcome in regard to
protection).
90 See above II.A. in regard to the concept of the states’ duty to
progressive realization.
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been or could be the focus of human rights violations by the state are
ICCPR rights which are unquestionably justiciable. The right to
property, which is undoubtedly the most important right to be
upheld for the investor, has come into its own and has achieved at
least near customary international law status. Therefore, international
human rights law does afford investors protection in regard to the
investment they have made.
No human rights bearer, however, holds their rights
absolutely. Article 29(2) of the UDHR generally acknowledges that,
in the exercise of
rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to
such limitations as are determined by law solely for
the purpose of securing due recognition and respect
for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting
the just requirements of morality, public order and
the general welfare in a democratic society.
Some rights in the IBR have specific limitations.91 Whether
specific limitations apply to the right to property is at this point in
time not generally recognized since the right to property has just
emerged on the international plane. Guidance can again be sought
from the ECHR and the ACHR. Article 1 of the Optional Protocol
No 1 to the ECHR 92 grants the state the possibility to limit the
individual’s right to property due to public interest. The ACHR also
allows the limitation of the right to property due to public interest.

The right to freedom of expression (art. 19(2), ICCPR), for example,
can be limited when it is necessary for the country’s national security (art. 19(3)(b)).
92 Optional Protocol No 1, Art. 1 reads: “Every natural or legal person is
entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of
his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided
for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding
provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such
laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the
general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or
penalties.” See Yukos v. Russia, Judgement, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 14902/04,
para. 554 (Sept. 20, 2011), in regard to the general interpretation of Art. 1.
91
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The ACHR only allows a limitation to the right to property for just
compensation. 93
The citizen’s rights in question are rights that require a
progressive realization by the state.94 To justify preventing the
realization of one right at the expense of another right, the realization
must be reasonable.95 It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss
the limitations on the right to property and the citizen’s rights at any
length. For the purpose of this article it is important to state that
neither the investor’s rights nor those of the citizens are absolute.
Human rights law has developed internal limitation mechanisms to
take account of the fact that the individual’s enjoyment of rights take
place within the community of other rights holders.
In addition to internally accepted limitations on a right, the
commonly used analytical framework to balance the rights of human
ACHR, Art. 21(2) : “No one shall be deprived of his property except
upon payment of just compensation, for reasons of public utility or social interest,
and in the cases and according to the forms established by law.” In Salvador
Chiriboga v. Ecuador, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 179 (May 6, 2008), the city
had expropriated applicant’s land for use as a public park but failed to pay any
compensation. The Court held that the public interest or social utility standard was
satisfied since the park provided a recreational and ecological protected area for the
benefit of city residents. However, the Court found a violation of the right to
property due to the city’s failure to comply with expropriation procedures required
under domestic law (i.e., failure to pay compensation). The Court also observed that
a restriction on the right to property must be proportionate to the legitimate
interest that justifies it, which requires a fair balance between the interests of the
public and owner. The ECtHR also generally requires compensation for a
limitation of the right to property. James et al v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R.
App. No. 8793/79 (ser. A) No. 98, para. 54 (Feb. 21, 1986) (“[T]he taking of
property in the public interest without payment of compensation is treated as
justifiable only in exceptional circumstances not relevant for present purposes”);
Lithgow and Others v. the United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 9006/80 et
al., para. 120 (July 8, 1986) (“[T]he taking of property in the public interest without
payment of compensation is treated as justifiable only in exceptional
circumstances”)..
94 See above II.B.2.(i).
95 The principle of reasonableness as an inherent limit of socio-economic
rights has been best developed by the South African Constitutional Court, see
Khosa v. Minister of Social Development, 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC) (Mar. 4, 2004); see
also, Kevin Iles, Limiting Socio-Economic Rights: Beyond the Internal Limitation Clause, 20
S. AFR. J. OF HUM. RTS. 448 (2004).
93
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rights holders to allow for the fullest human rights fulfillment is
proportionality. Proportionality has been received inter alia into the
constitutional doctrine of courts in continental Europe96, the United
Kingdom97, Canada98, New Zealand99, Israel100, South Africa101, and
the United States102, as well as the jurisprudence of treaty-based legal
systems such as the European Convention on Human Rights 103, the
American Convention on Human Rights, 104 the European Court of
Justice,105 and the ICCPR106107 The core proportionality analysis
requires the following inquiries to be made:
a)

Is there a legitimate aim in regard to the measure in
question?

b) Is the measure suitable to achieve the aim?
E.g., Bundesverfasungsgericht 1 BvR 2378/98 (Mar. 3, 2004) (police
surveillance powers in regard to living space).
97 R (Daly) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] UKHL
26; Huang v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 11;
Kashmiri v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 11.
98 R v. Oakes [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (Can.).
99 R v. Hansen [2007] N.Z.S.C. 7, para. 102 (N.Z.).
100 CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Cooperative Village
49(4) PD 221, 353 (1995) (Isr.).
101 S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) (S. Afr.).
102 In regard to the United States, see Iddo Porat, Mapping the American
Debate over Balancing in GRANT HUSCROFT/BRADLEY MILLER/GREGOIRE WEBBER,
PROPORTIONALITY AND THE RULE OF LAW 397 (CUP, Cambridge, 2016).
103 Handyside v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R., [1976] ECHR 5 (Dec.
7, 1976); Soering v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R., 11 EHRR 439 (1989); Helene
Ruiz Fabri, Approach taken by the European Court of Human Rights to the Assessment of
Compensation for Regulatory Exprorpriations of the Property of Foreign Investors (2002) 11
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 148, 163 (2002).
104 Compare IACHR, Art. 27(1) and discussion in YUTAKA ARAITAKASHI, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE AND THE PRINCIPLE OF
PROPORTIONALITY IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE ECHR 186 (intersentia,
Antwerp, 2001).
105 E.g., Sky Österreich, E.C.J. (GC) C-283/11, para. 50 et seq. (Jan. 22,
2013).
106 U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31, para. 6
(Mar. 29, 2004).
107 For an in depth discussion on the framework of proportionality in
different jurisdictions, see GRANT HUSCROFT, BRADLEY MILLER and GREGOIRE
WEBBER, PROPORTIONALITY AND THE RULE OF LAW (CUP, Cambridge, 2016).
96
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Is the measure necessary to achieve the aim?

d) Is the measure the least rights infringing means to
achieve the aim?
e)

Considering the competing interests of the different
rights bearers at hand is the measure proportional?

The human rights framework demands a balancing of the
investor’s rights with the rights of the citizens, i.e. the state’s right to
make public policy decisions to safeguard its citizens’ rights. The
human rights framework internally limits a state’s measure in regard
to the realization of the rights in question, like the right to health or
water. The proportionality paradigm gives the balancing a tested
structure. It is therefore curious that a review of arbitral awards
reveals that arbitral tribunals have turned a blind eye to the human
rights of the state’s citizens, as an extensive study by Jason Fry
determined.108 The argument generally advanced is that the arbitral
tribunal gets its power by virtue of the parties set out in an
investment treaty between the host state and the investor’s state. And
as long as the investment treaty does not stipulate an authority for the
investment tribunal to have regard to the citizens’ human rights,
tribunals do not have the authority to do so. 109 That has resulted in,
as Bruno Simma put it:110
a problem of aiming at two moving targets: for the
foreign investor, how to accurately estimate the
political risks of the investment before, or at the time
of, its establishment in the host State so as to enable
the investor to price the contract cost correctly
according to its projected returns on investment; and
for the host State, how to determine the optimal
degree of police powers and regulatory authority to be
retained during the life of the investment, needed to
perform its international human rights obligations.
Jason Fry, International Human Rights Law in Investment Arbitration:
Evidence of International Law’s Unity, 18 DUKE J. OF COMP. & INT’L L. 77 (2007).
109 Bruno Simma, Foreign Investment Arbitration: A Place for Human
Rights?, 60 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 573, 582 (2011).
110 Id. at 579.
108
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The non-use of the human rights framework by arbitral
tribunals is problematic. The reason is that the right which is at the
heart of investment arbitration – the right to access to justice – is the
right which puts the investor, at least sometimes, in a better position
than a state’s citizens. In a country with a non-functioning
adjudication system111 the investors, unlike the citizens, have through
investor-state arbitration an avenue open to them that allows access
to justice to independent adjudicators who are outside that nonfunctioning adjudication system. In this inequality lies the potential
human rights violation of investor-state arbitration but also the
potential for investor-state arbitration.
C. International Arbitration Approaches
Having set out the human rights framework applicable to the
investor-state relationship the paper will briefly set out the currently
proposed approaches of how tribunals can be compelled to take
human rights into account.
1.

Current Approaches

Broadly speaking three approaches are advanced. All
approaches are centered on the investment treaty. They have as their
underlying premise that human rights can only be taken into account
if, and as far as, an investment tribunal is allowed to consider rules of
international law. They allow any kind of human rights analysis only
in so far as human rights can be placed in a particular relationship
with the investment treaty concerned. 112 The core premise of those
approaches is illustrated by the travaux prepartoires of Article 42(1) of
the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID
Convention) which refers to “such rules of international law as may
be agreed by the parties.”113

“non- functioning” for the purposes of this article is meant in the
widest sense including a legal system that does grant effective justice.
112 See Bruno Simma, supra note 109, at 581-82.
113 ICSID Report of the Executive Directors, I ICSID Rep. 31 (2006)
(emphasis added) (cited in CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A
111
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(i) Explicit Referencing Approach
The first approach advanced is to draft (in the future)
investment treaties that clearly state that a tribunal has to take the
state’s human rights commitments into account. 114 Among the rare
investment treaties that do make reference to human rights already,
human rights are addressed in two different ways none of which
gives the tribunal an explicit mandate to incorporate a human rights
analysis into its decision making process. First, certain treaty clauses,
such as Article 1114(1) of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), allow a host state under its respective regimes
to enact measures aimed at protecting human rights.115 However,
such measures are only allowed to the extent that they are consistent
with the terms of the investment treaty.116 Second, other treaty
clauses provide that the provisions of the investment treaty do not
limit the regulatory power of states regarding the protection of
human rights. Article 10(1) of the Canadian BIT Model provides
such an example.117 The Comprehensive Economic and Trade
COMMENTARY 609 (CUP, Cambridge, 2001)). Pursuant to the report by the
Executive Directors, the term ‘international law’ as used in the context of the
Convention has to be understood in the sense given to it by Article 38(1) of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice. In light of this statement, the
applicable rules of international law are those contained in treaties, customary law,
and general principles of law recognized by civilized nations. Therefore, under the
ICSID Convention the IBR has to be taken into account if the investment treaty
makes reference to international law.
114 Bruno Simma, supra note 109, at 579.
115 See, e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art.
1114(1), Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
116
NAFTA, art 1114(1) (“Nothing in this Chapter [11] shall be
construed to prevent a Party from adopting, maintaining or enforcing any measure
otherwise consistent with this Chapter that it considers appropriate to ensure that
investment activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to
environmental concern”) (emphasis added).
117 Model Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments,
art. 10(1) (2004): “Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in
a manner that would constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between
investments or between investors, or a disguised restriction on international trade
or investment, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent a Party
from adopting or enforcing measures necessary: (a) to protect human, animal or
plant
life
or
health.”
Available
at
http://www.italaw.com/documents/Canadian2004-FIPA-model-en.pdf
(last
accessed 3 April 2016); see also the Norwegian Draft Model BIT (2015), which has
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Agreement (CETA) between Canada and the European Union as a
recent instance includes a clause which protects human rights
explicitly.118 Those express references to the state’s ability to regulate
with the aim to foster human rights are stating the obvious. As set
out in the previous part of this paper states are compelled by the IBR
to attain the highest standard in human rights compliance for their
citizens. A reminder of that in an investment treaty is undoubtedly
useful. In addition what is proposed is to clearly state in an
investment treaty a tribunal’s ability to weigh the state’s aim to foster
human rights compliance through its social and economic policy
against the investor’s right to its investment.
In regard to existing investment treaties two approaches have
been proposed:
(ii) Dynamic Interpretation Approach
The first approach promulgates a dynamic interpretation as
set out by the International Court of Justice in Kasiliki, Sedudu Island
(Botswana v Namibia):119 where treaties use known legal terms whose
content the parties expected would change through time, 120 the
meaning of these terms will be determined by reference to
international law as it has evolved and stands at present, rather than
to the state of the law at the time of the conclusion of the treaty. 121

an equivalent to art. 10 in its art. 25. In addition, art. 31 reads: “The Parties agree to
encourage investors to conduct their investment activities in
compliance with the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, the UN
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and to participate in the United
Nations Global Compact.”
118 Consolidated Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement Text,
EU-Canada, Oct. 30, 2016, Annex 8-E (“. . . . the Parties confirm their
understanding that measures that are ‘related to the maintenance of international
peace and security’ include the protection of human rights”), available at
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/september/tradoc_152806.pdf (last
accessed Feb. 15, 2017).
119 Kasiliki, Sedudu Island (Botswana v Namibia), Judgment, 1999 I.C.J.
Rep. 1045.
120 Id. at 2 (Declaration of Judge Rosalyn Higgins).
121 The same technic was utilized in Ronald Lauder v. Czech Republic,
Final
Award
of
Sept.
3,
2001,
at
para.
200,
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The European Court of Human Rights applies this principle as a
matter of routine, basing it inter alia on articles 31(1) and 31(2) of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.122
(iii) Interpretative Presumption Approach
The other school of thought emphasizes the interpretative
presumption that treaties are intended to produce effects which
accord with existing rules of international law.123 This presumption is
used to resolve issues of interpretation relating to the broader
normative content of a treaty rather than to the meaning of a specific
term. This argument is based on article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties124 which states that in the
interpretation of a treaty between the parties has to take account of
“[a]ny relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations
between the parties.” However, as Bruno Simma points out article
31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention can only be employed as a means
of harmonization qua interpretation, and not for the purpose of
modification, of an existing treaty.
2.

The Human Rights Centric Approach

However, is the Vienna Convention on Treaties really the
glue that prevents international law to disintegrate into a 1000 pieces?
In domestic law the respective constitution (generally containing a
human rights catalogue) is allowed comfortably to be the overarching
umbrella that gives the law legitimacy and provides a framework in
what the state but also its citizens can engage in and are allowed to
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0451.pdf
(last
accessed Feb. 15, 2017).
122 See, e.g., SE Golder v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No
4451/70, Report of the Commission, CE doc. D-60-355, 25 (June 1, 1973); also Id.,
Judgment, 29-36 (Feb. 21, 1975).
123 Case Concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v.
India), Preliminary Objections, 1957 I.C.J. Rep. 142; Corfu Channel case (U.K. v.
Albania), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 104.
124 See also Ciaran Cross & Christian Schliemann-Radbruch, When
Investment Arbitration curbs Domestic Regulatory Space: Consistent Solutions through Amicus
Curiae Submissions by Regional Organisations, 6 L & DEV. REV. 67, 87 (2013).
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do. On the international plane this paper argues the IBR provides
this overarching umbrella. The IBR sets out the paradigm in which
states but also the arbitrators and the investors have to operate in. If
states would not have to adhere to the IBR (and as stated at the
beginning since those rights embodied in the IBR are customary so
every state has to adhere to them) then human rights protection
would be illusory. The IBR has to be treated as jus congens by any
tribunal in investment treaties decisions. Article 53 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that “a treaty is void if,
at the time its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of
general international law.” The general principle that is extrapolated is
that domestic as well as international law follows a hierarchy whereby
treaty obligations are of no effect in the event that they conflict with
a fundamental jus congens.125 The IBR contains the most globally
recognized norms. International investment law itself should not be
blind to human rights.126 By signing an investment treaty states
cannot relieve themselves from any human rights obligation towards
their citizens. It should not matter whether the state includes human
rights protection in those treaties or not. It cannot lie in the hands of
the states or the investors whether human rights are applicable. 127
Regarding that international investment law constitutes a public law
discipline128, neither states nor investors can “flee into private law”129
Luke Eric Peterson & Kevin R. Gray, International Human Rights in
Bilateral Investment Treaties and in Investment Treaty Arbitration 18 (International
Institute for Sustainable Development Research Paper, Apr. 2004),
https://www.iisd.org/pdf/2003/investment_int_human_rights_bits.pdf
(last
accessed Feb. 15, 2017).
126 Filip Balcerzak, Jurisdiction of Tribunals in Investor–State Arbitration and the
Issue of Human Rights, 29 ICSID Rev. 216, at VI (2016),
https://academic.oup.com/icsidreview/article/29/1/216/2356645/Jurisdictionof-Tribunals-in-Investor-State (last accessed Feb. 15, 2017).
127 For a different opinion, see Tamar Meshel, Human Rights in InvestorState Arbitration: The Human Right to Water and Beyond, 6 J. OF INT’L DISP.
SETTLEMENT
277,
281
(2015),
https://academic.oup.com/jids/article/6/2/277/819997/Human-Rights-inInvestor-State-Arbitration-The (last accessed Feb. 15, 2017), who points out in his
conclusion that the highest responsibility for human rights protection bears the
state while building an investment treaty, even though he recognizes the possible
influence of investment arbitration tribunals regardless of investment treaties
clauses at least for the human right to water.
128 STEPHAN W. SCHILL, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND
COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW 17 et al. (2010).
125
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when it comes to violation of basic general law principles.130 The
ability of states to contract out, even partially, of the IBR would
seriously undermine human rights protection globally. As set out
above under B the IBR provides not only protection for citizens but
also for the investor. And also the arbitrator is part of the paradigm
as Lalive so clearly pointed out:131
While he is clearly not an organ of the State, the
international arbitrator is not acting in a legal vacuum
and is not called upon to decide, so to speak, as if he
did not belong to this world! The question may be
raised here, in passing [ . . . ] whether the arbitrator is
not, perhaps, the organ of the international
community, be it the community of States or the
‘international community of businessmen’ (in which
more and more States and State organs appear to be
active) or both international communities.
The investor-state relationship illustrates the private-public
divide on the international plane. The private-public divide, i.e. when
is a state action private when public, is one of the most contested in
every jurisdiction.132 One of the fundamental issues is that the
Compare the principle in German Public Law “keine Flucht ins
Privatrecht”, see Ferdinand Kirchhof, Art. 83, n.103, in GRUNDGESETZKOMMENTAR, 78 (Maunz & Dürig eds., Sept. 2016); Thorsten Kingreen, AEUV
Art. 36, n.111, in EUV/AEUV 5 (Calliess & Ruffert eds., 2016).
130 Compare Wolfgang Friedmann, The Use of “General Principles” in the
Development of International Law, 57 AM. J. INT’L L. 279, 295 (Apr., 1963) (“The
science of international law can no longer be content with the analogous
application of private law categories. It must search the entire body of the ‘general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations’ for proper analogies. With the
growing importance of international legal relations between public authorities and
private legal subjects, public law will be an increasingly fertile source of
international law”).
131 Pierre Lalive, Transnational (or Truly International) Public Policy and
International Arbitration, in COMPARATIVE ARBITRATION PRACTICE AND PUBLIC
POLICY IN ARBITRATION, ICCA Congress Series No. 3 at 258, 302 (1986).
132 For an overview of the German discussion, See Ulrich Stelkens, The
Public-Private Divide: Annual Report – 2010 – Germany, IUS PUBLICUM
NETWORK
REV.
(Nov.
2011),
http://www.iuspublicum.com/repository/uploads/23_11_2011_10_39_Stelkens.pdf (last accessed
May 28, 2016), for an overview of the German discussion. For an overview of the
129
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arbitration community seems to view the investor-state relationship
from a private law lens centering its analysis of the relationship
between in the investor and the state solely on the investment treaty.
The investment treaty, a treaty between two or more states, does
have to be the starting point of the analysis. The object of an
investment treaty is to attract investment, i.e. business, something
commonly associated with private law. However, only because the
subject matter of the treaty is private does not mean that public law
principles, i.e. human rights, do not apply to its interpretation. As the
German Constitutional Court has convincingly and regularly stated: a
state cannot resort to a private measure to circumvent its human
rights commitments since otherwise human rights protection would
be illusive.133
To accept the proposed paradigm in this article would mean
that human rights, as enshrined in the IBR, have to be taken into
account by the arbitral tribunal whether or not there is an
interpretative “hole” or “hook” in the respective investment treaty.
Human rights are the structure in which the investment treaty is fixed
to and which ultimately limits it. In other words, the paradigm
proposed is the opposite paradigm of, what is at this stage, the
general opinion where the investment treaty provides the structure in
which human rights have to find a hook to be able to find hold in
that structure. Thereby, while balancing the interests of the investor
against the interests of the citizens, arbitrators not only harmonize
two potentially conflicting regimes of international law (investment
law and human rights law) but, in substance, also highlight the human
dimension of investment law.134

discussion regarding the United Kingdom, see Dawn Oliver, common values in public
and private law and the public/private divide, in BA Rider (ed), LAW AT THE CENTRE 119
(Kluwer, London, 1999); see generally Christine Chinkin, A Critique of the Public/Private
Dimension, 10 EUR. J. INT’’L LAW 387 (1999); LAW COMMISSION OF CANADA, NEW
PERSPECTIVES ON THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DIVIDE (2007).
133 See BVerfGE 15, 256, 262; BVerfGE 21, 362, 369, 370; BVerfGE 115,
205, 237.
134 Yannik Radi, Realizing Human Rights in Investment Treaty Arbitration: A
Perspective from within the International Investment Law Toolbox, N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM.
REG. 1107, 1114 (2011).
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D. Conclusion
An analysis of the international human rights framework
demonstrates that states’ citizens as well as the foreign investors are
human rights bearers. Human rights methodology provides for a
balancing of conflicting rights’ positions. The current inclusion of
human rights into the decision making of arbitral tribunals occurs
through an investment treaty centered interpretation. That general
approach limits the tribunal’s ability, if not discourages, to consider
the relevant human rights of citizens and investors alike in its
decision-making. Arbitrators are part of the international community
and their mandate is not only determined by their appointment and
the relevant investment treaty provisions but also by the international
constitutional framework, i.e. the applicable human rights norms.
Even if an arbitral tribunal would ignore an exciting investment treaty
a human rights analysis would not disregard the rights of the investor.
Therefore, if a human rights analysis does not differ in its outcome
significantly from the analyses of tribunals under the relevant
investment treaty then it evidences that an arbitral tribunal does not
have to fear the inclusion of a human rights analysis in its decisionmaking process. On the contrary, an inclusion of a human rights
analysis will aid the decision-making process and most importantly
will foster a constructive dialogue with the human rights lobby and
thereby would promote the legitimacy of investment arbitration.
III. THE CASE
Investors have successfully sought relief in front of regional
human rights courts135 and domestic courts136 for government
interference with their investment. An analysis in light of the
international human rights framework adds an important dimension.
135 See, e.g., Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez v. Ecuador, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R.
(ser.
C)
no.
170
(Nov.
21,
2007),
available
at
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_170_ing.pdf (last accessed
May 10, 2016); Oao Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, Eur. Ct. H.R. App.
No. 14902/04 (Mar. 8, 2012).
136 See
Overview
in
Helene
Brubowski,
Internationale
Investionsschiedsverfahren und nationale Gerichte, Jus Internationale et Europaeum 79
(Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 2013).
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As set out earlier the international human rights framework provides
the global human rights standard available to every international
arbitral tribunal by virtue of being international. It provides the
globally accepted minimum human rights standard.
The general way human rights cases are approached are by
defining the ambit of the right that is potentially infringed and once
an infringement is established to balance the limiting of that right
with the rights of other rights holders since it is accepted that rights
can be justifiably limited by the rights of others. In the following that
methodology will be applied to TECMED v Mexico.137 The tribunals
approach in the judgement was also followed by other tribunals later
on, for example, in Azurix v Argentina.138
A. The Investment Arbitration Tribunal Decision
TECMED, a Spanish company with its two Mexican
subsidiaries, brought a claim against Mexico alleging several
violations of the Spain-Mexico BIT. The claim concerned
TECMED’s investment in a hazardous waste landfill site acquired in
1996. TECMED alleged that Mexico failed to renew a license for the
site.
In the investment arbitration proceedings TECMED alleged
the failure to renew the license rendered the investment completely
lost, as it did not have any economic value as an ongoing business.
TECMED alleged violations of the BIT, including expropriation, fair
and equitable treatment and full protection and security. The tribunal
found that Mexico’s action in effect expropriated TECMED’s
investment, and that it failed to provide fair and equitable treatment.
The Tribunal interestingly did balance Mexico’s interest in its

137 TECMED v Mexico, ICSID Case no. ARB(AF)/00/2 (May 29, 2003)
(the author chose this case as one of the earlier cases where the arbitral tribunal
payed regard to balancing the rights of the investor against the rights of Mexico’s
citizens).
138 Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12,
Award of July 14, 2006, para. 311, http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita0061.pdf (last accessed Feb. 15, 2017).
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environment and the investor’s right to property. The Tribunal
stated:139
After establishing that regulatory actions and
measures will not be initially excluded from the
definition of expropriatory acts, in addition to the
negative financial impact of such actions or measures,
the Arbitral Tribunal will consider, in order to
determine if they are to be characterized as
expropriatory, whether such actions or measures are
proportional to the public interest presumably
protected thereby and to the protection legally
granted to investments, taking into account that the
significance of such impact has a key role upon
deciding the proportionality. Although the analysis
starts at the due deference owing to the State when
defining the issues that affect its public policy or the
interests of society as a whole, as well as the actions
that will be implemented to protect such values, such
situation does not prevent the Arbitral Tribunal,
without thereby questioning such due deference, from
examining the actions of the State in light of Article
5(1) of the Agreement to determine whether such
measures are reasonable with respect to their goals,
the deprivation of economic rights and the legitimate
expectations of who suffered such deprivation. There
must be a reasonable relationship of proportionality
between the charge or weight imposed to the foreign
investor and the aim sought to be realized by any
expropriatory measure. To value such charge or
weight, it is very important to measure the size of the
ownership deprivation caused by the actions of the
state and whether such deprivation was compensated
or not. On the basis of a number of legal and practical
factors, it should be also considered that the foreign
TECMED v Mexico, supra note 137, at para. 122. Also recently
quoted in Philip Morris v. Uruguay, ICSID Case no. ARB(AF)/10/7, para. 295
(July 8, 2016), where it stressed that the tribunal relied on the jurisprudence of the
European Court of Human Rights, based on Article 1 of Protocol 1 of the
Convention..
139
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investor has a reduced or nil participation in the
taking of the decisions that affect it, partly because
the investors are not entitle to exercise political rights
reserved to the nationals of the State, such as voting
for the authorities that will issue the decisions that
affect such investors.
B. The Human Rights Tribunal Decision
This paper will limit its human rights analysis to the right to
property.
1.

Ambit of the right infringed?

The first step in a human rights analysis is to define the ambit
of the right that is potentially involved to determine whether the act
or omission is protected by the right. As discussed under II.B.2.(ii).
the right to property encompasses a license140 as well as legitimate
expectations in proprietary positions141 In TECMED the investor
sustained a complete loss of the profits and income from the
economic and commercial operation of the landfill as an ongoing
business. The damage sustained included the impossibility of
recovering the cost incurred in the acquisition of assets for the
landfill, its adaptation and preparation and, more generally, the
investments relating to or required for this kind of industrial activity.
That included, but was not limited to, constructions relating to the
landfill; lost profits and business opportunities; the impossibility of
performing contracts entered into with entities producing industrial
waste. Thus the government’s action lead to the termination of such
contracts and to possible claims relating thereto. Furthermore, the
government’s action resulted in a loss of reputation for TECMED

140 Compare Tre Traktörer ABGaramond v. Sweden, Eur. Ct. H.R. App.
No. 10873/84, para. 53 (1989); Fredin v. Sweden, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No.
12033/86 (1991); Latridis v. Greece, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 31107/96 (1999).
141 Compare Slivenko v. Latvia, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 48321/99 (2003),
para. 121; see also Vander Mussele v. Belgium, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 8919/80
(ser. A), para. 48 (1983); Pine Valley Developments Ltd. v. Ireland, 222 Eur. Ct.
H.R. App. No. 12742/87 (ser. A) (1991).
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and to its subsidiaries in Mexico. The consequence was a negative
impact on TECMED’s capacity to expand and develop its activities
in Mexico. Even though the government did not expropriate
TECMED its actions rendered the property of TECMED de facto
useless. In addition, TECMED’s expectation in the license and the
license itself are protected by the right to property. Therefore,
TECMED’s activities and expectations in regard to the operation of
the landfill were protected by the customary right to property.
TECMED’s right to its property was infringed by the actions of
Mexico’s government. As set out above under II.B.2.(ii). the right to
property can be limited if the property owner is compensated fairly
for the expropriation.142 If the state compensates fairly for the
expropriation the right to property is not infringed.
2.

Proportionality Analysis

After establishing that TECMED’s right to property in the
landfill was infringed through the government’s action the next
inquiry is whether the government’s action is a justified limitation on
TECMED’s right to property. That inquiry is particularly fact
specific. Since the arbitral tribunal did not engage in a human rights
analysis the government did not provide the facts to the standard
needed for a proportionality analysis according to the record. The
analysis is limited to the facts set out in the award.
(i) Is there a Legitimate Aim in Regard to the Measure in Question?
As set out under II.A. the right to health is a right protected
by ICESCR which the state has to progressively realize. The
Tribunal itself observed that:
the Arbitral Tribunal has to resolve any dispute
submitted to it by applying international law
What constitutes a “fair”, “just”, or “reasonable” compensation is of
course a matter of contention. It is beyond the scope of this article. For further
reading in regard to the ECtHR: Helene Ruiz Fabri, Approach taken by the European
Court of Human Rights to the Assessment of Compensation for Regulatory Expropriations of the
Property of Foreign Investors, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J,., 148, 165 et seq. (2002).
142
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provisions (Title VI.1 of the Appendix to the
Agreement), for which purpose the Arbitral Tribunal
understands that disputes are to be resolved by
resorting to the sources described in Article 38 of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice
considered, also in the case of customary international
law, not as frozen in time, but in their evolution. 143
Interestingly, the Tribunal only applied international law and
customary international law in regard to its understanding of the right
to property and the question whether indirect de facto expropriation
amounted to expropriation. It did not discuss international law or
customary international law applicable to the citizens of Mexico.
Instead the tribunal found that it was not concerned with whether
non-renewal of the permit was legal under domestic law. It held:144
The Arbitral Tribunal will not review the grounds or
motives of the Resolution in order to determine
whether it could be or was legally issued. However, it
must consider such matters to determine if the
Agreement was violated. That the actions of the
Respondent are legitimate or lawful or in compliance
with the law from the standpoint of the Respondent’s
domestic laws does not mean that they conform to
the Agreement or to international law.
Even if the Tribunal is correct by not reviewing the legality of
the non-renewal of the permit under domestic law the Tribunal in
accordance with its own reliance on Article 38 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice has to take into account the
international law and the international customary law applicable to
the citizens of the state.
The state is obligated under Article 12 ICESCR to safeguard
and to progressively realise the highest attainable standard of the
health of its citizens. To protect its citizens from the health effects of
TECMED v Mexico, supra note 137, at para. 116 n.133 (May 29,
2003) (citing Mondev Int’l Ltd. v. United States, ICSID Case no. ARB (AF)/99/2,
para. 116 (Oct. 11, 2002)).
144 Id. at para. 120.
143
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hazardous waste is an obvious obligation. The denial to renew a
permit for a landfill where hazardous waste is deposited due to the
urbanisation of the area is a measure that is in accordance with the
state’s duty to safeguard its citizens’ health and an aim the state is
under an international obligation to realise.
(ii) Is the Measure Suitable to Achieve the Aim?
On the available facts the closure and relocation of the
landfill is a suitable measure to avoid a hazard for the citizens of the
close by urban centre. The municipality’s motivation was stated
as:145“[to] secure environmental safety in view of the rapid urban
growth of Hermosillo, provide a response to the concerns that had
been expressed and guarantee, in the long term, the environmental
infrastructure to handle and dispose of industrial waste”.
(iii) Is the Measure Necessary to Achieve the Aim?
The facts indicate that TECMED operated the landfill in
accordance with all safety regulations and that the operation and even
a proposed extension of the operation did not and would not
threaten the public health of the citizens of the nearby town or the
environment. 146 Therefore the non-renewal of the permit was not
necessary to achieve the aim of safeguarding the citizens of
Hermosillo from a public health threat and environmental disaster.
However, it can be argued that a landfill that contains hazardous
waste even if compliant with all safety regulations poses an inherent
threat to the health of a nearby urban centre. By closing landfills
containing hazardous waste close to urban centres is a preventative
measure progressively realizing the right to health under Article 12
ICESCR.

145
146

Id. at para. 110.
Id. at para. 131.
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(iv) Is the Measure the Least Rights Infringing Means to Achieve the
Aim?
If the non-renewal of the license is the only measure suitable
to prevent a health threat to the citizens of the nearby urban centre.
It has to be borne in mind, that the need to dispose of hazardous
waste is a necessary by-product of modern civilisation. Therefore, the
state would potentially breach its obligations under Article 12
ICESCR by closing one landfill where hazardous waste can be
disposed of without allowing for the hazardous waste to be disposed
of somewhere else since it would risk the illegal dumping of
hazardous waste. With that in mind the question arises whether the
blanket non-renewal of the license is the least infringing measure or
whether the non-renewal of the license accompanied with either
compensation for the loss of the business and/or the offer of a
different site to resume TECMED’s business would have been a least
infringing measure. According to the facts, it is worthy to note that
negotiations in regard to relocating TECMED’s business to a
different site had taken place during and after the non-renewal of the
perm it but had ultimately ceased.147 The least infringing measure in
regard to TECMED’s property interest would have been to either
offer a new site for its operation or adequately compensate them for
its loss of business. As noted above, II.B.3. (especially footnote 92),
the right to property has the inherit limitation that generally
expropriation has to be accompanied with fair compensation to be
justified. Even though the facts are silent on the issue it seems that
for the state to fulfil its obligation under ICESCR and its obligation
towards TECMED the least infringing measure would have been to
offer an alternative site for TECMED’s operation. However, it is
acknowledged that the state can make choices in how to realize its
obligations. Therefore, the state instead of relocating TECMED’s
business could have compensated TECMED for its loss of property
and organised the disposal of hazardous waste differently. By not
doing either the state did not use the least infringing measure to
achieve its aim. The non-renewal of the permit without either fair
compensation or re-location of TECMED’s business is therefore
disproportionate to the state’s aim to safeguard the health of its
citizens. It is an justified limit on TECMED’s right to property.
147

Id. at para. 112.
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(v) Considering the competing interests of the different rights bearers at
hand is the measure proportional?
Since the non-renewal of the licence is not the least infringing
measure available to the state TECMED’s right to property is
disproportionally limited in balance with the citizens’ right to health.
3.

Conclusion

Using a human rights methodology to analyze TECMED’s
claim against Mexico in regard to the expropriation of its business
demonstrates that a human rights analysis will take the rights of the
investor into account. A human rights analysis will provide for an
analytical framework that will allow a tribunal to balance the rights of
the investor with that of the state’s citizens. The use of a human
rights framework will lead to more fully developed arguments under
international law. It is significant that in TECMED the Tribunal
relied on Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice in regard to the investor but not in regard to the state’s
citizens. Using the human rights framework in aiding its decision
tribunals would combat what, commentators generally agree, that
international investment law and arbitration have an adverse impact
on the promotion and protection of human rights.148
Having established a breach of the investor’s right to
property the question becomes what the appropriate remedy for a
breach of the human rights violation is. The question of
compensation is without doubt of utmost importance for the victims

See Ryan Suda, The Effect of Bilateral Investment Treaties on Human Rights
Enforcement and Realization 2 (N.Y.U. Global Law, Working Paper No. 1, 2005).
148
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of human rights abuses.149 In regard to the violation of the right to
property the ECtHR has generally held that:150
the protection of the right to property … would be
largely illusory and ineffective in the absence of any
equivalent principle. Clearly, compensation terms are
material to the assessment whether the contested
legislation respects a fair balance between the various
interests at stake and, notably, whether it does not
impose a disproportionate burden on the applicant.
The aim of this paper was to demonstrate that using a human
rights framework to analyze an investor-state dispute will adequately
address the rights of the investor and the state’s citizens. Using a
human rights methodology will aid a tribunal’s analysis of the dispute
and will contribute to the legitimacy of its decision. The question of a
fair remedy is outside the scope of this paper.
IV. GENERAL CONCLUSION
There is no need for an arbitral tribunal in an investor-state
dispute to have any “Berührungsängste” in regard to human rights.
International human rights do provide a methodological framework
that allows for a balanced consideration of both the investor’s
position but also the respective state’s citizens’ rights which the state
has to safeguard and/or progressively implement. The investor’s right
to property which is at the center of the contention is not an isolated

See, e.g., DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW (2015); EWA BGINSKA, DAMAGES FOR VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN
RIGHTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF DOMESTIC LEGAL SYSTEMS (Springer,
Heidelberg, 2015); JASON VARUHAS, DAMAGES AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Hart, 2016);
JAGMOHAN MISHRA, HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION: CONTEMPORARY CONCERNS &
REMEDIES (Akansha Publishing, 2011); see also G.A. Res. 60/147 (Dec. 16, 2005).
150 James v. United Kingdom, 98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), para. 54 (1986);
see also Lithgow v. United Kingdom, 102 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), para. 120 (1986);
Holy Monasteries v. Greece, 301-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), paras. 70-75 (1994);
Hentrich v France, 209-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), para. 48 (1994); Pressos Compania
Naviera SA v. Belgium, A332 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), para. 38 (1995); Guillemin v.
France, 1997-I Eur. Ct. H.R., paras. 52-57 (1997).
149
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right but a right which is instrumental, in the company with other
rights, in fostering socio-economic well-being151 Only the interplay
and inclusion of all members of a society, natural and legal persons,
nationals or foreigners, can society strive and attain the highest
possible standard of well-being. The international human rights
framework recognizes this and has tasked the state with the duty
through fair and reasonable government, i.e. through balancing the
rights of every member of society, to progressively achieve the
highest possible standard of well-being.
An international arbitral tribunal, as part of the international
community, is charged with overseeing whether the state has
balanced the rights at play justifiably. In essence, there can be no
doubt that the state has to be able to take any measure which
enhances the human rights of its citizens or safeguards them from
harm. If that measure infringes the rights of the investor the measure
will be justified if the investor is compensated. In other words, the
state can do anything as long as it compensates the investor. There
might be situations where the measure is of such importance that in
balance the property infringement of the investor does not warrant
compensation. 152
For an investment tribunal to include a human rights analysis
into its decision-making process will increase its legitimacy. Even
though desirable, there is no need for stronger human rights clauses
in investment treaties. The investment tribunals bear the
responsibility to implement the law, regardless whether states and
investors felt before responsible for including a human rights clause
in their investment treaties. Since human rights provide the
overarching framework any investment treaty, bi-lateral or multilateral, has to be interpreted in light of human rights and is limited by
them. Accordingly, also lawyers should be aware that they enjoy the
opportunity to introduce human rights considerations into the
arbitral conversation153, as already mentioned no matter for which
151 Luis Valencia Rodríquez, The right of everyone to own property alone as well
as in association with others, para. 116, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1994/19 (Nov. 25, 1993).
152 As noted earlier, it is outside the scope of this paper to discuss what
constitutes fair compensation.
153 Luke Eric Peterson & Kevin R. Gray, International Human Rights in
Bilateral Investment Treaties and in Investment Treaty Arbitration 20 (International
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side they argue. Then red riding hood and the wolf may have a break
from playing tag and come more often together for a cup of tea on
eye level.

Institute for Sustainable Development Research Paper, Apr.
https://www.iisd.org/pdf/2003/investment_int_human_rights_bits.pdf
accessed Feb. 15, 2017).
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WATER AS A HUMAN RIGHT: A CASE
STUDY OF THE PAKISTAN-INDIA WATER
CONFLICT
Waseem Ahmad Qureshi*

The Indus Waters Treaty was signed between India and Pakistan in 1960, with the World
Bank taking a mediatory role between the two countries. The treaty allocated the Ravi, Sutlej,
and Bias Rivers to India, while Pakistan was assigned the water from the Chenab, Jhelum,
and Indus Rivers. Nonetheless, Pakistan has alleged that India violated the Indus Waters
Treaty by initiating the construction of Baglehar Dam in 1999. Pakistan further claimed that
India exasperated the issue by proceeding to initiate new projects such as the Ratle Dam on the
Chenab River and Kishan Ganga on the Neelum–Jhelum River. The completion of these
projects, in addition to the modifications in the allocation of river waters to Pakistan, could
deprive the people of the Indus Basin region the basic human right of access to water; a region
strongly dependent on these rivers, and that basic right, for drinking, agricultural, and domestic
purposes. Access to water is a “basic human right,” as endorsed in different international
conventions and declarations. Therefore, India’s draconian act of restricting water flow to
Pakistan could directly result in human rights violations.

* Advocate Supreme Court of Pakistan.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Water is a basic human right1 because it is essential for human
survival. This paper is focused on the distribution of water between
India and Pakistan and the resulting conflict. The historical and
contemporary nature of the conflict, alongside the human rights
issues pertinent to the conflict, will be evaluated in the first section of
this paper. The Indus Waters Treaty resolved this conflict to a great
extent; however, the recent statements from Indian Prime Minister
Narendra Modi, regarding blocking the rivers that flow from India to
Pakistan, have reignited the conflict. 2 India is also constructing the
Kishan Ganga and Ratle Dams on the Jhelum and Chenab rivers,
respectively,3 and has also completed the Baglehar Dam on the
Chenab River. Pakistan has serious reservations about the
construction of these dams. The implications of India’s construction
of dams, its attempt to revoke or modify the terms of Indus Waters
Treaty (“IWT”), and its threats to block rivers to Pakistan will also be
discussed in the first section of this paper. The second section will
include the interpretations and positions of the international
conventions and declarations, which recognize “access to water” as a
fundamental human right. The role of the World Bank as a
“mediator” between India and Pakistan for resolving the water
conflict and, consequently, protecting the “human right to water” will
be explained in the third section. The fourth section will include the
options available to Pakistan, along with the proposal of a suitable
strategy to overcome the water conflict with India.
II. SUMMARY OF THE CONFLICT
A. The Historical Developments Toward Water Conflict and the
1 Amanda Cahil Ripley, The Human Right to Water and its Application in the
Occupied Palestinian Territories, 14 (TAYLOR & FRANCIS, 2011).
2 Hugh Tomlinson, Modi Threatens to cut Pakistan’s water in revenge for militant
attack, THE TIMES, September 27, 2016, http://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/modithreatens-to-cut-pakistan-s-water-in-revenge-for-militant-attack-j2vsgn8jf
(last
visited December 22, 2016).
3 Aziz Z. Azad, Indus Water Treaty and India’s Agitation, DAILY JANG
NEWSPAPER, December 18, 2016.
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IWT
At the time of the partition of the subcontinent, the British
rulers assigned an independent commission, named the “Radcliffe
Award” and under the supervision of Sir Cyril Radcliffe, for drawing
the international boundary between India and Pakistan. 4 As a result,
India became the upper riparian state, while Pakistan became the
lower riparian region.5 The water of six major rivers in the lower
riparian Pakistan comes from the upper riparian India.
Immediately after partition, India suddenly suspended all the
river water flowing to Pakistan, which threatened Pakistan’s
agricultural and agrarian infrastructure because it was heavily reliant
on the river water for irrigation.6 In response, Pakistan approached
the international community and, eventually, after a decade of
strained relations between India and Pakistan, the World Bank took
the very noble initiative of mediating between India and Pakistan for
the allocation and distribution of river water between the two
countries. As a result of the mediation of the World Bank, the Indus
Waters Treaty was signed by the rulers of both countries, Indian
Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Pakistani Field Marshal Ayub
Khan, in 1960.7
The IWT allocated the eastern rivers—the Ravi, Sutlej, and
Bias—to India, while the western rivers—the Sindh, Chenab, and
Jhelum—were allocated to Pakistan. Both countries were also given
the right of conditional usage of water of each other’s rivers for
domestic reasons, such as power generation, agricultural, and other
non-consumptive purposes; however, it was required that such usage

Lucy Chester, The 1947 Partition – Drawing the Indo-Pakistani Boundary,
AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, February 2002, http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/
archives_roll/2002_01-03/chester_partition/chester_partition.html (last visited
December 20, 2016).
5 Miriam R. Lowi, Water and Power: The Politics of a Scarce Resource in the
Jordan River Basin, 63 (CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 1995).
6 Danta Caponera, National and International Law and Administration, 230
(KLUWER LAW INTERNATIONAL, 2003) [hereinafter Caponera].
7 Michael Glantz and Igor Zonn, Scientific, Environmental, and Political Issues
in the Circum-Caspian Region, 285 (SPRINGER, 1997).
4
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must not lower the quantity and natural flow of the water in the river
of the other country.8
As a result of the IWT, the water conflict was resolved to a
great extent until 1999, when India announced the construction of
the Baglehar Dam on the Chenab River and completely disregarded
Pakistan’s concerns over the design of the dam. According to
Pakistani government sources, the design of the dam could affect the
quantity of water in the Chenab River. 9 Meetings of the Permanent
Indus Commission — a commission comprising members from both
countries to discuss issues related to the IWT — were also held, but
no consensus was reached10 and eventually Pakistan had to rely upon
the judgment of the neutral expert of the World Bank, whose final
verdict did not prevent the completion of the dam11
B. The Contemporary Nature of the Conflict
At present, the buried conflict of the past between India and
Pakistan seems to have been reborn after aggravated statements from
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi that he would be bringing
Indus water back to India;12 he also announced the formation of a
task force to “review” the Indus Waters Treaty.13 This has raised
Niranjan Das Gulhati, Indus Water Treaty: An Exercise in International
Mediation, 148–312 (ALLIED PUBLISHERS, 1973).
9 Laurence Boisson, Christina Leb, and Mara Tignino. International Law
and Fresh Water: The Multiple Challenges, 417 (EDWARD ELGAR PUBLISHING LIMITED,
2013); see also Aparna Pande, Explaining Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: Escaping India
(ROUTLEDGE, 2011).
10 UNECE, River Basin Commissions and Other Institutions for
Transboundary Water Cooperation, 20 (UNITED NATIONS, 2009).
11 2007: Neutral expert gives his judgement on Baglihar Dam, DAWN,
July 02, 2011, https://www.dawn.com/news/640989, (last visited April 03, 2017).
12 Varinder Singh, PM: Will Bring Indus Water Back. Tribune News Sources,
THE TRIBUNE, November 26, 2016, http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/
nation/pm-will-bring-indus-water-back/328690.html (last visited December 5,
2016).
13 Hindustan Times Correspondent, India forms task force on Indus Water
Treaty,
HINDUSTAN
TIMES,
December
17,
2016,
http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-forms-task-force-on-induswaters-treaty-pakistan-says-won-t-accept-changes-to-pact/storyfuzmtjpvi94ivzggp3epzn.html (last visited December 20, 2016).
8
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tensions for Pakistan as the Indus river was legally allocated to
Pakistan under the IWT, and Modi’s statement about the Indus river
has been regarded by Pakistan as very contentious. Reviewing the
IWT, or even modifying or changing its clauses, is also unacceptable
to Pakistan: the special assistant to the Pakistani prime minister
confirmed that no changes or modifications of the IWT would be
accepted by Pakistan.14 The Indian threat to revoke the IWT is also
alive, which has concerned Pakistan. If the treaty is cancelled, there
will be no consensus between the countries on the distribution of
waters. As a result, the peace of the region could be at risk.
Moreover, India has initiated the construction of dams on the
western rivers—the Chenab, Jhelum, and Neelum rivers in occupied
Kashmir and within the Indian territory. Pakistan has serious
objections to the Ratle, Kishan Ganga, and Sawalkot Dams and the
Wullar Barrage15 because they could impact the flow of the Chenab
and Jhelum rivers to a great extent, which would put in danger
Pakistan’s irrigation system and availability of water for drinking and
domestic purposes. Although, the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s
verdict on the Kishan Ganga Dam partially favors Pakistan,16 it also
allows India to build the Kishan Ganga dam in accordance with the
IWT’s requirement of minimum level of water flow (9m3/s) in the
Chenab river.17 However, the dispute still exists in relation to other
dams. These contentions are strengthening the India–Pakistan water
conflict.
C. Human Rights Issues Related to the Conflict
Water is a basic human necessity and recognized as a
fundamental human right. India’s threats and its construction of
dams on the western rivers are paving the way for the deprivation of
14 Anwar Iqbal, Pakistan not to accept alteration in Indus Water Treaty,
DAWN, December 17, 2016, http://www.dawn.com/news/1302848 (last visited
December 18, 2016).
15 A.K. Chaturvedi, Water: A Source for Future Conflicts, 164 (VIJ BOOKS
INDIA PVT LTD, 2013). [hereinafter Chaturvedi].
16 Robert G. Wirsing and Zafar Adeel, Imagining Industan: Overcoming Water
Insecurity in the Indus Basin, 79. (SPRINGER, 2016).
17 Gustaf Olsson, Water and Energy: Threats and Opportunities, 19 (IWA
PUBLISHING, 2015).
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the people of Pakistan of this basic right. India has also committed
violations of human rights in Kashmir and it would feel no harm in
repeating the same for the people of Pakistan by depriving them of
adequate water supply.
The main issue concerning the India–Pakistan water conflict
is related to the “human right to access water.” The construction of
dams by India on Pakistani-allocated rivers could lower the quantity
of water in the western rivers,18 which will affect the “access to
water” of the people who regularly consume the water of these rivers
in Pakistan, especially in the Punjab region. Moreover, blocking the
Indus and other rivers from India could cause a shortage of water in
Pakistan, which would deprive a large number of people who are
dependent on access to this river water for drinking, agricultural, and
domestic needs.
Agriculture is the only means of subsistence and earning for
almost half of the Pakistani population. Forty-five percent of the
Country’s labor force is associated with agriculture;19 therefore, any
harm done to the agriculture of Pakistan will cause a direct negative
effect on the lives of these people. Pakistan’s citizens’ well being,
standards of living, employment, access to health care, food, water,
and sanitation will all be directly affected. Moreover, around 70
percent of the region’s agricultural area is in the Punjab; 20 therefore, if
India pursues its ambitions of constructing dams or barrages to
deprive the Pakistani Punjab of the river water, then it would cause
severe harm to the basic rights 21 — the right to access water, food,
sanitation, employment, health care, etc. — of the people who are
dependent on the river water in Punjab.22
Another issue is related to threatening the agricultural
infrastructure of Pakistan. Almost the entire agricultural
Id.
Aaron Marcus, Design, User Experience, and Usability: User Experience
Design for Everyday Life Applications and Services, 574 (SPRINGER, 2014).
20 Peter Blood, Agriculture – Pakistan: A Country Study. (U.S. LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS, 1994). Chapter available at: http://countrystudies.us/pakistan/49.
htm (page 1) (last visited December 22, 2016).
21 Id.
22 Id.
18
19
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infrastructure of Pakistan follows the canals and barrage systems for
irrigation,23 and all of the water in the canals and barrages comes
from the western rivers,24 of which the Indus River shares the
maximum quantity of water supply. Any hindrance caused by India to
the flow of the Indus river will reduce the flow of water reaching to
Pakistan, and blocking the flow of this river would cause a shortage
or total lack thereof water available for irrigation; this would directly
threaten the very survival of the entire Pakistan population because
the absence of irrigation could result in crop failure, as well as food
and water shortages.
III. INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS & DECLARATIONS ENDORSING
THE “ACCESS TO WATER” AS A BASIC HUMAN RIGHT
There are a number of internationally accepted declarations,
conventions, and resolutions that shed light on the importance of the
access to water for every human-being residing in any region or state.
Some of these declarations explicitly mention the importance of the
“right to access water,” along with other basic amenities of life, while
others implicitly highlight it. In this regard, the United Nations has
been an essential international body, providing a platform to the
international community for issuing conventions. The notable clauses
that discuss this basic human right are mentioned below with
reference to the universally acclaimed declarations and conventions.
A. The United Nations Charter
The United Nations Charter25 has essential goals for human
development. For instance, Article 55 includes the following points: 26
a. Higher standards of living, full employment, and
conditions of economic and social progress and
development;

23
24
25
26

Id.
Chenab, Jhelum, and Indus rivers.
Charter of the United Nations, 1945.
Chapter IX, Charter of the United Nations, 1945.
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b. Solutions of international economic, social, health,
and related problems; and international cultural and
educational cooperation; and
c. Universal respect for, and observance of, human
rights and fundamental freedoms for all without
distinction as to race, sex, language or religion. 27
The need is to ensure all the required living conditions for
realizing the aforementioned goals of human development, and these
conditions must entail the right to water for basic life subsistence,
because, the access to water is the fundamental requirement for not
only the survival of life, but also human development.28
On the other hand, the climactic changes, population
increases, and conflicts between upper and lower riparian states over
the distribution of water resources are some of the prominent
challenges of the contemporary era that may hinder the progress to
fulfillment of human development goals.29
B. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (the
“Declaration”) was adopted by the General Assembly of the United
Nations in 194830 This Declaration is a fundamental part of
international law; a body of law that every state heavily weighs when
deciding on matters related to international jurisdiction31 Article 25 of
this declaration states:
Everyone has the right to a standard of living
adequate for the health and well-being of himself and
Id.
Stephen M. Wheeler and Timothy Beatley, Sustainable Urban Development
Reader, 217. (ROUTLEDGE, 2014).
29 Shimon Anisfeld, Water Resources, 100 (ISLAND PRESS, 2010). See also
Tamin Younus and Caitlin Grady, Climate Change and Water Resources, 146
(SPRINGER. 2013).
30 S.Prakash Sinha, Asylum and International Law, 93. (SPRINGER, 2013).
31 Burns H. Weston and Richard Pierre Claude, Human Rights in the World
Community: Issues and Action, 94. (UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA PRESS, 2006).
27
28
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of his family, including food, clothing, housing and
medical care and necessary social services.32
This clause highlights the importance of the well-being of
every human and their right to access the basic necessities of life. The
word “water” has not been used explicitly in the Declaration, but it is
a basic necessity for human life and well being, as human health and
subsistence are impossible without it. As a result, “access to water” is
required to ensure human rights.33
C. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(“ICCPR”)
The ICCPR has emphasized the importance of the right to
life for every human being by stating:
The ICCPR affirms the “right to life” which has
conventionally been interpreted to mean that no
person shall be deprived of his or her life in a civil
and political sense.34
This statement implies the notion that no state or individual
should create circumstances that may harm an individual’s life
through any means. The ICCPR also follows the Human Rights
Committee’s (“HRC”) principle that emphasizes the “right to life”
and access to water in the following words:
[HRC] has noted that the right to life has been too
often narrowly interpreted. The expression “inherent
right to life” cannot properly be understood in a
restrictive manner, and the protection of this right
requires that States adopt positive measures.
Disregarding this new development in the
Article 25, Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Phillip Aston and Ryan Goodman, International Human Rights, 369
(OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2013).
34 Angela Cassar, John Scanlon, and Noemi Nemes, Water as a Human
Right, 4 (IUCN-UNDP, 2004). See also Taniya Malik, Recognition of Human Right to
Water under International Law Regime, 170, INTERNATIOANL JOURNAL OF APPLIED
RESEARCH, 1(4).
32
33
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understanding of Article 6 and assuming a narrow
interpretation of such a right would nevertheless
require the inclusion of the protection against
arbitrary and intentional denial of access to sufficient
water, because this is one of the most fundamental
resources necessary to sustain life.35
Here, the ICCPR, in accordance with the HRC, is
recommending that states adopt the necessary measures for the
protection of the “inherent right to life” for every human being, and
classifies access to water as an integral part of the “right to life.”
D. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW”)
CEDAW is an organization that is pro-actively working for
the well being and development of womens’ lives, and has also
highlighted the access to water as a fundamental right and
requirement for the quality of life for women. 36 It also particularly
articulates the importance of access to water for women residing in
rural and under-developed areas where there could be fewer
resources of water37 Women may require water not only for drinking,
but also for essential child and family care, in addition to the other
basic domestic needs.
E. The Convention on the Rights of the Child
The Convention on the Rights of the Child highlights the
need to fulfill the fundamental necessities of life for the well-being of
children. It mentions access to healthcare, food, and clean water,
among other necessities set out in Article 24(2)(c) as follows:

Taniya Malik, Recognition of Human Right to Water under International Law
Regime, 170 INTERNATIOANL JOURNAL OF APPLIED RESEARCH, 1(4).
36 Article 14(2)(h), Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).
37 Id.
35
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[To] combat disease and malnutrition, including
within the framework of primary health care, through,
inter alia, the application of readily available
technology and through the provision of adequate
nutritious foods and clean drinking-water, taking into
consideration the dangers and risks of environmental
pollution. 38
Therefore, every child must have access to these fundamental
necessities of life to ensure their health, stability, well-being, and
survival.
F. The United Nations Watercourses Convention
This UN Convention is focused on highlighting the
importance of the “access to water” as a fundamental right for every
human being. Above all, Article 10 of this Convention recognizes the
right to access water for drinking purposes as being more important
than the right to access water for agriculture or electricity generation,
or any other use within a state, as well as in another riparian state.39
In this regard, the states should observe this comparison and adhere
to such in practice.
In light of this Convention, one country cannot deprive
another country access to drinkable water, and further, that specific
right must be prioritized over building infrastructure for storage,
hydroelectricity generation, irrigation, or any other non-consumptive
purpose. This clause is relevant to the upper riparian states, from
where rivers flow to the lower riparian states.40 If the former stops
the water flow, then the availability of water in the latter will certainly
decline.

Article 24(2)(c), Convention on the Rights of the Child.
Takele Soboka Bulto, The Extraterritorial Application of Human Right to
Water in Africa, 260 (CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2014). See also Antoinette
Hildering, International Law, Sustainable Development and Water Management, 101
(EBURON, 2006).
40 Parasan Rangarajan, Daniel Tan, and Veronica Fynn, International Law
Journal of London, 235 (INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL OF LONDON,
2014).
38
39
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Stephen McCaffrey, former Special Rapporteur on The Law
of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses41, has
further interpreted this clause and added the term “economic
development,” stating that a country cannot stop water flow to a
lower riparian state on the grounds of economic development,
particularly when this could harm the subsistence of people
dependent on that water in the lower riparian state.42
H. The Stockholm Declaration
This declaration was approved during the United Nations
Conference on the Human Environment, held in Stockholm in
1972.43 Stockholm Declaration explicitly mentioned the access to
water as a fundamental right for present and future generations:
The Declaration is one of the earliest environmental
instruments that recognizes the fundamental right to
an environment of a quality that permits a life of
dignity and wellbeing [sic] and also that the natural
resources of the earth including, the air, water, land,
flora, and fauna … must be safeguarded for the
benefit of present and future generations.44
I. The Mar del Plata Action Plan
The Mar del Plata Action Plan was approved during the
United Nations Water Conference, held in March 1977 in Mar del
Plata, Argentina. The main purpose of the conference was to evaluate
the contemporary challenges related to water availability,

41 Stephen McCaffrey has been considered an expert in International Law
of Watercourses and he has written on the geographical and other issues pertaining
to the watercourses. For instance, see his book: The Law of International Watercourses,
(OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2007).
42 Id.; and see Caponera, supra note 7, at 41.
43 David Weissbrodt and Connie de Vega, International Human Rights
Law: An Introduction, 197 (UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA PRESS, 2007).
44 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment.
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management,45 efficiency of usage, cleanliness, and agricultural and
socioeconomic uses, and to devise a plan to meet these challenges
and avert future global water crises.46 The Mar del Plata Action Plan,
presented by this conference, identified “water as a [fundamental
human] right, declaring that all people have the right to drinking
water in quantities and of a quality equal to their basic needs .”47
J. The Dublin Statement
The Dublin Statement was the result of the International
Conference on Water and Environment held in Dublin, Ireland in
January of 1992.48 The main purpose of this conference was to
evaluate the scarcity and inefficient use of water, and any scarcityrelated threats to sustainable development.49 Experts from the
varying states in attendance arrived at the mutual consensus that
“access to clean water and sanitation” is among the basic rights of
human beings.50
The four principles of the Dublin Statement highlight the
importance of water for all human beings 51 The first principle
evaluates the essentiality of water for life and environments and
confirms that the resource is in-fact finite52 The second principle
suggests a participatory approach for better management of water
usage. The third principle discusses the role of women in the
45 Malin Falkenmark, UN Water Conference: Agreement on Goals and
Action Plan, 222–227 (SPRINGER, 1977).
46 WHO, United Nations Conference on Water (Mar del Plata 1977) (WORLD
HEALTH ORGANIZATION. 2005.)
47 United Nations Division for Economic and Social Information, Mar del
Plata Action Plan: United Nations Water Conference, Mar del Plata, Argentina, 78. UN
DESI/DPI, 1983.
48 Ana Maria Daza-Clark, International Investment Law and Water Resources
Management: An Appraisal of Indirect Expropriation, 39. (BRILL, 2016). See also: Takele
Soboka Bulto, The Extraterritorial Application of the Human Right to Water in Africa, 48.
(CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2013).
49 The Dublin Statement on Water and Sustainable Development – UN
Documents: Gathering of a Body of Global Agreements, UNGO, January 31, 1992.
50 Id.
51 Hannatjie Jacobs, Jo-Ansie van Wyk, and Richard Meissner. Future
Challenges of Providing High-Quality Water, 152. (EOLSS PUBLICATIONS, 2009).
52 Tim Davie, Fundamentals of Hydrology, 157. (TAYLOR & FRANCIS, 2008).

387

2017

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

5:2

management and usage of water. The fourth and final principle sheds
light on the economic value of water, along with the importance of
clean water and sanitation.53
Hence, the Dublin Statement explicitly discusses the
importance of water and urges states to evaluate the Statement’s
suggestions and principles so that states may devise and implement
effective measures to manage water resources and fulfill the basic
water needs of humanity54
K. Agenda 21
“Agenda 21” is an international action plan that was devised
by the United Nations for achieving sustainable human and
economic development worldwide 55 The Agenda includes the
fundamental principles and requirements for sustainable
development.56 It also mentions that adequate water resources are
essential for achieving sustainable development. 57 Agenda 21 further
highlights the importance of maintaining good quality of pure and
fresh water resources in order to fulfill the human needs related to
water, and for the protection of the natural ecosystem.58
In this regard, Chapter 18 of Agenda 21 considers “access,
quality, and quantity” as the three basic elements of the “right to
water.”59 It also highlights the importance of maintaining an adequate
water supply for the entire population.60

Id.
Desheng Hu, Water Rights, 112. (IWA PUBLISHING, 2006).
55 Raymond Charles Rauscher and Salim Momtaz, Brooklyn’s Bushwick Urban Renewal in New York, USA: Community, Planning and Sustainable Environments,
50. (SPRINGER, 2014).
56 Delyse Springett and Michael Redclift, Routledge International Handbook of
Sustainable Development, 137. (ROUTLEDGE, 2015).
57 Donald A. Brown and J. Lemons, Sustainable Development: Science, Ethics,
and Public Policy, 201. (SPRINGER, 2013).
58 Id.
59 Chapter 18, point 47: Agenda 21, UNEP, October 2011.
60 Id.
53
54
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L. The Political Declaration in 2016
The last Political Declaration meeting held in accordance with
Resolution 70/183 of the UN General Assembly took place at the
United Nation’s New York headquarters in September of 2016.61 The
main focus of this meeting was related to antimicrobial resistance. 62
In addressing antimicrobial resistance, the U.N determined that
access to clean water, improved health care and sanitation facilities,
antimicrobial medications, and the protection of biodiversity were
considered among the essential goals for the millennium and
recognized as basic human rights.63
All of the aforementioned declarations and agendas classify
“access to water” as a basic human right. This basic right should be
implicit when considering other fundamental non-water related
human rights, all of which having already been accepted in the
Declaration of Human Rights, the UN Charter, and the various
conventions discussed above.64
In light of these declarations, India’s plan to block Indus
waters to Pakistan is a direct threat to the fundamental human right
of access to water for the people residing in those regions of Pakistan
where the population is entirely dependent on the river’s accessibility
and ability to provide consumable water. The resultant harm of such
an act could also negatively impact domestic, agriculture, and
sanitation initiatives effectuated by the harmed region65 More
61 Draft Political Declaration of the High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on
Antimicrobial Resistance, 2 (UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 2016).
62 Antimicrobial resistance is an activity induced by the micro-organisms
like bacteria, etc. to prevent the nurturing and spread of hazardous bacteria. For
details, see Mark H. M. M. Montforts and Patricia L. Keen, Antimicrobial Resistance in
the Environment, (JOHN WILEY & SONS, 2012). See also I.W. Fong and Karl Drlica,
Antimicrobial Resistance and Implications for the 21st Century, (SPRINGER, 2007).
63 Draft Political Declaration of the High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on
Antimicrobial Resistance, 2 (UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 2016).
64 Id.
65 Natalie Nax, Looking to The Future: The Indus Waters Treaty and Climate
Change, 17 (UNIVERSITY OF OREGON, 2016), http://www.transboundarywaters.
orst.edu/publications/publications/nax%20-%202016%20%20indus%20treaty
%20and%20climate%20change%20-%20thesis.pdf (last visited December 24,
2016).
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importantly, there are no alternate sources of water with the
capability to fulfill the threatened region’s needs in terms of water
usage and supply.66
Therefore, India’s government should reevaluate the decision
to construct dams on the western rivers of the Indus Basin and revise
the language of the IWT to avoid modifying the rivers’ paths, as these
actions can result in the deprivation of the fundamental human right
of access to water for the rural populations of Pakistan as a whole.
IV. THE WORLD BANK AND THE INDIA–PAKISTAN WATER
CONFLICT
The World Bank has an essential role related to the
implementation of Indus Waters Treaty. The major responsibilities of
the World Bank are discussed below.
A. Responsibilities:
The World Bank is tasked with the role of “facilitator” 67 for
IWT related matters between India and Pakistan. The World Bank
brokered the IWT between India and Pakistan in 1960 68 In addition,
it also plays the role of mediator whenever a staunch conflict arises
between India and Pakistan related to the IWT.69 Particularly, it
follows a procedure suggested in the IWT to resolve water related
conflicts between both countries through the following steps.

Id.
It facilitated the signing of IWT back in 1960.
68 Deepa Viswam, Role of Media in Kashmir Crises, 66 (GYAN PUBLISHING
HOUSE, 2010).
69 World Bank Urges Mediation for India, Pakistan over Indus, THE
WORLD BANK – WORLDBANK.ORG,
November
10,
2016,
http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2016/11/10/world-bankurges-mediation-for-india-pakistan-over-indus (last visited April 2, 2017).
66
67
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Appointment of a Neutral Expert70

The World Bank appoints a “neutral expert” when severe
disagreements occur between the relevant parties and the Permanent
Indus Commission becomes unable to resolve these disagreements.71
After being appointed, the neutral expert obtains opinions from both
parties and makes their determination on the matter at issue in
accordance with the principles illustrated in the IWT that is the
governing body of law for water related conflicts between the two
states.72 In this type of scenario, the judgment of the neutral expert is
considered binding on both parties.73 However, if the neutral expert
is unable to resolve the disagreement between the two parties, the
matter becomes a “dispute” and is then referred to the Court of
Arbitration.74
India has requested the World Bank to appoint a neutral
expert for the IWT.75 In response, the World Bank has sent an
official76 as its envoy, but has not appointed the neutral expert yet, to
mediate between India and Pakistan77 The envoy will attempt to
reduce tensions between the two countries in hopes of reestablishing
some form of dialogue.78

Annexure F, Indus Waters Treaty, 1960.
See Article IX, Indus Waters Treaty, 1960.
72 Id.
73 Deepa Viswam, Role of Media in Kashmir Crises, 135 (KALPAZ
PUBLICATIONS, 2010).
74 Article IX, Indus Waters Treaty, 1960.
75 Alex Ferguson, World Bank Urges Mediation for India, Pakistan over Indus.
THE WORLD BANK, November 10, 2016.
76 Mr. Ian H. Solomon, a senior official of World Bank, has been sent by
the World Bank as an envoy to India and Pakistan.
77 Moushumi Das Gupta, World Bank envoy to meet India, Pakistan officials
over Indus water dispute, HINDUSTAN TIMES, January 05, 2017,
http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/world-bank-official-to-meet-indiapakistan-officials-over-indus-waters-treaty/storyOVBkJH6P83uY0sVZ3iCjFO.html (last visited April 5 2017).
78 Wajid Ali Syed, World Bank appoints an envoy to save Indus Waters Treaty.
GEO.TV, December 18, 2016, https://www.geo.tv/latest/124192-world-bankappoints-envoy-to-save-indus-waters-treaty (last visited December 29, 2016)
[Hereinafter: Syed].
70
71
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The Expenses of the Neutral Expert

The World Bank is also responsible for establishing and
maintaining a trust fund for meeting the expenses of the neutral
expert. Both India and Pakistan provide funds as reimbursements for
that trust fund.79
3.

The Establishment of a Court of Arbitration80

The World Bank also facilitates both countries by referring
cases to the Court of Arbitration when the neutral expert cannot
reach a conclusion. For such cases, the World Bank provides
assistance in selecting judges with relevant legal expertise to comprise
the panel that will ultimately issue the final ruling in the dispute. 81
However, the World Bank does not participate itself in the hearings 82
3.2. Human Rights and the World Bank’s Role of “Mediator”
The World Bank should effectively fulfill its role as the
“mediator” between India and Pakistan, and should further
“facilitate” in assuring the protection of basic human rights. For this,
the World Bank should try to create an opportunity to arrive at a
mutual consensus on the water conflict between India and Pakistan.
It should prevent India from breaking or suspending the treaty and
from blocking river water flowing to Pakistan. If successful this could
help to protect the “right to access water” for people living around
the Indus Basin.
Moreover, if the World Bank is able to stop India from
constructing dams on the western rivers, then the other basic human
rights—the access to water for domestic, agriculture, and drinking
purposes—as well as amenities such as sanitation and health care for
the rural population, will be protected as well. This population is
largely reliant on the river water for meeting their aforementioned
The Acting Secretary of World Bank, Supplemental President’s Report and
Recommendations, 2 (THE WORLD BANK, April 25, 1960).
80 Annexure G, Indus Waters Treaty 1960.
81 Id.
82 Id.
79
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needs. Therefore, the role of the World Bank is crucial in protecting
the basic human rights of the population residing on the Indus Basin
in Pakistan. The World Bank should take note of this situation and
place importance on the protection of human rights over other
economic needs, which are put forth by India as the basis behind
constructing dams and as a rationale for the Country’s ambition to
modify the IWT to change the course of rivers toward its lands.
V. OPTIONS AND PROPOSED STRATEGIES FOR PAKISTAN
A. Options Available to Pakistan
At the moment, there are three options available to Pakistan.
1.

Bilateral Talks

The first option is that Pakistan can accept India’s offer 83 and
try to resolve the conflict bilaterally. For this purpose, Pakistan would
need to provide opportunities for sessions of dialogues with India.
Both countries can assign representatives for the discussions and
decide on IWT related issues mutually.
2.

World Bank Mediation

The second option that is available to Pakistan is approaching
the World Bank to resolve the water conflict with India. The World
Bank has the role of a mediator,84 but not an arbitrator or guarantor, 85
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has offered to resolve the water
conflict bilaterally instead of via mediation from the World Bank.
84 Narottam Banskota, South Asia Trade and Energy Security: The Role of
India, 81 (UNIVERSAL PUBLISHERS, 2012).
85 Daily Times, ‘WB not a guarantor of Indus Water Treaty’. DAILY
TIMES, September 30, 2016, http://dailytimes.com.pk/pakistan/30-sep-16/wbnot-a-guarantor-of-indus-water-treaty (last visited December 20, 2016]. See also
(Indian source): It’s not a guarantor of Indus Water Treaty: World Bank, Zeenews,
http://zeenews.india.com/news/south-asia/its-not-a-guarantor-of-indus-treatyworld-bank_197037.html (last visited December 20, 2016).
83
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for matters involving the IWT; therefore, the World Bank’s role is
limited as it can only propose ways for the countries to resolve the
water conflict as the mediator in negotiations, but ultimately lacks any
real enforcement ability..86
Currently, the World Bank has appointed a special envoy to
hold meetings with officials of both countries in an attempt to
establish a bilateral dialogue between the two regarding the IWT. 87
Pakistan can accept the suggestions of the envoy to maintain the
dialogue with India so that both countries can agree on certain
points; the envoy may also be present during the dialogue meetings, if
both countries permit such, to avoid any severe disagreements
between the officials of the two states. However, if consensus is not
reached, Pakistan can either request the World Bank to appoint a
neutral expert, whose judgment will be binding on both states, or
alternatively, Pakistan may take its case to the Court of Arbitration.
3.

Approaching China

The third and last option for Pakistan is to request its closest
ally, China, to pressure India to not obstruct water flow in the
western rivers. The water that flows into a major Indian river — the
Brahamaputra — comes from the Yarling Tsango river in China.88 As
a result, China has the upper riparian position and India is the lower
riparian state in this river system.89 It is pertinent to mention here
that China has already blocked one tributary, which had flows from
China’s Tibet region and had previously reached the Brahmaputra,
for the construction of a hydroelectricity project.90 If China stops all
of the major tributaries’ flow of water to India this would threaten

86 Guatem Sen, Conceptualizing Security for India, 181 (ATLANTIC
PUBLISHERS & DISTRIBUTORS, 2007).
87 See Syed, supra note 50.
88 Verghese Koithara, Managing India’s Nuclear Forces, 37 (BROOKINGS
INSTITUTIONS PRESS, 2012).
89 See Chaturvedi, supra note 15, at 190.
90 Jagran josh, Current Affairs, 50 (2016).
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India’s crop production in the Assam and Arunachal Pradesh states,
both of which are dependent on these rivers’ for water.91
Nonetheless, Pakistan can exercise its option to push China
to stop the flow of its river water to India if favorable results do not
come from World Bank arbitration attempts. Being a staunch
supporter of human rights, Pakistan cannot deprive the population of
India the basic human right of “access to water”; however, if India
attempts to steal this basic human right from the Pakistani people,
who are dependent on the Indus River and other western rivers, then
Pakistan may have to utilize this third option to ensure its own
survival.
B. A Proposed Strategy for Pakistan
To clarify its position, Pakistan should cooperate with the
World Bank’s special envoy and show its willingness to hold talks
with India. This will demonstrate a positive and peaceful image of
Pakistan.
Pakistan should officially provide notice to the World Bank
of the human rights violations that could arise from India’s
construction of dams and blockage of water flow from the western
rivers, so that they may then appoint a neutral expert or refer the
conflict to the Court of Arbitration to resolve it in accordance with
the IWT’s principles under a proper jurisdiction. 92 In this regard,
Pakistan’s showing of the violation of human rights needs to be in
accordance with the human rights endorsements provided by the UN
Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Stockholm
Declaration, the Dublin Statement, and other international
conventions, which categorize the “right to access water” as one of
the most fundamental human rights; one which must be provided to
all human beings.
Furthermore, should share with the Court of Arbitration – if
the dispute reaches to the Court for hearing – the current statistics
Aziz Zafar Azad, Indus Water Treaty and India’s Agitation, DAILY JANG,
December 18, 2016.
92 Indus, Chenab, and Jhelum rivers.
91
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related to the total number of people that would lose access to water
if India blocks river waters flowing into Pakistan.
In addition, Pakistan must also stress the totality of the size
of the Agrarian area of two million acres 93 that will be directly
affected by India’s harmful conduct; this conduct includes the
construction of dams on the Chenab, Jhelum, and Indus rivers and
the current work being done in the Ratle, Wuller, and Sawalkot
projects.94 All of these projects have the potential to affect water flow
in the Jhelum and Chenab rivers.95 Pakistan should emphasize the
need to halt these projects or even just change the design of these
projects so that affected rivers could still provide adequate quantities
of water to the Pakistani people to use for drinking, domestic, and
irrigation purposes.
Pakistan should also express its fears related to the violations
of human rights and international law arising from the revocation or
cancellation of the IWT 96 The Country should point out that the
revocation of the treaty could give birth to another, and potentially
even more intense, conflict between India and Pakistan. The
unbearable severity of the conflict that would arise could create
warlike situations with detrimental consequences for the South Asian
region, especially because both countries possess nuclear weapons 97
VI. CONCLUSION
The “access to water” has been universally recognized as
being one of the most fundamental human rights. All human beings
should have access to an adequate water supply for consumption,
irrigation, sanitation, and domestic purposes. Most international
93

Bilal Shafiq, Atomic Pakistan and Indus Water Treaty, DUNIYA, December

2016.
94 A.K. Chaturvedi, Water: A Source for Future Conflicts, 164 (VIJ BOOKS
INDIA PVT LTD, 2013).
95 Id.
96 Sartaj Aziz, Revocation of Indus Waters Treaty can be taken as an act of war,
DAWN, September 27, 2016, https://www.dawn.com/news/1286437, (last visited
2 April 2017).
97 Id.
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states have signed the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the Political Declaration, the ICCPR, the United
Nations Watercourses Convention, and other relevant declarations;98
therefore, these states should express their approval of basic human
rights, including the right to access water, and no state should cause
the hindrance of such for any other state’s residents.
However, India is harboring ambitions that are otherwise in
compliance with international declarations on human rights. For
instance, India plans to build dams on its western rivers, which are
allocated to its neighboring country, Pakistan, for hydroelectric
power generation. Although, the power generation projects can be
good for the public of India, simultaneously, these projects deprive
the people of Pakistan, and residents of the Punjab region especially,
the “right to access water.”99 Therefore, India’s actions constitute a
human rights violation.
The World Bank should play the role of “facilitator,” to
mediate and lessen tensions between India and Pakistan, as it did in
the past when the World Bank facilitated the promulgation of the
IWT in the 1960’s100 Without mediation, it may be difficult for the
two states to reach a consensus. However, resolution of this conflict
is vital to the region for the retention of peace and to ensure the
protection of residents’ fundamental human rights, including the
fundamental human right to access water.

Draft Political Declaration of the High-Level Meeting of the General Assembly on
Antimicrobial Resistance, 2 (UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 2016).
99 Russ Wellen, Will Pakistan Counter India’s “Water bomb” With a Nuclear
Bomb? FOREIGN POLICY IN FOCUS, December 31, 2011,
http://fpif.org/will_pakistan_counter_indias_water_bomb_with_a_nuclear_bomb
(last viewed December 24, 2016).
100 Fact Sheet: the Indus Waters Treaty 1960 and the World Bank, THE
WORLD
BANK
–
WORLDBANK.ORG,
January
24,
2017,
http://www.worldbank.org/en/region/sar/brief/fact-sheet-the-indus-waterstreaty-1960-and-the-world-bank, (last visited 3 April 2017).
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
(“RCEP”)1 is a proposed free trade agreement (“FTA”) between the
ten member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(“ASEAN”) (Brunei, Burma (Myanmar), Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam) and the
six states with which ASEAN has existing FTA’s (Australia, China,
India, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand). The RCEP
negotiations were formally launched in November 2012 at the
ASEAN Summit in Cambodia, and the 10th round of negotiations
ended in South Korea around early October 2015.
RCEP members originally agreed to conclude all the
negotiations by the end of 2015, but they failed to do so. As of May
2017, they are still in the process of negotiating. Among the many
working groups involved in the negotiations, the investment working
group has showed the slowest progress; its members simply debating
over the framework that should be chosen for listing the reservations
of the investment treaty. That is, for the last four years, they have
done nothing but debate the framework of the reservation list2 and
have agreed on nothing in text.
This raises the question of why host nations (i.e. countries
inviting and receiving foreign investment) pay so much attention to
the framework of the reservation list? They probably do so because
the reservation list is the most realistic and practical instrument that a
1 Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, DEPARTMENT OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE (2017), http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/
rcep/pages/regional-comprehensive-economic-partnership.aspx (last visited May
23, 2017).
2 There are two approaches for preparing a reservation list. One is the
negative list approach (“top-down” approach), which lists exceptions to the general
obligation of the main text of a treaty; the other is the positive list approach
(“bottom-up” approach or “GATS” approach), which lists the specific sectors to
which the general obligation applies. An advantage of the positive list approach is
that it gives a greater level of discretion over what to include and when. Politically
sensitive industries can be kept outside the scope of the agreement. The negative
list approach can automatically include new types of investment, while the positive
list approach cannot. See Preserving flexibility in IIA’s: The Use of Reservation,
UNCDAD series on International Investment Policies for Development, 2006.
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host nation can use to carve out regulatory power, given their
tendency for less developed negotiation skills and unequal bargaining
power. The host nations are usually developing nations which do not
have a legal department sophisticated enough to fully analyze and
examine the investment treaties. Moreoever, they lack training
programs and human resources to competently negotiate the treaties.3
The beauty of the International Investment Agreement
(“IIA”) lies in the way it balances the regulatory power of host
nations with investor protection. The host nations do their utmost to
carve out maximum domestic sovereignty, and home nations do their
best to protect their investors.4

3 Zeng Huaqun, Balance, Sustainable Development, and Integration: Innovative
Path for BIT Practice, 17 J. INT’L ECON. L, 299, 302-304 (2014) (explains that BIT
gives home states a negotiating advantage since the party who drafts the model
controls the negotiation. On the contrary, most of the host nations are suffering
from unequal bargaining power and low negotiation skills in a negotiation because
they have not prepared model BITs. Therefore, their position is merely accepting
or slightly modifying to a model BIT prepared by home states’ negotiating partner.
Only a few host states have prepared their model BITs and these are heavily
influenced by the model BIT of home nations); see also M. Sornarajah, The
International Law on Foreign Investment, 207-208 (Cambridge University Press,
2004)(the book points out that it is hard to expect host nations to have a legal
department sophisticated enough to understand and analyze the nuances in the
variations of the terms used in IIA).
4 See e.g. Suzanne A. Spears, The Quest for Policy Space in a New Generation of
International Investment Agreements 13 J. INT’L ECON. L, 1037, 1071 (2010)(Argues that
general exceptions clauses and new preambular language provide flexibility. The
article classifies three types of general exceptions clauses found in IIA’s. The new
preambular languages could include some non-investment policy objectives such as
labor or environment protection.); Zeng Huaqun, Balance, Sustainable Development,
and Integration: Innovative Path for BIT Practice, 17 J. INT’L ECON. L, 299, 324 (2014)
(Classifies three types of goals- 1) balance 2) sustainable development 3)
integration- that IIA’s should pursue. The article introduces the idea that the
Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development (hereinafter “IPFSD”)
emphasizes the insertion of “special and differential treatment (SDT)”. It pointed
out that SDT provisions could be an option where a negotiating party to an IIA has
significantly different levels of development, especially when one of the parties is a
less developed country); Joshua Boone, How Countries Can Adapt Current Bilateral
Investment Treaties to Provide Benefits to Their Domestic Economies 187 GLOBAL BUS. L.
REV.187, 196-7 (2011) (explains the importance of modifying the PerformanceBased Requirement provisions. The article notes that Performance-based
requirements such as technology transfers or limitations to technology licensing
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However, there has been much criticism that many IIA’s
which are being ratified are biased towards investor protection. The
claim is that these ratified IIA’s are being drafted in favor of
protecting investors rather than securing policy spaces in the host
nations. This is due to home nations negotiating based on their
model bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”), aiming for a high level
of market opening and liberalization.5 They try their best to persuade
host nations not to deviate from any terms in the Model BIT, and ask
them to carve out as little as possible. The host nations lack the
bargaining power and negotiation skills necessary to modify the
Model BIT and, thus, accept most of the terms therein. It is well

fees are probably the most powerful regulation methods for host nations. These
help to establish new markets, increase efficiency and production within new
domestic markets because they allow for the host nation to use, acquire, produce
and adapt the foreign technology. All these can be done by not prohibiting
performance based requirements through modifying IIA); Markus Wagner,
Regulatory Space in International Trade Law and International Investment Law 36 U. PA. J.
INT’L L. 3, 35-53 (2014) (The article compares the WTO dispute settlement system
in cases concerning human, animal or plant life, or health protection with
international investment regimes. The article suggests that international trade and
investment law can offer insights for one another. While international trade has
been more adept at incorporating health or environmental concerns, changes in
IIA’s should close the gap. Particularly, the article argues that such policy space
over health and environmental issues could be done through a provision of
expropriation in IIA).
5 Lei Cai, Where does China Stand: The Evolving National Treatment Standard in
BITs? 13 J. WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE, 373 384 (2012)(addresses how host
nations merely accept the terms in the Model BITs due to their low bargaining
power. “Based on Guzman’s “prisoner’s dilemma” theory, the host nations
compete with each other to attract foreign investment. As a result, they are
frequently at a disadvantaged position with poor bargaining power in the
negotiation process and thereby compelled to accept the model BIT proposed by
the home states”); Amit M. Sachdeva, International Investment: A Developing Country
Perspective 8 J. WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 533, 547 (2007)(Argues that IIA’s
result in a substantial reduction in regulatory power in host nations. The article
points out that well regulated national policy is what they actually needed. Neo
liberalism policy through IIA leads a reduction of infant indigenous industry and all
of these issues are difficult to overcome by host nations because of their low
bargaining power in IIA negotiation).
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known that most ratified IIA’s are extremely similar in appearance,
and almost identical to the terms in the model BIT.6
On this basis, host nations believe that the reservation list
framework is a practical and realistic solution to carve out and
protect their regulatory powers. Host nations devote meticulous care
to negotiating a reservation list,7 rather than the main text. In
particular, their concerns focus on the framework or modality of the
reservation list.
The framework is either a positive,8 or negative list.9 A
positive list inserts domestic measures that conform to the main
obligations of the treaty, while a negative list inserts non-conforming
measures (i.e. exceptions to the main text), with all other unlisted
measures automatically following the obligations of the main text. In
principle, these two frameworks should yield the same legal
consequences.

6 Huaqun, Supra note 3 at 324 (explains that most BITs follow either the
Draft International Convention on Investments Abroad or OECD 1967 Draft
Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property. Because of the common
origins, the terms used in BITs look remarkably similar across countries. This
similarity is due to the ‘innate’ priority of home nations and also reflects the
historically weak and passive positions of host nations as contracting parties in
IIA’s); see also Jason Webb Yackee, Conceptual Difficulties in the Empirical Study of
Bilateral Investment Treaties 33 BROOKLYN J. INT’L. L. 405, 415-416 (2008) (explains
that home nations have long been preoccupied with persuading host nations to
provide certain treatments such as MFN, National Treatment, Fair and Equitable
Treatment, which all yield a high level of liberalization).
7 IIA’s consist of two parts: the main text and the reservation list. While
the main text in the IIA’s determine the overall obligations (and rights) of both
parties, the reservation list includes either conforming measures to the obligation of
the main text (positive list) or non-conforming measures (negative list).
8 A positive list approach means the positive listing of sectors, subsectors and individual modes of supply in which countries voluntarily undertake
liberalization commitments. The selective nature of liberalization under this
approach implies that the treaties’ obligations apply only to the activities listed in a
country’s schedule and solely on the terms described therein.
9 Under the negative list, countries agree on a set of obligations in the
main text and list all domestic measures for which such obligations do not apply.
That is, the measures that do not appear in reservation lists are automatically under
the effect of obligations in the main treaty text. Thus, this approach is most
appropriate in countries aiming for a high degree of liberalization.
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To address why this is so, this article employs a behavioral
approach. This article seeks to answer the question of why
negotiators have different preferences regarding the two frameworks.
Fortunately, a few scholars have taken initial steps in determining the
methodological foundations of behavioral international law and
economics,10 and thus have examined how behavioral law and
economics can be applied to international law.11
Using the theoretical foundation of behavioral international
law and economics, this article primarily argues that host nations
strongly prefer a positive list over a negative list as they know that
they have limited cognitive capacities to fully collect and analyze the
existing domestic measures and determine which ones to carve out.
Simply put, they know they are suffering from bounded rationalityin

Anne van Aaken, Behavioral International Law and Economics 55 HARV.
INT’L L. J. 421,421-481 (2014); Tomer Broude, Behavioral International Law, 163 U.
PENN. L. REV. 1099, 1099-1056 (2015).
11 In fact, the rational choice approach to international law has been
widely accepted and the rational approach was recently applied to the field of
international investment law. However, while the rational choice paradigm has been
thoroughly challenged in the field of economics since the 1970’s and has changed a
significant part of economics, challenges to the rational choice paradigm have not
been systematically explored in the field of international law. . The literature of
international law never responded to this challenges of the rational choice and thus,
there is no systematic analysis of international law using behavioral economics. For
more references in applying rational choice to the field of international law. See
generally Robert E. Scott & Paul Stephan, The Limits of Leviathan: Contract Theory
and the Enforcement of International law (2006); Joel P. Trachtman, The
Economic Structure of International Law(2008); Eric Posner & Alan O. Sykes,
Economic Foundations of International law(2013), Andrew Guzman, How
International Law works: A Rational Choice Theory(2008); For more reference in
applying rational choice to the field of international investment law, See Anne van
Aaken, International Investment Law Between Commitment and Flexibility: A Contract
Theory 12 J. INT’L ECON. L. 507, 507 (2009) (argues that Contract theory could be
utilized in IIA’s. The author points out that Contract theory has been applied to
international trade law, but investment law has not yet been applied to IIA’s. IIA’s
may be regarded as a mechanism for overcoming commitment problems between
investors and host nations for mutual and reciprocal benefits. Contract theory deals
with the uncertainty problem and could solve this issue); For more references on
the literature of behavioral economics, See generally, Nick Wilkinson & Matthias
Klaes, An Introduction to Behavioral Economics (2012); Matthew Rabin,
Psychology and Economics, 36 J. Econ. Lit. 11 (1998).
10
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the drafting of the negative list.12 This article does not seek to
present a normative argument regarding the framework that should
be used in BITs, it simply seeks to indicate why negotiating partners
show different preferences regarding frameworks, which in theory,
yield the same legal consequences. In addition, the article does not
pinpoint the types of bounded rationality from which the host
nations are suffering, it merely argues that the negotiators are
experiencing trouble processing the limited information available to
maximize their profits by drafting the reservation list under the
negative list.
II.THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS
A. Reservation Lists in IIA’s
A positive approach means there is a positive listing of
sectors, sub-sectors, and individual modes of supply in which
countries voluntarily undertake liberalization commitments. The
selective nature of liberalization under this approach implies that a
treaty’s obligations apply only to the activities listed in a country’s
schedule and solely to the terms described therein.
Alternatively, negotiating partners may utilize a negative list
approach. In this case, countries agree on a set of obligations in the
main text and list all domestic measures for which such obligations
do not apply. That is, the measures that do not appear in reservation
lists are automatically subject to the obligations in the main treaty
text. Thus, this approach is most appropriate for countries aiming for
a high degree of liberalization.
Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J.
LEGAL STUD. 199 199 (2006); (Bounded rationality, an idea first introduced by
Herbert Simon, refers to the obvious fact that human cognitive abilities are not
infinite. We have limited computational skills and seriously flawed memories.
People can respond sensibly to these failings; thus it might be said that people
sometimes respond rationally to their own cognitive limitations, minimizing the
sum of decision costs and error costs. To deal with our limited memories we make
lists; to deal with our limited brain power and time we use mental shortcuts and
rules of thumb; but even with these remedies, and in some cases because of these
remedies, human behavior differs in systematic ways from that predicted by the
standard economic model of unbounded rationality. Even when the use of mental
shortcuts is rational, it can produce predictable mistakes).
12
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In summary, in a positive list schedule, a party sets out the
sectors it has agreed will be covered by the relevant rules in the main
text and if a sector is not stated in the list, it is not subject to those
rules. In a negative list schedule, a party sets out those sectors or
measures that are not subject to the relevant rules in the main text
and if a sector; activity; or measure is not listed, then it is
automatically covered (unless it has been excluded in the text itself).
In theory, both approaches yield the same result in terms of
liberalization.
1.

Positive List Approach

This approach recognizes four “modes” of trading in
services: across the border (e.g. the Internet); consumption abroad
(e.g. tourism); establishing a commercial presence (foreign direct
investment (“FDI”)); and temporary presence of a natural person to
deliver a service. Governments can make different levels of
commitment for each mode in relation to market access and national
treatment rules.
Sector or sub- Limitations on
sector
market access

Limitations on
Additional
national treatment commitments

8. HEALTHRELATED
SERVICES
Hospital
(1) None
Services (9311) (2) None
(3) Unbound
(4) None
(Registration and
Certification)

(1)None
(2)None
(3)None
(4)None13

Different entries under numbers 1 to 4 indicate the approach
the government is taking to each of the four “modes of supply‟ for
each service. When a country does not wish to limit or restrict market
For a detailed explanation of drafting a positive list, see
http://wtocentre.iift.ac.in/CBP/GENERAL%20PRINCIPLES%20&%20GUIDE
LINES%20ON%20SCHEDULING%20SERVICES%20COMMITMENTS.pdf
(accessed May 23 2017).
13
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access or national treatment in a sector or subsector in any of the
four modes of supply, it uses the word “None”, which indicates that
there are “no limitations.” So, for instance, in the chart above, a full
commitment using “None” means the country cannot restrict access
to its market of foreign suppliers who want to supply any aspect of
hospital services (9311) through modes 1 and 2 by using any of the
market access measures that are specifically prohibited. If a country
decides to restrict market access through Mode 3, thereby protecting
the hospital services market, the word “Unbound”, meaning no
bound commitments, is used in the column to block FDI by foreign
investors looking to establish a hospital business.
If a country wants to commit to a sector, but only under
certain circumstances or in a particular way, it needs to clearly spell
out the limitations that it wants to maintain. For instance, if a country
wanted to open the market only with respect to the registration and
certification of the hospital services, it could stipulate that limitation
in a column. In that way, foreign investors with temporary stay
authority would have an opportunity to work in the area of
registration and certification in hospitals. As noted above, the
obligations of the main text apply to the measures that are listed in
the column. If the country decided not to list the hospital services
area, then the government would have no obligations to comply with
the main text with respect to hospital services.
2.

Negative List Approach

Under the negative listing approach, the main features of the
non-conforming measures must be specified in detail. These
measures include the following elements: the economic sector in
which the reservation is taken; the specific industry in which the
reservation is taken; the activity covered by the reservation; the
substantial or procedural obligation to which the reservation is taken
(e.g. MFN or national treatment); and a description of the specific
law, regulation, or other measure for which the reservation is taken.
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The following is an example of a reservation list in the Korea-India
Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (“CEPA”).14
Sector

Manufacture of Chemical
Products

Sub-Sector

Manufacture of Biological
Products

Industry
Classification

KSIC 24212 Manufacture of
Biological Products

Type of Reservation

Performance Requirements
(Article 10.5)

Reservation Measure

Pharmaceutical Affairs Act
(Law No. 8552, February. 29,
2008), Article 42
Enforcement Regulations of
the Pharmaceutical Affairs Act
(Ordinance of the Ministry of
Health and Welfare No. 71,
October. 16, 2008), Article 21

Description

A person who manufactures
blood products must procure
raw blood materials from a
blood management body in
Korea.15

The above example shows that Korea reserves the right not to
comply with the investment treaty obligations regarding performance
requirements with respect to Indian investors’ manufacturing
chemical products in Korea. Because of this reservation, foreign
manufacturers of blood products in Korea must procure raw blood
materials from a blood management body in Korea, .
The Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (the CEPA) is
a free trade agreement between India and South Korea. CEPA was signed on
August 7, 2009. The signing ceremony took place in Seoul and the Agreement was
signed by the Indian Commerce Minister, Sharma, and South Korean Commerce
Minister, Kim Jong-Hoon. The negotiations took three-and-a-half years, with the
first session being held in February 2006. The agreement was passed in the South
Korean Parliament on 6 November 2009. Available at http://commerce.
nic.in/trade/INDIA%20KOREA%20CEPA%202009.pdf (Last visited May 25,
2017).
15 Id.
14
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The negative list may consist of several annexes and
reservations for future measures.16 These may be listed in Annex II
(reservations for future measures), in addition to the current domestic
measures, which are usually listed in Annex I (reservations for
existing measures). Annex II sets out the economic sector and the
activities where new restrictive measures can be implemented in the
future. For example, if a country believes that it may implement some
laws within the steel industry in the future, they would list the sector,
without having to provide any information about domestic measures
in Annex II.
B. Behavioral International Law and Economics
Recent literature has reconciled international law with the
field of behavioral economics to establish behavioral international
law and economics (“BIntLE”). BIntLE is the study of “how states
really behave.”17 It explains how behavioral assumptions may change
the strategies of states and negotiators, as well as the outcomes of
games. Some scholars employ three categories to explain the
foundations of BIntLE: the economic analysis of international law,
behavioral economics, and psychological approaches in international
relations.18The scholars believe that the three areas can complement
each other and reveal new insights into the behavior of actors in
international law. For instance, behavioral economics can enrich the
economic analysis of international law.
16 In addition to Annex I (Reservation for Existing Measures) and Annex
II (Reservation for Future Measures), there are more annexes that can be drafted,
as agreed by negotiating partners. For instance, under NAFTA, Mexico has an
Annex III (Activities reserved to the State) which reserves measures governing the
regulations of activities reserved to the State as decreed in the Mexican
Constitution (primarily in the oil and gas sector). The unique nature of Annex III is
that it has no requirement to specify the exact nature of non-conforming measures
maintained in sectors like Annex II. Another example is the Annex on Exceptions
from MFN. This annex carves out a number of sectors from MFN treatment (as
opposed to individual measures as per Annex I). Thus, this Annex gives greater
flexibility of reservations, allowing host nations to secure whole industries (e.g.
“steel”) without the level of specificity applied to Annex I. For more reference, see
UNCDAD, Supra note 2.
17 Aaken, Supra note 9 at 439.
18 Id. at 424.
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Some caveats with respect to applying individual decision
theory to international law should be discussed as a preliminary
matter because generally, the actor in international law is assumed to
be the state.
The application of behavioral economics to international law
depends on who the actor to be analyzed is. In other words, it is
uncertain whether we could apply individual decision theory to the
state and consider the factors in applying that theory to the
international sphere. There is no clear answer to this problem in
relevant literature since commentators are not sure who really acts in
international law.19 Both international organizations and individuals
contribute to the implementation of international law, but the direct
applicability of individual decision-making is in question. Some argue
that individual decision theory is directly applicable to international
judges, arbitrators, and treaty negotiators since they are individuals. 20
However, others counter by saying that the behavior of elites in
making decisions seems to be different from that of the normal
population, where various types of biases are concerned. This is
because elites tend to have higher levels of trust and cooperation
skills.21 That is, the behavior of judges and treaty negotiators may
differ from that of general participants in the experimental lab.
The application of BIntLE to IIA’s is still at an early stage.
Some analysts have begun research how the proliferation of IIA’s can
be interpreted in the field of behavioral economics. They argue that
host nations’ irrational decisions in signing IIA’s arise from their
“over-optimism” that IIA’s will support their economic growth. 22
They want to believe that signing IIA’s will help attract FDI, which,
in turn, will boost a country’s economy. However, once they face an

Id. at 441.
Id. at 443.
21 See Emily M. Hafner –Burton et al, The Cognition and the Political
Psychology of Elite Decision Making, 11 PERSP. ON POL. 369 369 (2013) (Arguing that
experienced policy elites differ from inexperienced subjects in how they make
decisions, rooted in “sophistication,” a learned skill that is derived from experience
and tends to be greater in elite than non-elite populations).
22 Lauge N. Skovgaard Poulsen, Bounded Rationality and the Diffusion of
Modern Investment Treaties, 58 INT’L STUD. Q. 1, 5 (2014)
19
20
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investor-state dispute claim, they may realize that they made their
decisions without any consideration of a cost-benefit analysis.23
Historically, the literature for this subject has never touched
on the application of the behavioral approach to the decision-making
process of investment treaty negotiators. Investment treaty
negotiators are imperfect, irrational human beings and behavioral
economics would have many implications for the negotiations. This
article is the first to raise the behavioral issue in the context of
investment treaty negotiators. The following section will argue that
the bounded rationality problem arises especially when host nations
draft the reservation list in the form of a negative list.
III. APPLYING THE BEHAVIORAL APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW
This section illustrates why home and host nations have
different preferences regarding the reservation list framework. The
first part argues that host nations prefer the positive list to the
negative list because they know that preparing the negative list will
result in self-suffering due to the bounded rationality problem. The
second part of this section examines various real world examples of
how host nations end up with incomplete and defective negative lists,
and their negative consequences when attracting investments. These
consequences explain why host nations avoid the negative approach.
A. Bounded Rationality in the Choice of Reservation List
Framework
Bounded rationality, an idea introduced by Herbert Simon,
refers to the finiteness of human cognitive abilities. People have
limited computational skills and seriously flawed memories, but they
can respond sensibly to these failings. Thus, it could be said that
people sometimes respond rationally to their own cognitive
limitations, minimizing the sum of decision costs and error costs.
People deal with limited memories, they make lists, and to deal with
23

Id. at 12.
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limited brainpower and time, they use mental shortcuts and rules of
thumb.24
The point of bounded rationality is not that people might
decide differently if they have more information or different
information, or decide differently with different items in the utility
function. Rather, the point is that they would not be able to process
all of the information even if they had it. Thus, if we are to predict
people’s actions, it is not enough to know the amount or quality of
available information, we must also know what the cognitive process
entails for selecting information and choosing rules of thumb.
There are various types of bounded rationality. For instance,
the framing effect25 relates to situations where people favor option A
when a question or problem is posed in one way but favor option B
when the same problem is posed in a different way. The endowment
effect26 is another example of bounded rationality which leads
Jolls & Sunstein, Supra note 12, 199.
The framing effect is an example of cognitive bias in which people
react to a particular choice in different ways depending on how it is presented; e.g.
as a loss or as a gain. People tend to avoid risk when a positive frame is presented
but seek risks when a negative frame is presented. Gain and loss are defined in the
scenario as descriptions of outcomes (e.g. lives lost or saved, disease patients
treated and not treated, lives saved and lost during accidents, etc.). See e.g. Tversky
et al. The Causes of Preference Reversal, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 358-361 (1990); Wansink et
al. Mindless Eating and Healthy Heuristics for the Irrational, 99 AM. ECON. REV 165-9
(2009)(argues that people’s eating habits including quantity consumed, can be
affected by the size of plates, packages or serving bowl used); Amos Tversky &
Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE
453, 455 (1981); Daniel Kahneman, A Perspective on Judgment and Choice: Mapping
Bounded Rationality 58 AM. PSYCHOL. 697, 703 (2003).
26 In a traditional sense, the endowment effect is described as one’s
preference to place a higher value on objects one owns relative to objects one does
not own. This is evidenced by the experiment of Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler.
In other words, willingness to accept (“WTA”) as a seller is higher than willingness
to pay (“WTP”) as a buyer. Many researchers have conducted experiments that
support this finding using different goods such as wine, chocolates, and basketball
tickets. The most common explanation for the endowment effect is loss aversion.
Simply put, a disutility from losing something is greater than the utility from
acquiring that same thing; therefore WTA is higher than WTP. See generally
Kahneman, D. et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem
98 J. Pol. Econ. 1325,1325-1348 (1990); For reference on experiment with wine, See
Van Dijk, E., & Van Knippenberg, D., Trading Wine: On the Endowment Effect, Loss
24
25
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individuals to value goods differently depending on whether or not
they possess them. If they already possess the goods, the individuals
value them higher than they would if they were not in their
possession. In other words, the people who have the goods at their
disposal show greater willingness to pay for them than the people
who do not have them at their disposal.
The “status quo bias” explains that individuals tend not to
deviate from their original positions. Depending on how the default
is set, people make different choices because they simply have a
tendency to not change their decisions.27 Organ donation, for
instance, can be set up on an opt-in (no donation by default) or an
opt-out (donation by default) basis. For example, an empirical study
has shown that an opt-in default leads to fewer individuals making
donations than an opt-out design.28 Last but not least, “overoptimism”29 shows that people are, on average, overconfident about
their future and about their predictions for their future. This relates
not only to their own situations and capacities, but also to their
evaluations of their control over a given situation.
Host nations are well aware of their limited capacity to fully
analyze domestic measures and prepare the optimal reservation list in
the form of a negative list. In order to prepare a negative list, they
should have the full capacity to examine all existing domestic
measures in their nations and precisely determine which measures to

Aversion, and the Comparability of Consumer Goods 19 J. Econ. Psychol. 579, 579-597
(2009); For reference on experiment with chocolate, See Knetsch J.L., The
Endowment Effects and Evidence of Nonreversible Indifference Curves 79 Am. Econ. Rev.
1277, 1277-1284 (1989); For reference on experiment with basketball tickets, See
Carmon, Z. & Ariely, D., Focusing on the Forgone: Why Value Can Appear so Different to
Buyers and Sellers, 27 J. Consumer Res. 360, 360-370 (2000).
27 Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions
About Health, Wealth, and Happiness (2008).
28 Eric J. Johnson & Daniel Goldstein, Do Defaults Save Lives? 302 SCI.
1338, 1338 (2003).
29
See generally Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism about Future Life
Events, 39 J. PERS. SOC. PSYCHOL. 806 806 (1980) For more detail on studies of
excess optimism, see Marie Helweg-Larsen & James A. Shepperd, Do Moderators of
the Optimistic Bias Affect Personal or Target Risk Estimates? A Review of the Literature, 5
PERS. SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 74 74 (2001).
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list. In principle, under the rational choice model, 30 rational
negotiators would easily achieve this maximized result. With their
infinite cognitive ability, the rational negotiators would analyze all the
data and information regarding the domestic measures perfectly, and
distinguish the non-conforming measures without error. They could
produce an optimal reservation list by perfectly examining the
domestic measures without any errors and figure out which one
should be carved out from the present IIA. This optimal reservation
list would maximize the gains of host nations and indicate to foreign
investors exactly which measures had been carved out from the
treaty. The imposition of carve-outs and specificities on the
reservation list would be optimal for attracting foreign investments.
However, host nations know they cannot produce the
optimal reservation list under the negative approach. They fully
recognize the variety of cognitive problems associated with
processing the data and information. They know they have
insufficient information available to create an optimal reservation list
that would maximize domestic profits. The limited access of host
nations to resources makes it difficult to collect all of the required
data and fully predict what measures should be carved-out from the
main text. For example, host nations may face extreme difficulties in
obtaining cooperation from other line ministries.31 Of course, there
The research of applying rational choice perspective under Contract
theory to International law is accelerating. A classic definition of rationality by Gary
Becker: “All human behavior can be viewed as involving participants who
maximize their utility from a stable set of preferences and accumulate an optimal
amount of information and other inputs in a variety of markets”. The central
principles of Rationality are thus, utility maximization, stable preferences, rational
expectations and optimal processing of information. Applying Rational choice to
international law is basically transferring these principles to collective actors such as
states or international organizations. It is assumed that potential biases cancel each
other out on the aggregate level or do not even occur within corporate actors) See
generally Kenneth Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for
International Lawyers (1989) 14 YALE J. INT L L. 335, 348-54 (discussing
methodology in international relations theory that is relevant for this paper); Jeffrey
L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis of International Law (1999) 24
YALE J. INT’L L. 1 ; Jack L. GoldSmith & Eric A. Posner, The limits of
International law (2005); Anne van Aaken, To Do Away with International Law? Some
Limits to ‘The Limits of International Law’ 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 289 (2016).
31 People debate whether trade representatives should be placed under
the Ministry of trade (or foreign affairs) or a part of the executive office of the
30
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are exceptions when the negotiation team has strong political power
and is prioritized, such as the United States Trade Representative
(“USTR”),32 which is a part of the Executive Branch of the United
States Government. However, almost all negotiators from host
nations experience difficulties in cooperating with line ministries,
especially with respect to collecting measures for the preparation of a
reservation list. For instance, a negotiation team under a Ministry of
Foreign Affairs or Trade may send a request to the Ministry of Land
to prepare a reservation list, with respect to land measures, because it
has no expertise in this area. However, in many cases, the Ministry of
Land frequently postpones submitting the reservation list to the
negotiation team because it is simply not one of its principal
functions. Thus, even if the domestic measures are easily obtainable
by line ministries, the administrative inefficiencies and lack of
cooperation between ministries may become big hurdles to listing the
measures in the reservation list.
Because of their incapacity to fully analyze and prepare the
reservation list, negotiators frequently fail to insert the reserving
sector that they would otherwise have to insert in the reservation list.
They sometimes leave blank the domestic measures section of the
reserving sector or stipulate unspecified domestic measures such as a
law without specific article numbers.
President. Many suggest host developing countries conduct structure reform of the
trade representative so that it becomes an independent entity under the executive
office of the President see e.g. Kim, supra note 20, at 69 (argues that Korea’s
current negotiation agency under Ministry of Trade lacks: the mechanism through
which the opinions of the interested-party are transmitted to the agency; the
mechanism of checks and balances between the parliament and the agency; the lack
of a horizontal decision-making process. The article ultimately argues that Korea’s
negotiation agency should follow the US model and establish a Korea trade
representative).
32 The USTR is the United States Government agency responsible for
developing and recommending United States trade policy to the President of the
United States, conducting trade negotiations on bilateral and multilateral levels, and
coordinating trade policy within the Government through the interagency Trade
Policy Staff Committee (TPSC) and Trade Policy Review Group (TPRG).
Established as the Office of the Special Trade Representative (STR) under the
Trade Expansion Act of 1962, the USTR is part of the Executive Office of the
President. With over 200 employees, the USTR has offices in Geneva, Switzerland,
and Brussels, Belgium. The current U.S. Trade Representative is Michael Froman,
who assumed the office on June 21, 2013.
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These incomplete reservation lists represent a significant loss
for host nations. The unlisted measures may be critical policy
measures that should have been carved-out. The unspecified
measures or blanks in the reservation lists make it difficult for foreign
investors to draw permissible boundaries for their investments, which
can reduce transparency and predictability for foreign investments.
In short, host nations are fully aware of their limited capacity
to conclude a benefit-maximizing reservation list in the form of the
negative list. They also recognize the negative consequences
associated with an incomplete and defective reservation list in the
form of the negative list.
In this regard, the positive list is less burdensome because
host nations do not face any significant pressure in the analysis of
their measures. If they fail to find a measure, the missed measure
does not have to comply with the highly liberalized main text. Thus,
it avoids a high level of liberalizations. There are also no unspecified
or blank measures in the positive list since the positive list does not
require the parties to specify the domestic measures. The positive list
mainly requires the parties to stipulate whether they will open or
close the market in a certain sector.
By contrast, home nations strongly prefer the negative list
because they believe the benefits of such outweigh its costs. Home
nations expect host nations to open more markets in various sectors
of the economy so that their foreign investors can make informed
investment decisions. Knowing that the host nations will fail to
include many economic sectors in the reservation obligations list of
the highly liberalized text, home nations will automatically bind all of
those sectors. They expect all unexamined sectors or measures to
conform to a main text that aims for high liberalization and market
openings.
For instance, if a host nation forgets to list a biotechnology
sector, this is clearly an advantage for the relevant home nations
involved because they know that the sector will automatically
conform to the main text of the treaty, thus achieving high
liberalization and market openings in the host nations. Of course, the
negative list has a downside for home nations being that the
incomplete and defective domestic measures may potentially confuse
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the investors. For example, if host nations successfully insert the
biotechnology sector in the negative list, but fail to put the domestic
measures of the biotechnology sector in the reservation list, foreign
investors have difficulty finding out which exact local rules have been
carved-out. However, home nations generally believe that this is a
minor cost because they anticipate additional benefits from
unexpected market openings within different sectors of the economy,
which the host nations failed to take into account. Moreover, home
nations believe that, to a certain extent, inserting a renegotiation
clause could cure the incomplete and defective domestic measures in
the reservation list. In fact, the home nations frequently include the
renegotiation clause for the host nations to specify and update the
reservation list.33
In this respect, home nations do not prefer the positive list
because their unlisted measures do not have to conform with the
main text of the relevant treaty. Home nations can no longer
anticipate the unexpected market opening from host nations’ failure
to carve-out certain terms that they would get under a negative list
approach.
So far, this article has concluded that host nations prefer the
positive list and avoid selecting the negative list because they suffer
from the bounded rationality problem, which makes it difficult to
examine and identify local domestic measures.
B. Issues with the Negative List – The Incomplete Reservation List
This section illustrates host nations’ poor drafting tendencies
with reservation lists and the negative consequences of such, which
e.g. Trilateral Investment Agreement between ASEAN, Australia, and
New Zealand:
Article 16 Work Program
1. The Parties shall enter into discussions of
(a) schedules of reservations to this Chapter; a
(b) treatment of investment in services which does not qualify as commercial
presence in Chapter 8 (Tradein Services). See also Japan-India Economic
Partnership Agreement:Article 90. Reservation and Exceptions. 5. Each Party shall
endeavour, where appropriate, to reduce or eliminate the exceptions specified in its
Schedules in Annexes 8 and 9 respectively.
33
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in turn, explains why they prefer the positive list. The article will
classify two types of incomplete reservation lists.
The first is the missing measures problem which comes in
two forms, and involves a failure to insert domestic measures. One
way this may occur is through a host nation’s failure to carve out the
economic sector itself, for instance, land acquisitions, so the number
of reservations is less than intended. When this is the case, the host
nation has no way to insert domestic measures with respect to land
measures. The other way this occurs is when, even if they do
successfully carve out a sector, host nations fail to insert domestic
measures in the reservation list. That is, the domestic measures
section of the reservation list is left blank. This type of incomplete
reservation list is the unspecified measures problem. This is the case
when host nations successfully carve out the economic sector and
even insert the domestic measures, but the measures are not clear or
specific enough to draw a clear boundary for permissible
investments.
The third type of incomplete reservation list arises from the
failure to continuously update treaties and their text to reflect any
amendments. Even if host nations successfully carve out the sector
and specify the measures, they frequently fail to reflect the
specifications in the later treaty. This section illustrates these three
types of problems through examples of IIA’s that demonstrate how
incomplete reservation lists negatively impact host nations’ ability to
attract foreign investment. Consequently, this illustration is best
understood by considering why host nations avoid the negative list.
1.

Missing Measures

The missing measures problem is the predominant reason
why host nations choose to avoid using the negative list. The
problem appears when countries leave a blank space in the domestic
measures section for the reserved sector. The following is an example
of missing measures in the Singapore-New Zealand Closer Economic
Partnership (“CEP”):
Sector:

Printing & Publishing
Manufacture & Repair of
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Transport Equipment
Power/Energy
Types of Limitation:

National treatment (Article
29)

Legal Citation:
Description:

More favourable treatment
may be accorded to Singapore
nationals and the permanent
residents in the above
sectors.34

In this reservation list, Singapore tried to carve-out regulatory
power in the area of Printing & Publishing, Manufacture & Repair of
Transport, and Equipment Power/Energy. However, a legal citation
section is missing indicating that Singapore failed to insert the
domestic laws that reflect the reservation, creating many problems.
For one, its absence reduces transparency and predictability for
foreign investors, especially when these investors have no idea what
domestic measures they should look at before making an investment.
Also, the legal consequences of the missing measures are not clear.
Suppose Act A is the law that should be inserted in the above
reservation list. Should this Act A be covered by the main text? The
answer is unclear. One may even argue that Act A is not carved-out
because it was not listed in the reservation list, so it should therefore
conform with the main text. All these uncertainties make it difficult
for host nations to attract foreign investment.
2.

Unspecified Measures

Host nations sometimes insert domestic measures that are
not clear or specific enough. For example in the CEP Singapore
34 The CEP entered into force on 1 January 2001. It is the most
comprehensive trading agreement, outside of the Closer Economic Relations with
Australia, that New Zealand has negotiated. The CEP aims to build on the close
historical ties between Singapore and New Zealand by improving opportunities for
trade in goods, services and investment. The two governments announced their
intention to negotiate an agreement in September 1999 and negotiations were
completed within one year.
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carved out their Companies Act with respect to the establishment,
reporting, and filing of accounts. However, the legal citation is not
clear as the article numbers are missing:
All Sectors
Type of Limitation:

National treatment (Article
29)

Legal Citation:

Companies Act, Cap
50(1994)

Description:

Compliance by Foreign
Companies with the
Companies Act as in
establishing, reporting and
filing of accounts.35

In the present example, the unspecified measures may
have a negative effect for the Governments of both Singapore and
New Zealand. For example the unspecified measures reduce
transparency and predictability for investors from New Zealand, the
main readers of the reservation lists, and thus, the Singapore
Government may have difficulty attracting FDI from New Zealand. 36
New Zealand investors may have difficulty ascertaining legally
permissible boundaries for investments in Singapore. The Companies
Act of 1994 includes all sorts of laws and regulations about
companies, which creates uncertainty in determining whether
Id.
See generally UNCTAD, Transparency (UNCTAD Series on Issues in
International Investment Agreements II) (Unite Nation 2012) (The report has a
comprehensive analysis of how IIA could enhance transparency and predictability
for investors. The report examines: the way in which traditional transparency issues
have been addressed in IIA’s since 2004; the emergence of investor responsibilities
as a consideration within transparency issues; and the introduction of a
transparency dimension into investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS). In analyzing
these issues, this report outlines possible sustainable development implications of
the different transparency-related formulations used in IIA’s and points to some of
the most progressive provisions that are appearing more frequently in investment
instruments. The report reviews transparency regarding investor conduct,
transparency in ISDS, and other obligations that are related to transparency in
IIA’s. This report does not address transparency relating to reservation lists. This
article is the first piece to argue the ways to enhance transparency and predictability
in IIAs)
35
36
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Singapore only carved-out measures related to establishing, reporting,
and filing of accounts. Thus, the question remains: Did the Singapore
Government reserve the right to adopt all of the provisions in the
Companies Act, or just the provisions relating to establishing,
reporting, and filing accounts?
IV. A HYBRID APPROACH AND A RENEGOTIATION CLAUSE
As home and host nations display dramatic differences in
their preferences for reservation list frameworks, it can sometimes be
very difficult to reach a consensus. To resolve the conflict, both
parties often conclude the treaty with a combined approach for
reservation lists: negative and positive. The Australia-Chile FTA is a
good example of such.37 The Agreement first grants market access
for all investments, then adds a reservation list in the market access
column. It is uncertain whether this complex structure really confers
transparency to the measures, but its intent is to combine the best
aspects of both frameworks.
Another method involves simply deciding to renegotiate the
reservation list when host nations have prepared their measures.38
The Australia–Chile FTA is a trade agreement between the countries
of Chile and Australia. It was signed on July 30, 2008 and went into effect in the 1st
quarter of 2009. The FTA is available at http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/
aclfta/pages/australia-chile-fta.aspx (accessed on Mar 6 2016).
38 Some international agreements are renegotiated while others remain
stable. Despite growing interest in agreement flexibility and design, the literature
has not addressed this question in depth. Some provide a theoretical framework for
explaining why some treaties contain limited duration and renegotiation provisions,
while others are rigid. Others explore the more general question of why states
design agreements with flexibility allowing obligations to be adjusted over time,
temporarily or permanently. The issue of renegotiation in the field of IIA is still in
an early stage. Some argue that the negotiating partners renegotiate when they have
learned something new about the state of the world, for instance faced a investorstate dispute settlement. That is, a direct experience with investment disputes,
which reveals new information about the consequences of the IIA, is associated
with a greater propensity to renegotiate. However, the literature has not examined
in depth why nations renegotiate after the ratification of the treaty. See Koremenos,
Barbara, Loosening the Ties that Bind: A Learning Model of Agreement Flexibility 55 INT ’ L
ORG . 289 289-325 (2001); Koremenos, Barbara, Contracting around International
Uncertainty, 99 AM . P OL. SCI. REV . 549, 549-565 (2005); Helfer, Lawrence R.
37
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Singapore and New Zealand recognized the problems associated with
unspecified measures in the reservation list, and as a result, put the
following clause in the main text to renegotiate the narrowing-down
of the measures:
Article 32 Limitations
2. As part of the reviews of this Agreement provided
for in Article 68, the Parties undertake to review at
least every two years the status of the limitations set
out in Annex 3 with a view to reducing the limitations
or removing them.
This allows Singapore to narrow-down the measures by
specifying the relevant article numbers. If the stated measures do not
reflect the “description,” then Singapore should reduce or eliminate
such measures in the reservation list.
The following is the renegotiation clause of the trilateral
investment agreement between ASEAN, Australia, and New Zealand
(“AANZFTA”).
Article 16 Work Programme
The Parties shall enter into discussions on:
(a) schedules of reservations to this Chapter;
and..[…]
3. The Parties shall conclude the discussions referred
to in Paragraphs 1 and 2 within five years from the
date of entry into force of this Agreement unless the
Parties otherwise agree. These discussions shall be

Flexibility Mechanism in International Agreements in International law and
International Relations (Jeffrey Dunoff &Mark A. Pollack eds., 2012); Kal
Raustiala, Form and Substance in International Agreement, 99 AM . J. INT ’ L L. 581,581614 (2005); Yoram Z. Haftel & Alexander Thompson, When Do States Renegotiate
International Agreements? The Case of Bilateral Investment Treaties (Univ. Of Maryland
Presentation Working paper, 2013).
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overseen by the Investment Committee established
pursuant to Article 17 (Committee on Investment). 39
As can be seen above, this is a different renegotiation clause
from the one found in the CEP in the sense that the three parties
signed the treaty without including a reservation list. Australia and
New Zealand successfully persuaded the 10 ASEAN host nations to
choose the negative list, but they all agreed to draft the list after the
ratification of the Treaty. Paragraph 2 states that the three parties
decided to start drafting and to conclude the negotiations on the
reservation list within five years of the ratification of the Treaty.
V. CONCLUSION
In reality, host nation negotiators are not rational agents
because they are just normal human beings. 40 They do not have
sufficient cognitive capacity to accurately examine the measures and
determine which domestic measures should be protected from the
highly liberalized text of a treaty. Because of this, host nations
frequently fail to put domestic measures that should otherwise be
inserted in the negative reservation list. They sometimes fail to insert
the name of a certain domestic measure in the reservation list and
frequently insert unspecified domestic measures (i.e. domestic laws
without article numbering).
Host nations are fully aware that these incomplete and
defective lists, which fall under the negative approach, will have

The AANZFTA was executed on 27 February 2009 and entered into
force on:1 January 2010 – Brunei, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore,
Vietnam, Australia and New Zealand;12 March 2010 – Thailand;1 January 2011 –
Laos; 4 January 2011 – Cambodia; and 10 January 2012 – Indonesia. (accessed on
Mar 6 2016, at http://www.thaifta.com/engfta/Home/FTAbyCountry/tabid/
53/ctl/detail/id/75/mid/480/usemastercontainer/true/Default.aspx ).
40 Herbert Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q. J. ECON. 99,
99 (1955) (argues that individuals do not seek to maximize their benefit from a
particular course of action because they have no capacity to digest all the
information that would be needed to do such a thing. They do not have the
capacity to access all the information required and even if they did, their mind
would not be able to process it properly).
39
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negative consequences. This awareness leads the parties to have
different preferences over the modality of the framework of the
reservation list.
This article is merely the beginning of the efforts to apply the
behavioral approach to international investment law. This article
examined the issues from the perspective of the bounded rationality,
however there are many other issues in the international law regime
that can be described from the behavioral economics viewpoint. For
instance, bounded self-interest may explain the existence of a
question and answer session during the negotiation phase. 41 This
would involve the negotiators from the home nations giving the
negotiators from the host nations brief lectures about the terms of
international investment agreements and answering the questions of
the host nations’ representatives. Why would negotiating partners
cooperate each other, instead of compete each other? Why are the
developed countries so altruistic that they would give a lecture to the
host developing countries? This may be able to be explained from the
perspective of bounded self-interest. More research should be done
in reconciling behavioral economics with international investment
law and international law in general.

41 Surprisingly, for most of the readers of this article, negotiators with
expertise from home nations frequently hold question and answer (Q & A) sessions
parallel to main investment negotiations in order to facilitate the negotiation.
Apparently, this shows a dramatic inequality of bargaining power between
negotiating parties. The Q&A sessions usually consist of discussions about the
meanings of provisions or articles and the consequences of adopting them. The
lecturers - negotiators from home nations- would have the maximum amount of
bargaining power depending on how they shape their Q & A sessions.
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I.INTRODUCTION
In 2009, Malaysia and Vietnam made a joint submission to
the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (“CLCS”), to
establish outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm.1 China
immediately objected to the submission, and sent a note verbale to the
United Nations General Secretary to be delivered to the UN member
States.2 In its note verbale, China alleged that the insular features and
maritime areas within the nine-dash line belonged to China and
added “it has indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South
China Sea and the adjacent waters.”3 China said it enjoys “sovereign
rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters as well as the seabed
and subsoil thereof.”4 The language used by China in the note verbale
was ambiguous and did not indicate what kind of maritime
jurisdiction China was claiming. There was also ambiguity in China’s
position regarding the status of the insular features in the South
China Sea (“SCS”) whether they are low tide elevations, rocks or
islands. In another note verbale, China claimed sovereignty over the
Spratly Islands and added they were islands under Article 121 of
“Receipt of the joint submission made by Malaysia and the Socialist
Republic of Viet Nam to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf,”
CLCS.33.2009.LOS (Continental Shelf Notification) (7 May 2009). Article 4 of the
Annex II of the Law of the Sea Convention provides:
Where a coastal State intends to establish, in accordance with article 76, the outer
limits of its continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, it shall submit particulars
of such limits to the Commission along with supporting scientific and technical
data as soon as possible; but in any case, within 10 years of the entry into force of
this Convention for that State. The coastal State shall at the same time give the
names of any Commission members who have provided it with scientific and
technical advice.
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, adopted December 10, 1982, 1883 UNTS
396,
http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_con
vention.htm [hereinafter “LOSC”].
2 People’s Republic of China, Note Verbale CML/17/2009 of May 7,
2009.
3 Id.
4 Id. (China reiterated its position in the note verbal of 14 April 2011).
1

427

2017

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

5:2

UNCLOS, therefore they were entitled to territorial sea, exclusive
economic zone and continental shelf.5

2009

Map 1. The nine-dash line map which China attached its note verbal in

The nine–dash line if connected would cover ninety percent of the SCS.
Ronald O’Rourke, Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes
Involving China: Issues for Congress, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 21 (Dec.
22, 2015); see People’s Republic of China, Note Verbale CML/8/2011 (April 14,
2011).
5
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Assuming China owns all of the insular features in the SCS,
this paper evaluates the China’s nine-dash line claim under
international law in light of the ruling by the Permanent Court of
Arbitration over the dispute between the Philippines and China
(“South China Sea Arbitration”),6 and evaluates the effect of the
ruling on the delimitation of the maritime areas in the SCS. The
ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration about the SCS is the
first decision by an international tribunal attempting to clarify the
difference between islands, rocks and low tide elevations.
II. AN ANALYSIS OF THE CHINESE CLAIMS IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF
‘HISTORIC TITLE’ THEORY
Some scholars argue that the Chinese claims can be justified
in the perspective of “historic title” theory.7 Gao argues that “support
for this view may be found in the resolution adopted at the 1947
inter-ministry meeting; the expression “limits of territory in the South
China Sea” was employed in the resolution,” and that “the precise
meaning of the reference in Chinese Note I [note verbale of 2009]8 to
“adjacent waters” over which it has sovereignty (…) has never been
defined by China.”9
The Arbitration Tribunal in Government of the State of Eritrea and
Government of the Republic of Yemen has made an important distinction
between the doctrine of “historic title” and “historical consolidation.”
It goes as follows:
The notion of historic title is well known in
international law, not least in respect of ‘historic bays’,
which are governed by rules exceptional to the
normal rules about bays. Historic bays again rely upon
a kind of “ancient title”: a title that has so long been
6 The South China Sea Arbitration, PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION
(July 12, 2016), https://pca-cpa.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/175/2016/07/PHCN-20160712-Award.pdf.
7 Zhiguo Gao and Bing Bing Jia, The Nine-Dash Line in the South China Sea:
History, Status, and Implications, 107 Am. J. of Int’l. L. 98, 109 (Jan. 2013).
8 Note Verbale CML/17/2009, supra note 2.
9 Id.
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established by common repute that this common
knowledge is itself a sufficient title. But an historic
title has also another and different meaning in
international law as a title that has been created, or
consolidated, by a process of prescription, or
acquiescence, or by possession so long continued to
have become accepted as law as a title. These titles
too are historic in the sense that continuity and the
lapse of a period of time is of the essence.10
This implies that 1) historic title is based on “common
repute” that has been established since time immemorial, meaning
that whoever inquires the existence of historic title will focus on
historical documents documenting the perception of States and
individuals in different historical times, and will be less focused on
material evidence of effective control. 2) Whereas in historical
consolidation a combination of modern titles, such as prescription
and occupation, that has existed over long periods of time will be the
determinant in a State’s land claim. So the doctrine of historical
consolidation is more related to modern territorial titles recognized in
international law today; this is probably why the International Court
of Justice, in its Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and
Nigeria decision, noted that “The Court notes that the theory of
historical consolidation is highly controversial and cannot replace the
existing modes of acquisition of title in international law.”11 Brownlie
refers to historical consolidation as being “not much more than a
compendium of pre-existing modes of acquisition”, and says that
“the accepted view is that consolidation does not exist as a concept
independent of the established rules governing effective occupation
and prescription.”12

10 Eritrea v. Yemen, Territorial Sovereignty and Scope of Dispute, Reports
of International Arbitral Awards, Vol. XXII pp. 209-332, para. 106 (Oct. 9, 1998).
11 Land and Maritime Boundry between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v.
Nigeria: Equitorial Guinea Intervening), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. Reports 303, para. 103
(Oct. 10, 2002).
12 JAMES
CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 236 (8th ed., Oxford University Press, 2012); See also
MALCOLM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 520 (6th ed., Cambridge University Press,
2008).
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A. Historic Title: Common Repute
A state’s claim to historic title, otherwise called “original
title” or “ancient title,”14 as mentioned above, depends upon
whether that State can establish that there was a common perception
since time immemorial that a certain area of territory or water were
within their possession. Examining a series of arbitral and judicial
decisions on this issue reveals that courts take the following factors
into account when examining whether a state’s claim to historic title
is valid:
13

1.

Whether the Parties Involved had a Common Perception of the
Island’s Existence

The International Court of Justice (“IC”) in its Sovereignty Over
Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge case
examined whether the islands under dispute between Malaysia and
Singapore were terra incognita in the colonial periods when Britain and
the Sultan of Johor were in existence as predecessor states to the
disputing parties.15 This is important because in order to have a
common perception that a certain piece of land or maritime territory
belongs to some party, that piece itself has to be at least recognized
as existing to all parties involved.
2.

The Territorial Regime of the Region and Time

In the Eritrea v. Yemen case, the arbitral court noted that the
“concept of territorial sovereignty was entirely strange to an entity
such as medieval Yemen,” and henceforth dismissed the Yemeni
claims that it had “ancient title” over the disputed islands.16 This
implies that in order for a State to claim ancient title over a land or
maritime territory, the parties involved must share, at the very least, a
common perception that a state have also been used by other States,
Id.
Id.
15 Sovereignty Over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South
Ledge (Malaysia/Singapore), Judgment, 2008 ICJ Reports, 27 (May 23, 2008), available
at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/130/14492.pdf.
16 Supra note 11, at 248.
13
14
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whether there was something similar to a condominium arrangement or
not.17
3.

The Existence of Rival Claims

In the Pedra Branca case, the ICJ took into account that there
was no challenge to the Sultanate of Johor’s claim to the island, citing
the lack of Norwegian claim to the lands in Eastern Greenland in the
Permanent Court of International Justice’s infamous Legal Status of
Eastern Greenland case.18
B. Historical Consolidation
We have established above 19 that historical consolidation is a
mixture of pre-existing modes of territorial acquisition, namely
prescription and occupation. The question to be raised here is could
maritime territory be acquired in the same way as land territory? And,
this question arises due to the following reason: In land territory, it is
established that any piece of land that is not terra nullius belongs to a
particular State, and that even terra nullius can be occupied by a State
if that State fulfills all requirements of occupation prescribed in
international law.20 The concept of “res communis” or the modern
“common heritage or mankind” has little place in land-territorial
regimes, unless some States establish condominium agreements or
other sui generis regimes in some of their territories.21
However, when it comes to maritime territory, or internal
waters or territorial sea in terms of modern international law of the
sea, there was always a conflict between the doctrine of open seas,
known as the doctrine of mare liberum, which dictates that maritime
Andrea Gioia, Historic Titles, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, para. 13 (Oxford University Press, 2013); D.P.
O’CONNELL, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA: VOLUME 1 423(Oxford
University Press, 1982).
18 Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B)
No. 53, 27 (Apr. 5, 1933).
19 See p. 5.
20 Malcolm Shaw, supra note 12, at 503.
21 Lea Brilmeyer and Natalie Klein, Land and Sea: Two Sovereignty Regimes in
Search of a Common Denominator, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 703, 704 (2001).
17
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areas be open to all States for navigation and economic activities, and
that of mare clausum, which argued for occupation of the seas by
certain States. Dutch jurist Huig de Groot (known in common
literature as Hugo Grotius) argued in his infamous booklet, Mare
Liberum, that the sea must be free and not susceptible to occupation. 22
Grotius, on the premise that only what is subject to occupation be
subject to possession, made the aforementioned distinction between
the land and the sea, saying that the limitlessness of the latter,23 as
well as the fact that the sea belongs to “all things which can be used
without loss to anyone else.”24 In contrast, John Selden published in
1635 a treatise named Mare Clausum, the main argument of which is
that the territorial sea is indeed subject to occupation by a State.25
The Grotian conception of the open seas was accepted in
international law by the 18th and 19th centuries. In the 19th century
Huebner tried to justify maritime blockades by championing a
“territorial-occupation theory of blockade” Neff explains it to mean
that “a blockading squadron occupies the portion of the sea which is
enclosed within the line of the ships and consequently that a
blockade involves a ‘substitution of sovereignty’ over the enveloped
sea area.”26 This notion, that enclosure might actually mean
occupation of a certain patch of ocean water, is heavily criticized by
British and American commentators such as Hall. 27 The consensus
was actually possible due to the proposal of Cornelius van
Bynkershoeck- in his book, De Dominio Maris Disseratatio, he based
his argument on the premise that ‘no sea was (currently) possessed by
anyone, and went on to suggest that “the control of the land extends
as far as cannon will carry.” Bynkershoeck’s proposal was accepted in
State practice as the so-called “three-mile rule,”28 which Great Britain,
RALPH VAN DEMIAN MCGOFFIN, FREEDOM OF THE SEAS: A
DISSERTATION BY HUGO GROTIUS 32 (1916).
23 Id. at 34.
24 Id. at 27.
25 John Selden, MARE CLAUSUM: THE RIGHT AND DOMINION OF THE
SEA IN TWO BOOKS 72 (London, 1663).
26 STEVEN J. NEFF, THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF NEUTRALS: A
GENERAL HISTORY 92 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000).
27 Id. at 93.
28 “The old rule of the cannon-shot, crystallized into the present three
marine miles measured from low water mark, may be modified at a later period
inasmuch as certain nations claim wider jurisdiction […]. There is an obvious
22
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the United States, and France accepted.29 The Grotian concept still
lives on in the modern law of the sea, subject to a few tweaks, such as
the introduction of the “twelve-nautical-mile rule” and the
introduction of the sovereign rights concept on the resources of the
exclusive economic zone and continental shelf, which is a limitation
of the States’ high-sea rights but actually conforms to the Grotian
notion of the separability of dominium and imperium.30 Also, the
sovereign rights of States do not rely on occupation; they rely on
rights ab initio and the proclamations of States, as established by the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”).
An overview of this history on the of the seas reveals that (i)
the seas are, not in principle, subject to any forms of occupation; (ii)
whatever sovereignty enjoyed by states due to the seas derives from
the concept of “the land dominates the sea” – in other words, it is
the occupying of land, and the resulting need to assume control of
some of the waters around it, that is the basis of sovereignty over the
waters. Occupation of the waters themselves does not ensure
sovereignty over the waters.31 Historical consolidation, as well as its
subcomponents, cannot serve as the territorial title for oceans. This
notion also applied to China when it was incorporated into the
international legal order in the mid-19th century.
C. Customary International Law
Even though occupation or prescription cannot themselves
serve as territorial title over the oceanic waters, there remains the
reason for that. The marginal strip of territorial waters based originally on the
cannon-shot, was founded on the necessity of the riparian State to protect itself
from outward attack, by providing something in the nature of an insulating zone,
which very reasonably should be extended with the accrued possibility of offense
due to the wider range of modern ordnance.” North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Case
(Great Britain, United States), Arbitral Award of Sept. 7, 1910, Reports of
International Arbitral Awards (RIAA) XI, 167, 205.
29 ROTHWELL ET AL., OXFORD HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF THE S EA 26
(Oxford University Press, 2015).
30 Id.
31 Lea Brilmeyer and Natalie Klein, supra note 21, at 707; ee Report of the
International Law Commission to the General Assembly, U.N. GAOR, 11th Sess., Supp.
No. 9, art. 68, Commentary, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956).
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possibility that even without the existence of historic rights
recognized by the relevant parties since the beginning of their
respective nations, the relatively recent sovereign claim over the seas,
accompanied by explicit or implicit acceptance by the relevant States,
can alter the existing territorial sea regime and allow for additional
patches of ocean water to fall under the sovereignty of a State. This
possibility was recognized in the ICJ’s Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case in
1951, in which Norway’s argument that its straight-baseline system
was acquiesced by the government of Britain and accepted by the
Courts of other States.32 Shaw has confirmed that this case is
irrelevant to the doctrine of historical consolidation.33
Since this way of assuming sovereign control over a patch of
water depends on the implicit consent or acquiescence of other
States, the Claimant State’s claims must satisfy a number of criteria to
ensure that the other States can genuinely consent to that State’s
claim. Before jumping into the contents of each criterion one has to
recognize the unique nature of acquiescence in modern law of the
sea. On land, acquiescence or explicit acceptance is usually done by
the state with competing claims to the particular piece of land in
question; this means that the legal relationships arising under
acquiescence tend to be bilateral. However, when it comes to
expanding the internal waters or territorial sea, the relationship is
rarely bilateral; all nations have an interest in the freedom of the high
seas.34 This means that the law of the sea is more general in nature
than the system of land boundaries – which implies that changing
this regime is akin to changing general rules of customary
international law. So the scope of acceptance for a sui generis regime
when it comes to internal waters or territorial sea has to be extensive
and substantially uniform 35 – if one is to borrow from the
terminology used in the North Sea Continental Shelf case.
The three commonly recognized criteria for acquiescence to
the State’s historic waters claim is stated as follows: (i) the claim has
to be formally made by the appropriate governmental authorities and
Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway), 1951 ICJ Reports 137 (1951).
Shaw, supra note 12, at 507.
34 CLIVE R. SYMMONS, HISTORIC WATERS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA: A
MODERN RE-APPRAISAL 55 (2008).
35 Id. at 57.
32
33
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must be clear and consistent,36 (ii) the claim has to be made public to
other states,37 (iii) the claim has to be continued long enough for
other states to make implicit acceptance of that claim. 38 The first
requirement is in place because no state can make implicit acceptance
of another state’s territorial claim if the original State never made an
official claim to the international community. The United Nations
study on the juridical regime of historic bays says that the
declarations “must emanate from the State or its organs;”39 and I) the
claim must come from the authorities competent to state the official
positions of that government, preferably the executive branch,40 II)
The official claim must be clear in its content- “the coastal State must
leave no doubt about its intention to claim the water area as part of
its national territory,”41 III) The claim must be consistent- the ICJ
based its decision on the El Salvador/Honduras case on the
“consistent claims of the three States.”42
Second, the claim must show sufficient “notoriety.” If the
claim is not made public, the other states, with a certain interest in
the freedom of the seas in that area, would miss the chance to be
aware of the other State’s claim. This means that the fellow States
would not develop the will to implicitly accept that other State’s
claim. Therefore, I) a claim has to be made public enough for States to
make effective protests; claimed buried in domestic documents or
voluminous pleadings is not sufficient to make a claim “public” 43; II)
the claim may be made in bilateral notifications to other states, or by
unilateral declarations;44 III) Open exercise of jurisdiction might suffice, given
that other states have other ways to be aware of the legal nature of
that claim.

Supra note 34, at 117.
Id. at 141.
38 Id. at 151.
39 United Nations, Juridical Regime of Historic Waters, Including Historic Bays,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/143, 14 (1962)
40 Supra note 34, at 121.
41 Id. at 128.
42 El Salvador/Honduras, 1992 ICJ Reports 601.
43 Supra note 34, at 140.
44 Id. at 144.
36
37
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Third, the claim must have continued for a certain period of
time long enough for acquiescence to occur. “Mere sporadic
enforcement of sovereign rights in allegedly historic waters will not
suffice.”45 The exact extent of the time requirement is not clear,
although, as the United Nations Juridical Regime study confirms, the
extent is closely related to the “extent that an inference of
acquiescence may be drawn from it.” If international reaction to the
historic claim is strongly pointing toward implicit acceptance of that
claim, then only a relatively short passage of time might be required.
The ICJ accepted this interrelationship between the passage of time
requirement and the acceptance of states requirement when it
confirmed in the seminal North Sea Continental Shelf case that a
norm of customary international law might be formed in a relatively
short period of time if the States with an interest in that particular
norm made an “extensive and virtually uniform” acceptance of that
norm. 46
The logical questions that follow entail (i) the extent of
knowledge that the States must have in acquiescing to the historic
waters claim, and (ii) the number of the States that must be involved
in the acquiescence. The accepted premise is that full knowledge of
the claim’s ‘nature’ and ‘geographical extent’ must be known by the
states making implicit acceptance. Libya argued during its
Tunisia/Libya case before the ICJ that Tunisian actions on its
claimed historic waters reflect[ed] substantial variations and
fluctuations in the size of the territorial sea, methods of establishing
baselines, and designations of a reserved and contiguous fishing
zones47 and therefore argued there could not be acquiescence on the
part of Libya. As Regarding the requirement on the extent of the
participation, since the historic waters claim entails an encroachment
of the high seas and therefore means a limitation of fishing and
navigation rights within that area, the states with a navigational or
fishing interest in the area claimed as historic waters by another state
must, at minimum, participate in the implicit acceptance.

45
46
47

Id. at 152.
North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 ICJ Reports 38.
Continental Shelf (Tunisia/ Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Judgment, 1982 I.C.J.

Reports 45.
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D. The Relationship Between the Historic Waters Regime and
UNCLOS
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) makes only few statements on historic waters – Article
10(6) of UNCLOS refers to historic bays, and Article 15 refers to
historic title as constituting one of the “special circumstances” that
allow states to derogate from the “equidistance” or “median” rule in
territorial sea delimitation. In other rules regarding the territorial sea,
UNCLOS sets quite clear and uniform rules on the extent of the
territorial sea that coastal states may enjoy, meaning that exceptions
to such uniform rules should be limited to those explicitly accepted in
UNCLOS. Failure to limit such exceptions would result in
unacceptable variations of claims in regard to baselines, which would
mean a loss of limits on the states’ claims to its Exclusive Economic
Zone (EEZ) and Continental Shelf areas, leading to uneven
encroachment of the res communis principle. So this means that the
historic waters regime would only have meaning in UNCLOS
regimes with regard to (i) “historic bays” and (ii) territorial sea
delimitation.
Even though Article 15 allows States to account for historic
rights or waters in territorial sea delimitation, this provision actually
limits the scope in which historical waters claims might be articulated.
The premise of Article 15 is that states have overlapping claims in
regard to its territorial sea, even when said claims are limited by
Article 3 of UNCLOS, which limits its scope to 12 nautical miles
from its baselines. So Article 15 would not apply when the length of
maritime areas between states extends beyond 24 nautical miles
between their respective baselines. A State might argue that their
historic waters constitute internal waters, a scheme accepted by the
ICJ in its Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. Iceland) case
(which would mean that its historic waters would be actually “within”
the baselines of that State). Even so, Articles 5 and 7 of UNCLOS
explicitly limit the ways in which baselines are drawn with Article 7
accepting the formula developed by the ICJ in its Fisheries Case
(United Kingdom v. Norway). So any historic “internal waters” claim
that does not fit with the baselines regime developed by UNCLOS
would be incompatible with the UNCLOS regime. These two
limitations seriously limit the scope in which historic waters claims
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could be made in regard to internal waters or territorial sea. Even if
one could pass through these limitations, the historic waters claim
would only serve as “special circumstances” in delimiting the
territorial sea in which overlapping claims exist, meaning that such
claims are subject to negotiations between two countries or judicial
review based on equity.
One could argue that since Article 10(6) allows states to
derogate from the definition of juridical bays, as defined in Article
10(2),48 might fall into the scope of bays and thus be included in the
list of historical waters regimes that UNCLOS explicitly proposes.
Even though this might be true, especially with bays that do not have
low-water marks of the natural entrance points that are more than 24
nautical miles apart, it would be satisfactory for our discussion here
to point out that the most traditional definitions of bays was based
on the so-called headland theory.49 This theory requires bays to be
enclosed “by reference to straight lines linking the headlands
wherever the geographical situation really withdrew the waters within
them for the traffic of nations.”50 This is in line with the Grotian
argument that enclosed features of the sea are exceptionally subject
to occupation and, therefore, imperium by individual States.51 This
means that maritime features not encompassed by straight lines
between headlands cannot be regarded as bays, even in terms of
Article 10(6) of UNCLOS.
A further argument is that the UNCLOS regime co-exists
with the customary law regime regarding baselines and the territorial
sea, which means that historic title may coexist with normal or
straight baselines drawn up by UNCLOS. If this argument is to be
valid, there has to be no legal conflict between the historical waters
regime put forward by China and the regime for internal waters and
48 “For the purposes of this Convention, a bay is a well-marked
indentation whose penetration is of such proportion to the width of its mouth as to
contain land-locked waters and constitute more than a mere curvature of the coast.
An indentation shall not, however, be regarded as a bay unless its area is as large as,
or larger than, that of the semi-circle whose diameter is a line drawn across the
mouth of that indentation.”
49 Supra note 17, at 380.
50 Id. at 382.
51 Supra note 22.
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territorial sea. However, such a proposition suffers from the fact that
if the territorial sea boundaries of supposed historic waters exceed
that of the 12-mile limit set from the normal or straight baselines
drawn up by UNCLOS, it conflicts with Article 3 of UNCLOS which
has a clear intent of forbidding that exact phenomenon. This can be
seen as a conflict between customary international law and new treaty
law, in which the principle lex posterior derogate legi priori would apply.
One might argue that the lex specialis principle would apply and so
the special regime of historic waters might prevail over the general
regime defined by UNCLOS, but UNCLOS, as stated above, is
clearly intent on limiting the scope of historical regimes that could be
used to derogate from its rules. Thus, rules that contradict this
limitation of scope cannot be considered lex specialis rules that can
derogate from UNCLOS.
Our conclusion is reinforced by the fact that Article 311(2) of
UNCLOS stipulates “this Convention shall not alter the rights and
obligations of States Parties which arise from other agreements
compatible with this Convention and which do not affect the
enjoyment by other States parties of their rights and the performance
of their obligations under this Convention.” As the Philippines v. China
arbitral tribunal accurately pointed out, the logical corollary of this
provision is that if the rights and obligations of a particular State
Party are “incompatible with the Convention” or “affects the
enjoyment by other States parties of their rights and the performance
of their obligations,” those rights and obligations are altered by the
provisions of UNCLOS.52
E. An Analysis of the Chinese Claim
The arbitral tribunal in the Philippines v. China case did not rule
on the possibility that China might be claiming the waters within the
nine-dash line as part of their historical waters because China
declared an optional exception according to Article 298(1)(a)(i) of
UNCLOS on disputes regarding “historical bays or titles.”53 The
tribunal moved on to establish its jurisdiction (by virtue of its

52
53

South China Sea Arbitration, supra note 6, para. 252.
Id. at 21.
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competence de a competence (French) or Kompetenz-Kompetenz
(German) on this case by declaring that China’s claims are actually
claims concerning historical rights, not historic title or historic
waters.54 In examining the validity of China’s potential historic waters
claims, therefore, it is not necessary to make an examination of the
specific findings of the arbitral tribunal. However, some of the points
made by the tribunal, such as the tribunal’s findings on whether
China’s claims satisfied the criteria for acquiescence is worth a glance.
1.

Does China Have Historic Title Over the Waters Within the
Nine-dash Line?

China has never clearly explained the legal nature it holds on
the islands or waters within the nine-dash line. Even though its
reference to historic rights in its notes verbales simply that China is
indeed making a historic waters or rights claim over the waters within
that line, China, perhaps in an attempt to keep strategic ambiguity,
never made clear whether it was claiming “historic rights” in the
meaning similar to “sovereign rights” recognized under UNCLOS on
its EEZ regime, or referring to the “historic waters” regime of
internal waters or territorial sea. As a corollary, China has never
officially presented evidence that backs up its claims for historic title
over the waters within the nine-dash line.
Even though official presentations by the government of
relevant evidence is scarce, a number of Chinese scholars have tried
to back up its claims by presenting historical evidence that the waters
in the SCS were perceived as Chinese waters since time immemorial.
These scholars cite (i) records on fishing; (ii) records on sporadic
military expeditions, particularly the one conducted by Zheng He
during the Ming era; (iii) records on naming; and (iv) records on
administrative boundaries.55 The main weakness in the Chinese
scholars’ works is that they are only focused on records kept by the
Chinese imperial government; it does not show enough records from
neighboring countries, or countries that shared the maritime routes at

Id. at 31.
Jianming Shen, China’s Sovereignty Over the South China Sea Islands: A
Historical Perspective, 1 CHINESE J. OF INT’L L. 103, 107 (2002).
54
55
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time, to show that there was a “common perception” among China
and other countries that the waters in question belonged to China.
Indeed, records on expeditions show that these expeditions
were rather sporadic, and China did not amass a stationary army to
solidify their new occupation; rather, the expeditions often resulted in
a tributary relationship between the Chinese imperial house and the
local residents residing in the islands in question. Zhang He’s
expeditionary fleet carried presents that were presented to the socalled “nomads,” a tradition which was a distinctive feature of the
Chinese tributary system in which the “Son of the Skies,” the Chinese
emperor, presented gifts to its underlying nomads in order to spread
the culture of Chinese civilization to the so-called “uncivilized”
areas.56 Also, Zhang He’s expeditions did not result in continuous
military rule over the areas he covered; maritime expeditions were
suspended shortly after the expeditions, allowing new influential
civilizations to grow on the outer areas.57
2.

The Problem of Acquiescence

The other way China can justify its historic waters claims over
the waters within the nine-dash line is to claim that other States
surrounding the area have acquiesced its claims. This differs from the
historic waters claim that mainly relies on recent evidence of implicit
acceptance, opposed to the ancient evidence of common perception
that traditional historic waters claims rely upon, which accompany
the relatively recently formulated claim that the waters are historically
part of that State’s sovereignty.
Taking into account the above-mentioned criteria, there are a
few problems that significantly undermine the persuasiveness of the
possible Chinese claim of acquiescence. First, the Chinese claim of
historic waters has not been geographically consistent, nor has it
clearly identified the legal nature of its claim. The Atlas of the
Administrative Areas of China, published by the Kuomintang

JOO KYUNG-CHUL, THE AGE
National University Press, 2002).
57 Id. at 17.
56
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government in 1948 refers to an “eleven-dash line,”58 which differs
from the “nine-dash line” published in Notes Verbales to Vietnam and
the Philippines in 2009.59 These are the only two times in which
China has officially identified the geographical scope of its claims,
and they do not match each other geographically. The very notion
that a series of dashes, and not a straight line, can mark a maritime
territorial boundary seems odd and causes geographical ambiguity.
Even if one accepts that China was actually consistent
geographically when making aforementioned claims, one needs to
note that China has never made clear the legal basis on which it
placed its claims. China, in its Notes Verbales to Vietnam and the
Philippines claimed that waters within the nine-dash line are within
its “sovereignty,” but it is not clear whether this means that the
waters within the nine-dash line are China’s internal waters or
territorial sea. Indeed, some Chinese scholars acknowledge that the
Chinese claims can be interpreted as a case for historic “fisheries
rights,”60 not historic waters; which means that the notion of
“sovereignty” in the Chinese documents can actually be interpreted
to mean “sovereign rights,” which is based on the Grotian separation
of dominium and imperium. Unless China makes its legal basis clear,
it is difficult for other States to provide effective acquiescence to its
claims.61
Second, the time in which China has placed its historic claims
is insufficient for other States to make effective acquiescence. As
mentioned above, only in 2009 did China clarify that its claims on the
waters within the nine-dash line is subject to its “sovereignty”(subject
to more ambiguity).
Third, there were actually serious protests by other States
after the 2009 claim. Here, one has to note the previous discussion
that acquiescence of maritime claims is different from the
58 United States State Department, Limits in the Seas: No. 143, Maritime
Claims in the South China Sea, 3 (Dec. 5, 2014), available at
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/234936.pdf.
59 Id.
60 Zou Keyuan and Liu Zinchang, The Legal Status of the U-Shaped Line in
the South China Sea, 14 CHINESE J. OF INT’L L. 57, 63 (2015).
61 Supra note 58, at 22.
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acquiescence of land claims because, unlike land claims, the interests
involved are barely bilateral and many states share a common interest
in maintaining freedom of navigation and overflight in the particular
sea area. This is especially true in the case of the SCS, given its large
proportion of global shipping that passes through this area and
proximity to the Malacca Strait. This means that the position of
global shipping power States, such as the United States, is of
significance; the US, however, in its Limits in the Seas report, made
clear that if the Chinese claims are based on the notion of
acquiescence, then China does not have a legal basis to support its
claim.62
3.

UNCLOS

Even if the Chinese claim of historic waters can be justified
by the traditional rules of acquiescence and historic title, it is
reasonable to interpret this regime to have been overridden by the
UNCLOS regime. First, the nine-dash line is not encompassed by
headlands that mark the lands surrounding it, which means that the
area is not an example of a “bay” in customary international law. This
strips the area of the eligibility to be qualified as a “historic bay” in
the meaning of Article 10(5) of UNCLOS. Second, the historic
waters claim that the nine-dash line represents stretches far beyond
the twelve-mile territorial sea zone that can be drawn up from its
baselines, even if one assumes that all the islands and rocks within the
nine-dash line belong to China and that the low-tide elevations that
China claims to be “islands” are actually islands in the meaning of
Article 121(1) of UNCLOS. This means that the overlapping
sovereignty claims between China, Philippines and Vietnam are not
overlapping twelve-mile claims envisioned by Article 15 of
UNCLOS, which means that the “historic circumstances” cannot
serve as “special circumstances” in territorial sea delimitation
between these countries.
Article 311(2), explained above, reinforces this conclusion.
The historic waters claims of China, for reasons explained above, is
indeed incompatible with the territorial sea regime put forward by
62

Id.
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UNCLOS, and seriously affects the navigational rights of States
within the area.
III. AN ANALYSIS OF THE CHINESE CLAIMS IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF
‘HISTORICAL RIGHTS’ THEORY
A. Legal Basis for Historical “Sovereign Rights”
Claims to historical sovereign rights means “a State is
claiming to exercise certain rights, usually fishing rights, in what is
usually deemed to be international waters.”63 This means that the
State is not claiming exclusive sovereignty over the disputed waters,
but arguing for historical rights over the resources of those waters.
This lack of exclusivity in their claims makes historical rights claims
different from those of the historical waters claims. As a logical
corollary, this leads to two further differences: (i) the lack of
exclusivity means that several “historical sovereign rights” can exist
within the same body of water; (ii) claims to historic rights tend to be
specific in its scope, such as specific rights to fish specific species or
catch specific resources.
Despite the differences, any historical rights claims put
forward by a State, just like historic waters claims, must be supported
by customary international law. With both types of claims, the
consent of the interested parties is rarely given explicitly through the
form of a treaty. Even if relevant treaties are concluded, the treaties
usually only mean a post facto acceptance of the historical right
already established such as the boundary agreement between
Australia and Papua New Guinea.64 Therefore, the practice of the
Claimant State must be supported by non-action or acceptance of the
parties involved, followed by opinion juris of the involved parties.
This consideration makes the criteria for acquiescence important for

Leonardo Bernard, The Effect of Historic Fishing Rights in Maritime
Boundaries Delimitation, in Securing the Ocean for the Next Generation, LOSI Conference
Papers, 2012.
64 Id. at 9.
63
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recognition of historic rights as well, which means the Claimant State
must establish the criteria of acquiescence.
B. The Relationship Between UNCLOS and the Historical
“Sovereign Rights” Claim
Even if a States’ historical rights claims are established by
international law, the question still arises as to whether the impending
imposition of UNCLOS, and the resultant activation of the Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ) and Continental Shelf regimes, actually
nullifies States’ title to aforementioned historical rights. This question
relates to the topic of legal conflicts between the EEZ or Continental
Shelf regimes, and States’ historical rights Claims. If there is no
conflict, Article 311(2) of UNCLOS ensures that the historical rights
regime remains intact. If there is a conflict, as a reverse induction of
the same article, the EEZ and Continental Shelf systems prevail over
individual State’s continental shelf claims’.
In order to determine whether such a conflict exists, a deep
probe is required on whether the sovereign rights over the natural
resources in the EEZ or Continental Shelf is exclusive to the rights
of other states. One can argue that since Article 56 of UNCLOS
ensures that States enjoy sovereign rights over the totality of
“resources” within the EEZ, and, since Article 62 allows the coastal
State to determine its capacity to “harvest the living resources of the
exclusive economic zone,”65 and only allows other States to intervene
when the coastal State “when the Coastal state does not have the
capacity to harvest the entire allowable catch,” the EEZ regime
envisions a total replacement of the pre-UNCLOS historical rights to
that of the rights stipulated to in the EEZ regime. The same line of
reasoning can be applied to the relationship between historical rights
claims and the continental shelf regime because Article 77 of
65 “The coastal State shall determine its capacity to harvest the living
resources of the exclusive economic zone. Where the coastal State does not have
the capacity to harvest the entire allowable catch, it shall, through agreements or
other arrangements and pursuant to the terms, conditions, laws and regulations
referred to in paragraph 4, give other States access to the surplus of the allowable
catch, having particular regard to the provisions of articles 69 and 70, especially in
relation to the developing States mentioned therein.” Article 62(2), LOSC.
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UNCLOS guarantees coastal states sovereign rights over the entirety
of resources within its continental shelf, without the same type of
limitations stipulated to in Article 62 in case of the EEZ. This is the
exact line of reasoning adopted in the Philippines v. China case, where
the Arbitral Tribunal concluded that even if China’s historical rights
claims over the resources within the nine-dash line are valid, any
historical rights held by China are overridden by the EEZ and
continental shelf regimes envisioned by UNCLOS.66
This argument suffers from two weaknesses. First, even
though the sovereign rights envisioned in the EEZ and continental
shelf regimes are deemed to be exclusive, there is nothing that stops
the coastal state from entering into agreements that allow non-coastal
state parties to harvest some of the non-living or living resources
within the EEZ.67 This is addressed in Article 62, where the coastal
State can determine its own capacity to harvest the living resources
within its EEZ, and allocate the leftover resources to other States.
Article 62 essentially means that the coastal state enjoys wide
discretion in the distribution of its resources to other States. If new
distribution agreements are allowed under UNCLOS, maintaining old
arrangements that are solidified under customary international law is
permissible as well. Even though the provisions on the continental
shelf lack distributive arrangements like those envisioned in Article
62, there is nothing in those provisions that blocks such
arrangements from remaining intact under UNCLOS.68
Secondly, in EEZ cases, UNCLOS envisions a regime of
functional distribution of resources, signified by Article 62. In giving
access to the EEZ, Article 62(3) stipulates that “the coastal State shall
take into account all relevant factors, including, inter alia, … the need
to minimize economic dislocation in States whose nationals have
habitually fished in the zone or which have made substantial efforts
in research and identification of stocks.” This means that the
historical rights of States must to be taken into account when
allocating any living stock within the EEZ. Thus, the legal

66
67
68

Supra note 6, para. 262.
Supra note 63, at 18.
Supra note 63, at 18.

447

2017

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

5:2

significance of historical rights held by a State remains a relevant
consideration.
The Tribunal left open the possibility of the EEZ regime
being amended or modified by customary international law after the
conclusion of UNCLOS, adding, “such a claim would require the
same elements discussed above with respect to historic rights.”69 This
also leaves open the possibility that the regime could be modified by
way of treaty, provided that the treaty satisfies the conditions aligned
in Article 41 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.70
C. An analysis of the Chinese claims
As in the analysis of whether China’s claims are acceptable
under the jurisprudence of historic waters, two determinative issues
arise in establishing whether China has historical rights over the
waters resources within the nine-dash line: (i) whether China’s
historical rights’ were part of customary international law due to
explicit acceptance or acquiescence by other States, and (ii) whether
China’s historical rights, even if accepted under customary
international law, are not overridden by the EEZ and Continental
Shelf regimes envisioned by UNCLOS.
As to the first question, the criteria required to establish
acquiescence in historic waters claims also applies to China’s claims’
for historical rights. As noted above,71 China’s historic waters Claims
lack the requisite level of clarity, notoriety, and longevity to be
accepted by other states adopting the theory of acquiescence. As it
follows, the criteria for acquiescence will not be met for historical
rights as well. In the Philippines v. China case mentioned above, the
Supra note 6, para. 275.
Article 41(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties reads:
Two or more of the parties to a multilateral treaty may conclude an agreement to
modify the treaty as between themselves alone if: (a) the possibility of such a
modification is provided for by the treaty; or (b) the modification in question is not
prohibited by the treaty and; (i) does not affect the enjoyment by the other parties
of their rights under the treaty and performance of their obligations; (ii) does not
relate to a provision, derogation from which it is compatible with the effective
execution of the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole.
71 See page 17.
69
70
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Arbitral Tribunal stated that China’s historical rights claims lack
sufficient historical grounds to be justified under international law. 72
The Tribunal ruled that the little evidence that exists can be evidence
of sovereignty over the islands within the nine-dash line, but not
evidence of historical rights.73
Up to this point, the Tribunal’s reasoning is acceptable.
However, the Tribunal made an error by oversimplifying the situation
when it declared that any historical rights China potentially had prior
to UNCLOS are overridden by the EEZ and Continental Shelf
regimes of the 1982 convention. The Tribunal based its judgment on
the premise that UNCLOS establishes an exclusive sovereign rights
regime that is wholly incompatible with the regime riddled by
historical rights.74 However, as demonstrated above, the Tribunal’s
reasoning was flawed: historical rights that predate the adoption of
UNCLOS may still co-exist with the sovereign rights guaranteed
under the EEZ and continental shelf.75
The question remains of whether any historical rights held by
China over resources within the nine-dash line stay intact under
UNCLOS. To answer this question, one must look to the intent of
the Chinese and Philippine delegations, the point at which the two
parties acceded to the UNCLOS regime. Negotiation records show
that China’s delegates, unlike delegates from Australia and New
Zealand, argued for a strong EEZ with little possibility of
preservation of historical rights.76 This was one of the decisive points
Supra note 6, para. 275.
Id. at para. 267-271.
74 Id. at para. 278.
75 See page 23.
76 Summary Records of Meetings of the Second Committee, 24th Meeting, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.24 at para. 2 (Aug. 1, 1974), Official Records of the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Volume II, 187 (Summary Records of
Meetings of the First, Second and Third Committees, Second Session); see also Summary Records
of Meetings of the Second Committee, 26th Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.26
at para. 108 (Aug. 5, 1974), Official Records of the Third United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea, Volume II, 120 (Summary Records of Meetings of the First, Second and Third
Committees, Second Session); Summary Records of Meetings of the Second Committee, 30th
Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.30 at para. 22 (Aug. 7, 1974), Official
Records of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Volume II, 228
(Summary Records of Meetings of the First, Second and Third Committees, Second Session);
72
73
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that led the tribunal to deny China the opportunity to invoke
historical rights. According to the tribunal, China “was resolutely
opposed to any suggestion that coastal States could be obliged to
share the resources of the exclusive economic zone with other
powers that had historically fished in those waters.”
IV. AFFECT OF THE RULING BY PERMANENT COURT OF
ARBITRATION ON THE DELIMITATION OF THE MARITIME
AREAS IN THE SCS
A. The Insular Features of the SCS
The SCS is a semi enclosed or enclosed sea surrounded by
Taiwan, China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Philippines.77 The SCS
measures about 550-650 nautical miles East-to-West and more than
1200 nautical miles North-to-South.78 There are five bulks of insular
features located in the SCS, which are disputed by the riparian States
regarding the their ownership, status and the maritime entitlenments
of such features: the Spratly Islands, the Paracel islands, Scarborough
Reef, Pratas Islands and Macclesfield Bank.79
The Spratly Islands are located in the southern quadrant of
the SCS, and composed of 140 islets, rocks, reefs, shoals and
sandbanks; all of which currently claimed by China, Taiwan, Vietnam,

Summary Records of the Meetings of the Second Committee, 48th Meeting, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.48 at para. 29 (May 2, 1975), Official Records of the Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Volume IV, 77 (Summary Records, Plenary,
General Committee, First, Second and Third Committees, as well as Documents of the
Conference, Third Session).
77 Because status of Taiwan is disputed as a state, it is excluded all of the
procedures relating to the South China Sea. Nien-Tsu Alfred Hu, Semi-enclosed
Troubled Waters: A New Thinking on the Application of the 1982 UNCLOS Article 123 to
the South China Sea, 41 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 281, 301 (2010) (between riparian
states to the SCS only Taiwan is not a party to UNCLOS).
78 Robert Beckman, The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the
Maritime Disputes in the South China Sea, 107 AM. J. OF INT’L L. 142, 143 (2013).
79 South
China
Sea,
LOWY
INSTITUTE,
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/issues/south-china-sea (last accessed Mar. 6, 2017)

450

2017

Korkut & Kang

5:2

the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei.80 The largest of the Spratly
Islands is Itu Aba is a mere 0.56 km2 in size.
The Paracels, which are under Chinese control, are located in
the northwestern quadrant of the SCS and consists of 35 islets,
shoals, sandbanks and reefs. Woody Island is the largest of the
Paracel Islands and has an area of 2.1 km2.81
The Scarborough Shoal, another feature in the SCS, is a
“large atoll with a lagoon of about 150 km2 surrounded by reef” and
located 124 nautical miles from the Philippines and is claimed by
China, Taiwan and the Philippines.82 The Pratas Islands are located in
the northern quadrant of the SCS and currently occupied by Taiwan.
The Macclesfield Bank is in the middle of the SCS, “a large atoll that
is totally submerged at low tide,” claimed by Taiwan and China. 83
B. Status of the Islands, Rocks and Low Tide Elevations under
UNCLOS
According to Article 121(1) of UNCLOS, “an island is a
naturally formed area of land, surounded by water, which is above
water at high tide.”84 Because of the word naturally, “artificially
wrought changes in its elevation will not entitle a rock of naturally
lower elevation to serve as a base point to generate various maritime
zones (unless it qualifies, in its natural state, as a low tide elevation, in
which case it may have a limited effect on the baseline).”85 China has
been piling sand onto reefs and low tide elevations located within the
Spratly Islands and Scarborough Shoal. In addition, China has
constructed military bases, airstrips, ports and radar facilities on those
features.86 Since these changes to the reefs are artificial and manSupra note 78, at 143.
Id. at 144.
82 Id. at 145.
83 Id.
84 Art. 121(1), UNCLOS.
85 Jonathan I. Charney, Rocks that cannot Sustain Human Habitation, 93 AM.
J. OF INT’L L. 863, 867 (1999).
86 For an interactive feature that show construction activities by China in
the SCS, see Derek Watkins, What China Has Been Building in the South China Sea,
N.Y.
TIMES,
(Feb.
29,
2016),
80
81
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made, they will not change their legal status to “islands” or “rocks” as
defined under UNCLOS.
Like a land territory of a State, an island has the capacity to
produce its own maritime zones: the territorial sea, the contiguous
zone, the exclusive economic zone, and the continental shelf. 87
An island is distinguished from a low tide elevation based on
how water covers the land. A low tide elevation is under water at a
high tide but above water at low tide. An island is never submerged
under water during a low or high tide. A low tide elevation is not
entitled to any maritime zones. Nevertheless, a low tide elevation can
be used as a baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea if
it is situated within the territorial sea of the mainland or an island.88 A
low tide elevation may not be appropriated because they are part of
the territorial sea or the continental shelf of a State.
UNCLOS states that “rocks which cannot sustain human
habitation or economic life of their own” do not produce any
economic zone or continental shelf. 89 On the other hand, they have
the capacity to produce a territorial sea and a contiguous zone. It can
be understood that an island is capable of sustaining human
habitation or economic life of its own.90 A rock does not need to
satisfy both requirements of “human habitation” and of “economic
life of its own” to be called an island because the Article 121(3) uses
the word “or” instead of “and” between these two requirements.91
While some commentators have argued that the key factors in
determining if a rock constitutes status an island are “if it can provide
fresh water, food, and shelter to human inhabitants and if the island
possesses sufficient resources of its own to sustain economic life.” 92
Additionally, Van Dyke and Brook look to “whether the island can in
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/07/30/world/asia/what-china-hasbeen-building-in-the-south-china-sea-2016.html?ref=asia&_r=0
87 Art. 121(2), UNCLOS.
88 Art. 13, UNCLOS.
89 Art. 121(3), UNCLOS.
90 CRAIG H. ALLEN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR SEAGOING OFFICERS 70
(6th ed., New York: Naval Institute Press, 2014).
91 Marius Gjetnes, The Spratlys: Are They Rocks or Islands?, 32 OCEAN DEV.
& INT’L L. 191, 199 (2001); Charney, supra note 85, at 868.
92 Id. at 199
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fact support a stable population” as a key factor, further stating that,
“islands should generate ocean space if stable communities of people
live on the island and use the surrounding ocean areas.”93
Charney opposes those standards on the ground that nothing
in the travaux preparatoires mentions such an interpretation. 94
Moreover, Charney infers from the travaux preparatoires of UNCLOS
that “human habitation does not require that people reside
permanently on the feature or that the economic life be capable of
sustaining a human being throughout the year.”95 He further stated
that economic activity of a rock may be met by the exploitation of
the living and non-living resources found in its territorial sea.96
The case between the Philippines and China decided by the
Arbitral Tribunal constituted under Annex VII to UNCLOS is the
first decision by an international tribunal to elaborate on Article
121(3) of UNCLOS.97 Accordingly, the Arbitral Tribunal concluded
that the use of the term “rock” in Article 121(3) does not require a
feature be composed of rock in the geologic sense. 98 The Tribunal
also tried to explain the intent behind the use of the word “cannot”
in Article 121(3) of UNCLOS as following:
The use of the word “cannot” in Article 121(3)
indicates a concept of capacity…it (the enquiry) is
concerned with whether, objectively, the feature is
apt, able to, or lends itself to human habitation or
economic life. That is the fact that a feature is
currently not inhabited does not prove that it
Jon M. Van Dyke and Robert A. Brooks, Uninhabited Islands: Their
Impact on the Ownership of the Oceans’ Resources, 12 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 165, 286
(1983).
94 See Charney, supra note 85, at 870.
95 Id. at 868.
96 Id. (“Consequently, a feature would not be subject to Article 121(3)
disabilities if it were found to have valuable hydrocarbons (or other characteristics
of value, e.g., newly harvestable fisheries in its territorial sea, or perhaps even a
location for a profitable gambling casino) whose exploitation could sustain an
economy sufficient to support that activity through the purchase of necessities
from external resources”).
97 South China Sea Arbitration Award, supra note 6.
98 Id. at paras. 480-482.
93
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uninhabitable. The fact that it has no economic life
does not prove that it cannot sustain an economic
life.
Nevertheless, historical evidence of human habitation and
economic life in the past may be relevant for establishing a feature’s
capacity. If a known feature proximate to a populated land mass was
never inhabited and never sustained an economic life, this may be
consistent with an explanation that it is uninhabitable. Conversely,
positive evidence that humans historically lived on a feature or that
the feature was the site of economic activity could constitute relevant
residence of a feature’s capacity.99
Regarding the “human habitation” requirement, the Tribunal
said that “at a minimum, sustained human habitation would require
that a feature be able to support, maintain and provide food, drink
and shelter to some humans to enable them to reside there
permanently or habitually over an extended period of time.” 100 The
term “habitation” is said to imply “the habitation of the feature by a
group or community of persons.”101 The Arbitral Tribunal said that
the military or governmental personnel stationed on the Spratly
Islands do “not suffice to constitute ‘human habitation’ for the
purposes of Article 121(3)” because “these groups are heavily
dependent on outside supply, and it is difficult to see how their
presence on any of the SCS features can fairly be said to be sustained
by the feature itself, rather than by a continuous lifeline of supply and
communication from the mainland.”102 The Tribunal pointed out
military or governmental personnel are actually deployed “in an effort
to support the various claims to the sovereignty that have been
advanced.”103
Like the scholars mentioned above, the Tribunal came to the
conclusion that an island would be given an EEZ and a continental
shelf if it is able sustain either human habitation or an economic life

Id. at paras. 483-484.
Id. at para. 490.
101 Id. at para. 491.
102 Id. at para. 620; see also para. 550.
103 Id. at para. 620.
99

100
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of its own.104 The Tribunal however indicated: “humans will rarely
inhabit areas where no economic activity or livelihood is possible.
The two concepts are thus linked in practical terms, regardless of the
grammatical construction of Article 121(3).”105
Regarding the criteria of “economic life of its own,” the
Tribunal concluded that economic life must “pertain to the feature as
‘of its own’.”106 According to the Tribunal, economic life of its own
does not cover activities from a possible EEZ or continental shelf,
however economic activities from the territorial sea may be part of
economic life of a feature.107 It was pointed out in the award:
Distant fishermen exploiting the territorial sea
surrounding a small rock and making no use of
feature itself, however, would not suffice to give the
feature an economic life of its own. Nor would an
enterprise devoted to extracting the mineral resources
of the seabed adjacent to such a feature and making
no use of the feature itself.108
China has not released any information regarding the status
of insular features in the SCS. In the note verbale of 2011, China said its
Nansha (Spratly) Islands are “fully entitled to territorial sea, exclusive
economic zone (“EEZ”) and Continental Shelf” without
differentiating low tide elevations, rocks or islands from each other. 109
Since these insular features include low tide elevations, rocks and
islands, they cannot produce the same maritime zones. The Arbitral
Tribunal in the South China Sea Arbitration concluded the high tide
elevations in the Spratlys were not capable of sustaining human
habitation or economic life of their own, therefore they were rocks.110
Indeed, most of the features in the SCS are low tide
elevations. For example, all the formations in the Macclesfield Bank
104
105
106
107
108
109
110

Id. at para. 496.
Id. at para. 497.
Id. at para. 543
Id. at paras. 502-03.
Id. at para. 503.
For the note verbal of 2011, see supra note 4.
South China Sea Arbitration, supra note 6, para. 622.
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are permanently submerged.111 Hence they may not be entitled to any
maritime zones. The Arbitral Tribunal in the SCS Arbitration, said
that Hughes Reef, the Gaven Reef (South), the Subi Reef, the
Mischief Reef, Second Thomas Shoal were low tide elevations.112
With regard to the Scarborough Shoal, the Tribunal concluded it was
a rock which can not sustain human habitation or economic life of its
own and went on saying:
The protrusions above high tide at Scarborough Shoal
are minuscule… They obviously could not sustain
human habitation in their naturally formed state; they
have no fresh water, vegetation, or living space and
are remote from any feature possessing such features.
Scarborough Shoal has traditionally been used as a
fishing ground by fishermen from different States, but
the Tribunal recalls that economic activity in the
surrounding waters must have some tangible link to
the high tide feature itself before it could begin to
constitute the economic life of the feature. There is
no evidence that the fishermen working on the reef
make use of, or have any connection to, the high tide
rocks at Scarborough Shoal. Nor is there any evidence
of economic activity beyond fishing. There is,
accordingly, no evidence that Scarborough Shoal
could independently sustain economic life of its
own.113
Similarly, the Tribunal reached the same conclusion regarding
the Curteron reef, the Fiery Cross Reef, the Johnson Reef, the
McKennan Reef, the Gaven Reef (North), accordingly it concluded
that they were rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or
111 “The submerged bank at its shallowest is covered by some 30 feet of
water. Of course China may claim it as part of its extended continental shelf but it
has not yet done so.” Mark J. Valencia, China’s Maritime Machinations: The Good, the
Bad and the Ugly, THE DIPLOMAT (Dec. 10, 2014), available at
http://thediplomat.com/2014/12/chinas-maritime-machinations-the-good-thebad-and-the-ugly/.
112 South China Sea Arbitration, supra note 6, paras. 358, 366, 373, 378,
380.
113 Id. at para. 556.
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economic life of their own. 114 Therefore, they may not be entitled to
any EEZ or continental shelf.
Chinese position against Japanese claims over the
Okinotorishima is worth to be mentioned at this point. Japan claims
EEZ and continental shelf around the Okinotorishima Atoll.115 Its
area at high tide is “one size of a twin bed and of a small
bedroom.”116 Since 2004, China opposes Japanese claims concerning
legal status of the Okinotorishima on the ground that it is a rock,
which “on its natural conditions” cannot sustain human habitation or
economic life of its own, and therefore can not be entitled EEZ or
continental shelf. 117 Most of features in the SCS does not allow “on
its natural conditions” to sustain human habitation or have economic
activity of its own. This situation actually highlight China’s
inconsistent position taken with respect to its interpretation of Article
121(3) of UNCLOS. Smith said: “Yet, if China claims all the islands
in the Spratly group with a view to claiming EEZs and continental
shelves from them, then there must be some inconsistency in its
position on Article 121, paragraph 3.”118

Id. at paras. 557-570.
See Yann-huei Song, Okinotorishima: A “Rock or an “Island”? Recent
Maritime Boundary Controversy between Japan and Taiwan/China, in MARITIME
BOUNDARY DISPUTES, SETTLEMENT PROCESSES, AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 14576 (eds. Seoung-Yong Hong and Jon M. Van Dyke, 2009) (the writer said the island
was unsuitable for human habitation and was not able to economic activity of its
own); see also Robert W. Smith, Maritime Delimitation in the South China Sea: Potentiality
and Challenges, 41 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 214, 223 (2010).
116 Herber Smith, A Rock or an Island? The significance of Okinotorishima and
its Status under the International Law of the Sea, PUB. INT’L L. E-BULLETIN, available at
http://www.herbertsmithfreehills.com//media/HS/HKTSIBEBASHL0407122110.pdf (last accessed May 2, 2016)
117 See China’s Note Verbale to the U.N. Secretary General,
CML/2/2009
of
Feb.
6,
2009,
available
at
http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/jpn08/chn_6feb09_e.
pdf; Note Verbale CML/59/2011 of Aug. 3, 2011, available at
http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/jpn08/chn_3aug11_e.
pdf
118 Robert W. Smith, supra note 115.
114
115
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C. Practice of States Regarding Status of Insular Features and
Effects of the SCS Arbitration over the Practice of States
The Arbitral Tribunal stated, “there is no agreement based
upon State practice on the interpretation of the Tribunal of Article
121(3) which differs from the interpretation of the Tribunal as
outlined in the previous sections.”119 Several countries have claimed
fully fledged EEZs around high tide elevations, which are actually
incompatible with the SCS Arbitration award. Mark E. Rosen, in a
published article in a magazine, gave examples of such proclamations
established by the United States and France. 120 The United States
claims an EEZ of 407, 635 sq km around the Johnson Atoll, which is
an uninhabited atoll and located 860 miles south of Hawaii. 121
Accordingly, this feature has never had any indigenous populations
and has no fresh water and tillable soil.122 Similarly Howland and
Baker Islands, located in the equatorial Pacific, have no fresh water or
arable land however they have phosphorite and guano deposits, and
they have an EEZ of 434, 921 sq km.123 Jarvin Island, another US
uninhabited island located in the South Pacific have scant vegetation
but have no fresh water and it is alleged that the island has never
supported “a self sustaining population.” 124 Yet, it produces an EEZ
of 316, 665 sq km.125
Similarly, France has some tiny, uninhabited features, yet they
generate fully entitled EEZs. Although Austral Islands in French
South China Sea Arbitration, supra note 6, para. 553.
Mark E. Rosen, China Has Much to Gain From the South China Sea Ruling,
THE DIPLOMAT (July 18, 2016), http://thediplomat.com/2016/07/china-hasmuch-to-gain-from-the-south-china-sea-ruling/; Peter Coy, Is it an Island or a Rock?
Ruling Could Cost U.S. a Huge Swath of Ocean?, BLOOMBERG (July 28, 2016),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2016-07-28/u-s-japan-and-othernations-could-lose-exclusive-economic-zones.
121 Id., Rosen.
122 Id.
123 The US District Court for the District of Guam in 2008 said that an
insular feature does not have to satisfy both the requirement of “human habitation”
and “economic life” to be called an island and ruled that Howland and Baker were
islands in terms of Article 121(1) of the LOSC. United States v. Marshalls 201, 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38627 (D. Guam May 8, 2008).
124 Rosen, supra note 120.
125 Id.
119
120
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Polynesia are uninhabited, they were given effect in the EEZ
generation. 126 Rosen argued these features nearly gave rise to an
increase of 4.7 sq km in the EEZ generation. 127 The French
Clipperton Island, located in 671 miles southwest of Mexico, is a ring
shaped atoll, which have no freshwater and arable land, yet it has an
EEZ of 431, 263 sq km.128 Similarly French Crozet Islands,
uninhabited tiny features between Africa and Antarctica, does not
have any arable land or fresh water. However their EEZs amount to
574,558 sq km.129
Japan claims a 200 nautical miles EEZ zone around tiny
Okinotorishima and the Senkakus features. As mentioned above the
Okinotorishima Island is uninhabited and does not have economic
activity of its own. Japan has an EEZ of over 400,000 sq km around
this feature.130 Senkakus are also uninhabited islets, which have no
fresh water and tillable soil.131
Most of the features above do not sustain human habitation
in their natural conditions. Although some of them seem to have
economic resources like seabed mining and fishing,—as Arbitral
Tribunal in the SCS arbitration put it—”economic activity in the
surrounding waters must have some tangible link to the high tide
feature itself before it could begin to constitute the economic life of
the feature.”132 People who make use of these resources actually have
no connection to those features. The Arbitral Tribunal also stated:
“Purely economic activities, which accrue no benefit for the feature
or its population, would not amount to an economic life of the
feature as ‘of its own’.”133 Therefore those insular features do not
sustain economic activity of their own. Following the Arbitral
Tribunal decision, it is likely that most of the aforementioned States
will get objections from the international community about their
EEZs around these insular features. However, a writer said that “it
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
South China Sea Arbitration, supra note 6, para. 556
Id. at para. 500.
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seems higly unlikely that these states will revise their legal position in
light of the tribunal’s award in the South China Sea Arbitration and treat
these ‘islands’ in future as mere ‘rocks’ without an EEZ and
continental shelf.”134
Even if we assume the features in the SCS are regular islands
under Article 121(1) of UNCLOS, maritime delimitations are
required with States whose coasts are opposite or adjacent.
D. Maritime Delimitations Involving Islands
UNCLOS has parallel provisions regarding the delimitation
of the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone (EEZ).
According to UNCLOS, “the delimitation of the continental shelf
(and the EEZ) between States with opposite or adjacent coast shall
be effected by agreement on the basis of international law, as referred
to in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in
order to achieve an equitable result.”135 Unlike the 1958 Convention
on the Continental Shelf, which applies the median line method,
UNCLOS does not regulate a standard delimitation method but asks
to come to an equitable result.136

Stefan Talmon, The South China Sea Arbitration and the Finality of ‘Final’
Awards, 8 J. OF INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 388, 400 (2017).
135 Art. 74 and 83, UNCLOS.
136 Art. 6 of the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf provides:
1. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two or more
States whose coasts are opposite each other, the boundary of the continental shelf
appertaining to such States shall be determined by agreement between them. In the
absence of agreement, and unless another boundary line is justified by special
circumstances, the boundary is the median line, every point of which is equidistant
from the nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial
sea of each State is measured.
2. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two adjacent
States, the boundary of the continental shelf shall be determined by agreement
between them. In the absence of agreement, and unless another boundary line is
justified by special circumstances, the boundary shall be determined by application
of the principle of equidistance from the nearest points of the baselines from which
the breadth of the territorial sea of each State is measured.
3. In delimiting the boundaries of the continental shelf, any lines which are drawn
in accordance with the principles set out in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article should
134

460

2017

Korkut & Kang

5:2

According to UNCLOS, the outer border of the EEZ and
the continental shelf may extend up to 200 nm from the baselines
from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.137 A State’s
continental shelf may be wider than 200 miles if its continental
margin extends beyond 200 nm, although such extension may not be
longer than 350 nm from the baselines or longer than 100 nm from
the 2,500-meter isobaths.138 States that claim an extended continental
shelf shall submit relevant information and data to the CLCS. 139
Article 2 of China’s “Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone
and the Continental Shelf” establishes a 200 nm limit of continental
shelf and EEZ from the baselines.140 The dash lines lays much closer
to the coasts of other coastal States rather than China’s coastal line.
For example, in the Philippines situation, the nine-dash line is 50 nm
far away from the island of Luzon and 30 nm away from the island of
Palawan.141 At its farthest point, the nine-dash line is 800 nm away
from the Chinese mainland.142 Therefore, China’s claims extend
beyond the entitlement under UNCLOS. The ICJ said: “no maritime
delimitation between States with opposite and adjacent coasts may be
affected unilaterally by one of those States.”143 As Tanaka put it:
“maritime delimitation is international by nature.”144

be defined with reference to charts and geographical features as they exist at a
particular date, and reference should be made to fixed permanent identifiable
points on the land.
137 Art. 57 and 76(1), UNCLOS.
138 Art. 76(6), UNCLOS.
139 See supra note 2.
140 Zhiguo Gao and Bing Bing Jia, supra note 9, at 105 (citing to the “Law
on the EEZ and the Continental Shelf of China” of June 26, 1998).
141 Emma Kingdon, A Case for Arbitration: The Philippines’ Solution for the
South China Sea, 38 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 129, 157 (2015) (citing Audio tape:
A Discussion on the Philippines’ South China Sea Arbitration Case, held by the
Center for Strategic & International Studies (Dec. 3, 2013), available at
https://csis.org/multimedia/audio-discussion-philippines-south-china-seaarbitration- case, archived at http://perma.cc/5XE7-SY35).
142 Id.
143 Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area, Judgment,
1984 I.C.J. Reports 299, para. 112.
144 YOSHIFUMI TANAKA, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 197
(2nd ed., Cambridge University Press, 2015).
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Regardless of the issue surrounding whether insular features
are islands or rocks, international tribunals gave less or even no effect
to islands in maritime delimitations, on the ground that situation of
the islands affected maritime delimitations disproportionally. In
general, international tribunals avoided addressing the issue if an
insular feature is an island or a rock. The following are some of the
decisions reached by the ICJ and arbitral tribunals regarding maritime
delimitation involving an island.
The Arbitral Tribunal in the Anglo-French maritime
delimitation case applied a median line between the French and
British mainland without taking into consideration the British
Channel islands located in front of the French mainland and giving a
12 nm continental shelf area to the Channel Islands.145
In the Tunisia-Libya maritime delimitaiton case,146 the
Kerkennah Islands were given half effect, as was the Seal Island in
the Gulf of Maine Case.147 In the 1985 Libya-Malta maritime
delimitaion case, the court stated that dependent islands would be
given less effect than independent island States in maritime
delimitation.148
In the 1992 Canada-France maritime delimitation case, the
Arbitral Tribunal observed that with respect to “western seaward
projection (of the French islands located in front of the Canadian
mainland), it is unavoidable that any seaward extension of the French
coasts beyond their territorial sea would cause some degree of
encroachment and cut off the seaward projection towards the south
from points located in the southern shore of Newfoundland (the

Case concerning the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the French Republic, 18 REP. OF INT’L
ARB. AWARDS 3,
para.
202
(June
30,
1977), available
at
http://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_XVIII/3-413.pdf.
146 Supra note 47, para. 129.
147 Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area, supra note
143, para. 222.
148 Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/ Malta), Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 1985, para. 53 (June 3, 1985), available at http://www.icjcij.org/docket/index.php?sum=353&p1=3&p2=3&case=68&p3=5.
145
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Canadian coast).”149 The French islands St. Pierre and Miquelon,
located in front of the Canadian mainland, were given a 24 nm
maritime area and a narrow 200 nm EEZ towards the high seas.150
In the Romania-Ukraine maritime delimitation case, the
Ukrainian Serpents’ Island was only entitled to a 12 nm territorial sea
and the court did not take into account the Serpents in the maritime
delimitation.151 The status of Serpents as to whether it was a rock was
not addressed or event taken into consideration by the ICJ because
the Court said that any reliance on the Serpents would create a
disproportionate effect in the delimitation line.152
V. CONCLUSION
All the above-mentioned islands in the delimitation cases
satisfy the definition of an island under Article 121(1) of UNCLOS.
Even so, they were not given a fully-fledged EEZ or continental shelf
or sometimes they were given no EEZ or continental shelf. Since
most of the features in the SCS are disputed as an island and since
most of them are barely above water at high tide, they should not be
taken into consideration in the maritime delimitation. Giving full
effect to these features would affect the maritime delimitations
disproportionally in the SCS. After the South China Sea Arbitration,
in which the Tribunal decided most of the insular features are not
island for the purposes of Article 121(3), even the
equidistant/median line method may not be a defensible claim for
China since most of the features will barely produce a territorial sea.
Because the Chinese nine-dash line does not comply with UNCLOS
nor prior and current decisions by the international tribunals, it is
invalid under international law norms and should not be given any
recognition or effect.
149 Court of Arbitration for the Delimitation of Maritime Areas Between Canada
and France: Decision in Case Concerning Delimitation of Maritime Areas (St. Pierre and
Miquelon),
31
I.L.M.
1145,
para.
67
(Sept.
1992),
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20693736.
150 Id.
151 Serpents’ Island has a 0.17 km2 land area. Maritime Delimitation in the
Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009, 61.
152 Id. at 110.
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I. INTRODUCTION
“My dream is to attend university in the United States!”
These are words I heard countless times while teaching law as a
Fulbright Scholar in China for two years. My initial reaction was that
he or she must want to study, travel, and experience life in the United
States (U.S.). I soon realized that my colleagues on the faculties of
Chinese universities, students’ parents, and nearly every educated
Chinese person I spoke with yearned to study in the United States.
Our system of higher education is a precious commodity that we
must not squander. Education is not an area where one may rest on
one’s laurels. In the words of Bob Dylan, “that he not busy being
born is busy dying”2 – a country must move ahead in education or
risk falling behind.
The U.S. is clearly a global leader in higher education, and it is
essential that we maintain our edge, both for the benefit of American
students and for the export of our educational system to international
students. Most U.S. universities have discovered that Chinese
students help their bottom line economically, but the true benefit is
so much greater than just that. Currently, China has the world’s
largest economy and is home to one-fifth of the worldwide
population. 3 Due to economic reforms in China over the past ten
years, 203 million people are now included in their middle class. As a
result, the demand for a world-class education has increased with the
growth of this middle class.
II. CHINESE STUDENT ENROLMENT IN US UNIVERSITIES
Chinese students have been enrolling in higher education
institutions of the United States in record numbers since 2010.4 From

2

BOB DYLAN, IT’S ALRIGHT, MA (I’M ONLY BLEEDING) (Columbia

1965).
Rakesh Kochhar, Mapping the Global Population: How Many Live on How
Much, and Where, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (2015).
4 Open Doors Fact Sheet: China, INST. OF INT’L EDUC., 2015,
http://www.iie.org/Research-and-Publications/Open-Doors/Data/Fact-Sheetsby-Country/2015#.WBI53pMrLdc .; Glen M. Vogel, A Study of the Language &
3
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2007 to 2015, there has been a 166 percent increase in the number of
students from China studying in the U.S.5 In 2015, Chinese students
made up over 30 percent of the total international students enrolled
in higher education institutions within the U.S.6 Even the daughter of
the President of China, Xi Mingze, attended and graduated from
Harvard College in 2015.7 In the past five years, applications to
Boston University alone from Chinese students increased by a
whopping 236 percent.8 The University of Illinois (UrbanaChampaign) has the largest number of international students of any
public higher education institution in the U.S., and “nearly 5,000 of
whom are Chinese.”9 There has also been a “remarkable growth of
foreign attorneys enrolled at U.S. law schools and particularly in
LL.M. programs.”10
Previously, Chinese students “tended to be graduate students
living on tight budgets,”11 but recently the number of undergraduate
students has surged, and now there are more undergraduate Chinese
students than graduate Chinese students. 12 Although many of these
Cultural Challenges Facing Business & Legal Studies Faculty in the Ever-Expanding Global
Classroom, 13 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 127, 129 (2014).
5 Id.
6 Open Doors Data: International Students: Leading Places of Origin, INST. OF
INT’L EDUC., 2015 http://www.iie.org/Research-and-Publications/Open-Doors
/Data/International-Students/By-Academic-Level-and-Place-of-Origin/2014-15.
7 Evan Osnos, What Did China’s First Daughter Find in America?, THE NEW
YORKER, Apr. 6, 2015 (Magazine), http://www.newyorker.com/news/newsdesk/what-did-chinas-first-daughter-find-in-america.
8 Laura Krantz, Number of Foreign College Students in Boston Surges, THE
BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 17, 2015, https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2015/11/
16/number-foreign-students-bostonsurges/0rrwqyAoHbSjn6f7chxxMI/story.html.
9 Sarah Svoboda, Why Do So Many Chinese Students Choose US Universities?,
BBC NEWS, June 2, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/business-32969291.
10 Lmindie Lazarus-Black & Julie Globokar, Foreign Attorneys in U.S.
LL.M. Programs: Who’s In, Who’s Out, and Who They Are, 22 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 3, 5 (2015).
11 Matt Schiavenza, The Tenuous Relationship between American Universities and
Chinese Students, THE ATLANTIC, May 30, 2015 (Magazine), http://www.theatlantic.
com/education/archive/2015/05/american-universities-are-addicted-to-chinesestudents/394517/.
12 Open Doors Data: International Students: Academic Level and Place of Origin,
INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION, http://www.iie.org/Research-andPublications/Open-Doors/Data/International-Students/By-Academic-Level-and-
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students are from affluent families who own Lamborghinis and flashy
clothes,13 a growing number are from lower middle-class families.14
The number of international students has grown so dramatically that
the University of California Regents voted “to cap the number of
out-of-state and international students at UCLA and UC Berkeley at
their current levels – about 30%.”15 The number of out-of-state and
international students has become so high that two California
legislators introduced Assembly Bill No. 1711 to the California
legislature on January 26, 2016; if passed, this bill will “limit the
percentage of undergraduate nonresident students enrolled at the
University of California system-wide to 15.5% of total undergraduate
student enrollment.”16 Similar measures have been enacted in Iowa
and Washington. 17 Although in the past students from China were
enrolling in post-graduate education, now Chinese students are
applying to attend U.S. high schools and even primary schools.”18

Place-of-Origin/2014-15. ; Chinese Enrollment in the US Shifting Increasingly to
Undergraduate Studies, INTERNATIONAL CONSULTANTS FOR EDUCATION AND FAIRS
(ICEF) MONITOR , May 27, 2015, http://monitor.icef.com/2015/05/chineseenrolment-in-the-us-shifting-increasingly-to-undergraduate-studies/ (“Data reveals
that the flow of Chinese students into US undergraduate programmes is speeding
up at the same time as demand for American graduate programmes (the historic
core of Chinese enrolment in the US) has been slowing.”)
13 See Christopher Beam, Children of the Yuan Percent: Everyone Hates China’s
Rich Kids, BLOOMBERG BUS., Sept. 30, 2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
features/2015-10-01/children-of-the-yuan-percent-everyone-hates-china-s-richkids. (The young, fabulously wealthy second-generation rich Chinese are referred to
as feurdai).
14 Frank Shyong, Not Only China’s Wealthy Want to Study in America, THE
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2015, http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-mechinese-students-20151228-story.html.
15 Id.
16 University of California: Nonresident Student E, Cal. S. AB-1711
(2016), http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201520
160AB1711.
17 Miriam Jordan, International Students Stream into U.S. Colleges, THE WALL
ST. J., Mar. 24, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/international-students-streaminto-u-s-colleges-1427248801.
18 Miriam Jordan, U.S. Schools Draw More Chinese, THE WALL ST. J , Dec.
17, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-schools-draw-more-chinese-14504002
23.
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The top six states with foreign students are California, New York,
Texas, Massachusetts, Illinois, and Pennsylvania.19
There are a number of reasons for this rapid increase in the
number of Chinese students attending U.S. universities. The United
States is considered to have the best higher education institutions in
the world. Of the several published best university rankings in the
world, each of them shows the U.S.’s dominance over the rankings.
The U.S. News and World Report rankings published near the end of
2015 rates eight U.S. universities in the top ten of universities
worldwide.20 Of the top 100 universities, the U.S. houses 53.21 The
Times Higher Education World University Rankings for 2015-2016
lists the U.S. as having 39 of the top 100, and six of the top ten
higher education institutions.22 The Center for World University
Rankings for 2015 lists the U.S. as having eight of the top ten
institutions and 54 of the top 100 universities.23 The CS World
University Rankings for 2015/16 shows U.S. universities as six of the
top ten and 30 of the top 100 institutions in the world.24 Clearly, the
United States is the global leader in higher education.
Conversely, Chinese universities are ranked relatively lower in
global rankings of universities according to the above-referenced
rankings. The U.S. News and World Report rankings include three
Chinese universities in the top 100 global university rankings, where
Peking University is tied for #41, Tsinghua University is #59, and
Fudan University at #96.25 The Times Higher Education World
University rankings show two Chinese universities in the top 100:

Krantz, supra note 9.
Best Global Universities Rankings 2017, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT,
http://www.usnews.com/education/best-global-universities/rankings.
21 Id.
22 World
University Rankings 2015-2016, THE TIMES HIGHER
EDUCATION, https://www.timeshighereducation.com/world-university-rankings/
2016/world-ranking#!/page/0/length/25.
23 CWUR 2015: World University Rankings, CENTER FOR WORLD
UNIVERSITY RANKINGS (CWUR), http://cwur.org/2015/.
24 QS World University Rankings 2015/16, QS TOP UNIVERSITIES,
http://www.topuniversities.com/university-rankings/world-universityrankings/2015#sorting=rank+region=+country=+faculty=+stars=false+search=.
25 U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT supra note 21.
19
20
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Peking University at #42 and Tsinghua University at #47.26 The
Center for World University Rankings lists two Chinese universities,
Peking University at #56 and Tsinghua University at #78.27 Finally,
QS World University Rankings include four Chinese universities in its
top 100 with Tsinghua University at #25, Peking University at #41,
Fudan University at #51, and Shanghai Jiao Tong University at #70.28
The rankings are certainly uppermost in the minds of Chinese
students and their parents,29 but Chinese students are interested in
U.S. universities for more reasons than the prestige of the top
universities.30 “The ambitions of Chinese students are shifting. No
longer are they attracted just by the glittering names. Pursuit of
education abroad is becoming an end in itself.”31 The growing
Chinese middle class prefers a “well-rated university overseas to a
second-tier option at home.” As noted above, only Peking University
and Tsinghua University are ranked in the world top 100. These two
schools have room for only 6,000 new students a year. 32 That is onetwentieth of one percent of the Chinese college entrance exam
takers.33
Chinese students and their parents are also attracted to
American methods of teaching. In the U.S., students are encouraged
to be curious, which is generally not true of Chinese higher

THE TIMES HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 23.
CENTER FOR WORLD UNIVERSITY RANKINGS (CWUR), supra note 24.
28 QS TOP UNIVERSITIES, supra note 25.
29 TEA LEAF NATION STAFF, For Chinese Students in America, a
Transformative Journey, FOREIGH POLICY, Dec. 9, 2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/
2015/12/09/for-chinese-students-in-america-a-transformative-journey-fp-surveyexclusive-results/, (“Respondents overwhelmingly said they were drawn by the
quality of American education, with over 77 percent listing it as their primary
reason for studying abroad.”)
30 Georgia on their Minds, THE ECONOMIST, China ed., Feb.21, 2015
(Magazine).
31 Id.
32 Doug Bandow, Transforming China from Within: Chinese Students Head to
American Universities, FORBES, Sept. 22, 2014, http://www.forbes.com/sites/doug
bandow/2014/09/22/transforming-china-from-within-chinese-students-head-toamerican-universities/#339da382918f.
33 Id.
26
27
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education.34 Many Chinese find their higher education system “too
rigid and ideologically stifling.”35 There is a great difference between
the American style of critical thinking (particularly in law school)
versus the Chinese style of rote memorization. 36 “In China, people
often humorously compare the traditional method of conveying
information to a student to “feeding a duck’: you feed it, and feed it,
and feed it until the duck is full, and then you’re done.”37 Chinese
students and their parents find that study abroad “is more studentcentered and individualized.”38 Some residents of China believe the
education in China, which rewards rote-style learning, stifles students’
creativity and critical thinking abilities.39
One important difference between the U.S. and Chinese
higher education systems is the flexibility of choice in the U.S. The
American education system gives students the freedom to choose
their field of study.40 My students in China were astounded by the
fact that my son changed his major four times in college. In China, a
student’s test score determines his or her field of study. 41 In fact, only
the highest scoring students are able to study lucrative majors such as
finance and economics.42 According to one student, “Chinese
education makes you memorize a lot of things but don’t let [sic] you
have your opinion to exercise your mind.” Indeed, the U.S. education

Janet Eom, The Eagle, the Dragon, and the “Excellent Sheep,” FOREIGN
POLICY, Oct. 20, 2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/20/china-us-americaeducation-ivy-league-college-testing-innovation/.
35 Georgia on their Minds, supra note 31.
36 Erin Ryan, Xin Shuai, Yuan Ye, You Ran, Li Haomei, When Socrates
Meets Confucius: Teaching Creative and Critical Thinking Across Cultures Through Multilevel
Socratic Method, 92 NEB. L. REV. 289 (2013); TEA LEAF NATION STAFF, supra note
30.
37 Ryan, at 307.
38 Andrew Ross, How the Children of China’s Elite Learned to (By)pass the
Gaokao, CHINA ECON. REV., July 11, 2015, http://www.chinaeconomicreview.com
/how-children-chinas-elite-learned-bypass-gaokao.
39 Duncan Hewitt, Fraud Rings, Drone Surveillance and Extra Police – It’s
China’s ‘Killer’ University Exams, INT’L BUS. TIMES, June 9, 2015,
http://www.ibtimes.com/fraud-rings-drone-surveillance-extra-police-its-chinaskiller-university-exams-1957897.
40 Svoboda, supra note 10.
41 Id.
42 Janet Eom, supra note 33.
34
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system has been described as offering “the freedom to be indecisive
and the ability to change your mind.”43
The price of a U.S. university education far exceeds the price
of a Chinese education.44 In China, Tsinghua University charges
40,000 CNY (Chinese Yuan Renminbi), or $6,140 USD, while Fudan
University charges 25,000 CNY, or $3,838, for tuition.45 On the
other hand, an international student is charged $45,000 per year for
tuition at Harvard College and anywhere between $32,096 and
$41,376 for tuition at the University of Illinois. 46 Additionally, most
Chinese students are ineligible for federal financial aid.47
Nevertheless, “Chinese parents see American education as the most
valuable of commodities and are willing to make sacrifices to get it.” 48
A sacrifice it is. The tuition is “the equivalent of nearly ten times the
average annual disposable income of urban households” in China.49
In somewhat of a win-win situation for U.S. universities and Chinese
students, “foreign students have become crucial to many public
universities” because the universities may charge these students full
tuition.50 The Greater Boston Convention & Visitors Bureau
President referred to this as “a Super Bowl of education spending.” 51
Shyong, supra note 15.
Tuition Fee Less than $4,000 in Top 100 China Universities: Most Affordable
China Universities, CHINA’S UNIVERSITY AND COLLEGE ADMISSION SYSTEM
(CUCAS), http://news.cucas.edu.cn/Admission_Express/Tuition-fee-less-than—
4,000-in-Top-100-China-Universities%EF%BC%9AMost-Affordable-ChinaUniversities-_2644.html.
45 Id.
46 Tuition and Expenses, HARVARD COLLEGE: HARVARD UNIVERSITY,
https://college.harvard.edu/financial-aid/how-aid-works/cost-attendance; Tuition,
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS: ADMISSIONS, https://admissions.illinois.edu/Invest/
tuition.
47 TEA LEAF NATION STAFF, The Most Chinese Schools in America, Foreign
Policy, Jan. 4, 2016, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/01/04/the-most-chineseschools-in-america-rankings-data-education-china-u/.
48 U.S. Schools Draw More Chinese, supra note 19.
49 Chinese Enrollment in the US Shifting Increasingly to Undergraduate Studies,
supra note 13.
50 International Students Stream into U.S. Colleges, supra, note 18.
51 Laura Krantz, For Some Foreign Students, a Driving Passion for Luxury, THE
BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 10, 2015, https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2015/10/
10/for-some-foreign-students-driving-passion-forluxury/eYkBwYnXa4ZRDmT2s3mhUO/story.html.
43
44
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In a move that bucks the recent trend of limiting the number of
international students, lawmakers in Colorado “passed a law in 2010
that exempts state colleges from a 45% cap on out-of-state
students.”52
III. THE TROUBLE WITH CHINESE EDUCATION
A. Chinese Entrance Exam – the Gaokao
There is only one road to a university education in China – a
certain passing score on the gaokao, the National College Entrance
Exam (NCEE).53 “Unlike in the U.S., no amount of community
service, interview prep, or athletic heroics will help you get into a top
school.”54 A high score on the gaokao means entry into a prestigious
university with an expected lucrative major.55 The Chinese Ministry
of Education sets two “cutoff” points. 56 There is a higher cutoff
point for prestigious universities and a lower cutoff point for general
university admission.57 Additionally, students’ gaokao score determine
their major.58 The Chinese entrance exam is referred to as “the SAT
on steroids.”59 The top scorers on the gaokao are referred to as the

International Students Stream into U.S. Colleges, supra note 18.
Tessa Wong, China’s Gaokao: High Stakes for National Exam, BBC
NEWS, June 9, 2015., http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-33059635.
54 Yuling Yang, Take the Test to Get into China’s Top Universities,
BLOOMBERG NEWS, June 2, 2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2015-06-02/take-the-test-to-get-into-china-s-top-universities.
55 Vogel, supra note 5.
56 Amy Burkhoff, “One Exam Determines One’s Life”: The 2014 Reforms to the
Chinese National College Entrance Exam, 38 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1473 (2015).
57 Id.
58 Terry Crawford, What Students in China Have Taught Me About U.S.
College Admissions, THE ATLANTIC, Jan. 6, 2015 (Magazine), http://www.theatlantic.
com/education/archive/2015/01/what-students-in-china-have-taught-me-aboutus-college-admissions/384212/.
59 Yang, supra note 55.
52
53
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zhuangyuan, or principal graduate, and “often become brief media
darlings.”60
The gaokao was first administered in 1952. The exam is
loosely based on the imperial exam system that was used to reward
merit rather than birthright for job opportunities as government
officials from 1644 to 1911.61 Between 1911 and 1949, universities
had their own individual tests for admission.62 This system was
replaced by a uniform exam given across the country (the test does
vary by province). The exam was seen as a way to “countervail
nepotism and inherited wealth.”63 The use of the gaokao was
suspended from 1966 through 1976 during the Great Proletarian
Cultural Revolution, commonly known as the Cultural Revolution. 64
In fact, during the Cultural Revolution, schools and universities were
closed from 1966 through the beginning of 1970.65 When schools
reopened, “revolutionary purity” was the basis of college admissions
from 1970 until 1973.66
The Cultural Revolution ended in 1976 with the death of
Chairman Mao Zedong, China’s supreme leader, and the arrest of the
60 See Yifu Dong, China’s Cutthroat Academic Competition is Ruining a
generation
of
Youth,
FOREIGN
POLICY,
June
30,
2015,
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/06/30/in-chinas-cutthroat-academic-competitionruining-generation-of-youth-gaokao-wealth-power/ ; see also, Girls Outperform Boys
among
Gaokao
Top
Scorers,
PEOPLE’S
DAILY,
July
1,
2015,
http://en.people.cn/n/2015/0701/c90782-8914129.html (Interestingly, women
are more often the zhuangyuan in the regions of China).
61 Edward Wong, Test That Can Determine the Course of Life in China Gets a
Closer Examination, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07
/01/world/asia/burden-of-chinas-college-entrance-test-sets-off-wide-debate.html ;
Luo Wangshu, History in the Making: the Classes of 1977, 1978 and 1979, CHINA
DAILY,
Mar.
31,
2015.
http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/201503/31/content_19963835.htm; Crawford, supra note 59 ( “The practice of using
exams to locate talent and distribute scarce educational opportunities began as early
as 650 AD.”)
62 Wangshu, supra note 62.
63 Dong, supra note 61.
64 Id.
65 Stephanie Lamb, Introduction to the Cultural Revolution (adapted from
Jonathan Spence, THE SEARCH FOR MODERN CHINA,(2001)), SPICE DIGEST,
(2007), http://spice.fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/CRintro.pdf.
66 Id.
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“Gang of Four.”67 When the gaokao was first reinstated, 5.7 million
students took the exam and only 278,000 were placed in universities,
constituting a placement rate of approximately one half of one
percent of all those who took the exam. 68 Opportunities improved
slightly by 1984, when 1.6 million students took the exam and
430,000 won spots in Chinese universities, an increased chance of
nearly three percent. 69 By 2011, the Chinese higher education system
had grown so substantially that one’s chance of being accepted to a
higher education institution increased to nearly 69 percent. 70 Today, a
Chinese student’s chances are greatly improved. China now has
approximately 1,145 universities.71 In June of 2015, 9.42 million
students took the gaokao, a number close to the entire population of
the state of Michigan.72 During the same year, 7.5 million students
graduated from Chinese colleges. Although data is not available for
the percentage of those taking the gaokao who were admitted to
Chinese universities, it currently appears to be close to 80 percent,
quite a change from the 1970’s. Nevertheless, the chance of being
admitted to a top-100 globally ranked university in China is still
extremely slim. One must also keep in mind that for those who do
not pass the gaokao, a university education in China is impossible and
the individual is essentially relegated to a low-income job.73 There is a

67 Paul L. Barresi, The Chinese Legal Tradition as a Cultural Constraint on the
Westernization of Chinese Environmental Law and Policy: Toward a Chinese Environmental
Law and Policy Regime with More Chinese Characteristics, 30 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 1156,
1193 (2013).
68 Jeffery Hays, The Gaokao: the Chinese University Entrance Exam, FACTS
AND DETAILS, 2008, http://factsanddetails.com/china/cat13/sub82/item1649
.html.
69 Id.
70 Vogel, supra note 5, at 137.
71 Embassy of Switzerland in China, Research and Higher Education in China
(Jan. 27, 2015), http://www.swissnexchina.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2014
/07/Higher-Education-in-China-2014.pdf.
72 Xinhua, 9.42m to Sit for College Entrance Exam, CHINA DAILY, June 6,
2015. http://www.chinadailyasia.com/nation/2015-06/07/content_15273341
.html.
73 Vogel, supra note 5, at 138.
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lot at stake. Moreover, Chinese teenagers’ chances of university
education depend upon where they reside in China.74
B. The Chinese Registration System – the Hukou
A major barrier to higher education in China is the hukou, the
country’s registration system.75 “Chinese students from rural China
are at a great disadvantage compared to their urban counterparts
when taking the gaokao and have lower chances of gaining admission
to top tier universities.”76 The hukou system began in 1958 and was
designed to ensure the country’s agricultural system.77 Prior to the
hukou system, China experienced a large influx of rural peasants to
the cities.78 Officials were fearful that the mass migration could
destabilize the relatively new system of government.79 The hukou
system was borrowed from the Soviet Union, which had a “model of
rapid industrialization, political organization, and legal institutions.”80
Under the system, every citizen in China “inherits a household
registration at birth, which may be altered only under very limited
exceptions.”81 From 1958 until the late 1970’s, rural to urban
migration was “essentially halted.”82 Beginning in the late 1970’s, the
ban on migration was eased.83
During the 1980’s, 1990’s, and early 2000’s, approximately
140 million Chinese citizens migrated from rural villages and towns
to cities.84 Despite their new homes, they are not entitled to public
74 Yiqian Fu, China’s Unfair College Admissions System, The Atlantic, June
19, 2013, (Magazine), http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/06/chinasunfair-college-admissions-system/276995/.
75 Yang, supra note 55, at p. 1499.
76 Id. at 1476.
77 Id. at 1478.
78 Margaret Y.K. Woo, Christopher Day, & Joel Hugenberger, Migrant
Access to Civil Justice in Beijing, 4 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 167, 173-174. (2007).
79 Id.
80 Hilary K. Josephs, Residence and Nationality as Determinants of Status in
Modern China, 46 TEX. INT’L L.J. 295 (2011).
81 Id. at 297.
82 Woo, supra note 77, at 174.
83 Id.
84 Id.at 167.
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services available to urban residents.85 They are treated as secondclass citizens and are referred to as liudong renkou, or the “floating
population.”86 Though millions of workers have migrated to larger
cities for jobs,87 children of migrant workers must return to their
home provinces to take the university entrance exam. 88 Due to a
quota system, it is much easier for a student who has a Beijing or
Shanghai hukou to attend the universities considered the best in
China.89 The two top ranking Chinese universities, Peking University
and Tsinghua, both located in Beijing, admit Beijing resident students
at a much higher rate than students from other provinces.90 The score
required by a Beijing-based test-taker may be much lower than the
qualifying score for a rural test-taker.91 The top two universities
admitted an average of 84 students out of every 10,000 Beijingers and
two out of every 10,000 from the Guangdong province in 2014. 92
Due to the hukou system, “an examinee from wealthy Beijing or

85 Andrew Scheineson, China’s Internal Migrants, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS, May 14, 2009, http://www.cfr.org/china/chinas-internal-migrants/
p12943.
86 Id.; Matt Sheehan, 13 Million People in China Don’t Have the Document that
Would Guarantee Them Rights, THE HUFFINGTON POST: THE WORLD POST, Dec. 10,
2015, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/china-undocumented-residents_us_
56692ca3e4b080eddf570d99.
87 Huaxia, ed., China to Orderly Urbanize Migrant Workers: Premier Li,
XINHUA, Feb. 1, 2016 (By 2014, China estimated its number of migrant workers at
approximately 274 million, or 20 percent of China’s population).
88 Fu, supra note 75.
89 Id.; Wong, supra note 62.
90 Fu, supra note 73.
91 Id.; Indeed, a widely circulated joke on Weibo (a microblogging
network, referred to as the Twitter of the East) is the following:
In Beijing: “Dad, I got a 530 [on the gaokao], 50 points higher than the lowest
qualifying score for top-tier universities!” “Great job, son! Let’s go to Shanghai for
our vacation!”
In Shandong: “Dad, I got a 530, 20 points lower than the lowest qualifying score
for second-tier universities!” “You’re not so bright…Don’t go [to college]. Get out
of here and go become a migrant worker in Shanghai.”
In Shanghai: “Dad, I got a 330. Send me abroad.” “Okay, son. Go get an MBA,
then come back and help me. I got another group of migrant workers from
Shandong this year.”
92 Id.

477

2017

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

5:2

Shanghai may gain admission to elite education with a lower score
than someone from impoverished Anhui.”93
China has announced that it plans to change the hukou system
in order to “promote greater equality between urban residents and
migrant workers and their children.”94 On February 1, 2016, Chinese
Premier Li Keqiang stated that the government would improve the
permit system.95 In the meantime, an increasing number of Chinese
students are opting out of the gaokao and instead taking the American
SAT, the U.S. standard test for college admission. 96
IV. THE US ENTRANCE EXAM – THE SAT
The precise number of Chinese students who have taken the
SAT is unknown, although the College Board, the non-profit agency
that owns the exam, indicated it will publish the number in the
future.97 One online test preparation company estimates that 55,000
Chinese took the SAT in 2014.98 It is known that overseas registrants
for the SAT have increased dramatically since 2009.99 The number of
registrants from “East Asia and Pacific” has increased by 76 percent
in just the past five years.100 This trend may not continue. The SAT
exam has been recently revised and the changes are viewed as
Josephs, supra note 81 at 303.
Burkoff, supra note 57 at 1479.
95 Huaxia, ed., supra note 88.
96 EL Borromeo, Over 9 Million Chinese Students Take National College
Entrance Exam, YIBADA, June 9, 2015, http://en.yibada.com/articles/37346/
20150609/over-9-million-chinese-students-take-national-college-entranceexam.htm.
97 Nick Anderson, How Many Chinese Take the SAT Every Year? We May
Soon Learn, THE WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/
local/education/how-many-chinese-take-the-sat-every-year-we-may-soon-learn/
2014/10/31/7ba6b35a-6124-11e4-9f3a-7e28799e0549_story.html.
98 Alexa Olesen, China’s Hot New Luxury Product: the SAT, FOREIGN
POLICY, June 8, 2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/06/08/chinas-hot-newluxury-product-the-sat-scholastic-aptitude-test/.
99 Te-Ping Chen and Abby Schultz, Cheating Concerns in Asia Cloud SAT
Testing, THE WALL ST. J., June 5, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/cheatingconcerns-in-asia-cloud-sat-testing-1433549895.
100 Id.
93
94
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disadvantageous to Chinese students.101 The new SAT includes more
reading passages, passages from US founding documents, no
mandatory writing section, and “wordier math problems.” 102
Interestingly, China’s new official China News Agency criticized the
change in the SAT due to “worries [that] the materials may impose
the American values system on students.”103 A Chinese student may
opt to take the ACT instead of the SAT, as American universities
accept students based on ACT scores as well. A very small number of
U.S. universities accept scores on the gaokao in lieu of the SAT or
ACT.104
The record number of foreign students taking admission
exams to gain entry to U.S. universities has unfortunately resulted in
increased cheating on these entrance exams. On May 21, 2015, a
federal grand jury in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania indicted fifteen Chinese
nationals on charges of conspiracy, counterfeiting foreign passports,
mail fraud, and wire fraud by having imposters take college and
graduate school standardized entrance examinations.105 The United

Zhao Xinying, Students Urged to Seek SAT Alternatives, CHINA DAILY,
Feb. 23, 2016, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2016-02/23/content_236011
40.htm.
102 Id.; Amy He, Overhauled SAT Exam May Pose Hurdles for Chinese, CHINA
DAILY,
Feb.
23,
2016,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/201602/23/content_23598053.htm.
103 Tommy Yang, China Complains SAT may impose American Values on its
Best Students, THE L.A. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2014, http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/
la-fg-sat-exam-american-values-chinese-students-20140829-story.html.
104 Abby Schultz, U.S. Colleges Put China’s Gaokao to the Test, BARRONS,
Oct. 30, 2015, http://www.barrons.com/articles/u-s-colleges-put-chinas-gaokaoto-the-test-1446188818, (These universities are reportedly Suffolk University, St.
Thomas University, The University of San Francisco (pilot program) and the
Illinois Institute of Technology.) ; Elizabeth Redden, Giving ‘Gaokao’ a Go, INSIDE
HIGHER ED, May 20, 2015, https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/05/20/
u-san-francisco-gives-gaokao-based-admissions-try-china; Amy He, Gaokao Exam
Looks
for
Wider
Acceptance,
CHINA
DAILY,
June
5,
2015,
http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2015-06/05/content_20923416.htm.
105 Press Release, Fifteen Chinese Nationals Charged in Fraud Scheme, U.S.
DEPT. OF JUSTICE, Office of Public Affairs (May 28, 2015).
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/fifteen-chinese-nationals-charged-fraud-scheme.
101
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States Attorney in the Western District indicated that he “believed
the issue extended beyond the 15 people charged.”106
In 2015, the College Board, which administers the SAT
“delayed thousands of scores in Asia.”107 The College Board
cancelled the SAT exam in five countries, including 43 sites in China
in January 2016.108 Previously, Chinese students needed to travel to
Hong Kong to take the SAT, 109 but in August of 2012, the test was
made available to Chinese students who attended one university prep
school in mainland China.110 Currently, the SAT is offered at “select
international schools” in China.111 The exam was cancelled however
in January of 2016 because some students “may have already seen
copies of the tests.”112 A magazine based in Beijing demonstrated in
an article from September of 2015 just how easy it is to cheat on the
SAT in China.113

106 Jess Bidgood, 15 Chinese Accused of Using Test-Taking Impostors for College
Entrance Examinations, N.Y. Times, May 28, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/
05/29/us/15-chinese-accused-of-using-test-taking-impostors-for-college-entranceexams.html.
107 Chen, supra note 100.
108 Abby Schultz, SAT Integrity Falls Victim to China Cheating Scandal,
BARRON’S, Jan. 25, 2016, http://www.barrons.com/articles/sat-integrity-fallsvictim-to-china-cheating-scandal-1453713163.
109 Ernest Kao, Thousands of Mainland Students Flock to Hong Kong for SAT
Exams, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 4, 2012, http://www.scmp.com/
news/china/article/1096372/thousands-mainland-students-flock-hong-kong-satexams.
110 Mike Liberty, Summer SAT Administration Now Available to Chinese
Students, BUSINESS WIRE, Apr. 15, 2012, http://www.businesswire.com/news/
home/20120415005096/en/Summer-SAT-Administration-Chinese-Students.
111 Te-Ping Chen & Abby Schultz, Battle to Thwart SAT Cheating in Asia
Continues, THE WALL ST. J., June 7, 2015, http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2015
/06/07/battle-to-thwart-sat-cheating-in-asia-continues/.
112 Joe Mandak, College Board Cancels SATs in China Over Cheating Concerns,
US News and World Report, Jan. 22, 2016, http://www.usnews.com/news/us/
articles/2016-01-21/sat-tests-canceled-in-china-macau-over-cheating-concerns.
113 An Ran & Qian Wei, Put to the Test, NEWSCHINA MAGAZINE, Sept.
2015, http://old.newschinamag.com/magazine/put-to-the-test.
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V. FIERCE COMPETITION PROMOTES UNETHICAL MEASURES
It is not surprising that, given the importance of exams, and
the fact that “one exam determines one’s life,” unethical tactics
abound.114 Moreover, there is a perception that “the system is
rigged.”115 Students and schools are “getting a lot of community and
parental pressure” for students to attend a top-ranked school. 116
Application materials to U.S. universities may be forged and falsified.
By one estimate, “90 percent of Chinese applicants submit fake
recommendations, 70 percent have other people write their essays, 50
percent have forged high school transcripts, and 10 percent list
academic awards and other achievements they did not receive.” 117
Undoubtedly, these estimates are high, but “when Chinese students
are taught by their parents, teachers, and governmental officials to
cheat in order to succeed on the gaokao and their admissions
endeavors in their homeland, it is not surprising that the dishonesty
would spill over to their efforts to get accepted into an American
college or university.”118
Universities in the U.S. are taking notice. At the 2015
Overseas Association for College Admission Counseling (OACAC)
conference, the participants discussed the problems, the reasons, and
the need “to make [the application process] safe for honest
applicants.”119 One of the main reasons for the unethical conduct is
the use of agencies to assist in the application process. There are over
400 educational consulting firms that are certified by the Chinese
Ministry of Education and thousands more that are unlicensed.120
114 Vogel, supra note 5; Nicola Davison, Revealed: The Extreme Revision
Measures Taken by Chinese University Hopefuls, THE TELEGRAPH, Aug. 15, 2015,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/education/11794171/Revealed-the-extreme-revisionmeasures-taken-by-Chinese-university-hopefuls.html.
115 Elizabeth Redden, In China, No Choice But to Cheat?, INSIDE HIGHER
ED, July 9, 2015, https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/07/09/admissions
-process-broken-chinese-students.
116 Id.
117 Vogel, supra note 5; Schiavenza, supra note 12.
118 Vogel, supra note 5 at 139.
119 In China, No Choice But to Cheat?, supra note 116.
120 Shen Lu and Katie Hunt, Fraud Frenzy? Chinese Seek U.S. College
Admission at any Price, CNN, July 14, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/12/asia
/china-education-agencies/.
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These agencies often promise to help a student gain acceptance to a
Top-50 U.S. university, and may be paid partially on a success basis,
increasing the incentive to falsify applications. 121 One prominent
agent estimated that one half of the transcripts were “doctored” to
make the candidate more competitive.122 In one instance, ten
different applicants from the same school claimed to be the top
student in the class.123 It is no small wonder that honest students
believe they are unable to compete with students who use agents.
One student interviewed stated, “I did feel slightly guilty but all my
friends did the same thing.”124
Another reason for unethical behavior is that there is virtually
no punishment if one is caught cheating on U.S. exams or on their
application materials. One participant at the OACAC Conference
stated “it blows my mind that students who cheat on the SAT get to
take the test again – why aren’t they outed to all of your schools?”125
In China, students “face expulsion and even jail time for cheating on
their country’s rigorous college entrance exam.”126 However, there is
essentially no price to pay if one is caught cheating on the SAT.127
Finally, the entire U.S. university application process is
perplexing for Chinese citizens. In a country that sees test scores as
the only way to get ahead (“in rural China a top gaokao score can lift
the fortune of an entire family, promising a life beyond the fields for
generations to come”), 128 the listing of extracurricular activities is
Crawford, supra note 59.
Id.
123 Stephanie Yang, The Unbelievable Things Some Chinese Students are Doing to
Get into US Colleges, BUS. INSIDER, Feb. 27, 2015, http://www.businessinsider.com
/chinese-students-go-to-crazy-lengths-in-us-university-applications-2015-2.
124 Johan Nylander, How Chinese Students are ‘Cheating’ to Get into U.S.
Universities, FORBES, July 13, 2015, http://www.forbes.com/sites/jnylander/2015
/07/13/how-chinese-students-are-cheating-to-get-into-u-suniversities/#14375e6d1573.
125 In China, No Choice But to Cheat?, supra note 116.
126 Laura Krantz and Jessica Myers, Fight to Find Cheats Takes Schools
Around the World, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 16, 2016, https://www.bostonglobe.
com/metro/2016/01/19/chinese-students-hungry-attend-universities-caughtfraudulent-application-process/gpRB06mqBVAsxZ6eAbFKCJ/story.html.
127 Davison, supra note 115.
128 Nicola Davidson, Revealed: The Extreme Revision Measures Taken by
Chinese University Hopefuls, The Telegraph, August 15, 2015, http://www.telegraph.
121
122
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quite foreign. Also, many times the students’ teachers are not
sufficiently proficient in English to write letters of
recommendations.129 Further, Chinese students are not particularly
familiar or comfortable with admission essays.130 If a family has the
financial means, of course they consult these “expert” agencies.
The falsification of application material hurts both potential
students and students who do in fact “make it” to U.S. universities.
In the period between 2012 and 2015, U.S. universities expelled 8,000
Chinese students due to low grades and cheating. 131 Schools in the
U.S. have recently begun to verify information through U.S. agencies
and Skype interviews with students to combat the fraudulent
applications.132 American universities must ensure Chinese candidates
are submitting accurate application materials in order to maintain the
integrity of U.S. universities. Perhaps U.S. and Chinese authorities
would be willing to work together to monitor questionable
application agents operating in China. This equally benefits China, as
approximately 75 percent of Chinese students who study abroad
return to China.133
VI. INVESTMENT IN HIGHER EDUCATION
During the same time frame as the increased demand for
higher education, U.S. state support for higher education has
decreased significantly.134 In fact, since my first year teaching in
co.uk/education/11794171/Revealed-the-extreme-revision-measures-taken-byChinese-university-hopefuls.html.
129 Krantz, supra note 127.
130 Id.
131 Max Kutner, U.S. Colleges Expelled as Many as 8,000 Chinese Students in 3
Years, NEWSWEEK, May 29, 2015, http://www.newsweek.com/us-collegesexpelled-many-8000-chinese-students-3-years-337445.
132 Krantz, supra note 127.
133 Number of Chinese Outbound Students up by 11% in 2014, ICEF MONITER,
Mar. 31, 2015, http://monitor.icef.com/2015/03/number-of-chinese-outboundstudents-up-by-11-in-2014/.
134 Michael Mitchell and Michael Leachman, Years of Cuts Threaten to Put
College Out of Reach for More Students, CENTER ON BUDGET AND POL’Y PRIORITIES,
May 13, 2015, http://www.cbpp.org/research/state-budget-and-tax/years-of-cutsthreaten-to-put-college-out-of-reach-for-more-students.
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China, “forty-seven states are spending less per student in the 201415 school year than they did at the start of the recession,” in 2008.135
Conversely, the Ministry of Education in China has increased
spending on an average of 20 percent per year over the past
decade.136 Certainly the spending in China improves access to basic
education in its developing economy, but it also indicates
government priorities. Recently, the budget cuts of many U.S. higher
education institutions has been dramatic. State appropriations for
higher education has decreased by 14.6 percent since 2007.137 The
States’ budget choices will determine whether they can successfully
rebuild their higher education systems.”138
The U.S. is currently the global leader in higher education,
but efforts must be made to continue this leadership. In 2010,
Richard C. Levin, the President of Yale University predicted the rise
of Asia’s universities.139 He correctly indicated the Chinese goal of
creating world-class universities as a benefit to all economies. The
President further stated, “Competition in education, like the
phenomenon of globalization itself, is a positive sum game.”140
China is investing approximately $250 billion annually in
higher education, and the number of Chinese universities had
doubled over the past decade.141 According to former Yale President
Levin, “in 25 years, only a generation’s time, these universities could
rival the Ivy League.”142 In a new book published by the Institute of
International Education and the American Institute for Foreign Study
Foundation, “leading scholars, practitioners, and education policy
Id.
China’s Education Spending on the Rise, XINHUA, Nov. 20, 2015,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-11/20/c_134838051.htm.
137 Mitchell, supra note 134.
138 Id.
139 President Richard C. Levin, Speech at the Royal Society, The Rise of
Asia’s Universities, (Jan. 31, 2010) (transcript available at Yale Office of Public
Affairs & Communications).
140 Id.
141 Doug Bandow, Transforming China from Within: Chinese Students Head to
American Universities, FORBES, Sept. 22, 2014, http://www.forbes.com/sites/
dougbandow/2014/09/22/transforming-china-from-within-chinese-students-headto-american-universities/#230e278b918f.
142 Id.
135
136

484

2017

Murphy

5:2

experts from 10 different countries” predict that Asia will be the next
higher education superpower.143 In an interview with Inside Higher
Ed, Mark S. Ferrara, the author of Palace of Ashes: China and the Decline
of American Higher Education, Ferrara compares the “substantial and
enduring investments in higher education” in China with America’s
decline in spending on higher education.144
VII. CONCLUSION
Without question, increased access to higher education and
the improvement of universities, no matter where situated, mutually
benefit every society. Nevertheless, if the quality of education in the
United States continues to decrease, the U.S. will be harmed. In the
past five years, Congress has cut federal funding for elementary and
high school education by 20 percent. 145 If higher education in the
U.S. becomes less desirable, other counties will fill the void. It would
be a shame if the United States lost its place as the world leader of
higher education. Education must not go the way of the steel
industry. This Author hopes to be able to return to China again and
continue hearing “My dream is to attend university in the United
States!”

Press Release, Asia: the Next Higher Education Superpower?,
INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION, (Mar. 11, 2015), http://www.iie.org
/en/Who-We-Are/News-and-Events/Press-Center/Press-Releases/2015/201503-10-Asia-the-Next-Higher-Education-Superpower#.WBbAbpMrJR0.
144 Elizabeth Redden, Palace of Ashes: Author Discusses New Book Arguing
that China’s Universities are Rising while America’s Decline, INSIDE HIGHER ED, Nov.
12, 2015, https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/11/12/author-discussesnew-book-arguing-chinas-universities-are-rising-while-americas.
145 Allie Bidwell, Report: Federal Education Funding Plummeting, U.S. New
and World Report, June 24, 2015, http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/datamine/2015/06/24/report-federal-education-funding-cut-by-5-times-more-than-allspending.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This article presents an overview of the benefits of an
enterprise legal risk management (“ELRM”) Framework when
deployed as a tool by multinational companies (“MNCs”) to
strengthen their corporate U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”)
compliance programs.1 The article identifies and discusses important
benefits of the Framework, including improved effectiveness and
efficiency in in-house and related outside legal costs.2 According to
Forbes magazine, legal services costs associated with FCPA

1
R. Walker, International Corporate Compliance Programs, 3 INT’L J. OF
DISCLOSURE AND GOVERNANCE 70, 70-81 (2006) (explaining the increased
importance of compliance and ethics programs both outside and within the United
States). See also Evan Peterson, Compliance And Ethics Programs: Competitive Advantage
Through The Law, 17 J. OF MGMT. & GOVERNANCE 1027, 1027–1045 (2013)
(advocating that corporate compliance programs offer a sustainable competitive
advantage from the law by assisting organizations in achieving a better
understanding of the law, a cost-effective approach for coping with an
organization’s legal issues, as well as aiding organizations by preventing these legal
issues from occurring in the future and by supporting organizations in reframing
legal issues as business opportunities.). See also Shaun Cassin, The Best Offense Is a
Good Defense: How the Adoption of An FCPA Compliance Defense Could Decrease Foreign
Bribery, 36 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 19, 19-58 (2014) (providing a brief historical overview
of FCPA, arguments for and against adding a compliance defense to the FCPA, a
five-part compliance defense proposed by the former assistant chief of FCPA
enforcement at the U.S Department of Justice (DOJ) William Jacobson and
options available to a company for designing of a compliance program).
2 Garrick Apollon, The Intersection between Legal Risk Management and Dispute
Resolution in the Commercial Context, 15 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 284, 284-285 (2015)
[Hereinafter Garrick Apollon, The intersection between LRM & DR] available at
http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol15/iss2/2 (last visited Jan. 28,
2017) (explaining that the implementation of an ELRM Framework promotes:
strong corporate governance for the client organization by reducing the negative
impacts of legal risk across the organization; gives access to better insurance;
enables the client to make informed decisions and avoid surprises; accomplishes its
corporate policies and objectives using more objective and reliable information;
improves client’s engagement and intake management vis-à-vis legal issues for a
better working relationship between lawyer-client; reduces monetary and other
possible impacts of litigation; improves cost control and cost effectiveness of legal
fees; assists in taking “calculated” or smart risks that are balanced against possible
benefits; fosters necessary controls and due diligence; promotes better business
planning; and generally enhances decision making from an organization-wide
perspective.).
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compliance incurred by MNCs run to several million dollars every
year without necessarily achieving the desired legal compliance
results. 3 FCPA compliance is a very lucrative business for law firms
because MNCs are paying several million dollars in legal fees while
often still paying several million dollars in fines to U.S. regulators.4
Forbes magazine also went so far as to label the FCPA as the “milk
cow” for the Department of Justice (“DOJ”).5 In light of the
foregoing, this article presents ELRM Framework as the solution for
MNCs looking to prioritize their FCPA legal services efforts in a riskbased approach and as a means of keeping a tighter rein on their inhouse and outside legal costs.6 After all, a Chief Legal Officer
(“CLO”) or General Counsel (“GC”) in the legal department of a
MNC is responsible not just for supervising the delivery of excellent
legal services, but also for justifying and controlling the cost of legal

Lisa Prager, FCPA Compliance: Don’t Blow Your Budget Just Yet, FORBES
MAGAZINE,
Mar.
27,
2012,
available
at
http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol15/iss2/2 (last visited Jan. 28,
2017) http://www.forbes.com/sites/insider/2012/03/27/fcpa-compliance-dontblow-your-budget-just-yet/#3e88127c7e89
4 The anti-bribery business, THE ECONOMIST, May 9, 2015, available at
http://www.economist.com/news/business/21650557-enforcement-laws-againstcorporate-bribery-increases-there-are-risks-it-may-go (last visited Jan. 28, 2017). See
also Nathan Vardi, The FCPA Fiasco: Pressure Tactics In Corruption Cases Backfiring,
Forbes
Magazine,
Jan.
17,
2012,
available
at
http://www.forbes.com/sites/nathanvardi/2012/01/17/the-fcpafiasco/#454e7e55be45 (stating that the Government’s track record on FCPA cases
in court has been terrible. For many years the FCPA, which prohibits bribery of
foreign government officials, was hardly been enforced. But for the last decade the
federal government has greatly increased its FCPA enforcement, threatening to
bring an indictment against any company that does not cooperate and act harshly if
companies don’t voluntarily report any potential sins. This game has been cheered
on by lawyers and accountants, even journalists, who benefit immensely from the
expensive internal investigations companies initiate to deal with this new reality).
5 Forbes, supra note 3 (explaining that FCPA enforcement has long been
considered a cash cow for the Department of Justice. It should not be a surprise,
therefore, that complying with the FCPA and other anti-corruption laws comes
with its own hefty price tag.).
6 Garrick Apollon, The intersection between LRM & DR, supra note 2, at
284-285 (discussing the key advantages and challenges of using legal risk
management to help lawyers manage substantive matters related to commercial
negotiations and disputes).
3
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fees for the MNC.7 In practice, GC get fired not only for poor
delivery of legal services but also over excessive legal billing against
the MNC.8
As Susskin’s best-selling book The Future of the Law mentions,
the next generation of lawyers will have to embrace a proactive
perspective focused on dispute prevention rather than just dispute
resolution, as well as legal risk management rather than just legal
problem-solving.9 Susskind’s message in the Future of the Law remains
a stark one: in order to guarantee a stake in the legal and regulatory
system of the future, lawyers must adapt their work practices or die.10
A recent article in the Harvard Business Review went as far as to say
that “Technology Will Replace Many Doctors, Lawyers, and Other
Professionals” by asserting that “within decades the traditional
professions will be dismantled, leaving most, but not all,
professionals to be replaced by less-expert people, new types of
experts, and high-performing systems.”11 As an illustration, Thomson
Reuters, the world’s leading source of intelligent information for
businesses and professionals, and Blue J Legal (company owned by
University of Toronto tax law professor Benjamin Alarie) are
launching Tax Foresight, a new suite of artificial intelligence-based
E. NORMAN VEASEY AND CHRISTINE T. DI GUGLIELMO,
INDISPENSABLE COUNSEL: THE CHIEF LEGAL OFFICER IN THE NEW REALITY 56
(Oxford University Press, 2012). (discussing the challenges of budget constraints
and the financial dependence of GC on a single client).
8 This statement is based on conventional wisdom, but see Frederic S. Ury,
Jordan Furlong, What The Future Legal Market Means For Lawyers And Bar Associations,
ABA
JOURNAL,
Vol.
37
No.
6
(2013),
available
at
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/bar_leader/2012_13/july_august/what
_future_legal_market_means_lawyers_bar_associations.html (last visited Jan. 28,
2017) (asserting that too many clients, both consumer and corporate, believe that
attorneys drive up the cost of legal transactions without adding commensurate
value).
9 RICHARD E. SUSSKIND, THE FUTURE OF LAW: FACING THE
CHALLENGES OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996)
(theorizing on the future of the law in the face of the technological evolution of the
world).
10 Id.
11 Richard Susskind and Daniel Susskind, Technology Will Replace Many
Doctors, Lawyers, and Other Professionals, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 11, 2016), available at
https://hbr.org/2016/10/robots-will-replace-doctors-lawyers-and-otherprofessionals.
7
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tax case outcome predictors, to Canadian corporate tax professionals;
tax preparers; accountants; and tax lawyers. Tax Foresight leverages
the power of machine learning and artificial intelligence (“AI”),
enabling practitioners to rapidly receive a legal risk assessment to
predict how courts will rule in new tax decisions, based on facts
provided by users and analysis of prior judicial decisions. 12 In other
words, we can expect in the future that routine work can be taken on
by machines with AI or “robot lawyers” 13, and that human experts
will only be needed for the tricky stuff that calls for judgment,
creativity, and empathy.14
It is in this context that the implementation of ELRM
Framework has risen to the top of the list of priorities of companies’
in-house legal departments.15 CLO or GC are now directed by the
Chief Risk Officer (“CRO”) and/or Chief Compliance Officer
(“CCO”) to supervise the implementation of mandatory ELRM
Framework in their companies.16 Accordingly, the idea behind this
article is based on the fact that the largest in-house public legal
department in Canada (the Department of Justice Canada) has
recently established a mandatory ELRM Framework with a business
analytics software called iCase to modernize the delivery of legal
services for all litigation, legislative and advisory legal files for the
Government of Canada.17 This framework is mandatory and supports
the day-to-day practice of law in all federal departments and agencies
12 Thomson Reuters and Blue J Legal Deliver Artificial Intelligence-Based Tax
Foresight,
THOMSON
REUTERS,
Nov.
15,
2016,
available
at
http://thomsonreuters.com/en/press-releases/2016/november/thomson-reutersand-blue-j-legal-deliver-artificial-intelligence-based-tax-foresight.html
13 Chris Sorensen, Big Law is having its Uber Moments, Maclean’s Magazine,
Jan. 16, 2017, available at http://www.macleans.ca/economy/business/big-law-ishaving-its-uber-moment/ (last visited Feb 7, 2017).
14 Supra note 11.
15 Garrick Apollon, The intersection between LRM & DR, supra note 2,
at 271.
16 Id.
17 Legal Risk Management in the Department of Justice, CANADA
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/cp-pm/eval/rep-rap/08/lrm-grj/p2.html (last
modified Jan. 7, 2015) (presenting the legal risk management initiative and an
overview of legal risk management today within the Government of Canada).
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of the Government of Canada.18 The International Organization for
Standardization (“ISO”) is currently working on the development of
international standards named the ISO/AWI 31022 Guidelines for
Implementation of Enterprise Legal Risk Management to respond to
the shift in public and corporate sector accountability.19 These ISO
standards aim to strengthen and modernize the practice of legal risk
management in private and public organizations around the world
and as a result improve the rule of law and anti-corruption and
regulatory compliance.20
The FCPA is now the top legal risk facing American
multinational companies.21 The FCPA is a United States (“U.S.”)
federal criminal law known primarily for two of its main provisions;
one that addresses accounting transparency requirements under the
U.S. Securities Exchange Act (“SEC”) and the other concerning bribery
of foreign officials.22 The FCPA applies to any person who has a
Id.
See ISO/AWI 31022, Guidelines for Implementation of Enterprise
Legal
Risk
Management,
available
at
http://www.iso.org/iso/home/store/catalogue_tc/catalogue_detail.htm?csnumber
=69295
20 Lalonde, C., & Boiral, O., Managing risks through ISO 31000: A critical
analysis, 14 RISK MGMT. 4, 272-300 (explaining that the ISO 31000 standard is
intended to help organizations to manage in a systematic and comprehensive
manner diverse types of risk, by offering a universal framework to assist the
organization to integrate risk management into its overall management system).
21 GORDON E. KAISER, CORPORATE CRIME AND CIVIL LIABILITY 587
(Lexis Nexis, 2012) (stating that for the past 50 years, the greatest threat to
multinational corporations in terms of criminal liabilities fell under the competition
and anti-trust laws. Serious enforcement of the U.S. FCPA by U.S. prosecutors
have led to fines to the tune of 3.6 billion from 2012-2009 alone, and U.S.
prosecutors continue to aggressively enforce the FCPA.). See also R. Christopher
Cook & Stephanie Conner, Jones Day LLP, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Recent
Enforcement Trends, THOMSON REUTERS (2010), http://us.practicallaw.com/
(explaining recent trends in actions against individuals, sector-wide investigations,
record fines that include large amounts of disgorged profits, anti-corruption
enforcement outside the US because jurisdictions like the U.K., Germany and
Canada have strengthened their own anti-corruption legislation and activities,
increasing mutual enforcement and legal assistance, impact on cross-border
transactions such as M&As and increase in civil actions (while civil actions are rare,
they present an expensive risk of additional litigation)).
22 A Resource Guide to The U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, THE CRIMINAL
DIVISION OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND THE ENFORCEMENT
18
19
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certain degree of connection to the United States and engages in
foreign corrupt practices.23 The Act also applies to any act by foreign
corporations trading securities in the U.S.24 Therefore, the FCPA has
strong extraterritorial reach25 and, like most anti-corruption
legislation based on the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery
of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions,
can apply to foreign companies and individuals.26 FCPA enforcement
in the recent years by DOJ and SEC has been marked by record
prosecutions against companies, often resulting in multi-million
dollar financial penalties and a greater prosecutorial effort leading to
fines and imprisonment against individuals.27 By focusing on
prosecution against individuals, DOJ and SEC attract more

DIVISION OF THE U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 2 (2012),
available http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-resource-guide.pdf (last visited
July 19, 2015).
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Nicholas M. McLean, Cross-National Patterns in FCPA Enforcement, 121
YALE L.J. 1970 (2012). (providing an empirical examination of U.S. enforcement
actions under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in order to explore the
cross-national patterns associated with United States’ international antibribery
enforcement).
26 Robert D. Tronnes, Ensuring Uniformity in the Implementation of the 1997
OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions, 33 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 97, 97-130 (2001) (discussing that since
the passage of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in 1977, the United States
has worked to persuade other nations to forbid bribery of foreign public officials in
an effort to secure business abroad. As a result of pressure from the United States
and the increased costs associated with corruption, the international tide is turning
against transnational bribery. 3 In order to capitalize on this global shift towards
condemnation of corruption, twenty-nine Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) member countries and five non-member countries
signed the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions (Convention) on December 17, 1997. The
Convention is an effort to cut off transnational bribery at its source. Consequently,
in signing the Convention all signatory countries made the commitment to “pass
legislation necessary for [the Convention’s] ratification and implementation into
national law.”).
27 Kaiser, supra note 21, at 587-588 (discussing bribery and anticorruption).
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cooperating witnesses and generate even more investigations. 28 The
Dodd-Frank Wall Street and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Act”)
grants significant protections and rewards to whistleblowers. 29
Whistleblowers who provide original information that leads to the
assessment of monetary sanctions in excess of $1 million are entitled
to receive between 10% and 30% of the sanction amount as a
reward.30 For instance, a record award of $30M was recently obtained
by a foreign whistleblower pursuant to the Dodd-Act.31
An ELRM Framework serves as a continuous, proactive and
systematic or integrated process to understand, manage and
communicate legal risk from an organization-wide or enterprise-wide
perspective in a cohesive, consistent and cost-efficient manner.32 It is
about supporting strategic decision-making that contributes to the
achievement of an organization’s overall objectives.33 Legal risks
cannot be managed effectively in silos; hence an ELRM Framework
must be part of an Integrated or Enterprise Risk Management
Framework (IRM or ERM).34 It requires an ongoing assessment of all
risks such as financial, corporate and reputational at every level and in
every sector of the organization, and aggregating these results at the

Murdock, Charles W., The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act: What Caused the Financial Crisis and Will Dodd-Frank Prevent Future
Crises, 64 S.M.U. L. REV. 1243 (2010).
29 Id.
30 See Rachel Louise Ensign, SEC to Pay $30 Million Whistleblower
Award, Its Largest Yet, WALL STREET J., Sept. 22, 2014, available at
http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-to-pay-30-million-whistleblower-award-itslargest-yet-1411406612 (last visited July 19 2015).
31 Supra note 24.
32 Garrick Apollon, the intersection between LRM & DR, supra note 2, at
283-287 (explaining that based on international standards (ISO 31 000) a risk
management framework serves as a set of components that provide the
foundations and organizational arrangements for designing, implementing,
monitoring, reviewing and continually improving risk management through the
organization).
33 Id.
34 Integrated Risk Management Framework, TREASURY BOARD OF
CANADA SECRETARIAT,
http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?section=text&id=12254#appA (last
modified Apr. 1, 2001) (discussing shared leadership-suggested roles and
responsibilities in risk management).
28
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corporate level, communicating them and ensuring adequate
monitoring and review.35
ELRM Framework has four main objectives: 1) identifying
issues early and assessing potential legal risks; 2) avoiding and
mitigating legal risks; 3) managing legal risks as they occur for an
organization in consistent; enterprise-wide and cost-efficient manner;
and 4) using business analytics software to modernize the ELRM
practices and ensuring the use of data and business analytics as a
means to improve organizational performance. 36 In this current
context, this article encourages MNCs to strengthen their anticorruption and anti-bribery (“ABC”) compliance program with an
ELRM Framework.37 The main goal is to further “prevent FCPA
violations prior to their occurrence, quickly detect any violations and
mitigate penalties if violations occur.”38 “The DOJ and SEC have
indicated that the existence of an ABC compliance program is a
significant factor taken into account in deciding whether to bring
charges, what charges to bring and what penalties to impose”. 39 As
observed, “despite increased FCPA enforcement, U.S. corporations
continue to pay bribes out of business necessity because of the
leniency of other countries”.40 For instance, President Donald Trump
in a national television interview with CNBC in 2015 made the
controversial comment that “this country is absolutely crazy” to
35
36

Id.
Garrick Apollon, The intersection between LRM & DR, supra note 2,

at 284-285.
37 See Daniel L. Goelzer, Designing an FCPA Compliance Program: Minimizing
the Risks of Improper Foreign Payments, 18 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 282 (1998)
(explaining the importance of a FCPA compliance program), available at
http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1474
&context=njilb (last visited Feb. 7, 2017) (this article asserts that a FCPA
compliance program must be complemented by an ELRM Framework).
38 Kaiser, supra note 21, at 593 (explaining the goals of an anti-corruption
compliance program).
39 Id.
40 Id. See also the academic work of Professor Eugene Soltes, Jakurski
Family Associate Professor of Business Administration at Harvard Business
School, author of the celebrated book Why They Do It: Inside the Mind of the WhiteCollar Criminal (Hachette, 2016). Professor Soltes research focuses on corporate
misconduct and fraud, and how organizations design cultures and compliance
systems to confront these challenges.
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prosecute alleged FCPA violations in places like Mexico and China. 41
Moreover, President Trump said that the FCPA is a “horrible law
and it should be changed” and that it puts U.S. business at a “huge
disadvantage.”42 As pointed out by Professor Koehler (founder and
editor of the FCPA Professor website43), the FCPA is here to stay
because “the FCPA’s legislative history makes clear that in passing
the FCPA Congress intended to capture only a narrow category of
payments and chose not to capture so-called facilitating payments
given the difficult and complex business conditions encountered in
many foreign countries”. 44
Legal scholarship emphasizes the power of reframing and the
manner in which a legal practitioner frames or describes legal
problems to help create a new dynamic and achieve better results.45
In a similar vein, this article presents the implementation of an
ELRM Framework as a necessary additional step for MNCs to ensure
effective and cost-efficient anti-corruption compliance program for
the MNC. This article argues that MNCs should reframe their
problems with FCPA and anti-corruption compliance as not just a
compliance risk but also a legal risk that needs to be managed with an
ELRM Framework.

CNBC SquawkBox interview (beginning at the 14-minute mark)
http://video.cnbc.com/gallery/?video=3000089630&play=1 and FCPA Professor
(FCPA Professor website is the website of Professor Koehler, respected authority
in the field of FCPA), see Donald Trump: The FCPA Is a “Horrible Law and It
Should
Be
Changed”,
August
6,
2015,
available
at
http://fcpaprofessor.com/donald-trump-the-fcpa-is-a-horrible-law-and-it-shouldbe-changed/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2017).
42 Id.
43 Id. See also F. Joseph Warin, Michael Diamant, Patrick Doris, Mark
Handley and Melissa Farrar,
Gibson Dunn Offers Update on Non-Prosecution and Deferred Prosecution Agreements,
Columbia Law School’s Blog on Corporations and the Capital Markets, Jan. 16,
2017 (explaining Donald J. Trump assumes the Presidency on January 20, 2017,
and his inauguration will bring inevitable changes to the composition and mandate
of DOJ).
44 Id.
45 Ran Kuttner, The Wave/Particle Tension in Negotiation, 16 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REV. 331, 359-60 (2011) (discussing the power of reframing in
scholarship for the practice of law).
41
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This article explains the general steps and benefits to a GC
and its legal department in MNCs in implementing an ELRM
Framework specifically designed for FCPA compliance and risk
management. An ELRM Framework helps in-house and outside legal
counsel to move away from a specific and narrow legal analysis
focused on problem-solving to a more preventative style. This allows
them to better select which FCPA risk management strategy to apply
to better prevent FCPA liability and help their clients to achieve
better decision-making in their international business transactions.46
ELRM is also all about linking the practice of the law with
technology. 47 For instance, an ELRM should incorporate business
analytics software to assist the GC and senior management of the
MNC with monitoring the number of hours and lawyers involved in
a FCPA files based on their legal risk and complexity level.48 This
means in practice that in-house lawyers, and most importantly
outside lawyers, will be accountable for the legal risk and complexity
level of the FCPA file and the numbers of hours they spend on it
based on objective criteria.49 Therefore, “an ELRM Framework
presents as its main advantage the prevention of lawyers who score
highly on Machiavellianism and who are process-oriented from
manipulating legal risk communication and assessments to get their
client to perceive what they want them to perceive, and for the
benefit of their own unethical agendas, such as overbilling or from
raising their profiles by ranking legal risks high when in reality the
level of complexity and risk is medium or low.”50
Above all, the implementation of an ELRM Framework is
designed to avoid making the ABC compliance program a “paper

Supra note 7, at 56 (explaining that the GC and in-house counsel are
the managers of legal and reputational risk and educators for the company. They
need to perform the increasingly important function of assessing legal risks and
translating those risks into business terms in order to facilitate decision-making
considering those risks).
47 Garrick Apollon, The intersection between LRM & DR, supra note 2,
at 285-286.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id.
46
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program”. 51 This is achieved through the implementation of a strong
legal risk assessment process for the delivery of day-to-day FCPA
legal services that will help the lawyers to play their role as
gatekeepers of corporate integrity and as problem solvers in the
execution of international business transactions for the MNC. 52
I. WHAT IS AN ELRM FRAMEWORK?
The author defines an ELRM Framework as a compliance
management system for the effective and cost-efficient delivery of
legal services in an organization.53 The ISO 19 600 international
standard broadly defines a compliance management system such as
an ELRM Framework as a set of interrelated or interacting elements
of an organization to establish policies, objectives, processes and
tools to achieve legal (regulatory) compliance requirement that an
organization must comply with and chooses to voluntary comply
with.54 Therefore, an ELRM Framework aims to go beyond the
51 Patrick Head, The development of compliance programs: one company’s
experience, 18 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 535 (1997) (explaining that companies have run
into the difficulty for having a FCPA compliance program fully conceived on
paper, but no real compliance or financial controls. A “paper program” means a
failure to implement a culture of legal compliance and ethics).
52 David Nersessian, Business Lawyers as Worldwide Moral Gatekeepers: Legal
Ethics and Human Rights in Global Corporate Practice, 28 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1135,
1135-1188 (2015). See also, Joseph W. Yockey, FCPA Settlement, Internal Strife, and the
Culture of Compliance, WIS. L. REV. 689 (2012) (explaining that though cooperation
generally remains the prerequisite to obtaining a DPA or NPA, regulators also
stress that they are more likely to offer leniency to firms with a strong “culture of
compliance.” Like before, this follows from the use of the OSG as a framework for
settlement negotiations. The OSG was amended in 2004 in response to the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 to allow for lower sanctions for firms that have
“effective compliance and ethics programs” in place. Programs that meet this
requirement will be found in firms that “exercise due diligence to prevent and
detect criminal conduct” and “otherwise promote an organizational culture that
encourages ethical conduct and a commitment to compliance with the law.)
53 Garrick Apollon, The intersection between LRM & DR, supra note 2,
at 306-307.
54 See ISO 19600:2014 Compliance management systems – Guidelines,
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION (ISO), available at
http://www.iso.org/iso/home/store/catalogue_tc/catalogue_detail.htm?csnumber
=62342 (last visited Feb. 7, 2017).
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required legal compliance by building an organization’s approach to
legal compliance that is ideally shaped by objective standards and an
ethical leadership and corporate culture that apply core anticorruption values and the highest corporate governance standards in
decision-making.55 The long term goal of an ELRM Framework is to
contribute to building an exemplary “compliance culture”56 in an
organization. As a result, an ELRM Framework should never be
perceived as unnecessary red tape or a burdensome internal
administrative process, but instead an organizational design built to
promote a real dialogue and partnership between lawyer-client
towards ethical leadership.
The need to implement objective standards with an ELRM
Framework for the day-to-day practice of FCPA risk communication
in an organization arises from the fact that risk is emotionally,
socially, culturally, economically and politically constructed and is
therefore subjective by nature.57 For instance, an international VP of
sales might prefer to see an international business transaction as low
risk for corruption because the business benefit outweighs the legal
threat for him and his unit. However, this same international business
transaction might be assessed as high risk by his compliance officer
and in-house counsel. The goal of an ELRM Framework in practice
is to improve the legal risk communication between the VP of sales
and counsel so that they can share the responsibly to manage the
FCPA risk in order for a sound legal and ethical decision risk
response commensurate to the corruption risk level that the MNC is
facing. FCPA risk management is not only the business of
compliance officers or lawyers but this is a shared responsibility for
all employees in an organization. 58 However, we live in an
Barbara Mescher & Bryan Howieson, 1 Beyond Compliance: Promoting
Ethical Conduct by Directors and Corporations, CORP. GOVERNANCE L. REV., 93-114
(2005) (examining the relationship between legal and moral perspectives of
directors’ behaviour and corporate governance).
56 Sow Wei Wong, A Culture, Not a Programme, INT’L FIN. L. REV. (2010)
(explaining that a compliance culture is where the management and all the
employees share the common belief, value or goal that doing the right thing, even
when no one is looking is an important part of what defines the organization.).
57 Garrick Apollon, The intersection between LRM & DR, supra note 2,
at 275.
58 Id.
55
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individualist culture where the collective interests of the organization
do not always come first.59 An ELRM Framework serves to
standardize and objectify the organizational ELRM practices in order
to mitigate the risk that the self-interest of the individuals involved in
the compliance process supersede the collective interests of the
organization.60 The author also argues that the implementation of an
ELRM Framework specific to FCPA risk is the first step for a MNC
to later develop a more comprehensive ELRM Framework that will
be applied to all their advisory and litigation files and covers all the
legal risks facing the MNC every day.
An ELRM Framework also helps to deal with the inherent
complexity of FCPA risks.61 FCPA is a complex legal risk that is
influenced by many factors such as foreign legal, economic, cultural
and political environments.62 For instance, the MNC must take into
consideration that the vast majority of anti-corruption laws such as
U.K. Bribery Act or Canada’s Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act
(“CFPOA”) have an extraterritorial reach just like the FCPA.63 This
means a FCPA risk assessment must also assess the likelihood of
adverse outcomes with other anti-corruption foreign laws such as the
U.K. Bribery Act and CFPOA. For instance, an American company
registered and trading stocks on the London Stock Exchange is also
GEERT HOFSTEDE, CULTURE’S CONSEQUENCES: COMPARING
VALUES, BEHAVIORS, INSTITUTIONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS ACROSS NATIONS
(2nd ed., Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2010).
60 Garrick Apollon, The intersection between LRM & DR, supra note 2,
at 309-310 (explaining that lawyers who score highly on Machiavellianism and who
are process-oriented can manipulate communications and assessments to get their
client to perceive what they want them to perceive for the benefit of their own
unethical agendas, such as overbilling or raising their profiles by ranking legal risks
high when they are in reality medium or low).
61 Adam Seligman, Role Complexity, Risk, and the Emergence of Trust, 81 B.U.
L. REV. 619, 619-634 (2001) (theorizing that trust emerged as a dimension of social
relations in modern society along with risk. Risk became inherent in behaviours
when, with the segmentation of social roles, there developed an in-built limit to
systemically based expectations. Potential dissonance between the different aspects
of roles increased, revealing these two new phenomena characteristic of modern
forms of social relations: risk and decided trust).
62 See McLean, supra note 21.
63 Anna Simonova, Extraterritorial Reach of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 8
J. COMP. L. 211, 211-231 (2013) (discussing the Extraterritorial Reach of the
FCPA).
59
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subject to the U.K. Bribery Act.64 The U.K. Bribery Act sets out in
Section 7 the corporate offence of failure to prevent bribery in the
course of business; the section legally obligates companies to
maintain an effective ABC compliance program, as the only statutory
defence to this offence is to prove the existence of adequate systems
and controls.65 This strict liability corporate offence (Section 7 failure of commercial organizations to prevent bribery) is unique to
the U.K. Bribery Act.66 The U.K. Bribery Act also prohibits facilitation
payments that are somewhat permitted under the FCPA.67 Therefore,
the breadth of the application of the new U.K. Bribery Act is generally
seen as part of a global trend of requiring higher ethical standards and
is broader in scope than the FCPA in a number of respects.68
II. ADVANTAGES TO AN MNC OF HAVING AN ELRM FRAMEWORK
SPECIFIC TO FCPA RISK
If MNCs are spending millions on FCPA compliance, they
are not spending enough money and resources on developing an
ELRM Framework to ensure the effective and cost-efficient delivery

Jessica Lordi, The U.K. Bribery Act: Endless Jurisdictional Liability on
Corporate Violators, 44 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 955, 955-998 (2012), available at
http://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1139&context
=jil (last visited Feb. 7, 2017); see also Sharifa G. Hunter, Article & Essay: A
Comparative Analysis Of The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act And The U.K. Bribery Act, And
The Practical Implications Of Both On International Business, 18 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L.
89 (2011).
65 The Bribery Act, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL UK, available at
http://www.transparency.org.uk/our-work/business-integrity/bribery-act
(last
visited Feb. 7, 2017).
66 Id.; See also Kaiser, supra note 21, at 627 (explaining the U.K. Bribery
Act).
67 Kaiser, supra note 21, at 637 (explaining that FCPA accepts as a
defence the grating of facilitation payments but these payments are not allowed
under U.K. Bribery Act).
68 See Natalie Shu Ying Wee, The OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of
Foreign Public Officials and the Impact of the United Kingdom’s Bribery Act 2010 on
Corporations: Is the Act Too Harsh, 17 INT’L TRADE & BUS. L. REV. 126 (2014). See also
Dominic Saglibene, U.K. Bribery Act: A Benchmark for Anti-Corruption Reform in the
United States, 23 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 119, 119-146 (2014).
64
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of day-to-day FCPA legal services in their organization.69 As
evidence, the United Nations (“UN”) Global Compact published in
2013 a Guide for Anti-Corruption Risk Assessment, where it noted
that the principal weakness of ABC compliance programs is often the
absence of process to establish robust measures and practices for
day-to-day anti-corruption legal risk assessment.70 It specifically
observed that “The Global Corporate Sustainability Report 2013
shows that only 25% of UN Global Compact business participants
conduct anti-corruption risk assessments, and there are substantial
differences in implementation levels among large and small
companies.”71
Risk management principles and frameworks are nothing new
to other professionals such as actuaries, accountants, engineers or
medical doctors, but they are a new discipline for lawyers.72 In
practice, a ELRM Framework that brings objective standards and
guidelines into decision-making in international business transactions
is needed because anti-corruption legal risk assessments are
dependent on three basic determinants: 1) lack of information and
knowledge; 2) lack of power and control; and 3) lack of time and
resources in relation to the execution of international business
transactions for all companies operating globally.73

69

Garrick Apollon, The intersection between LRM & DR, supra note 2,

at 271
70 United Nations Global Compact, A Guide for Anti-Corruption Risk
Assessment (2013) (explaining that the Global Corporate Sustainability Report 2013
shows that only 25% of UN Global Compact business participants conduct anticorruption risk assessments, and there are substantial differences in implementation
levels
among
large
and
small
companies),
available
at
https://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/issues_doc/AntiCorruption/RiskAssessmentGuide.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2017).
71 This article focuses on the implementation of LRM Framework for
large companies such as MNCs.
72 Garrick Apollon, The intersection between LRM & DR, supra note 2,
at 287 (explaining that ELRM is relatively new in the legal profession—as with
anything new, a period of adjustment is expected, and senior management of law
firms and legal departments must support the implementation of an ELRM
Framework in their organizations. This means change management is required,
especially since lawyers usually do not like to be managed and told what to do).
73 Id. at 306 (explaining that social-psychological measures are also
important because lawyers do not have the information necessary to accurately
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As part of the advantages already discussed, an ELRM
Framework provides technological, financial and corporate
compliance value to an organization by offering the following
strategic and monetary benefits to an organization. 74 It:
• promotes ethical leadership and an integrity-based corporate
compliance culture where unethical and illegal bribery and
corruption activities and other white-collar crimes such as
fraud, insider trading, money laundering are anticipated,
detected and prevented;
• allows the CRO and/or CCO to implement a ELRM
Framework in accordance with the IRM or ERM Framework
of the organization to ensure more cost-certainty, efficiency
and business value for corporate decision-making in the
management of legal risks (i.e. deter a culture of risk taking or
risk aversion to encourage a culture of smart risk-taking based
on an integrity-based corporate compliance culture);
• the main driving force for organizations to implement a legal
risk management framework is to ensure more cost-certainty,
efficiency and business value for corporate decision-making
(i.e. deter a culture of risk aversion to encourage a culture of
smart risk-taking);
• allows the GC to generate customized timekeeping legal risk
reports (in real-time) for senior management and the Board
of Directors (i.e. the GC is in a better position to explain the
legal risks that the company is facing (risk profile of the
company) and justify its budget and the legal expenses/legal
costs for the organization);

judge the legal risks of the bargaining or dispute resolution situation. A lawyer’s
ability to complete an accurate legal assessment may be dampened by several
factors, such as lack of information, lack of time, situational constraints based on
resources or power, and self-selection processes. The lawyer and the client’s
judgments are biased, and biases are associated with inefficient performance.)
74 Garrick Apollon, The intersection between LRM & DR, supra note 2,
at 285.
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• improves the overall quality and objectivity of lawyers’ legal
services (the risk and complexity level must be assessed on
the basis of objective criteria based on the universally
accepted risk management principles of ISO 31000);
• contributes to mitigating the risk of lawyers overbilling by
manipulating the risk level or complexity of a legal file (the
subjective elements of risk perception and treatment are
mitigated);
• improves information sharing and eliminates the duplication
of work through enhanced information governance by the
use of business analytics software;
• enables the use of a common language in communicating
FCPA risks;
• enhances the ability of lawyers to manage legal risks from an
IRM or ERM perspective, where they can see the ‘big picture’
(all legal and non-legal consequences are assessed such as the
operational/corporate, financial, values and ethics, and
reputational) and concentrate energy and attention to areas of
highest legal risk facing the organization (risk-based
approach);
• increases the respect of governmental regulators and helps to
attract shareholders, investors and stakeholders by showing
that the company has a strong corporate compliance program
for the management of legal risks; and
• helps the organization to attract investors and secure better
rates and/or prices from lenders and insurance companies by
showing that it has a strong corporate compliance program
for the management of its legal risks.
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III. BENEFITS OF ELRM FRAMEWORK FOR LAWYERS AND LAW
FIRMS
Legal risk management has been identified by the Canadian
Bar Association (sister organization of the American Bar Association
in Canada) as the future of the law for lawyers.75 While an ELRM
Framework helps MNCs to manage FCPA risk and keep legal
services providers accountable, ELRM Framework also helps lawyers
and law firms to highlight their good work and justify their legal fees
billed to their clients (or the legal costs associated with an in-house
legal department). Therefore, ELRM Framework should not be
perceived as a threat for law firms and lawyers (providers of outside
legal services to MNCs) because an ELRM framework aims to
improve the lawyer-client relationship and is equally beneficial for
lawyers and law firms by doing the following:
•

improves the overall quality and objectivity of lawyers’ legal
services (the risk and complexity level must be assessed on
the basis of objective criteria based on the universally
accepted risk management principles of ISO 31 000). It
contributes to mitigating the risk of clients questioning the
risk level or complexity of a legal file to avoid paying a legal
bill (the subjective elements of risk perception and treatment
for the client is mitigated). Therefore, this reduces the time
lawyers spend to explain or justify invoices to their clients. It
also prevents against disputes and complaints at the Law
Society (bar) for overbilling, thus preserving the integrity
reputation of the law firm and its lawyers;

•

the general practice of ELRM for lawyers is legal work and
therefore billable time. For instance, lawyers have a financial
incentive to insert all the ELRM information such as
timekeeping, risk and complexity level in ELRM business

75 The Future of Legal Services in Canada: Trends and Issues, Canadian Bar
Association, 6 (2013) (explaining that emerging fields of competency may include
legal risk management, legal project management, legal process analysis, and legal
knowledge
engineering),
available
at
http://www.cba.org/CBAMediaLibrary/cba_na/PDFs/CBA%20Legal%20Future
s%20PDFS/trends-isssues-eng.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2017).
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analytics software. This is because tasks completed in relation
to ELRM should always be considered as billable legal work
and not administrative work (since ELRM is the main
responsibility of a lawyer to his client and ELRM information
such as legal risk assessments should always be shared with
his client);
• ISO 31 000 standards help to protect lawyers and law firms by
ensuring that all key legal risks are documented and
communicated (also increase efficiency, save time and effort
by eliminating duplication);
• enables the use of a common language in communicating
risks among colleagues from the same law firm or legal
department; and consistency among clients and other
stakeholders;
• improves reliability, consistency and timeliness of
organizational legal risk information, thus providing more
accurate and reliable contingent liability reports, and
standardized and effective ELRM services to clients. It
ensures effective reporting to clients, improves cost-control
and cost-effectiveness, assists in the allocation of financial
and human resources, and attention and effort to each file;
improves capacity to plan, forecast and manage high-risk and
high-profile files in a risk-based management approach (i.e.
priority to high risk files is guaranteed); and improves the
communication of legal risk and leadership of files;
• leads to better working lawyer-client relationships because the
ELRM framework facilitates communication between lawyer
and client and legal risks are managed from an IRM or ERM
standpoint (in other words counsel would always consider not
just the legal consequences but also the non-legal
consequences such as operational, financial, ethical and
reputational impacts when they assesse a legal risk – this
generates more relevant and practical legal advice for senior
management and corporate decision-makers);
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• provides a competitive advantage for a law firm by helping to
standardize the delivery of their legal services and using
technology such as business analytic software;
• allows access to business analytics for benchmarking and
performance management (allows the law firm to improve
internal processes and rank its effectiveness and efficiency in
delivering solutions compared to other market competitors);
and
• reduces the costs of professional liability assurance (or
insurance).
IV. HOW AN ELRM FRAMEWORK IS IMPLEMENTED IN A MNC?
Overall, just like a house alarm system detects security risks,
an ELRM Framework or system helps the MNC to detect, deter, and
prevent the occurrence of FCPA risk.76
The full implementation of an ELRM Framework can be
estimated to take up to 1-2 years because this requires a change of
corporate culture. However, the implementation time is always
dependent on the personal endorsement and commitment of senior
management (Tone at the Top)77 along with an appropriate allocation
of financial and human resources.78 For optimal results, it is
recommended that implementation plan be based on the
Transparency International (“TI”) Business Integrity Toolkit79 for

Garrick Apollon, The intersection between LRM & DR, supra note 2,
at 285 (using the analogy that a LRM and compliance system for a company should
be viewed as an alarm system for your house. Just like your house alarm system
detects security risks, your LRM system will works to detect, deter, and prevent the
occurrence of legal risks in an organization.)
77 ISO 19600:2014 Compliance management systems—Guidelines, supra
note 54.
78 Id.
79 Business
Integrity
Toolkit,
TRANSPARENCY
INTERNATIONAL,
https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/tools/business_integrity_toolkit/0/
(last accessed Dec. 6, 2015).
76
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building an effective ABC program.80 The complete six steps and
their sequence are summarized below:

1.
COMMIT

6.
REPORT

2.
ASSESS

5.
MONITOR

3. PLAN

4. ACT

Commit ‘Tone at the top’ to a strong corporate compliance
agenda in managing FCPA legal risks and the implementation of the
ELRM framework.81 The ‘buy-in’ and full participation of senior
management, board of directors and other stakeholders is critical to
success. The “Tone from the Top”82 is often the greatest challenge
Id.
ISO 19600:2014 Compliance management systems – Guidelines, supra
note 54, at 8-10 (explaining the importance of senior management support in the
development of a corporate compliance system). Mark S. Schwartz, Thomas W.
Dunfee & Michael J. Kline, Tone at the Top: An Ethics Code for Directors?, 58 J. BUS.
ETHICS 79 (2005) (explaining that legal reforms without proper attention to ethical
obligations will likely prove ineffective. The ethical role of directors is critical.
Directors have overall responsibility for the ethics and compliance programs of the
corporation. The tone at the top that they set by example and action is central to
the overall ethical environment of their firms).
82 Id.
80
81
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for the implementation of an ELRM Framework in practice because
the CEO is often more focussed on profit and strategic planning
than risk management. However, with the example of corruption
scandals such as Siemens83, Wal-Mart84, SNC Lavalin85, etc., this
article argues that in this new era where “reputation rules”86 CEOs
should be equally concerned by managing, not just the legal risk, but
the reputational and financial risk that FCPA poses to their MNC
rather than just focusing on making profit. These corruption scandals
also reinforce that an ELRM Framework is even more necessary in
time of crisis management. For instance, Wal-Mart, reported that it
spent $439 million in FCPA compliance (i.e. legal fees, forensic and
investigative fees) only in the first two years of the scandal (2012
83 Siri Schubert & T. Christian Miller, At Siemens, Bribery Was Just a Line
Item,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Dec.
20,
2008,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/21/business/worldbusiness/21siemens.html
(covering the largest corruption scandal in the corporate world. Siemens, one of the
world’s biggest companies, ended up paying $1.6 billion in the largest fine for
bribery in modern corporate history).
84 Tom Schoenberg & Matt Robinson, Wal-Mart Balks at Paying $600Million-Plus in Bribery Case, BLOOMBERG,
Oct. 6, 2016, available at
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-06/wal-mart-said-to-balk-atpaying-600-million-plus-in-bribe-case (last visited Feb. 10, 2017) (discussing the
possibility that officials have proposed that the world’s biggest retailer pay at least
$600 million to resolve probes by the Justice Department and the Securities and
Exchange Commission into whether it bribed government officials in markets from
Mexico to India and China. Such a settlement would rank among the largest in four
decades under a U.S. law against bribing foreign officials to obtain business. The
Justice Department and the SEC have spent half a decade investigating allegations
that Wal-Mart representatives paid government officials over the course of 10 years
to fast-track store openings). See also Ben W. Heineman, Jr, Who’s Responsible for the
Walmart Mexico Scandal?, HARV. BUS. REV., May 15, 2014, available at
https://hbr.org/2014/05/whos-responsible-for-the-walmart-mexico-scandal (last
visited Feb. 10, 2017) (discussing that the Walmart bribery scandal is one of the
most closely-watched cases of alleged malfeasance by a global company. It broke
into the open in April, 2012, when the New York Times published a lengthy
investigative piece alleging Walmart bribery in a Mexican subsidiary and a cover-up
in its Bentonville, Arkansas, global headquarters).
85 See Snc Lavalin Corruption, HUFFINGTON POST, available at
http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/news/snc-lavalin-corruption/ (last visited Feb. 10,
2017).
86 DANIEL
DIERMEIER, REPUTATION RULES: STRATEGIES FOR
BUILDING YOUR COMPANY’S MOST VALUABLE ASSET (2011)
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2013), making it one of the most expensive probes in U.S. history.87
The Economist, reported that “by the time bribe-busters at America’s
Department of Justice (DOJ) are done with their own investigation,
which began in 2012, Walmart’s bill for lawyers’ and forensic
accountants’ fees will be well above $1 billion—and perhaps closer to
$2 billion”.88
Assess the organization’s current risk environment and risk
exposure using ELRM Framework to detect areas of the greatest
inherent risk in order to prioritize and allocate resources (financial
and human) appropriately to these areas.89 Assess also refers to
benchmarking the current ELRM practices of the organization to
identify its strengths and weaknesses.90
Plan the scope and activities that the organization will
undertake to prevent, detect, avoid, transfer/shift if possible, mitigate
and in general strategically manage legal risks by using ELRM
framework.91
Act by implementing internal checks and balances, as well as
documenting with business analytics software and communicating
legal risks, to promote an integrity-based corporate compliance
culture where unethical and illegal activities are prevented and
detected and FCPA risks are mitigated in a risk-based approach. 92

87 David Voreacos & Renee Dudley, Wal-Mart Says Bribe Probe Cost $439
Million in Two Years, BLOOMBERG, Mar. 26, 2014, available at
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-03-26/wal-mart-says-briberyprobe-cost-439-million-in-past-two-years (last visited Feb. 10, 2017).
88 The Economist, supra note 4.
89 ISO 19600:2014 Compliance management systems – Guidelines, supra
note 54, at 11 (explaining that senior management should allocate adequate and
appropriate resources to establish, develop, implement, evaluate, maintain and
improve the compliance management system and performance outcomes).
90 Id. at 24-25 (asserting the importance of report-keeping for compliance
management).
91 Id. at 7 (asserting the importance of identification, analysis and
evaluation of compliance risks for compliance management).
92 Id. at 24-25 (asserting the importance of report-keeping for compliance
management). See also Id. at 16-17 (discussing the concept of compliance culture or
integrity-based compliance that aims to establish a culture of ethical leadership and
goes beyond required legal compliance).
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Monitor processes to ensure that strengths and weaknesses
are identified and that the ELRM framework is continuously
improved to remain effective and up to date.93
Report on the sincerity of the organization’s commitment to
an effective FCPA compliance program to raise awareness among
employees and positively influence the organization’s reputation in
the marketplace.94 ELRM Framework presents a performance
management plan for continuous monitoring and improvement
designed on the basis of ISO 19600:2014 - Compliance Management
Systems.95 This performance management plan provides guidance for
establishing, implementing, evaluating, monitoring, maintaining and
improving an effective and responsive compliance management
system within an organization.96
V. CHALLENGES TO IMPLEMENTING AN ELRM FRAMEWORK IN AN
ORGANIZATION
First, like any corporate compliance program the “Tone from
the Top” is crucial and senior management must support the ELRM
Framework implementation.97
Second, lawyers must remain vigilant and not provide legal
risk assessment on a corporate decision that is illegal or immoral like
in the case of the infamous Ford Pinto case.98 Law and morality
cannot be separated and a strong commitment to business ethics and
integrity must remain present at all times when legal risk assessments
Id. at 21-22 (discussing monitoring to ensure performance
management).
94 Id. at 22-23 (discussing information analysis and classification).
95 Id. at 22 (discussing the sources of feedback on compliance
performance).
96 Id. at 23 (discussing compliance reporting and that the compliance
function should ensure that they are effectively informed on the organization’s
compliance performance).
97 Id. at 8-10. (explaining the importance of senior management support
in the development of a corporate compliance system).
98 Garrick Apollon, The intersection between LRM & DR, supra note 2,
at 286 (disusing Pinto case in the context of legal risk management)
93
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are conducted by lawyers for corporate decision-makers.99 Lawyers
must have strong legal advisory and legal advocacy skills to facilitate
corporate decisions that are based on integrity.100 In other words, the
role of the lawyers is not to find legal “loopholes” but to help their
client to manage their legal risks in a spirit that promotes ethical
leadership and an integrity-based corporate compliance culture where
unethical and illegal activities are prevented and detected by the
lawyer to the benefit of its client’s reputation.101
Third, while it assists in objectifying and standardizing legal
practice, ELRM is not a science (a decision of a court can never be
predicted with complete certainty).102 The ELRM approach must be a
flexible one that relies on the legal virtuosity of the lawyer, but also
the honesty, business judgment and conventional wisdom of each
participant.103 This means risk reports and risk profiles based on
business analytics software rely on the accuracy of the FCPA risk
assessments conducted by lawyers when human errors are frequent,
and also all information are not always shared with the lawyer.
Fourth, change management is required.104 The ELRM
Framework like any corporate compliance program is mandatory and
professionals (especially lawyers) don’t like to be told what to do.105

M.E. Stucke, In search of effective ethics & compliance programs, 39 J. CORP.
L. 769, 769-832 (2014) (explaining that the US Sentencing Commission’s
Organizational Guidelines provided firms strong financial incentives to have
effective ethics and compliance programs (“ethics programs”). Since then,
compliance has become big business. To incentivize compliance, some statutes
require public firms to disclose their compliance efforts. Directors of Delaware
corporations owe a duty “to attempt in good faith to assure that a corporate
information and reporting system, which the board concludes is adequate, exists.”
Companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ must have an
ethics code. But unethical and illegal corporate conduct is still pervasive. The
economic crisis heightened concerns of widespread unethical and illegal conduct
among financial institutions, ineffectual compliance, and corporate crime).
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Garrick Apollon, The intersection between LRM & DR, supra note 2,
at 286.
103 Id.
104 Id at 287.
105 Id.
99
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As with any new initiative within an organization, a period of
adjustment is expected.106
Finally, an ELRM Framework must be developed by ELRM
experts working in close collaboration with the compliance and legal
departments of the MNC to benchmark their current practices. A
consultation committee chaired by the CRO or CCO with as many
representatives of the legal team led by the CLO or GC and his
senior counsel, senior and middle management of the MNC should
be created to ensure the buy-in of all organizational players for the
implementation of the ELRM framework, while also consulting with
external stakeholders.107
VI. FOUR MAIN COMPONENTS OF THE ELRM FRAMEWORK
The ELRM Framework applies international risk
management standards to FCPA risk such as ISO 31 000 Risk
Management108 and ISO 19600:2014 Compliance Management
Systems109 The utilization of the ISO 37 001 Anti-Bribery
Management System should also be considered.110 The
implementation of an ELRM Framework should include the
following four elements:

Id.
See Mark Bandsuch, Larry Pate, Jeff Thies, Rebuilding Stakeholder Trust
in Business: An Examination of Principle‐ Centered Leadership and Organizational
Transparency in Corporate Governance, 113 BUS. & SOC. REV. 99, 99-127 (2008).
108 See ISO 31000 - Risk Management, International Organization for
Standardization (ISO),
http://www.iso.org/iso/home/standards/iso31000.htm (last visited Feb. 10,
2017).
109 ISO 19600:2014 Compliance management systems – Guidelines, supra
note 54.
110 Id.
106
107
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A. FCPA risk assessment process or how the FCPA legal
services are delivered to assist the day-to-day execution of
international business transactions for the MNC; 111
B. ELRM Toolbox; 112
C. Business analytics software utilized by the MNC for FCPA
risk management and reporting; 113 and
D. Implementation of a performance measurement plan for
the ELRM Framework.114
A. FCPA risk assessment process or how the FCPA legal services
are delivered in the day-to-day execution of international business
transactions for the MNC
First, the MNC needs to benchmark and compare their
approach to FCPA risk assessment against the well-tested ISO 31 000
LRM process115 and the anti-risk management guidelines developed
by the UN Global Compact 116, while highlighting any gaps in their
anti-corruption legal risk assessment process approach. For instance,
the ISO 31 000 process is used by the Department of Justice Canada
for the Government of Canada Legal Risk Management (LRM)
Framework.117
Based on the ISO 31 000 model and the LRM Framework at
the Department of Justice Canada, the LRM Framework for FCPA
ISO 31000, supra note 108, at 2 (explaining that a risk management
policy is a statement of the overall intentions and direction of an organization
related to the daily practice of risk management).
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 ISO 19600:2014 Compliance management systems – Guidelines, supra
note 54.
115
ISO 31000, supra note 108, at 13 (explaining risk management
process).
116 United Nations Global Compact, A Guide for Anti-Corruption Risk
Assessment, supra note 70.
117 Garrick Apollon, The intersection between LRM & DR, supra note 2,
at 288-290.
111
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risks should be based on a five- step approach that can be illustrated
by the following graphic: 118
FCPA Risk
Communication and
Consultation [Step 4 ongoing]

Communication includes
reporting to facilitate
corporate decision
making. Consultation
means that the lawyer
will seek proactively his
client’s intake
management. This step
is also linked with the
use of business analytics
software and the
electronic risk recording
of all the FCPA legal
information.

1.



FCPA Risk Identification
[step 1]
Process of finding, recognizing and
describing events which may generate
FCPA risks as the top legal risk for
companies operating globally


FCPA Risk
Monitoring and
Review [Step 5 ongoing]



FCPA Risk Assessment [step 2]
Exercise of assessing the likelihood of
adverse outcome pursuant to the
FCPA (also, other anti-corruption
legislation such as U.K. Bribery Act
must, due to the extraterritorial reach
of other anti-corruption laws of the
MNCs, ensure legal compliance with
all anti-corruption laws). In practice,
FCPA risk assessment is done by using
the FCPA Matrix and Table of
Consequences.





FCPA Risk Response [step 3]
Measures of risk mitigation or control
that are developed and implemented to
respond to an identified FCPA risk.



Ensure FCPA
risk information
remains relevant
and review FCPA
risk response
accordingly.

FCPA Risk Identification [step 1]

The employee needs to identify FCPA risk by using the elibrary of pre-identified and pre-assessed FCPA risks.119 In practice,
these pre-identified and pre-assessed FCPA risks are called “red
Id.
ISO 31 000, supra note 108, at 11 (explaining the need to be creative in
developing resources for risk management).
118
119
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flags”.120 ISO 31 000 recommends using tools to identify the risk.121
The tools need to address the particular foreign bribery risks faced by
the MNC, including but not limited to, the following: 122
(i) Tools and Sources for Analyzing the Risk of Corruption by
Country
The UN Global compact anti-corruption risk assessment
guide provides an appendix with a list of tools and their brief
description for analyzing the risk of corruption by country such as
the well-known Corruption Perceptions Index from Transparency
International123 or the Governance Indicators from the World
Bank.124
(ii) Nature of the International Business Contract being Negotiated
As MNCs are often involved in cross-border strategic
alliances, due diligence is crucial for these transactions. 125 As noted,
120 Charles Kenny & Maria Musatova, Red Flags Of Corruption’ In World
Bank Projects: An Analysis Of Infrastructure Contracts, WORLD BANK E-LIBRARY,
(2010), available at http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/abs/10.1596/1813-94505243 (last visited Feb. 10, 2017).(discussing “Red flags” are indicators of potential
issues regarding governance failure, collusion or corruption in projects).
121 ISO 31 000, supra note 108.
122 Transcript of Proceedings Taken in the Court of Queen’s Bench of
Alberta, Calgary Courts Centre, Calgary Alberta, Her Majesty the Queen v. Niko
Resources Ltd., E-File No.: CCQ11NIKORESOURCES (June 24, 2011). This this
list is based on Niko Probation Order, Appendix A par. C., available at
https://www.scribd.com/document/61566823/Niko-Resorces-Probation-Order
(last visited Feb. 10, 2017). See Canada’s Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act: Niko
Resources Ltd. Receives a $9.5 Million Fine for Bribery, MILLER THOMSON (Oct. 2011),
available at http://www.millerthomson.com/en/publications/communiques-andupdates/criminal-law-regulation-enforcement/october-2011-criminal-lawregulation-enforcement/canadas-corruption-of-foreign-public/ (last visited Feb.
10, 2017).
123 Corruption Perceptions Index, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, available
at http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview (last visited Feb. 10, 2017).
124 Worldwide
Governance Indicators, WORLD BANK, available at
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/worldwide-governance-indicators
(last
visited Feb. 10, 2017).
125 Niko Probabtion Order, supra note 122.
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“the U.S. regulatory authorities have made it clear through their
FCPA enforcement activity that extensive FCPA due diligence is
expected in connection with any merger, acquisition, joint venture or
other cross-border business transactions involving entities subject to
the FCPA.” 126 In the case of cross-border M&As due diligence
serves not only to avoid unwanted FCPA liability but also to avoid
the risk of overpaying for the target’s business.127 This is particularly
important if the country and industrial sector have a reputation for
corrupt practices, “which the DOJ views, in and of itself, as potential
“red flag” from a compliance standpoint".128
The DOJ has instituted an FCPA opinion procedure to assist
MNC in their legal risk assessment and due diligence prior to the
execution of their cross-border business transaction, particularly
M&A, because of successor liability.129 The request must be related to
a real (not hypothetical) transaction and creates a rebuttable
presumption applicable in a subsequent enforcement action. 130
However, requests for an opinion have not been frequent and the
reluctance may be partly due to a concern that the request for an
opinion may open a Pandora’s box and trigger a DOJ investigation,
as the opinion does not in any way limit the enforcement intentions
or the litigating positions of the U.S. authorities. 131

Id.
A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE AND SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Nov. 2012), available
at
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminalfraud/legacy/2015/01/16/guide.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2017) (discussing
Mergers and Acquisitions: Pre-Acquisition Due Diligence and Post-Acquisition
Integration).
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id.
126
127
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(iii) Third Parties or Intermediaries are Involved in the International
Business Transaction
In accordance with an OECD report, intermediaries were
involved in 3 out of 4 foreign bribery cases.132 75% of cases were
agents, such as local sales and marketing agents, distributors and
brokers, in 41% of cases.133 Another 35% of intermediaries were
corporate vehicles, such as subsidiary companies, local consulting
firms, companies located in offshore financial centres or tax havens,
or companies established under the beneficial ownership of the
public official who received the bribes.134 It is important to also
consider local foreign accountants and lawyers as agents.135 A foreign
agent is a “red flag” and the overwhelming use of intermediaries in
foreign bribery cases demonstrates the need for enhanced and
effective legal due diligence and risk assessment. 136 ELRM
Framework should obligate an individual/separate FCPA risk
assessment to be conducted on all foreign agents.137

132 OECD Foreign Bribery Report, An Analysis of the Crime of Bribery of
Foreign Public Officials, OECD (2014), available at
http://www.oecd.org/newsroom/scale-of-international-bribery-laid-bare-by-newoecd-report.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2017).
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, supra note 127.
137 Id. at 34.
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(iv) The Perceived Legal Culture of the Counterpart: American
Universalism Versus Particularism (Rules Versus Relationships):
American Universalism is based on Rule of Law, while
Particularism is based on Rule of Men138
The need to identify if the legal culture of the foreign
counterpart is Universalist or Particularistic is a highly practical
one.139 Despite the influence of culture and cultural factors which are
controversial to measure corruption in specific countries.140 This
Nicole Hines, Cultural Due Diligence: The Lost Diligence That Must Be
Found by U.S. Corporations Conducting M&A Deals in China to Prevent Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act Violations Duquesne Business Law, DUQ. BUS. L.J. BLOG, 9-19 (May 16,
2007) (discussing the importance of cultural due diligence to prevent FCPA
liability).
139 CHARLES HAMPDEN-TURNER & FONS TROMPENAARS, RIDING THE
WAVES OF CULTURE: UNDERSTANDING CULTURAL DIVERSITY IN GLOBAL
BUSINESS 252-64 (2d ed. 1998). Trompernaars and Hampden-Turner’s statistical
approach and empirical results are explained in detail in Appendix 2 of their book.
For instance, the data for the Universalist/Particularist dimension were collected
from the results of a hypothetical dilemma presented to approximately 70,000
managers across 65 countries. See also Garrick Apollon, Sino-American Contract
Bargaining and Dispute Resolution, 13 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. Iss. 3, 396-397 (2013)
(discussing the application of this theory for comparative law and management
with foreign cultures).
140 Kathleen A Getz & Roger J. Volkema, Culture, Perceived Corruption, and
Economics A Model of Predictors and Outcomes, 40 BUS. & SOC. 7, 7-30 (2001) (asserting
that corruption can impede commerce and economic development, yet it seems to
be tolerated in many countries. The purpose of this study was to develop and test a
model that integrates socioeconomic factors related to corruption. The analysis
revealed that a negative relationship between economic adversity and wealth was
mediated by corruption. Economic adversity was positively related to corruption,
and corruption was inversely related to wealth. Uncertainty avoidance moderated
the relationship between economic adversity and corruption, whereas power
distance and uncertainty avoidance were positively associated with corruption. The
implications of these results for enhancing the effectiveness of international
agreements are discussed). See also Abigail Barr and Danila Serra, Corruption and
culture: An experimental analysis, 94 J. OF PUB. ECON., 862-869 (2010) (discussing: why
do some people choose corruption over honesty and others not? Do the social
norms and values prevailing in the societies in which they grew up affect their
decisions? In 2005, we conducted a bribery experiment and found that, among
undergraduates, we could predict who would act corruptly with reference to the
level of corruption in their home country. Among graduate students we could not.
In 2007, we replicated our result and also found that time spent in the UK was
138
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article argues that based on Montesquieu’s Spirit of the Laws the
“state of law is a state of mind (l’état de droit est un état d’esprit)”141 that a
wise lawyer should first conduct anti-corruption legal risk assessment
that aims to uncover not just the “law-in-book” and “law-in-action” of its
foreign counterparts, but most importantly their “law-in-minds.”142 To
achieve this lawyers should use the well-tested empirical comparative
management tool by Trompenaars-Hampden-Turner called the Seven
Cultural Dimension with the Universalism Versus Particularism
dimension. 143 The empirical data for this cultural dimension where
collected from “Did the Pedestrian Die?” as an accumulation of a
decade of research into cultural diversity across the globe144:
The title is taken from a hypothetical dilemma
Trompenaars presents to managers - so far to about
70,000 managers in over 65 countries. He asks them
to consider the situation in which they are a passenger
associated with a decline in the propensity to bribe, although this does not explain
our inability to predict graduate behaviour. We conclude that, while corruption
may, in part, be a cultural phenomenon, individuals should not be prejudged with
reference to their country of origin). See also Eugene Soltes, Why they do it: inside the
mind of white-collar criminals (PublicAffairs, 2016) at 133-135 (discussing the immunity
from parking violations in New York City for United Nations diplomats.
Explaining that a study found that the numbers of tickets received from diplomats
was the highest from high-perceived corruption countries such as Chad, Sudan,
Pakistan, Mozambique, and Bulgaria. Diplomats from low-perceived corruption
countries like Norway and Canada received the least). See also, John Bruner,
Forbes Magazine, The World's Most Corrupt Diplomats, As Told Through Parking Tickets
(Jul. 2011), available at https://www.forbes.com/sites/jonbruner/2011/07
/12/the-worlds-most-corrupt-diplomats-as-told-through-parking-ticketsmap/#c8395c82a3b7 (last visited June 21 2017).
141 See also Garrick Apollon, Sino-American Contract Bargaining and Dispute
Resolution, supra note 138, at 393-394 (arguing with inspiration from Montesquieu’s
Spirits of the Laws, that “l’état de droit est est un état d’esprit” (the rule of law is a rule
of mind) that Montesquieu’s mirror theory has some practical relevance. Yet to
truly understand a foreign negotiator, a skilled negotiator should not just aim to
superficially enter the mind of the foreign negotiator, but rather aim to uncover the
deeper multilayers of their minds).
142 Id. at 394.
143 FONS TROMPENAARS, DID THE PEDESTRIAN DIE?: INSIGHTS FROM
THE GREATEST CULTURE GURU (Capstone 2003) (explaining an accumulation of a
decade of research into cultural diversity across the globe with a wide range of
client organizations).
144 Id.
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in a car driven by a close friend. That friend knocks
down a pedestrian. The friend was travelling well
above the speed limit - say 35 miles an hour in a 20mile-an-hour-zone. There are no witnesses. The
friend’s lawyer suggests that testifying under oath on
the friend’s behalf that he was only doing 20 miles an
hour may save him from serious consequences.
Trompenaars asks whether the friend has a definite
right, some right or no right at all to expect someone
(the manager being as asked the question) to testify to
the lower figure. He also asks whether - irrespective
of such right - the manager would testify to the lower
figure. The answers received have varied around the
world and, to some extent, comply with existing
stereotypes. The American and Swiss almost
unanimously feel that the friend has no right to
expect his friend to perjure him/herself, and that in
no circumstances should this be considered.
However, in Venezuela and, interestingly, in China,
less than 35 per cent of people agree with this line.145
In sum, for particularistic cultures the application of the Rule
of Law is influenced by societal or relational ethical considerations at
the expense of the application of the universal legal principles of the
Rule of Law. 146 Therefore, while Americans, Canadians or the British
follow the rule of law, in contrast Asian, Africans, Arabs or Latin
Americans tend to follow the Rule of Men.147 It is important to note
that certain European cultures like the French or Italians are more
oriented towards Particularism.148 This cultural orientation does not
necessarily explain the propensity for a particularistic party to be
corrupted but if corruption is defined as complying with the rule of
law and honoring the terms and conditions of a contract that can be
enforced by a court-of-law, as the Governance Indicators also known
Id.
See also Garrick Apollon, Sino-American Contract Bargaining and Dispute
Resolution, supra note 138, at 393-396-398 (discussing the principle of Rule of Law
vs. Rule of Men).
147 Id. at 396.
148 Id.
145
146
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as the Rule of Law Ranking from the World Bank149 defines it, it is
conventional wisdom to assert that particularistic cultures could
present a higher risk of engaging in corrupt practices. However, “the
Rule-of-Law and Rule of Men distinction should not be based on a
philosophy of law comparison that is too moralistic and too black–
and–white in order to keep its practical “analytic utility.”150 It is
important to remember that “sometimes culture matters a lot,
sometimes not at all”.151 Also, a legal ethnocentric approach that will
see all foreign Particularistic counterparts as corrupt will “foreclose
the possibility of meaningful cross-cultural relationship between
American’ and its foreign Particularistic counterparts”.152
(v) Due Diligence or Audit on the Foreign Counterpart by the
American Party (MNC must acquire intelligence on the field about
their foreign business partners or third parties)
MNCs are starting to conduct active, often intrusive, due
diligence or ethical audits not just on their prospective foreign
business partners, but also on the foreign third parties they do
business with.153 The goal is to avoid corporate scandals like the case
of Nike with child labor.154
A good example of ethical due diligence is presented in the
documentary “The Factory” showing an ethical audit conducted by
Nokia on the labor practices of their suppliers in China. 155 U.S.
149 Worldwide Governance Indicators, WORLD BANK, available at
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/databases/rule-of-law (last visited Feb. 10,
2017).
150 Garrick Apollon, Sino-American Contract Bargaining and Dispute Resolution,
supra note 138, at 397.
151 Garrick Apollon, Cross-Cultural Deal Mediation as a New ADR Method for
International, 20 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 255, 283 (2014).
152 Id.
153 Kristen Bell DeTienne & Lee W. Lewis, The pragmatic and ethical barriers
to corporate social responsibility disclosure: The Nike case, 60 J. OF BUS. ETHICS, 359-376
(2005) (discussing the benefits of CSR audits). See also World Economic Forum,
Third party audits to prevent bribery by agents or third parties, available at
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_PACI_ConductingThirdPartyDueDiligenc
e_Guidelines_2013.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2017).
154 Id.
155 A DECENT FACTORY (2004).

523

DOCUMENT10 (DO NOT DELETE)

2017

6/23/2017

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

5:2

Department of State with their American embassies and consulates
abroad also provide useful information about the foreign party.
However, it is crucial for the MNC in practice to conduct their own
ground “ethical audits or investigations” by hiring a lawyer for the
investigation or audit to remain confidential (preserve the attorneyclient privilege). The MNC should also make sure to send
representatives on international business trips in the field in order to
interview third parties and various stakeholders (e.g. local chambers
of commerce or local authorities). This approach can be related to
Sun Tzu’s concept of “foreknowledge”.156 According to Sun Tzu,
such knowledge “cannot be gotten from ghosts and spirits, cannot be
had by analogy, and cannot be found out by calculation. It must be
obtained from people, people who know the conditions of the
enemy.”157 Experienced international business people know that
because of the complexity of cross-cultural communication and
relationship-building there is so much that can be accomplished in
the home office without actually going to the “field” and meeting
people “face-to-face”.158
2. FCPA Risk Assessment [Step 2], FCPA Risk Assessment
Comprises Two Fundamental Components: Likelihood and
Consequences
Following the international standard ISO 31 000, Risk Assessment
[Step 2], risk assessment is defined by two components of a risk: 1)
likelihood adverse outcome 159 or strength of legal position;160 and 2)
Garrick Apollon, Sino-American Contract Bargaining and Dispute Resolution,
supra note 138, at 402.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 The “likelihood of adverse outcome” means the likelihood that a
point of law in accordance with the FCPA, should it be litigated, would yield an
unfavorable result for the MNC. This means the likelihood of adverse outcome
needs to be conceptualized on the basis that the FCPA investigation or legal
challenge (prosecution) is already taking place. The likelihood of being challenged
(odds of being investigated or sued/prosecuted), however, is a practical and
relevant consideration that influences the level of detail for the legal risk assessment
(step #2) and the proposed legal risk response (step #3) by the counsel. When
counsel is privy to information that helps them to predict the likelihood of being
156
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consequences or impacts.161 If these two components are not
assessed, then it is not a comprehensive legal risk assessment.162
Therefore, for the purpose of the proposed ELRM process in this
article, FCPA risk assessment is the exercise of assessing the
likelihood of adverse outcome (FCPA liability) in the international
business transaction and the negative potential consequences (such as
legal, corporate, financial, ethical and reputational) of noncompliance
with the FCPA.163 The legal risk assessment is conducted with the
assistance of tools, methods, and principles developed by the
international standard ISO 31 000 and customized by the MNC for
their own specific needs, such as the FCPA Matrix:

investigated or challenged pursuant to the FCPA before a court and communicates
this information to his client, the legal risk assessment should clearly indicate that
the likelihood of being investigated or prosecuted does not influence the risk
ratings that result from using the FCPA risk assessment grid. In other, this is a
separate information practical to determine the level of efforts that should be
invested to manage the FCPA risk.
160 Counsel may alternately use the “strength of legal position” when
assessing the likelihood of an adverse outcome occurring in commercial advisory
context. This alternative way to define likelihood of an adverse outcome reinforce
the communication of the legal risk and prevent the confusion that the legal risk
will be conceptualized in terms of the likelihood of being challenged. The strength
of a legal position will be inversely proportional to the likelihood of an adverse
outcome. This means in accordance with the FCPA Grid if the likelihood is remote
(0-20%) the legal position will be very sound, if the likelihood is unlikely (21-40%)
the legal position will be sound but may have some vulnerabilities, if the likelihood
is possible (41-60%) the legal position is vulnerable, if the likelihood is likely (6180%) the legal position is very vulnerable and if the likelihood is almost certain (81100%), the legal position is extremely vulnerable. This alternative wording also
help to avoid to prevent confusion by avoiding that decision-makers understand
the FCPA risk in terms of the odds of the company facing an FCPA investigation
or prosecution.
161 ISO 31 000, supra note 108.
162 Id.
163 ISO 19600:2014 Compliance management systems – Guidelines, supra
note 54.
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Graph 1: FCPA Legal Risk Assessment Grid
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investigation and
prosecution from a
foreign regulator.
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In conclusion, it is important to understand that the level of
effort and detail for each FCPA risk assessment will vary and is
primarily based on the judgment of the lawyer. 164 This will also
depend on many other factors such as FCPA risk and complexity
level (more effort and detail will be put in a high risk or complex file),
importance of the file for senior management or the client
department in order to meet client’s expectations, what is possible
within the time and resources allowed by the client to the lawyer,

164

Garrick Apollon, The intersection between LRM & DR, supra note 2,

at 308.
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information available, and complexity or novelty of the corruptionrelated legal issue in question.165
3.

FCPA Risk Treatment and Response [step 3]

Following the international standard ISO 31 000, Risk
Treatment Risk Response [step 3], is the process of selecting and
implementing measures to determine the appropriate course of action
to follow in responding to the identified FCPA risk and managing its
potential negative consequences.166 Usually, a legal risk management
strategy is proposed by the lawyer and it is the responsibility of the
corporate client as the decision maker to select the best risk response
option (FCPA risk management is a shared responsibility).167 The
four common risk treatments or responses are: 1) risk avoidance, this
means to avoid or cancel the transaction because the likelihood of
adverse outcome is too high and the MNC was unable to mitigate the
FCPA risk to an acceptable risk tolerance level;168 2) risk mitigation
means improving the legal position of the MNC to a risk tolerance
level that is acceptable;169 3) risk shifting/transferring is a usual risk
response in ELRM but this is not a valid option with FCPA risk
because of third party liability and successor liability;170 4) risk
acceptance (status quo) is not a valid option unless the FCPA risk has
been identified as insignificant by the lawyer. A FCPA risk is a
serious risk that should always be mitigated to an acceptable risk
tolerance level for the MNC.171

Id. at 306 (discussing that a lawyer’s ability to complete an accurate
legal assessment may be dampened by several factors, such as lack of information;
lack of time; situational constraints based on resources or power; and self-selection
processes. etc.).
166 Id. at 289.
167 Id. at 275 (discussing that legal risk management is shared
responsibility between lawyer-client).
168 Id. at 289.
169 Id. at 289.
170 Id. at 289.
171 ISO 31 000, supra note 108.
165
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FCPA Risk Communication and Consultation [Step 4-ongoing]

Following the international standard ISO 31 000, Risk
Communication and Consultation is an integral and on-going part of
the decision-making process because legal risk management is a
shared responsibility between lawyer-client.172 It refers to the efficient
communication and consultation of the FCPA risk between the
lawyer-client, to ensure that the client as the decision-maker is aware
of the identified FCPA risks and will respond to it appropriately. 173
Lawyer-client risk communication and consultation is on-going. 174
Risk communication and consultation is challenging because this is
not just a technical task but also a human one. 175 Risk communication
and consultation is intrinsically linked with negotiation and dispute
resolution because it aims to resolve issues that the company is facing
due to FCPA risk.176 Therefore, there is not just the objective to deal
with substantive issues such as legal compliance issues that are
subject to legal interpretation, but also crucially the non-substantives
issues such as issues in relation to the organizational culture and
conflicts that can cause bad emotions.177 For instance, it is obvious
that when a huge bonus, promotion or performance appraisal is at
stake for an employee, such employee might be biased in his or her
perception and assessment of the FCPA risk.178
The effectiveness of the ELRM communication and
consultation process is based on good negotiation and dispute
Id.
Id.
174 Id.
175 Garrick Apollon, The intersection between LRM & DR, supra note 2,
at 298 (explaining that LRM is primordial because negotiations and disputes are
formed by rational arguments based on the law and facts. However, in negotiation
and dispute resolution, there is always more than rational argument based on what
the law and facts present because human beings are not computers or robots that
can be programmed. Even though LRM exists to objectify and rationalize the
practice of law, we cannot stop having emotions any more than we can avoid all
risks at all times).
176 Id. at 276.
177 Garrick Apollon, The intersection between LRM & DR, supra note 2,
at 297-303 (discussing the importance for the legal to manage emotions in relation
to the legal risk).
178 Id. at 309-310.
172
173
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resolution skills.179 Therefore, this article also invites MNCs to
reframe FCPA compliance as a negotiation and dispute resolution
issue and provide training in this field to their employees.180 First, this
will help employees to resolve internal conflicts in relation to the
application of the ABC compliance program and ELRM Framework.
Second, this will help the international business negotiators and deal
makers for the MNC on the field to resolve FCPA compliance issues
with foreign public official requesting bribes by finding creative and
ethical solution to this problem. After all, corruption and bribery is as
an illegal and immoral bargaining tactic occurring during the
negotiation of international deals or settlement of international
disputes (e.g. environmental or tax disputes with local foreign
governments). Therefore, an international negotiator needs great
cultural intelligence181 and a lot of creative negotiation and dispute
resolution skills to comply with the FCPA at all times while securing
international deals.182 This means that employees need training and
skills in the field of cultural intelligence and negotiation ethics. 183
Finally, this step is linked with the use of business analytics
software and the electronic risk recording of all the FCPA legal
information. Counsel should be mandated to enter timekeeping,
complexity and risk information in the business analytics software
within a determined number of days of the legal file being opened,
and to select one of the option buttons in the software for risk
recording such as: 1) “FCPA risk is insignificant” (i.e. the risk is so
low that it is not considered negligent to not conduct a
comprehensive legal risk assessment and avoid the cost/time
Id. at 314 (explaining that risk communication between lawyer and
client, and with the other party, is key to a successful commercial mediation
because it contributes to defining both the substantive and non-substantive issues
and interests, generating options, and working on a more durable and efficient
settlement agreement.).
180 Garrick Apollon, MMA Negotiation, 15 U. DENV. SPORTS & ENT. L. J.
3, 11-12 (2013) (theorizing that MMA Negotiation should be viewed and practiced
on the foundation of four core disciplines, like the four elements of nature, to allow
the negotiator to reframe his reality).
181 Id. at 19 (theorizing on the cross-border and cross-cultural discipline).
182 Id.
183 Id. (theorizing on the cross-border and cross-cultural discipline that
must be aligned with the discipline the legal risk management discipline).
179
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associated with it– e.g. an international contract is signed by a
Delaware company with the Government of Canada); 2) “FCPA risk
may materialize now or in a near future” (i.e. FCPA risk must be
managed and monitored on an on-going basis and updated when
necessary). When the FCPA risks may materialize now or in the near
future should it be mandatory to conduct the legal risk assessment. It
is also key to have a third option button for “Unauthorized or Illegal”
(i.e. the international business transaction is unauthorized following
the ABC policies of the MNC (e.g. in the context of a political
contribution to a foreign political party for an act against the ABC
policies or an expensive gift or lavish dinner that could be interpreted
as ‘illegal’ in accordance with the FCPA).184
5. FCPA Risk Monitoring and Review [Step 5 - ongoing]
Following the international standard ISO 31 000 FCPA Risk
Monitoring and Review, the ongoing monitoring by the lawyer and
his client is essential to ensuring that FCPA risk information remains
relevant and up-to-date.185 FCPA risk-reviewing and monitoring must
be based on analytic software to store the risk information “before
evidence is lost and panic sets in.”186 The goal is to establish an
advanced secured internet repository to insert, review and report on
the FCPA risk.187 Overall, business analytics software facilitates data
acquisition and analysis by using the most up-to-date analytic
software to measure and monitor the performance of the ABC

A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, supra note 127,
at 15 (explaining that FCPA does not ban gifts and travel. It prohibits payment of
bribes, including those disguised as gifts. Most companies and their employees are
clear that large payment for gifts, travel and entertainment can constitute FCPA
violations, if they are given to government officials or to employees of state-owned
enterprises to obtain or retain business).
185 ISO 31 000, supra note 108, at 20 (theorizing on risk monitoring and
review).
186 Garrick Apollon, The intersection between LRM & DR, supra note 2,
at 286 (asserting that LRM is about effective business intelligence, business
analytics, and electronic file management—more generally referred to as law
practice management and technology).
187 Id.
184
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compliance program and ELRM Framework in the day-to-day
international business transactions of the MNC. 188
Review can occur every five (5) days or every day for high
risk international business transaction.189 If no change, the lawyer will
simply indicate and click on the business analytics software option
button “no change” but at least this will protect him and his client by
showing that he is diligently monitoring the FCPA file for the benefit
of his client and organization.190 This means a policy should be
established for lawyers to know when to open and close their FCPA
files in the business analytics software in order to ensure compliance
but also avoid unnecessary workload such as monitoring inactive files
that should be closed.191
B. ELRM tools
It is important to have a friendly ELRM user Toolbox on the
organization’s secured website that is translated into other languages
so that all employees and third parties can easily gain access to it.
ELRM Toolbox must offer flexible tools to account for
distinctiveness between the legal advisory function of preventing
FCPA risk and the function of reacting to a corruption risk that
might cause an investigation or worse a conviction pursuant to the
FCPA.192 The ELRM Toolbox must be customized to the reality and
needs of the organization.193 The ELRM Toolbox should include but
not be limited to, the following tools:

Id.
ISO 31000, supra note 108, at 20 (explaining that both monitoring and
review should be a planned part of risk management process and involve regular
checking or surveillance. It can bed periodic or ad hoc. Therefore, the idea of five
days is just an example).
190 Garrick Apollon, The intersection between LRM & DR, supra note
186.
191 ISO 31 000, supra note 108, at 21 (explaining that recording the risk
management process should provide the foundation for improvement in methods
and tools, as well as in the overall process).
192 Id. at 20.
193 Id.
188
189
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1) A guide with frequently asked questions (FAQs) on the ELRM
Framework;
2) A one-pager explaining the FCPA risk assessment process;
3) A guide for with the FCPA risk assessment techniques for lawyers;
4) FCPA Matrix and Table of Consequences (see Graph 1 in this
article);
5) E-library of pre-identified and assessed FCPA risks by country,
industrial sector of operations, legal foreign culture, interactions with
various types and levels of government officials, involvement in
strategic alliances (e.g. IJV, M&A, R&D, etc.), importance of licences
and permits in the company’s operations, degree of governmental
oversight and inspection, and volume and importance of goods and
personnel clearing through customs and immigration;
6) FCPA Consequences Assessment Sheet (i.e. standard E-form for
legal counsel to obtain necessary factual information and intake from
their clients to conduct an appropriate FCPA risk assessment with all
the non-legal consequences, a good lawyer usually understands the
business of their clients but clients are often best placed to know
more about the corporate, financial, ethical and reputational
consequences);
7) ELRM Committee (to review and approve high FCPA risk
international business transactions);
8) A Guide that will serve as core training tool for the MNC similar
to RESIST194 with real-life FCPA scenarios collected over the years
from the MNC corporate memory;

RESIST: Resisting Extortion and Solicitation in International
Transactions. A company tool for employee training, TRANSPARENCY
INTERNATIONAL
(Mar.
21,
2011)
available
at
https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/resist_resisting_extortion_a
nd_solicitation_in_international_transactions.
194
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9) FCPA Communication Guide- provides legal counsel with
practical tips on how to communicate FCPA risk to their clients in an
effective manner for better results.195
C. Business analytics software utilized by the MNC for FCPA risk
management and reporting
ELRM is all about effective business intelligence, business
analytics, and electronic file management—more generally referred to
as law practice management and technology. 196 The goal is to use a
business analytics software to bring periodic FCPA risk reports to
senior management, the Board, but also to stockholders, insurers,
investors, lenders, regulators or stakeholders in order to build trust
and show that the MNC is managing its FCPA risk in international
business transactions in a proactive, diligent, ethical, transparent,
accountable and cost-efficient manner.197
D.

Performance measurement plan for the ELRM framework

The international standard ISO 19 600 – Compliance
Management Systems provides useful guidelines for the performance
evaluation of the monitoring, measurement, analysis and evaluation
of a compliance system such as an ELRM Framework.198 The
monitoring of the ELRM Framework should include effectiveness of
the ELRM training199, effectiveness of the controls and inspections
(audits)200, effectiveness of the audits conducted with the FCPA
reports from the analytic software on the performance of lawyers in
managing their FCPA files (e.g. quantitative reports about the
ISO 31000, supra note 108, at 14-15 (discussing risk communication
and consultation).
196 Garrick Apollon, The intersection between LRM & DR, supra note
186.
197 Evan Peterson, supra note 1 (explaining the strategic advantages of
effective corporate compliance).
198 ISO 19600:2014 Compliance management systems – Guidelines, supra
note 54, at 21-25.
199 Id. at 15-16.
200 Id.
195
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compliance rate for the insertion of the FCPA risk information in the
system and qualitative reports on the quality of the legal advice
provided by the lawyers for their FCPA files), effective allocation of
the ELRM role and responsibilities for the lawyer-client, surveys
about the practicality and acceptance of the ELRM Framework in the
organization, effectiveness in addressing failures of ELRM
Framework previously identified, etc.201
VII. CONCLUSION
This article shows that it is not too difficult for a MNC to
implement an ELRM Framework specific to FCPA risk. This article
also demonstrates that the strategic and economic benefits of an
ELRM fFramework outweigh the cost of its implementation in order
for the MNCs to better control their in-house and outside legal fees
and strengthen their FCPA compliance program.202 Generally, this
article shows that an ELRM Framework helps legal departments to
not just improve their FCPA compliance but also modernize their
legal practices.203 This article, shows like my mother always says, that
“an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure”!

201
202

Id.
Garrick Apollon, The intersection between LRM & DR, supra note 2,

at 307
Id. at 271 (Susskind’s message for lawyers remains a stark one: in
order to guarantee a stake in the legal system of the future, lawyers must adapt their
work practices or die. Therefore, the importance of effective legal risk management
has risen to the top of the list of priorities of many law firms and in-house legal
departments).
203
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I. INTRODUCTION
Taxation is unique as the single most consistent function of
government. For as long as the world has needed governments,
governments have needed taxes. There have been few options
available for governments to raise money that have been as successful
and as simple. The word ‘tax’ itself first appeared in English in the
14th century. The Latin word Taxare means “to assess.” In England,
the related words ‘tax’ and ‘task’ were commonly used referring to
labour and money as a ‘duty’ respectively.1 Because of their
compulsory nature – as long as there have been taxes – there have
also been strategies to avoid them. The imposition of duties has
driven mass migrations, transitions in governments, riots and even
wars.
Under the Egyptian Pharoahs ‘scribes’ raised funds however
possible, including a tax on cooking oil. To ensure that the citizenry
was using the taxed cooking oil and not a substitute, these early
scribes conducted regular ‘audits’ of the citizens’ homes.2
Governments have also emphasized one type of tax over another,
relying on the value system of their citizenry, or even political goals in
funding government operations. For example, some jurisdictions like
the member states of the European Union rely more heavily on a
consumption tax (or “Value Added Tax”). A consumption tax has
the advantage of being easier to levy than an income tax or estate tax,
because a consumption tax is collected automatically by a merchant
whereas an income or estate tax requires a semi-voluntary declaration
to be issued by the party being taxed.
In the world of tax, not only the rules, but also the
enforcement mechanisms are varied based upon the values of the
people. As people have run from taxes, governments have run after
people. Governments around the world have taken different
positions on which avoidance strategies are legal and which are
forbidden. As an example of enforcement leniency, the Swiss
authorities have implemented a system that is quite different than
A Short History of Taxation, NEW INTERNATIONALIST MAGAZINE (2008),
https://newint.org/features/2008/10/01/tax-history/ (last visited May 1, 2015).
2 Id.
1
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what is applied in much of the rest of the world. In Switzerland,
failure to disclose a taxable event is an infringement that is among the
lowest categories of criminal offenses and only subject to a fine.3 In
the United States, the use of tax enforcement is at the extreme
opposite, drawing criticism over its alleged use as a political tool.
Across the Atlantic, former tennis star, Boris Becker was accused of
living in Germany while claiming tax residency in Monaco whereby
he avoided paying 1.7 million Euros in taxes to the German
government from 1991 to 1993. After admitting to evasion and being
sentenced to pay a $500,000 fine and serve 2 years of probation in
Germany, Becker moved to Switzerland.4
The stakes are of course much higher among Corporate
Multinationals. Boards of Directors owe a fiduciary duty to their
shareholders, and that duty embraces obligations to deliver bottom
line performance and yield.5 This is counterbalanced by external
obligations to ensure that the company meets its tax and regulatory
obligations. These obligations are inversely correlated. As the board
errs on the side of safety in its tax strategy, it returns less to its
shareholders. This also drives down stock price and makes the
company less competitive in cash draining activities like Research and
Development. Contrarily as companies take greater risks in their tax
strategies, they better meet their obligations to effectively manage the
individual company’s capital, optimize its competitiveness, and of
course – its returns. This is directly reflected on the financial
statements of the largest publicly traded companies. In 2013, Apple,
Inc. made headlines when the United States Senate reported that
America’s largest company had avoided paying tax on $102 billion of
profits anywhere in the world by exploiting rules that made income
Pietro Sansonetti, Tax evasion: The evolution of the Swiss Criminal Tax Law
Tax evasion: The evolution of the Swiss Criminal Tax Law, INT’L TAX REV. (Mar. 12,
2013), http://www.internationaltaxreview.com/Article/3167155/Tax-evasion-Theevolution-of-the-Swiss-Criminal-Tax-Law.html (last visited Apr 1, 2015).
4 Ex-Tennis Star Given 2 Years' Probation, N.Y. TIMES (2002),
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/25/world/ex-tennis-star-given-2-yearsprobation.html (last visited Mar 15, 2015).
5 William M. Lafferty, Lisa A. Schmidt & Donald J. Wolfe, A Brief
Introduction to the Fiduciary Duties of Directors Under Delaware Law, 116 PENN ST. L.
REV.
837,
(2012),
http://www.pennstatelawreview.org/116/3/116%20Penn%20St.%
20L.%20Rev.%20837.pdf.
3
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from its European operations “sourceless,” and thus, not subject to
tax anywhere.6
The realities of the varied sovereign tax opportunities are no
surprise to authorities around the world. Tax systems have grown up
organically and selfishly. In order to accommodate business in a
rapidly globalizing world, governments have needed to make
agreements with one another to preserve fairness in the way their tax
systems interact; namely to avoid or limit double-taxation and to
preserve equity by taxing all income as equally and fairly as possible.
In January 2003, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (“OECD”) introduced the Model Tax Convention,
which was designed to provide a framework by which countries were
to mitigate the effects of double taxation.7 Apple was nonetheless
ultimately able to accomplish its tax plan by manipulating tax treaties,
residency rules and the specific treatment of certain types of income
in different jurisdictions.8
Governments are held politically accountable through the
ballot box and their leaders want to earn votes and political capital by
attracting large corporations to their geographic and economic bases.
In response to these pressures, leaders of high-tax countries like the
United States, Germany and the United Kingdom in particular, have
called for a treaty system to limit tax jurisdiction competition of this
nature.9 This war cry resulted in the creation of a project.
Spearheaded by the OECD, this project is known as the Action Plan
on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (“BEPS”) and it was issued by
the OECD on July 19, 2013 with the goal of reviewing the

Emily Cohn, Apple Paid Little Or No Taxes To Any Government On Billions
In Profits: Senate Report, HUFFINGTON POST (May 20, 2013),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/20/apple-senate-report-offshore-taxstructure_n_3308741.html (last visited Mar 1, 2015).
7 OECD, Articles of the Model Convention With Respect to Taxes on Income and
on Capital (2003), http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/1914467.pdf (last visited Feb
12, 2015).
8 Supra note 6.
9 Who are the BEPS supporters?, TAX ADVISER MAGAZINE (2014),
http://www.taxadvisermagazine.com/article/who-are-beps-supporters (last visited
Feb. 10, 2015).
6
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interaction of nations’ tax systems and proposing changes in
international taxation laws.10 According to the OECD:
Base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) is a global
problem which requires global solutions. BEPS refers
to tax planning strategies that exploit gaps and
mismatches in tax rules to artificially shift profits to
low or no-tax locations where there is little or no
economic activity, resulting in little or no overall
corporate tax being paid. BEPS is of major
significance for developing countries due to their
heavy reliance on corporate income tax, particularly
from multinational enterprises (MNEs).
In an increasingly interconnected world, national tax
laws have not always kept pace with global
corporations, fluid movement of capital, and the rise
of the digital economy, leaving gaps that can be
exploited to generate double non-taxation. This
undermines the fairness and integrity of tax systems.
Fifteen specific actions are being developed in the
context of the OECD/G20 BEPS Project to equip
governments with the domestic and international
instruments needed to address this challenge. The
first set of measures and reports were released in
September 2014. Combined with the work to be
completed in 2015, they will give countries the tools
they need to ensure that profits are taxed where
economic activities generating the profits are
performed and where value is created, while at the
same time give business greater certainty by reducing
disputes over the application of international tax
rules, and standardising [sic] requirements. For the

OECD BEPS Project - EY Canada, EY CANADA - EY - CANADA
(2016), http://www.ey.com/CA/en/Services/Tax/Tax-BEPS (last visited Jun 20,
2017).
10
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first time ever in tax matters, non-OECD/G20
countries are involved on an equal footing. 11
As tax jurisdiction competition becomes limited, the central
questions presented by our modern world is (i) can tax still drive
business decisions for multinational corporations and (ii) to what
extent does tax drive those decisions in today’s globalized
environment?
II. TAX JURISDICTION COMPETITION AS A THEME
In tax planning it is easy to become myopic — only seeing tax
as a reason to make a decision about where to locate a business
component. However, a number of factors drive major business
decisions and more often there is a balancing act between the
interests and value proposition of each business driver especially in
choosing a venue for a business headquarters, operation, subsidiary
or branch. Consider the non-tax reasons driving these decisions.
These include preserving logical group and legal structure that
appeals to simplicity and predictability, which is something appealing
prospective investors. They also include preserving the subsidiaries’
balance sheets and thus their financing capabilities. Decision makers
cannot ignore political and economic stability in the jurisdiction nor
the regulatory requirements.
In 2009 McKinsey Consulting conducted a global study
entitled How companies make good decisions in which 34% of executive
respondents cited “expansion into new products, services or
geographies” as the driving factor in decision making compared to
21% citing “organizational change for other reasons,” which based
upon the alternatives would encompass tax and regulatory reasons.
When asked about the “general goal of [any] given type of decision,”
78% cited revenue growth as the driving factor, while only 22% cited
cost savings, which would likewise encompass tax planning. 12

About
BEPS
and
the
inclusive
framework,
OECD
http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps-about.htm (last visited Jun 20, 2017).
12 Massimo Garbuio, Dan Lovalla & Patrick Viguerie, How companies make
good decisions, McKinsey Global Survey Results, MCKINSEY & COMPANY (Jan. 2009),
11
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The implications of these results show that in essence tax
jurisdiction competition can have a marginal impact on business
decisions, however the implications of even the most favorable
structure is limited because of competing drivers influencing
executive decision making. Based upon the McKinsey study and the
OECD BEPS response to tax jurisdiction competition, we can draw
the conclusion that if we assume for the sake of discussion that the
risk factors among different tax strategies are the same, then the
attractiveness of a tax regime will drive a business decision toward a
tax strategy encompassing that regime:
(1) to the extent it doesn’t compete with other factors;
(2) is relatively simple to implement; and
(3) provides for a real and appreciable tax savings.
A. How Tax Jurisdiction Competition Works
There are several tax-oriented factors that can drive a tax
strategy and the corresponding establishment of basic holding
structures implicating low-tax and no-tax jurisdictions.
The first and most obvious goal is that companies seek to
reduce withholding taxes, or the combined income taxes that the
company must pay on its operations both locally in the investors’
country and in the country which hosts the operations by using tax
treaties. The second goal is to protect corporate profits from local
capital gains tax by using tax treaties. These factors are what the
OECD BEPS project has addressed in what is called BEPS Actions 2
(Hybrid mismatch arrangements) and 6 (Preventing Treaty Abuse).13

http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/strategy/how_companies_make_good_decisi
ons_mckinsey_global_survey_results (last visited May 1, 2015).
BEPS
Frequently
Asked
Questions,
OECD,
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-frequentlyaskedquestions.htm (last visited Mar 1,
2015); BEPS Action 2 - Branch Mismatch Structures, OECD (2016),
http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/Discussion-draft-Action-2-Branch-mismatchstructures.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2017).
13
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The third goal is to provide tax efficiency for the movement of
cash, and the fourth is to implement tax-efficient financing
structures. This fourth factor is addressed by the OECD BEPS
project in BEPS Actions 8 (Transfer pricing of intangibles) and 13
(Transfer pricing documentation).14
1.

Tax Treaties and Source and Residency Rules

People move around, but have the advantage for tax purposes
of only being able to be in one place at a time. If a miner mines for
gold in South Africa, most would agree that the source of that gold is
South Africa. Let’s assume that miner is paid for his work and workproduct (the gold) in South Africa; he of course is subject to tax in
South Africa. This is called his “Source Income” and is taxed at the
source.15 If however, it happens that this miner is a resident of
neighboring Zimbabwe then he is also subject to tax on his income
on the basis of his residency in Zimbabwe. 16 This is called “Residency
Income.” To go a step further, if it happens that this miner is a
citizen of the United States as defined by the United States tax code,
the United States tax code provides that his income wherever in the
world it may be sourced will be taxed by the United States.17 This is
where the OECD model convention comes into play. Article 23
governs how to handle the above scenario. There are two basic
options Article 23A, known as the “Exemption Method” and Article
23 B, known as the “Credit Method.”18 As the names indicate, the
Exemption Method involves exempting income from taxation in one
of the two contracting states from any tax whatsoever. The Credit
Method involves crediting the tax paid in one state against the tax
paid in the other contracting state. The model treaty distinguishes
income derived from various types of activities and allocates the
income to more closely align with the source country.

Id.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (2d ed.).
16 Clive Mphambela, Residence-based tax system commendable, THE
ZIMBABWE
INDEPENDENT
(Mar.
1,
2013),
http://www.theindependent.co.zw/2013/03/01/residence-based-tax-systemcommendable (last visited Mar 12, 2015).
17 INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, § 7701(b).
18 Supra note 7.
14
15
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Unfortunately for our miner, there is no double-taxation treaty
between the United States and Zimbabwe. As a result the miner must
pay tax on the income “in the same way and at the same rates shown
in the instructions for the applicable U.S. tax return.”19 In other
words, our miner will be subject to taxation on the same income,
both at the applicable rate in Zimbabwe and the United States.
If however, our miner moves across the border to South
Africa, his income is taxed only once in South Africa and pursuant to
Article 23 of the Tax Convention with South Africa, our Miner
would be able to apply as a credit, the tax paid in South Africa against
the tax due in the United States.20
Unlike a natural person, an entity such as a Corporation,
Limited Liability Company or Trust is much more difficult to locate
geographically for residency purposes when these entities operate on
a global level. Consider that a Corporation might be formed in one
jurisdiction, but have operations in many foreign jurisdictions and be
managed in yet another jurisdiction. Out of 23 major economies
surveyed by the accounting firm Deloitte, four placed their residence
in the place of incorporation and sixteen placed it by using some
form of a “place of effective management” standard.
Incorporation

Place of
effective
management

Incorporation and place of
effective management

Registration

Estonia, Hong
Kong, Russia,
United States

Denmark

Austria, Canada, China, Cyprus, Denmark,
Czech Republic, Germany,
Sweden,
Greece, Hungary, Ireland,
Ukraine 21
Luxembourg, Malta, The
Netherlands, Portugal,
Romania, South Africa

19 United States Income Tax Treaties - A to Z, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,
http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/International-Businesses/United-States-IncomeTax-Treaties---A-to-Z (last visited July 2, 2015).
20 Tax Convention With South Africa, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE (Jan. 1,
1998), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-trty/safrica.pdf (last visited July 2, 2015).
21 Survey into substance, place of residence and tax avoidance, DELOITTE (Dec. 6,
2012), http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/nl/Documents
/tax/deloitte-nl-nederland-geen-belastingparadijs.pdf (last visited June 10, 2015).
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As discussed in the Deloitte survey:
When a company is subject to tax because the place
of effective management is in the state concerned,
most countries take into account facts and
circumstances. This usually is an open standard, but
several factors can be taken into account. In almost all
cases it would be decisive where the central
management is performed and the main business
decisions are taken. This is not necessarily the place
where the day-to-day management takes place. Other
relevant factors that can be taken into account are the
place where the directors reside or, more formally, the
place of the registered office. Some countries apply
only one of above criteria to determine the tax liability
of a company, other countries apply both criteria
besides each other.
***
In addition to this table, please note that most countries stated
the place of effective management under bilateral tax treaties to
be decisive for determining the place of residence in the event of
dual resident companies.22
It is the very nature of this difference in establishing tax
residency that tax planners have traditionally sought to take
advantage of in planning zero-tax strategies like those employed by
Apple, Inc. identified and discussed generally above.
2.

Intra-Europe and International Tax Competition

One of the broadest differences between the European Union
and the United States is the federal/supranational competency to levy
taxes. Although such a power is contemplated within the EEA treaty,
it has never been exercised by European Authorities and has
otherwise been left to the Member States.23 The United States
however, has exercised its direct authority to tax and levy pursuant to
22
23

Id.
EEA Treaty art. 115, opened for signature May 2, 1992.
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the United States Constitution, which has been powerfully
implemented from the beginning. 24
This distinction is significant because these factors give the
European Union a powerful pro-jurisdictional competition slant. The
United States on the other hand consolidates its power through its
tax base and collects the lions share of corporate and personal
income taxes paid by its subjects through its Internal Revenue Service
(“IRS”), as opposed to the much smaller rates collected by the states.
Thus, while certain states are more attractive because they levy
no corporate income tax, all U.S. Corporations are subject to tax at
35% for their 2014 taxable income at or above $18,333,333, which
covers every major U.S. Corporation.25 In the United States, as in
most parts of the world, a Corporation is taxed as an entity itself on
its annualized taxable gross income. The income that it distributes to
its shareholders is subsequently taxed a second time at the
shareholder level as a dividend. The dividend tax is calculated on a
bracket scale that corresponds to that person’s ordinary income tax
bracket.26 There are two scales divided into Ordinary Dividends and
Qualified Dividends, which are subject to a lower level of taxation,
provided that the investor held the shares in the company for a
minimum holding period prior to the ex-dividend date. The
maximum ordinary dividend tax is 39.6% and the maximum qualified
dividend tax is 20%.27

U.S. CONST. ART. I § 8.
Internal Revenue Service, 2014 Instructions for Form 1120, Ctat. No.
11455T (Jan. 8, 2015).
26 For the purposes of discussion all references to “Person” or “person”
unless specified as applying only to “natural person(s)” shall mean an individual, a
trust, estate, partnership, agency, branch or corporation organized or incorporated
under the laws of the relevant jurisdiction.
27 Tax
Law
Changes
for
2008,
KIPLINGER'S
(2009),
http://www.kiplinger.com/features/archives/2008/11/tax-planning-tax-lawchanges4.html?kipad_id=44 (last visited Jun 20, 2017); Supra note 19. Qualified
Dividends must (a) be paid after December 31, 2002, by (i) a U.S corporation, (ii) a
foreign corporation located in a jurisdiction subject to a U.S. tax treaty or (iii) on
stock in a foreign corporation traded on a U.S. exchange by way of an American
Depository Receipt (A.D.R.), and (b) the stock must have been held by the investor
for more than 60 out of the 121 days preceeding the ex-dividend date.
24
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III. SURVEY OF LOW TAX JURISDICTIONS
The nominal corporate tax rate, although a significant
consideration in tax planning, is often neither the central operative
factor in a tax planning strategy for a multinational corporation nor is
it a business driver. Instead it is more often the special tax treatment
of certain types of income in a certain jurisdiction that plays a major
factor. However, it is important in understanding basic structures to
evaluate the nominal rate of a jurisdiction to provide a baseline for
understanding the tax efficiency of the given strategy.
High Tax

MediumHigh

MediumLow

Low Tax

No Tax

Japan
(33.06%)

Australia
(30%)

China (25%)

Bulgaria (10%)

British
Virgin
Islands

USA (40%)

Brazil (34%)

Hungary
(19%)

Cyprus (12.5%)

Cayman
Islands

Canada
(26.5%)

Poland (19%)

Ireland (12.5%)

Estonia

France
(33.33%)

Romania
(16%)

Latvia (15%)

Jersey

Germany
(29.65%)

Russia (20%)

Netherlands
(25%)

UAE28

India
(34.61%)

Slovenia
(17%)

Switzerland
(17.92%)

Malta (35%)

UK (20%)

Spain (28%)

Tax
tools
&
resources,
KPGM,
http://www.kpmg.com/Global/en/services/Tax/tax-tools-andresources/Pages/corporate-tax-rates-table.aspx (last visited Jun 20, 2017).
28
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IV. PAST: TRADITIONAL TAX STRUCTURES
A. Limited Liability Companies and Corporations
As a preamble to understanding basic holding structures, it is
important to understand the tax distinction in business entity types
and how tax rules evolved organically to permit these types of
arrangements. For tax purposes, most places in the world classify
business entities into two types: pass-through or disregarded entities,
and entities with a corporate personality; the two most common
American varieties being the Limited Liability Company29 and the
Corporation, respectively.30 These types of forms have an equivalent
structure in most jurisdictions, for example, in Switzerland and
Germany the Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung (GmbH)31 (Farlex) and
Aktiengesellschaft (AG).32
The primary feature shared by both Limited Liability
Companies and Corporations is “Limited liability.”
Limited liability is a type of liability that does not exceed the
amount invested in a partnership or limited liability company. The
limited liability feature is one of the biggest advantages of investing in
publicly listed companies. While a shareholder can participate wholly
in the growth of a company, his or her liability is restricted to the
amount of the investment in the company, even if it subsequently
goes bankrupt and racks up millions or billions in liabilities.
In a partnership, the limited partners have limited liability,
while the general partner has unlimited liability. The limited liability
feature protects the investor's or partner's personal assets from the

29 Small Business/Self-Employed Topics, Limited Liability Company (LLC),
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businessesself-employed/limited-liability-company-llc (last visited Jun 20, 2017).
30 Id.
31 The
Free
Dictionary,
GMBH,
http://acronyms.thefreedictionary.com/GmbH (last visited Jun 26, 2015).
32 The
Free Dictionary, AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT, http://financialdictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Aktiengesellschaft (last visited Jun 24, 2015).
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risk of being seized to satisfy creditor claims in the event of the
company's or partnership's insolvency.33
Civil Law jurisdictions generally have differing capitalization
requirements for the Limited Liability Company versus the
Corporation. The Italian Società per azioni (S.p.A.) for example carries
an initial capitalization requirement of €50,000. Like an AG or
Corporation, the capital is split amongst the shares “azioni” that can
be transferred by endorsement or bought and sold on a stock
exchange. In Italy, only an SpA can be quoted in a stock exchange,
issue corporate bonds, and other financial instruments.34 The SpA is
also the required form for protected businesses such as banks, leasing
companies, etc. The Italian Civil Code also provides for the Società a
responsabilità limitata (Srl). An Srl has a lesser initial capitalization
requirement of €10,000. Like a Limited Liability Company or GmbH,
in an SrL capital is split into stakes “quote” which can be traded by
notarial act in Civil Law countries or by Contract in Common Law
Countries. In the United States for example, no notarial act is
required for the transfer of shares. 35 As in an Italian SrL, a United
States Limited Liability Company traditionally could not be listed on
most public exchanges including the New York Stock Exchange or
NASDAQ because of the added uncertainty associated with a
Limited Liability Company by virtue of its “Operating Agreement.”
According to Black’s Law Dictionary, an LLC Operating Agreement
is:
[A] document that customizes the terms of a Limited
Liability Company (LLC) according to the specific
needs of the owners, and outlines the financial and
functional decision-making in a structured manner.
Though writing an Operating Agreement is not a
mandatory requirement for most states, it is
33 Limited
Liability,
INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/
limitedliability.asp#ixzz3fhHLZ1Vn (last visited Jun 26, 2015); supra note 15.
34 Italian Civil Code of 1942 (as amended by Government Act 6/2003).
35 Gesuato Elisabetta, La S.p.A. si costituisce con capitale minimo di 50.000 €,
FISCO
E
TASSE
(July
3,
2014),
https://www.fiscoetasse.com/approfondimenti/11929-la-spa-si-costituisce-concapitale-minimo-di-50-000.html (last visited June 25, 2015).
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nonetheless considered a crucial document that
should be included when setting up a Limited
Liability Company. The document, once signed by the
members (owners), acts as a binding set of rules for
them to adhere. The document is drafted to allow
owners to govern the internal operations according to
their own rules and specifications.36
These provisions fill in for state law, which would govern a
Corporation. In popular states for corporate formations like
Delaware, the body of law is well developed and provides a level
playing field for prospective investors.37 Traditionally the uncertainty
associated with varying terms in LLC operating agreements could not
be overcome by the rather substantial tax benefits a Limited Liability
Company could sustain through the elimination of double-taxation.
However, so called “widely held partnerships” or “publicly traded
partnerships” (“PTPs”) have become more of a reality; specifically in
oil, gas and natural resource projects. The rise of PTPs lead to the
implementation of rules that cause these types of entities to be
treated as corporations by the United States Internal Revenue Service
in most instances.38

LLC
Operating
Agreement,
INVESTOPEDIA
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/
llc-operating-agreement.asp (last visited June 26, 2015); How To Change Ownership Of
A
Limited
Liability
Company,
THE
LAW
DICTIONARY,
http://thelawdictionary.org/article/how-to-change-ownership-of-a-limitedliability-company/ (last visited Jun 26, 2015).
37 Facts
and
Myths,
STATE
OF
DELAWARE
http://corplaw.delaware.gov/eng/facts_myths.shtml (last visited June 26, 2015).
38 Daniel M Dunn, Michael Hirschfield & Michael A Lehmann, Publicly
traded
partnership
proposed
regulations,
LEXOLOGY
(2015),
http://www.lexology.com/library/
detail.aspx?g=0af9fa15-9a54-40ea-ad4d-ae780edfe247&utm_source=Lexology%2B
Daily%2BNewsfeed&utm_medium=HTML%2Bemail%2B-%2BBody%2B%2BGeneral%2Bsection&utm_campaign=Lexology%2Bsubscriber%2Bdaily%2Bf
eed&utm_content=Lexology%2BDaily%2BNewsfeed%2B2015-06-25&utm_term
(last visited Jun 26, 2015); Internal Revenue Bulletin: 2015-21, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking Qualifying Income from Activities of Publicly Traded Partnerships With Respect to
Minerals or Natural Resources, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE (May 26, 2015),
http://www.irs.gov/irb/2015-21_IRB/ar14.html (last visited June 26, 2015).
36
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The elimination of double-taxation is the largest tax distinction
between a Corporation and a Limited Liability Company. The
Limited Liability Company is treated by default as a pass-through or
“disregarded” entity, which means that the profits and losses flow
through the entity as if the owners had engaged in those activities
personally. The Corporation on the other hand is treated as a
“person” which is subject to taxation independent of its shareholders
on the basis of a corporate income tax and its shareholders are
subject to a second tax when the profits of the corporation are
distributed in the form of a dividend.39
B. Basic Holding Structures
1.

Reduction of Withholding Taxes

Consider the following scenario. Investors in Sweden invest in
an active operating company in Canada that manufactures cars. The
Canadian company is a corporation for the purposes of the Canadian
Revenue Code and thus taxed at 26.5%.40 The company retains a
small amount in reserves and distributes the remainder of its profits
to the Swedish company in the form of a dividend. Pursuant to
subsection 215(1) of the Canadian Income Tax Act, dividends to nonresident shareholders would normally be taxed at a rate of 25% to be
withheld and paid to the Canadian Revenue Authority. However,
because of the Canada-Sweden Tax Treaty, the Canadian company
would only be required to apply the reduced rate of 15%.
Consider now that the Swedish company takes on a partner
in the United Kingdom and this partner desires to invest into 50% of
the shares of the Canadian company. If the British company acquired
50% of the shares of the Canadian company directly, it would be
subject to a reduced rate of taxation of 10% pursuant to the CanadaUnited Kingdom Tax Treaty. However, the Swedish company and the
39 Classification of Taxpayers for U.S. Tax Purposes, INTERNAL REVENUE
SERVICE, https://www.irs.gov/individuals/international-taxpayers/classificationof-taxpayers-for-u-s-tax-purposes (last visited Jun 26, 2015); Limited Liability
Company
(LLC),
INTERNAL
REVENUE
SERVICE,

https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/limitedliability-company-llc (last visited June 26, 2015); supra note 29.
40

Id.
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British company decide instead to form a jointly-owned subsidiary
holding company that will own the Canadian company. This
company would be formed in the Netherlands and consist merely of
a post office box and have no employees. The Swedish and British
companies agree as shareholders to pay 80% of all profits of the
Dutch company to the Swedish and British shareholders by way of a
dividend. Thus, the applicable tax treaties would become the CanadaNetherlands Tax Treaty, which provides for a reduced rate of 5%. The
Dutch company is not subject to Income Tax on the foreign
dividends received and Dutch law provides for certain credits
reducing the tax on re-distributed dividends which originate from
dividends received from other countries reducing the Dutch tax to
virtually zero.41

Without Holding Company

With Holding Company Structure

Joseph Peters, Netherlands: A Dutch Tax Credit For Foreign Dividend
W/H Tax, Even Though The Dividend Received Is Not Taxed In The
Netherlands, Due To The Dutch Participation Exemption, MONDAQ (2013),
http://www.mondaq.com/x/228050/Corporate+Tax/A+Dutch+Tax+Credit+Fo
r+Foreign+Dividend+WH+Tax+Even+Though+The+Dividend+Received+Is+
Not+Taxed+In+The+Netherlands+Due+To+The+Dutch+Participation+Exemp
tion (last visited Jun 7, 2015); Dutch withholding taxes on outbound payments,
TAX
CONSULTANTS
INTERNATIONAL,
https://www.tax-consultantsinternational.com/read/Dutch_withholding_taxes (last visited Jun 7, 2015);
Dentons, Landmark treaty case: Prévost Car Inc. v. The Queen, LEXOLOGY,
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=50700034-20f4-4677-826ba36d4ee3923e (last visited June 20, 2017); 2008 TCC 231 (CanLII), Prevost Car
Inc. v. The Queen, http://canlii.ca/t/lwpfq (last visited June 7, 2015).
41
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Thus by shifting profits from Canada through a Dutch
Holding Company, the result is that the total effective tax on the
dividends can be reduced from 25% assuming no treaty is in place to
approximately 5%. These types of structures have been subject to
attack by revenue-losing governments. Many governments have put
into play “substance requirements,” which require that the entity
have some purpose and basic existence in the host country other than
mere incorporation.
The OECD Model Treaty and the Canada-Netherlands Tax Treaty
also contain provisions in Article 10, Section 2 which made the treaty
benefits only applicable if the person was the “beneficial owner,” to
wit: “if the recipient is the beneficial owner of the dividends the tax
so charged shall not exceed . . . .” However, this scenario was based
upon a 2008 Canadian case in which the Canadian Revenue authority
had ruled that the Dutch company was not the “beneficial owner” of
the dividend and that the term “beneficial owner” is in fact not
defined anywhere in the treaties.42 This is inapposite to the UK High
Court’s finding in the case of Indofood International Finance Ltd. V.
JPMorgan Chase Bank, London Branch. In Indofood, the English High
Court held “that a newly interposed Dutch company used purely to
take advantage of the treaty would not be the beneficial owner of the
interest and, therefore, the purported tax objective of any theoretical
restructuring to avoid the 20% withholding would not be effective”. 43
Contrarily in Prevost, in rendering the Court’s decision, Justice Rip
held that Indofood was distinctive from Prevost because in Indofood, there
was no discretion left to any party as to whether income could be
passed through the structure making the Dutch company merely a
“conduit.” Alternatively, in Prevost, the Dutch company was not
bound by its articles of formation to make a subsequent dividend
payment to the UK Company and the Swedish Company. The
Swedish and UK Companies did in fact however have a side
agreement to which the Dutch company was not a party agreeing to
Id.
Indofood Decision: UK Tax Authorities' Guidance on Treaty Claim, (Oct 23,
2006),
https://www.clearygottlieb.com/news-and-insights/publicationlisting/indofood-decision--uk-tax-authorities--guidance-on-treaty-claims9
(last
visited June 28, 2015)
42
43
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vote in favor of at least an 80% dividend. Justice Rip determined that
because the Dutch company was not a party to the side agreement
the remedies for failure to issue a dividend would be decided in
litigation amongst the shareholders directly and not by suing the
Dutch company. The Court held this distinction sufficient to
distinguish the facts before it from Indofood in finding that the Dutch
company was in fact the beneficial owner of the dividends issued by
the Canadian company for the purposes of treaty benefits.44
The tax imposed by Canada on the Dutch company is what is
known as “inbound” taxation, while the tax imposed by Holland on
the Dutch company’s dividends paid to foreign entities is what is
known as “outbound” taxation. Each term is so defined based upon
the direction of the movement of capital. This example is not the end
of the story with respect to what Governments are doing to limit
these types of structures. Substance Requirements and CFC Rules
will be further addressed in Article V.
2.

Protection from Local Capital Gains Taxation

Taxation on income from operations of a business is taxed as
ordinary income at the applicable rate for that business. As discussed
supra at Ch. III, Art. A, such income is either taxed at the corporate
level applying the applicable corporate income tax rate or at the level
of the individual owners in the case of a pass-through entity like a
Limited Liability Company. When a person engages in investment
into a capital asset, such as an investment or real estate that:
gives it a higher worth than the purchase price. The
gain is not realized until the asset is sold. A capital
gain may be a short term (one year or less) or long
term (more than one year) and must be claimed on
income taxes. A capital loss is incurred when there is
a decrease in the capital asset value compared to an
asset’s purchase price.45

2008 TCC 231, supra note 41.
Investopedia, Capital Gain, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/
capitalgain.asp (last visited June 1, 2015); supra note 15.
44
45
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In Ch. 1 Art. 2 supra we analyzed the Qualified vs. Ordinary
dividend tax rates in the United States. These rates are mimicked by
the rates imposed for Long-Term Capital Gain and Short-Term
Capital Gain taxes. Long-Term Capital Gains are capital gains on
assets which are held for longer than one-year. These types of capital
gains are subject to taxation at the lesser amount of 20% for most
types of transactions.46
These types of capital gains are particularly applicable to
investment companies and private equity funds which trade assets
regularly. Private equity funds typically have a longer horizon for
their investments and hold them for longer than a year making most
of their income subject to long-term capital gains tax. Moreover,
private equity funds are typically structured as pass-through entities
and its managers are paid by receiving a share of the profits, thus
receiving the vast majority of their compensation in capital-gains and
subject to a lesser tax than the 40% they would otherwise be subject
to at normal U.S personal income tax rates.47
The OECD conducted a survey of Long-Term Capital Gains
taxation by country in 2011, resulting in the following with a few
additions for discussion purposes:48
High Tax

MediumHigh

MediumLow

Low Tax

No Tax

Italy (44.5%)

Norway
(28%)

United States
(19.1%)

Japan
(10%)

Mexico

Denmark
(42%)

Germany
(25%)

Israel (20%)

Hungary
(16%)

Luxembourg

France (31.3%)

Finland
(28%)

Estonia
(21%)

Portugal

46 Internal Revenue Service, Topic 409 Capital Gains and Losses,
https://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc409.html (last visited June 1, 2015).
47 MARK JICKLING & DONALD MARPLES, TAXATION OF HEDGE FUND
AND PRIVATE EQUITY MANAGERS (2014).
48 Robert Carroll & Gerald Prante, Corporate Dividend and Capital Gains
Taxation: A comparison of the United States to other developed nations, (2012),
http://www.theasi.org/assets/EY_ASI_Dividend_and_Capital_Gains_Internation
al_Comparison_Report_2012-02-03.pdf (last visited June 25, 2015)
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UK (28%)

Iceland
(20%)

Austria

Australia
(22.5%)

Poland
(19%)

Netherlands

Spain (21%)

Slovak
Republic
(19%)

Korea

Canada
(22.54%)

Chile (20%)

Switzerland

Ireland
(25%)

Greece
Slovenia
Turkey
Czech
Republic
Cayman
Islands49
Bermuda50
Mauritius51

The OECD model convention addresses Capital Gains in
Article 13, which provides the following in substance:

Cayman
Island
Government,
Taxes,
(2011),
http://www.gov.ky/portal/page/portal/cighome/cayman/theeconomy/taxes (last
visited June 24, 2015).
50 Trading
Economics,
Bermuda
Corporate
Tax
Rate,
https://tradingeconomics.com/bermuda/corporate-tax-rate (last visited Jul 22,
2017).
51 Gary Gowrea, Standard Chartered – Publicised tax avoidance strategy,
ACTIONAID (Jan. 2015),
http://www.actionaid.org/sites/files/actionaid/standard_chartered_publicised_tax_avoidance_strategy_0.pdf (last visited June, 25 2015)
49
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1. Gains derived by a resident of a State A from
alienation of immovable property State B may
be taxed in State B.
2. Gains derived by resident of State A forming
part of the “business property of a permanent
establishment” which an enterprise of State A
has in State B, including gains from the
alienation of the permanent establishment
itself may be taxed in State B.
3. Gains from the alienation of ships or aircraft
operated in international traffic, or movable
property pertaining to the operation of ships,
aircraft or boats shall be taxed in the state
“where place of effective management is
situated.”
4. Gains derived by resident of State A from
alienation of shares deriving more than “50
per cent of their value directly or indirectly
from immovable property” situated in State B
may be taxed in State B.
5. All other gains than in Paragraphs 1-4 shall be
taxable only in the state where the alienator is
a resident.52
Consider the following scenario. A Chinese company wishes
to invest in a Mozambique Company that holds immovable property
in Mozambique. Pursuant to Mozambique law capital gains are taxed
at a rate of 32%. In 2014, Texas-based Andarko, an oil and gas
company paid Mozambique $520 million USD in capital gains after a
transaction yielded a capital gain of $1.625 billion USD.
Instead, if the Chinese company interposes a holding
company in Mauritius that owns 100% of the shares in the

52

Supra note 7.
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Mozambique Co., the capital gains tax can be eliminated per the tax
treaty between Mauritius and Mozambique, which states to wit:
Mauritius has the exclusive right to tax any gains
derived by the Mauritius Holding Company on the
sale of shares held in the Mozambique Company.
As opposed to other tax treaties signed by
Mozambique, Mauritius has exclusive rights to tax
capital gains on the sale of shares held in the
Mozambique Company even if the assets of the
Mozambique Company consist (sic) principally of
immovable property. 53
“As per the tax treaty between Mauritius and Mozambique,
dividend [sic] paid to the Mauritius Holding Company will be subject
to a reduced withholding tax rate of 8% in Mozambique.”54 Capital
Gains are also not taxed in Mauritius on this type of transaction
because the Mauritius-Mozambique double taxation treaty excludes
Paragraph 4 of the Model Convention applying to immovable
property, thus pushing this transaction into the catchall Article 13,
Paragraph 5 of the OECD Model Convention. 55

Supra note 51.
Gary Gowrea, Mauritius: Investment Gateway to Africa in Maximising
Business Opportunities in Asia, Africa and the Middle East – a Treasury Guide, CIM TAX
SERVICES
(2014),
https://www.cim.mu/files/cgb/mauritius%20%20investment%20gateway%20to%20africa%20(insights%20201314)%20a%20pu
blication%20of%20standard%20chartered%20bank.pdf (last visited June 21, 2017).
55 Supra 53; Agreement between the Republic of Mauritius and the Republic of
Mozambique for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income, LEGAL
SUPPLEMENT TO THE GOVERNMENT GAZETTE OF MAURITIUS (1997).
53
54
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With Holding Company Structure56

Tax Efficient Movement of Cash

A major consideration of any business with operating entities
in foreign jurisdictions is how to get cash to those entities without
suffering a debilitating tax. Consider the previous scenario. Investor
parent company in China invests in an Operating Company in
Mauritius, but now also invests in another Operating Company in
Country Y. The Chinese company wants a way to move cash easily
into the Operating Company in Country Y. As discussed supra,
dividends paid would be subject to a 20% withholding tax in
Mozambique, thus limiting the capital available for movement from
China to Country Y.

56

Supra note 52.
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Cash Efficient Holding Structure

Using a similar structure, the Chinese investors would interpose
Country Y’s Operating Company as a wholly owned subsidiary of the
Mauritius Co. subject to the same reduced 8% withholding tax.57
However, instead of the Mauritius Co. redistributing the dividend to
China it would make a capital investment either as equity or debt into
Country Y’s Operating Company.
C. Financing Structures
Another reason that companies develop holding structures is
for tax efficient financing. In financing structures, the primary driver
is often not tax efficiency, but rather non-tax considerations like the
availability of external financing sources. Tax only becomes the
bigger consideration when internal financing is proposed (e.g., the
Holding Co. lending to the Operating Co. or CFC 1 lending to CFC
2).

57

Id.
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As discussed infra Article IV, Section D, Chapter 4 (the
Amazon.com, Hybrid and Reverse Hybrid examples), lending
internally is an effective way of reducing income in a high-tax country
and shifting it to a low-tax country. Some basic financing structures
apply in this regard.
1.

Spain – Swiss Finance Branch

Consider the following scenario:
1. ParentCo. in High-Tax Jurisdiction owns Spanish Co.,
which is a corporate subsidiary.
2. Spanish Co. owns subsidiaries in high-tax jurisdictions.
3. Spanish Co. establishes a branch office in Switzerland.
4. The Swiss Branch loans money to the high-tax
subsidiaries for operating capital and the interest is
sufficient to wipe-out the profits of the subsidiaries in the
high-tax countries.
5. Pursuant to Swiss Law, the branch is subject to a lowlevel of taxation in Switzerland on interest income and no
withholding tax on profits redistributed to the Spanish
head office, because the branch is a disregarded or nonexistent entity. 58
6. Pursuant to Spanish law there is no deemed interest
income in Spain so the interest income in tax exempt in
Spain. 59

58 Corporate Taxation System In Switzerland, INT’L TAX REV. (2015),
http://www.internationaltaxreview.com/pdfs/taxdata/tax_data_switzerland_0002
26.pdf (last visited July 6, 2015).
59 Barbra Mambrilla & Jose Manuel Calderon, The new Tax Protocol to the
Spain-Switzerland Tax Treaty, GOMEZ-ACEBO & POMBO (Feb. 2013),
http://www.gomezacebo-pombo.com/media/
k2/attachments/the-new-tax-protocol-to-the-spain-switzerland-tax-treaty.pdf (last
visited July 6, 2015).
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7. The end-result is a deferral strategy whereby the profits
are shifted from the high-tax subsidiaries to the Swiss
Branch.
8. The effectiveness of this strategy is subject to avoidance
of Spanish CFC legislation, which is discussed infra in
Article IV, Section D, Chapter 2.
The Swiss Finance Branch60

2.

Malta Financing Structure

Consider the following scenario:
1. Parent Co. in high-tax jurisdiction owns Malta Co., a
Maltese subsidiary company.
2. Malta taxes interest income at a low rate.
3. Malta Co. loans money to the subsidiaries of Parent Co.
in high tax jurisdictions.
4. The high tax companies get the interest deduction.
Madeleine Syré, MODULE 6 – M&A - TAX PLANNING (2014),
University of St. Gallen, EMBL-HSG.
60
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5. The interest is initially taxed at 35% in Malta.61
6. The money is distributed by the Malta Co to the Parent
Co. in the form of a dividend and subject to no
withholding tax pursuant to Maltese law.62
7. Under Maltese law, interest income is classified as
“Passive Interest” if the interest income is not derived,
directly or indirectly, from a trade or business and the
interest income has not suffered or has suffered foreign
tax of less than 5%. “Then a registered shareholder of a
Malta company who has: (i) received a dividend from a
Malta company, from (ii) profits of the company which
arise from Passive Interest, is entitled to claim a 5/7 th’s
refund of the CIT paid by the Malta company on the
Passive Interest.” 63 If the income is not “Passive
Interest” the fallback is that the interest is classified as
“Non-Passive Interest” an subject to a 6/7 th’s refund of
the CIT paid by the Malta company on the interest.64
8. The effectiveness of this strategy is subject to avoidance
of CFC legislation in the high-tax country, which is
analyzed in detail in Section D, however it is likely given
the fact that the tax is charged and a refund paid, that
double-taxation treaty benefits would likely be available to
the Parent Co. for the taxes paid in Malta at 35%.

61 Jonathan Pisani, Taxation of interest income,
CHETCUTI CAUCHI
ADVISORS
(May
23,
2012),
https://www.ccmalta.com/publications/taxation_of_interest_income (last visited
Jul 6, 2015).
62 Nicholas Gouder, Malta: Withholding Taxes, MONDAQ (Oct. 1, 2013),
http://www.mondaq.com/x/266212/withholding%20tax/Malta%20Withholding
%20Taxes (last visited Jul 6, 2015).
63 Supra note 61.
64 Id.
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The Maltese Finance Subsidiary65

3. Malta – BeNeLux Interest Free Loan with Notional Interest
Deduction (“NID”)
Consider the following scenario:
1. Parent Co. in high-tax jurisdiction owns Malta Co., a
Maltese subsidiary company and BeNeLux Co., a Belgian
subsidiary company.
2. Parent Co. makes an equity contribution to Malta Co.
3. Malta Co. makes an interest free loan to BeNeLux Co.
4. BeNeLux Co. makes a loan to OpCo in a high tax
jurisdiction.
5. OpCo deducts the interest paid to BeNeLux Co.
6. BeNeLux Co. receives a “Notional Interest Deduction”
equal to the amount of Belgium’s published rates. “The
deduction for risk capital or more commonly called
“notional interest deduction” (NID) is a unique tax

65

Supra note 60.
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measure allowing a tax-free return on qualified equity by
allowing a deemed interest deduction calculated as the
qualifying equity multiplied by the applicable NID rate”.66
7. This creates a tax deferred cash accumulation in BeNeLux
Co. and only principal amounts remain owing to Malta
Co.
The BeNeLux Co. with Notional Interest Deduction67

4.

Finance Structures Do Not Drive Business Substantively

In evaluating structures both in the context of treaty
application and financing structures, the question of whether or not
tax is a business driver is ever present. Choosing where to establish a
mailbox company and where to loan money for the purposes of
deductions like the Notional Interest Deduction are strategies that
haven’t truly driven business in a measurable way. These are tactics
that allow business to function in more tax efficient ways, but do not
introduce new lines of business or otherwise drive business out of a
market. The end result is ultimately the same, profits are drained
from high-tax subsidiaries into low-tax countries. That does not
What NID Could Mean for Your Company’s Effective Tax Rate, ERNST &
YOUNG (2015),
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Notional_Intrest_Deduction_2011
/$FILE/NID%202011.pdf (last visited July 6, 2015)
67 Supra note 60.
66
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mean that the company has truly ceased any operations in those
jurisdictions.
D. Multinational Corporations
1.

International vs. Intra-Europe

Across the world companies have applied the disparate
treatment of tax available from various double taxation treaties to
their business model to create holding structures that are tax efficient
both for the purposes of driving the bottom line and efficiently
moving cash between subsidiaries. However, companies also have
additional rules which apply to their activities when those activities
take place within the European Internal Market. Two major
European Union directives apply, they are the E.U.
Parent/Subsidiary Directive and the E.U. Interest and Royalty
Directive.
Article 31 EEA provides in relevant part that:
[T]here shall be no restrictions on the freedom of
establishment of nationals of an EC Member State or
an EFTA State in the territory of any other state of
these States. This shall also apply to the setting up of
agencies, branches or subsidiaries by nationals of any
EC Member State or EFTA State established in the
territory of any of these states.68
The language of Article 34 of the EEA (like Article 54 of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) provides that:
Companies or firms … shall, for the purpose of this
Chapter, be treated in the same way as natural persons
who are nationals of EC Member States or EFTA
States.69
In light of this core treaty language, the European Union has
taken competence in this area. The E.U. Parent/Subsidiary Directive
68
69

Supra note 23 at art. 31.
Id. at art. 34.
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was adopted on December 22, 2003 “to eliminate tax obstacles in the
area of profit distributions between groups of companies in the E.U.
by: abolishing withholding taxes on payments of dividends between
associated companies of different Member States and preventing
double taxation of parent companies on the profits of their
subsidiaries”.70 In sum, this language provides a mechanism that
sidesteps the necessity of the holding structure described supra in
Article IV, Section B.
The E.U. Interest and Royalty Directive was adopted on June
3, 2003 “to eliminate withholding tax obstacles in the area of crossborder interest and royalty payments within a group of companies by
abolishing withholding taxes on royalty payments arising in a
Member State, and withholding taxes on interest payments arising in
a Member State.”71 In essence, interest and royalty payments arising
in one member state are exempt from any taxes in that state if the
beneficial owner of the payment is in another member state.72
All initial time periods for phased and member-state specific
transitional implementation for both directives have passed.73
2.

CFC Rules, United States (Subpart F) and International

The United States tax system is built on two fundamentally
inconsistent principles that drive the need for tax structures such as
those discussed thus far. These principles are (1) that corporations
are treated as independent fictitious persons for the purposes of
taxation and (2) that all U.S based taxpayers are subject to worldwide
taxation.74 The tax treatment of corporations was previously
Parent companies and their subsidiaries in the European Union, EUROPEAN
COMMISSION,
TAXATION
AND
CUSTOMS
UNION,
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/
business/company-tax/parent-companies-their-subsidiaries-eu-union_en
(last
visited June 21, 2015).
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Office of Tax Policy, The Deferral of Income Earned Through U.S. Controlled
Foreign Corporations: A Policy Study, DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, 1 (Dec. 21, 2000),
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/ReportSubpartF-2000.pdf.
70
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addressed herein. One distinctive and unique feature of the U.S. tax
system is that it taxes all U.S. citizens, residents and corporations on
worldwide income. 75 Corporations are determined as U.S. domestic
or foreign on the basis of their place of organization contrary to
many other places in the world as described herein. Foreign
corporations are taxed on income that is from “sources within the
United States” or that is “effectively connected with the conduct of a
trade or business within the United States”. 76 There is a tension
between the two principles insofar as tax Persons are incentivized to
use offshore corporations as a barrier to U.S taxation of the income
earned through those corporations.
From 1913 when the U.S Income Tax was enacted through
1962, a number of tax avoidance techniques were developed by
international investors and were subsequently addressed through
legislation, including transfers of property to foreign corporations to
avoid U.S tax on the capital gains, the incorporation of the personal
or foreign personal holding companies or “incorporated
pocketbook” used to hold all personal holdings in stocks bonds or
other income producing property and foreign operating and
investment companies in the wake of World War II. 77 In 1962, the
United States enacted what is known as “subpart F” regulations at
I.R.C. §§ 951 – 964.78
The Code provides:
[E]very person who is a United States shareholder …
of such corporation and who owns … stock in such
corporation on the last day, in such year, on which such
corporation is a controlled foreign corporation shall
include in his gross income, for his taxable year in
which or with which such taxable year of the
corporation ends . . . . (i) his pro rata share … of the
corporation’s subpart F income for such year[.]79

75
76
77
78
79

Id. at 2.
Supra note 17 at §§ 881 and 882.
Supra note 74 at 8.
Id. at 12.
Supra note 17 at §§ 951.
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In summary:
Subpart F applies to certain income of “controlled foreign
corporations” (“CFCs”). A CFC is a foreign corporation more than
50% of which, by vote or value, is owned by U.S. persons owning a
10% or greater interest in the corporation by vote (“U.S.
shareholders”). “U.S. persons” includes U.S. citizens, residents,
corporations, partnerships, trusts and estates. If a CFC has subpart F
income, each U.S. shareholder must currently include its pro rata
share of that income in its gross income as a deemed dividend.80
Subpart F income includes the following:
•

Foreign personal holding company income (FPHCI),
A major category of subpart F income is foreign personal
holding company income (“FPHCI”). 81 (I.R.C. § 954(c))
This category includes interest, dividends and rents and
royalties. It also includes gains from the sale of property
that produces passive income or that is held for
investment, gains from commodities transactions, and
gains from foreign currency transactions, as well as certain
other income that is, in effect, the equivalent of interest or
dividends. Because of its passive nature, such income
often is highly mobile and can be easily deflected. 82 . . . .
Generally, rents and royalties earned by a CFC in an active
business are excluded from FPHCI.83 This exception does
not apply, however, if the CFC’s rents or royalties are
received from a related person.

•

Foreign base company sales income [S]ales income is
active income and subpart F generally does not apply to
active income. However, certain sales income, referred to
as foreign base company sales income (“FBCSI”), is
subject to current inclusion under subpart F because, when
the manufacturing function is separated from its sales

Supra note 74 at 8-10; supra note 17 at §§ 957, 951(b), 957(c),
7701(a)(30), 951(a).
81 Supra note 17 at § 954(c).
82 Supra note 74 at 10.
83 Supra note 17 at § 954(c)(2)(A).
80
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function, the sales income can easily be deflected from the
jurisdiction in which the major economic activity that
produced the value in the goods occurred, often a high-tax
jurisdiction, to a low-tax jurisdiction where the “sales”
activities occur.84 This is particularly true in the case of
related party transactions. Thus, the FBCSI rules require
current inclusion of income of a CFC from the sale of
property (a) that is purchased from, or on behalf of, or
sold to, or on behalf of, a related person, and (b) that is
manufactured and sold for use, consumption or
disposition outside the jurisdiction where the CFC is
incorporated.85
•

Foreign base company services income Foreign base
company services income is another category of subpart F
income that applies to active income that can be deflected
to a low-tax jurisdiction through related party transactions,
in this case, through the performance of services.86 Foreign
base company services income includes income from
services performed outside the CFC’s country of
incorporation for, or on behalf of, a related person. These
rules generally were intended to address circumstances in
which service activities are separated from the other
business activities of a corporation into a separate
subsidiary located in another jurisdiction to obtain a lower
rate of tax for the services income. 87

•

Foreign base company oil-related income includes
income from all oil activities outside the CFC's country of
incorporation. 88

•

Insurance income includes all income derived from
insurance and annuities related to risks that are situated
outside the CFC's country of incorporation.89

84 H.R. Rep. No. 1447, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 62 (1962) (1962 House
Report); S. Rep. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 84 (1962) (1962 Senate Report).
85 Supra note 17 at § 954(d); supra note 74 at xiii.
86 Supra note 17 at § 954(e)(2).
87 Treas. Reg. § 1.954-4(b)(1)(iv); supra note 74 at xiv.
88 Supra note 17 at § 954(g).
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All other income earned by a CFC is not subject to U.S. tax
until the income is repatriated to the U.S. The United States is no
longer alone in implementing CFC rules, however it is alone in its
application of worldwide taxation. Although, Germany, Sweden,
United Kingdom, Italy, France, Spain, Denmark, Finland and
Portugal have enacted CFC regimes that bear some resemblance to
the U.S scheme, the United States has a special provision which
permits the creation of what are known as “Hybrid Entities” and
arrangements known as “Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements.”90 A
Hybrid Entity is an entity that is taxed as a corporation in a foreign
jurisdiction but treated as a partnership or disregarded pass-through
entity for U.S. tax purposes. Conversely, a “Reverse Hybrid Entity” is
an entity that is taxed as a partnership or disregarded pass-through
entity in a foreign jurisdiction and treated as a corporation for U.S.
tax purposes.91 This is a feature of the United States tax code known
as Entity Classification Election or “Check the Box.” In order to
receive treatment as a corporation or partnership, the eligible entity
simply completes IRS Form 8832, which provides the following
election:92

Supra note 17 at § 953.
HRMC's International Manual, Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988, as
amended (hereafter ICTA88), sec. 747 et seq., INTM20000; Inkomstskattelag
(1999:1229); §§ 7-14 AStG, Foreign Tax Act; Ernst & Young, An Overview of CFC
Rules in Key EU Countries and an Analysis of Cross-Border Planning Structures to Avoid the
Application of CFC Rules, UNIVERSITAT HAMBURG, http://www.m-itax.de/content/Wichtige_Links/Alumni_Netzwerk/documents/cfcrules_000.pdf
(last visited July 7, 2015).
91 Supra note 74 at 62.
92 Form
8832,
INTERNAL
REVENUE
SERVICE,
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f8832.pdf.
89
90
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(i) Scenario: Deflect Profit to Low Tax Country
Consider the following scenario:
1.

Company A is a U.S. company with a wholly owned
subsidiary, CFC X in Country X, a high-tax jurisdiction.

2.

In order to transfer operating income from CFC X in
Country X where it would be taxed at a high rate to
Country Y, which is a low-tax country, CFC X creates a
wholly owned subsidiary Company Y in Country Y that
is treated as a corporation in Country X and of course in
Country Y, but would be disregarded for U.S. tax
purposes.

3.

Company Y makes a loan to CFC X. Country X treats
CFC X as a corporation and so the interest payments
from CFC X to Company Y are deductible in Country X
and thus reduces operating income of CFC X. Interest
payments received by Company Y in Country Y, are
subject to low-taxation in Country Y.

4.

Because the United States treats CFC X as disregarded
for U.S. tax purposes, the taxpayer takes the position that
interest payments between CFC X and Company Y
should be disregarded for U.S. tax purposes and thus
should not be considered subpart F income. 93

5.

The end result is that CFC X pays tax significantly
reduced income (by the amount of interest paid) in
Country X and subject to any applicable double-taxation
treaty benefits, tax on equally reduced income in the
United States.

93

Supra note 74 at 64.
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CFC Use of Hybrid to Deflect Income to Low-Tax Country94

(ii) Scenario: Shelter From Tax in All Jurisdictions
Now consider an alternative scenario.
1.

Company A is a U.S. company with a wholly owned
subsidiary, CFC X in Country X, a high-tax jurisdiction.

2.

Company A could establish Company X in Country X,
the same high-tax jurisdiction, but the entity would not
be a corporation, it would be a disregarded pass-through
entity, such as a Partnership or Limited Liability
Company.

3.

Company A would elect to treat Company X as a
Corporation for U.S. tax purposes but the law of
Country X would provide that the entity would be
disregarded for tax purposes.

4.

Company A would make a cash contribution to
Company X.

94

Id.
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5.

Company X would make a loan to CFC X.

6.

CFC X would get a deduction in Country X for the
interest paid to Company X.

7.

For purposes of Country X, Company X is a disregarded
entity and no tax would be imposed on Company X for
the interest paid to it. Assuming a double taxation treaty
existed between Country X and the United States, the
interest would likely be subject to minimal withholding
tax in Country X.

8.

From the United States perspective, the U.S. would treat
Company X as a Country X corporation as well as CFC
X and thus interest payments between CFC X and
Company X would not be subpart F income pursuant to
the same country exception in section 954(c)(3)(A)(i)
which “exempts from FPHCI dividends and interest
received from a related corporation organized under the
laws of the same country as the recipient, provided that
the related payer corporation has a substantial part of its
assets used in a trade or business in the same foreign
country.”95

9.

The end result is CFC X has little or no income for U.S
or Country X tax purposes because it deducts interest
paid to Company X. Company X, a disregarded entity
pays no tax in Country X because it is disregarded in
Country X and no tax in the United States because the
U.S. treats it as a Corporation.

95

Id.
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Use of Reverse Hybrid to Shelter Income from Tax in All
Jurisdictions1

This is of course, as in the first example, a tax deferral
strategy as compared to an avoidance strategy. Whenever Company
X in this example or Company Y in the prior example repatriates
profits to the U.S. Company, these profits would be subject to
taxation as dividends pursuant to the applicable double-taxation
treaties between the United States and Country X or Y depending on
the applicable example above.
(iii) Scenario: Dual-Resident Corporation and Stateless Income
Consider the following scenario:
1.

U.S. Company A owns CFC X1, which is a
manufacturing corporation incorporated in Country X, a
high-tax jurisdiction.

2.

The U.S. Company forms a sister corporation, CFC X2
in Country X.

3.

CFC X2 is effectively managed and controlled in the
United States and so it is a non-resident for the purposes
of Country X’s tax code.

4.

CFC X2 enters into a contract manufacturing
arrangement for CFC X1 to manufacture goods from
578
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raw materials that CFC X2 will purchase from the U.S.
company and provide to CFC X1, thus reducing CFC
X1’s profit.
5.

CFC X2 will then sell through a branch established in the
country of sale.

6.

CFC X2 will not be taxed on its sales profits in Country
X, because Country X treats it as a non-resident because
its place of management is in the U.S.

7.

The U.S. tax law treats CFC X2 as a Country X
corporation because it was incorporated in Country X.

8.

Because the income of CFC X2’s sales is derived from
the sale of products manufactured in Country X, this
does not constitute Foreign Base Sales Company Income
(FBCSI). In order for FBCSI to apply the sales income
would have to be derived in connection with the sale of
products both manufactured and sold for use outside
CFC X2’s country of incorporation (Country X).

9.

Thus, CFC X1 will have reduced its tax payable to
Country X without any subpart F income arising in CFC
X2 because of CFC X2 is a foreign corporation to both
Country X and the United States.96

10.

CFC X2 is stateless.97

This is a key component of case studies to be examined
subsequently in Article IV, Section E, where this article will be
examining the tax structures of Apple, Inc. and Google, Inc.

Id.
Edward D. Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 699 (2011),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1791769## (last visited
July 8, 2015).
96
97
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Transfer Pricing

Tax strategies have two major overlapping goals: (a) deferral
and (b) avoidance. In large part the tax strategies described above
focus on the avoidance aspect, e.g. how applying disparate treatments
of treaties escapes a high level of taxation in the source country by
interposing a holding country with a favorable treaty network.
Although avoidance is the goal, the practical result of most modern
tax strategies is deferral. Sooner or later the reality is that
shareholders will pressure companies to repatriate offshore profits to
reinvest or distribute in the form of dividends.98
Each of the strategies described above involve the use of treaty
provisions to legally reduce the amount of tax due and owing in one
country versus another and shift the profits of a company from a
high tax country to a low tax country. Contrarily, tax evasion would
involve an illegal reduction in tax by relying on sovereign privacy laws
to hide foreign profits and assets. Alternatively, some corporations
use what is known as transfer pricing in order to further reduce tax.
Depending on the methods used to establish the transfer pricing,
some legal experts have argued that such techniques might also
qualify as illegal tax evasion especially as the pricing applies to hard
goods.99
Transfer pricing involves the application of prices to goods and
services sold between related companies. The price of the goods sold
should be the same as the prices that would be paid by unrelated
parties, or a so-called “arms-length transaction.” “By lowering the
price of goods and services sold by parents and affiliates in high-tax
jurisdictions and raising the price of purchases, income can be
shifted.”100 The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines provide five

98 Jane G. Gravelle, Tax Havens: International Tax Avoidance and Evasion,
CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH
SERVICE
(Jan.
15,
2015),
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40623.pdf (last visited July 5, 2015); Apple under
pressure for new dividends, repatriation of cash, MACNN (Mar. 11, 2013),
http://www.macnn.com/articles/13/03/11/wall.street.government.wants.more.of.
companys.growing.cash.hoard/ (last visited July 5, 2015).
99 Id.
100 Gravelle. supra note 99 at 12.
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methods to estimate an arm’s length price of transactions and allocate
profits between companies:
(i)
the comparable uncontrolled price method
(hereinafter “CUP”), which involves observing comparable
transactions between two independent companies and applying the
same price for group companies;
(ii) the cost plus method, which involves approximating
income from goods sold or services provided to the company within
the group for a fair income level;
(iii) the resale minus method, which involves
approximating the costs of goods bought from and services provided
by a group company for a fair cost of goods;
(iv) the transactional net margin method (hereinafter
“TNMM”), which involves using a net profit indicator, referring in
principle to the ratio of profit per item compared to the profit and
loss account of the firm, a fair margin is applied to be considered
“arm’s length”
(v) the transactional profit split method, which involves
considering each of the related parties relative value of their
contributions to the profit or loss and splitting the profit
appropriately.101
It is relatively simple to police a simple product that has a
markup and other competitive goods offered for sale in the
marketplace. Failure to sell those goods between related companies at
fair market value, which is what parties negotiating at arms-length
would pay, is a violation of the transfer-pricing rules. Intellectual
property and intangible assets are the primary assets where transfer
pricing remains relevant within international tax planning, largely for
one reason: there is no competitive market to license these assets and
there is only one customer and only one licensee – the company that
TRANSFER
PRICING
GUIDELINES
FOR
MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES
AND
TAX
ADMINISTRATIONS,
OECD
(2010),
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/transfer-pricing/transfer-pricing-guidelines.htm
(last
visited July 6, 2015).
101
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exploits the intellectual property. New inventions, new
pharmaceutical drugs, trademarks have nothing to be compared to
that would effectively affix a value to the intellectual property.102
By transferring the intellectual property to a subsidiary in a
low-tax jurisdiction and requiring every use of the intellectual
property to pay high-royalties, the royalties are deductible in the hightax jurisdictions and the income flows to the low-tax jurisdictions.
4.

State Aid & Subsidies

State Aid is a tool that is used by many jurisdictions to attract
specific companies. It is “A grant of money made by government in
aid of the promoters of any enterprise, work, or improvement in
which the government desires to participate, or which is considered a
proper subject for state aid, because [it’s] likely to be of benefit to the
public.”103
As a domestic American example of State Aid consider
Mercedes-Benz. In 2015, Mercedes-Benz USA (“MBUSA”) the
United States subsidiary of Daimler, AG negotiated a subsidy with
the Governor of Georgia, whereby MBUSA would relocate its
headquarters from the high-tax state of New Jersey, which imposes
its own corporate income tax of 9% in addition to the United States
corporate income tax.104 The State of Georgia imposes a corporate
income tax of 6% in addition to the United States corporate income
tax.105 Although 300 basis points is a significant reduction, the State
of Georgia also agreed to enact an “incentive package” valued at
$27,000 per job. MBUSA estimates that it will create 800 to 1,000

102
103

Id.
Supra note 15.
Corporation Business

104
Tax Overview, STATE OF NEW JERSEY
DEPARTMENT
OF
TREASURY
http://www.state.nj.usU.S/treasury/taxation/corp_over.shtml (last visited July 6,
2015).
105 Corporate Income and Net Worth Tax, GEORGIA DEPT. OF REV.,
http://dor.georgia.gov/corporate-income-and-net-worth-tax (last visited July 6,
2015).
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jobs in Georgia by moving its headquarters. This amounts to a
subsidy of up to $27 million USD.106
Article 107 of the Treaty for the Functioning of the European
Union provides that “any aid granted by a Member State or through
State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to
distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the
production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between
Member States, be incompatible with the internal market.”107 In 2014,
the European Commission opened an investigation into
Amazon.com, Inc.’s arrangements with Luxembourg over favorable
tax treatment of income from Amazon’s transfer pricing
arrangements.108 The decision involves Luxembourg’s validation of
Amazon’s Advance Pricing Arrangement (“APA”). An APA is an
agreement between various subsidiaries and branches of a multinational group to set prices based upon comparable prices, pricing
methods and adjustments for various factors.109
Amazon’s structure is as follows:
1.

Amazon Company 1 (AC1) and Amazon Company 2
(AC2) are based in the United States and own 100% of
Amazon Europe Holding Technologies SCS (Lux SCS), a
limited liability partnership.

2.

For the purposes of Luxembourg law, Lux SCS is a
transparent entity.

James Salzer, Gov. Deal signs tax breaks for Mercedes-Benz staffers, private
college, THE ATLANTA JOURNAL CONSTITUTION (May 6, 2015),
http://www.ajc.com/news/news/state-regional-govt-politics/gov-deal-signs-taxbreaks-for-mercedes-benz-staffe/nk9y6/ (last visited July 6, 2015).
107 TFEU Treaty, art. 107 opened for signature March 25, 1957.
108 David Meyer, EU Publishes Details of Amazon Luxembourg “State Aid”
Tax Probe, GIGAOM (Jan. 16, 2015), https://gigaom.com/2015/01/16/eupublishes-details-of-amazon-luxembourg-state-aid-tax-probe/ (last visited July 6,
2015).
109 STATE AID SA.38944 (2014/C) – Luxembourg Alleged aid to Amazon by
way of a tax ruling, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Brussels (Oct. 7, 2014).
106
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3.

For the purposes of U.S. law, Lux SCS is a corporation
and tax is deferred on its profits until they are repatriated
to the U.S. as a dividend.

4.

Lux SCS owns all Amazon’s intangibles and intellectual
property, and licenses both of them to Amazon EU Sarl
(LuxOpCo) for which Lux OpCo must pay a royalty to
Lux SCS.

5.

LuxOpCo operates all of Amazon’s European Sites and
owns all of the shares in Amazon’s E.U. subsidiaries
located outside of Luxembourg in the European Union.

6.

Lux SCS also loans LuxOpCo and other related
companies cash to provide operating capital to the group
and the group pays Lux SCS deductible interest
payments. 110

7.

As a result of this arrangement, Amazon shifts most of
its profits from subsidiaries located in high tax European
jurisdictions to Luxembourg, where they are not subject
to tax and deferred under U.S. taxation until those profits
are repatriated back to the U.S. in the form of a
shareholder dividend or distribution.

Id.; Proposed Treasury Regulations under Section 385 would have profound
impact
on
related
party
financings,
PwC
(Apr.
7,
2016),
https://www.pwc.com/U.S/en/tax-services/publications/insights/assets/pwcproposed-section-385-regs-would-impact-related-party-financings.pdf (last visited
Mar. 15, 2017).
110
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111

Luxembourg applied the Transactional Profit Split Method to
determine that Amazon’s transfer pricing arrangement, which
favored placing profits in Luxembourg over other E.U. member
states, was a fair practice and in compliance with Article 164 of the
Luxembourgish tax code of 1967 (“LIR”) which gives no discretion
to tax authorities.112
In comparing the U.S. example of Mercedes-Benz USA,
whereby the State of Georgia enacted tax law solely for the purpose
of attracting a single firm, and the E.U. example of Amazon
obtaining a ruling that its APA was in compliance with Luxembourg
law, it can be seen that a far greater latitude is given to United States
taxpayers than to member states of the European Union, in this
regard. However, in both cases, the governments will toe the line of
legality in order to attract large businesses to their jurisdiction. The
fact that Mercedes-Benz USA moved to Georgia, and that Amazon
setup their European headquarters in Luxembourg, evidences that, at

111
112

Id.
Article 164 of the Luxembourg Income Tax Law of 1967; supra note

110.
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the extremes, when governmental assurances are provided, tax can
act as a major business driver.
E. The Present: Intellectual Property and Modern Tax Structures
In the context of intellectual property, the very nature of the
property itself makes it a valuable tool for international tax planning.
The features of intellectual property make it portable and relatively
easy to relocate either by contractual terms or re-registering in foreign
jurisdictions. When a product or good exploits a trademark or patent
the company that manufactures that product or good must pay a
royalty or licensing fee to the company that owns the intellectual
property. In order for one company to control all rights to intellectual
property that property must be sold and assigned to the other and
those rights include the rights to receive royalties and licensing fees
from that property. In other words, intellectual property could be
compared to real estate in the sense that an assignment is a transfer
of title to the property and the right to receive rental income for the
property’s use. Whereas a manufacturing company has to pay rent to
use a warehouse, it would also have to pay a licensing fee to use the
applicable trademark for a good, the patent in the way that the good
operates or is constructed, and even a sum for confidential access to
a trade secret in how the product is manufactured or what the recipe
consists of.
By relocating intellectual property from a high tax jurisdiction
to a low tax jurisdiction, as in the Amazon example above, the
royalties and licensing fees relating to that intellectual property are
booked in the low tax country, and thus, subject to taxation there.
Two major multinational companies, Google, Inc. and Apple,
Inc., provide a good example of how these tax rules can be used to
their benefit with avant garde tax strategies that take advantage of both
intra-European and international tax rules.
1.

Back-to-Back License Structure with Double Irish Dutch
Sandwich Case Study : Google, Inc.

The first example, Google, utilizes many of the strategies
described thus far. Google primarily derives its taxation benefits
through use of the double Irish-Dutch sandwich strategy, U.S.
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Check-the-Box Rules, the E.U. Interest & Royalties Directive, and
general arbitrage between definitions of terms such as Tax Residence
and Transfer Pricing Opportunities. To illustrate:
1.

Google, Inc. transfers all of its intellectual property to an
Irish holding company, Google Ireland Holdings, Inc.,
which has its company management and tax residency in
Bermuda where the corporate income tax rate is 0%.

2.

This company has subsidiary sales companies that sell
advertising, Google’s main source of revenue, to
European markets (“High-tax OpCos”).

3.

However, sandwiched between the Irish holding
company and the European subsidiaries is a Dutch
subsidiary, Google, BV., and an Irish subsidiary, Google
Ireland, Ltd.

4.

Google Ireland, Ltd. collects royalties from the
subsidiaries at market value and transfers them by paying
nominal royalty fees to Google, BV. in the Netherlands.
Google Ireland, Ltd. incurs these nominal royalty fees by
licensing hard-to-price intangible assets from Google,
BV., using one of the OECD transfer pricing methods,
as explained by the Amazon example

5.

Google BV. is incorporated in the Netherlands and the
Company’s management is located in the U.S.113

6.

Google, BV. distributes its income to Google Ireland
Holdings and is not subject to withholding tax on that
distribution under Dutch law.

7.

Google Ireland Holdings is a tax resident of Bermuda
and subject to 0% corporate income tax.

8.

This strategy allows the Irish operation to avoid “even
the low Irish tax of 12.5% and, by using the Dutch
sandwich, to avoid Irish withholding taxes -- which are

113

Supra note 98.
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not due on payments to European Union companies -per the E.U. Interest & Royalties Directive”.114
9.

Because Google “Checks the Box” on Google Ireland
Holdings and Google, BV. for U.S. taxation purposes,
the royalty payments disappear when the entities
disappear and all the U.S. sees are the fees from the
operating company engaged in active business with
Google Ireland Holdings, Inc., which has its tax
residency in Bermuda.115

Google’s European Operations116

114 Jane G. Gravelle, Tax Havens: International Tax Avoidance and Evasion,
CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH
SERVICE,
12
(Jan.
15,
2015),
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40623.pdf (last visited July 5, 2015).
115 Ruth Mason, Tax Planning for U.S. Multinationals, UNIVERSITY OF
VIRGINIA SCHOOL OF LAW (2015).
116 Id.; Jesse Drucker, Google Joins Apple Avoiding Taxes with Stateless Income,
BLOOMBERG
BUSINESS
(May
22,
2013),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-05-22/google-joins-appleavoiding-taxes-with-stateless-income (last visited July 8, 2015).

588

2017

Agresta

5:2

2. Case Study: Apple, Inc.
While Google takes advantage of intellectual property,
transfer pricing, and royalty payments, Google also sells advertising,
which is also intangible. Apple, Inc., America’s largest company
applies a tax that is quintessentially Apple as it is perhaps the most
simple and innovative modern international tax planning technique in
use. Here’s how it works:
1.

Apple, Inc. is a U.S. corporation and U.S. tax resident
pursuant to U.S. law.

2.

Apple sells goods to end consumers around the world
through its retail stores in Europe, which are located in
the various member states where they do business and
are incorporated. The retail stores are tax residents in the
relevant member states and are all disregarded entities for
U.S. taxation purposes.

3.

The retail stores are owned by Apple Sales International,
incorporated in Ireland with Management and Control in
the United States.

4.

Apple Sales International is owned by Apple Operations
Europe, incorporated in Ireland with Management and
Control elsewhere.

5.

Apple Operations Europe is owned by Apple Holdings,
incorporated in Ireland with Management and Control in
the United States.

6.

Using arbitrage of the rules, Ireland considers Apple
Sales International, Apple Operations Europe and Apple
Holdings to be non-tax residents in Ireland because
management and control lies outside of Ireland.

7.

The United States considers these entities to be tax
resident in Ireland because of their incorporation in
Ireland but Apple anyway checks the box on the Retail
Subsidiaries, Apple Sales International and Apple
Operations Europe.
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8.

Apple transfers its Intellectual Property including the
patents, trademarks and know-how that go into making
its products into Apple Sales International.

9.

Apple contracts with third party manufacturing
companies in China at market price to manufacture its
products for it.

10. Once each product is complete, the third party

manufacturing companies transfer written title to the
products to Apple Sales International, which also owns
all of the Intellectual Property.
11. Apple then sells its products from Apple Sales

International to its retail subsidiaries in Europe by
transferring title and the items themselves are dropshipped to the retail stores. The retail subsidiaries pay a
high mark-up price for the hard goods, which include a
component for the intellectual property licensing.
12. The retail subsidiaries re-sell the hard products to the

end-consumers at a mark-up that is just sufficient to
cover the cost of the retail subsidiary’s operations leaving
minimal profit in the high tax jurisdiction.
13. This leaves most of the income in Apple Sales

International, which has a very large profit but is not
taxable in Ireland because it is stateless.
14. As a result of this strategy, Apple has $102 billion in

offshore cash stored in Ireland, which cannot be
repatriated because it would become subject to U.S.
Taxation.117

Hearing Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs United States Senate,
One Hundred Thirteenth Congress, First Session, United States Senate (May 21,
2013),
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113shrg81657/pdf/CHRG113shrg81657.pdf (last visited July 10, 2015).
117
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15. Like Google, Inc. the United States only sees the

payments from the end consumers to Apple Holdings in
Ireland. These streams through these stateless, check-thebox companies are disregarded so it is as if the customers
are dealing directly with Apple Operations
International.118
Apple’s Worldwide Operations119

118
119

Supra note 116.
Id.; supra note 118.
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V. FUTURE: PROACTIVE TAX PLANNING – CAN TAX DRIVE THE
DECISION
Tax strategies such as those implemented by Apple, Inc. and
Amazon.com have been subjected to public disclosure because
governments and in particular the United States Senate and European
Commission respectively have conducted inquiries into the practices
of these multinationals and called upon representatives of these
companies to testify publicly about their tax practices.120 As a publicly
traded company, exposure to publicity affects investor confidence
and thus stock price in a more qualitative way.121
Perhaps one of the simplest resolutions would be for the
United States to abolish the “check-the-box” rules. By doing so, the
IRS Subpart F regulations would resume their intended meaning
because companies would not be able to use payments of interest or
royalties to a hybrid entity in order to eliminate taxable offshore
Subpart F income. It is important to recognize that the IRS’ official
justification for enacting the “check-the-box” provided in part:
Because the complexities and resources devoted to
classification of domestic unincorporated business
organizations are mirrored in the foreign context, the
Service and Treasury are considering simplifying the
classification rules for foreign organizations in a
manner consistent with the approach . . . for domestic
organizations.122
In other words, “check-the-box” was about providing
simplicity in the tax code for multinationals. Although the IRS has
implemented anti-abuse rules related to “check-the-box,” these rules

120 Id.; State aid SA.38944 (2014/C) – Luxembourg Alleged aid to Amazon by
way of a tax ruling, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Brussels, (Oct. 7, 2014).
121 Ben Rooney, Apple’s Tim Cook is Wall Street hero for a day, CNN MONEY
(May 21, 2013), http://buzz.money.cnn.com/2013/05/21/apple-tim-cookcongress/ (last visited July 8, 2015).
122 Internal Revenue Service, Notice 95-14, 1995-1 CB 297, 298 (Mar. 29,
1995).
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do not apply for internal payments within a corporation. 123 According
to the Office of Chief Counsel of the Internal Revenue Service, loans
between a corporation and its disregarded branch in another country
are disregarded for U.S. tax purposes.124
After the implementation of “check-the-box,” in countries like
the United Kingdom and Germany where corporations are taxed at
rates comparable to the United States, the tax bases dropped
dramatically as profits were shifted offshore to low tax jurisdictions.
In 1998, the IRS proposed new regulations to close the loophole and
U.S corporations began a massive lobbying effort to stop the
implementation.
General Electric, PepsiCo, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch,
Monsanto and other major companies urged Congress to resist the
change. The U.S., they said, was trying to be “the tax policeman for
the world.” Allies in Congress dug in, and Treasury quickly rescinded
the proposal.125
By 2000, over 8,000 disregarded entities were in existence with
large concentrations in the Netherlands because of their specific
treatment of royalties and interest discussed supra. By 2004, billions
had built up in the Dutch bank accounts of major U.S. corporations
and the United States Congress approved a tax holiday allowing these
companies to repatriate the profits at a rate of 5.25 percent. Over $90
billion USD was repatriated from the Netherlands alone.126
In 2009 when President Obama was elected, he included
elimination of “check-the-box” loopholes as part of his agenda,
however due to vehement opposition and threats that American
companies would be bought by their foreign competitors, Obama

123 Jeff Gerth, Corporations Couldn’t Wait to ‘Check the Box’ on Huge Tax
Break,
PROPUBLICA
(Sept.
26,
2011),
http://www.propublica.org/article/corporations-couldnt-wait-to-check-the-boxon-huge-tax-break (last visited July 8, 2015).
124 Memorandum 201420017, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF COUNSEL INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE (May 16, 2014), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/1420017.pdf
(last visited July 8, 2015).
125 Supra note 124.
126 Id.
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retracted his position leaving “check-the-box” on the table as a
valuable tool.127
A. The Value of Tax to Management Compared with Other
Business Drivers: Case Study: Inversion
Although society has seen tax impact business in the context of
structures and branch operations, perhaps the single biggest impact
that tax can have on major corporations is the inversion, or the
inversion merger. In the introduction, we examined how Boris
Becker moved his residency for taxation purposes. We have also
addressed how taxation based upon source and residence rules allows
companies like Apple to take advantage of stateless income that is
not subject to tax anywhere on the basis of residence. As discussed,
the United States is unique in its approach to the taxation of
worldwide income. Because the United States views the place of
incorporation as the determining factor for tax residency, many U.S.
corporations have moved their legal headquarters overseas by
reincorporating. To do this, the U.S. company establishes or acquires
another company in a country with a lower corporate tax rate and
then calls the new country home. 128 As explained by The Economist:
When a company becomes foreign through a merger,
or “inverts”, it no longer owes American tax on its
foreign profit. It still owes American tax on its
American profit. But that, too, can be minimised [sic].
Often, the group can shift debt to the American unit,
or have it borrow from the foreign parent. It can then
pay interest to the parent while deducting the sums
involved from its American taxes. Several studies have
found such “earnings stripping” common when
companies invert. When Walgreens, an American
chemist, announced plans to merge with Swiss-based

Id.
John W. Schoen, How Does a Corporate ‘Tax Inversion’ Work?, NBC
NEWS (Sept. 23, 2014), http://www.nbcnews.com/business/taxes/how-doescorporate-tax-inversion-work-n209701 (last visited July 8, 2015).
127
128
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Alliance Boots, Barclays, a bank, reckoned the move
could save $783m a year in taxes in this way.129
In practice, this is a relatively simple solution to a complex
problem, however, the United States has changed the rules, so simply
opening an office in London or Ireland, or even declaring a foreign
country as the corporation’s tax residence is insufficient to change
the tax base of the corporation as further discussed below.130
The September 2014 regulatory change resulted in an increased
fervor of actual substantive business acquisitions. In 2014, U.S. based
medical device manufacturer Medtronic signed a deal for $42.9
billion USD to buy Irish competitor Covidien. The new
conglomerate’s headquarters: Ireland; the effective reduction in
corporate income tax: over 65% (from the U.S. rate of 40% down to
the Irish rate of 12.5%). Shortly after announcing the merger,
Medtronic announced a $10 billion USD investment in new U.S.based research and development commitments. We can surmise that
the ability to make this investment may have been afforded as a result
of the tax savings. With these figures, it is hard to imagine how tax
could not drive these types of decisions in every major multinational
corporation.131
According to Bloomberg News, as of April 2015, over 48
companies had reincorporated in low-tax countries since 1982, out of
these 48, 17 have occurred since 2012. These include some of
America’s most cherished and valuable brands like Burger King,
Mylan, and Aon.132

Inverse
logic,
THE
ECONOMIST
(Sept.
20,
2014),
http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21618912-americaweighs-action-discourage-corporate-exodus-inverse-logic (last visited July 9, 2015).
130 Kevin Drawbaugh, U.S. Treasury Moves Against Tax-Avoidance ‘Inversion’
deals,
REUTERS
(Sept.
23,
2014),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/23/usU.S-tax-inversion-treasuryidUSKCN0HH2TM20140923 (last visited July 8, 2015).
131 Charles Riley, Medtronic buys Covidien for $42.9 billion, CNN MONEY
(June 15, 2014), http://money.cnn.com/2014/06/15/investing/medtroniccovidien/index.html (last visited July 9, 2015).
132 Zachary R. Mider, Tax Inversion: How U.S. Companies Buy Tax Breaks,
BLOOMBERG
NEWS
(Apr.
21,
2015),
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133

B. Substance Requirements, Anti-Avoidance and Anti TreatyShopping
One area that has been subjected to significant scrutiny in
many tax structures is overall substance. As discussed in the context
of inversions, the U.S. Treasury used a form of Substance
Requirements to curb U.S. corporations’ ability to simply
http://www.bloombergview.com/quicktake/tax-inversion (last visited July 9,
2015).
133 Id.
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reincorporate elsewhere, or to use the acquisition of a much smaller
foreign rival to change the company’s overall tax residency.
Substance Requirements however, arise most prominently in
the area of treaty shopping and the use of Special Purpose Vehicles
(“SPVs”):
In order to qualify for tax treaty benefits, which is
what SPV's are all about, the SPV will in most cases
have to meet two criteria generally contained in tax
treaties: (i) the SPV must be a tax resident of the State
it is registered in; and (ii) the SPV must be the
'beneficial owner' of the income flow. 134
The OECD model convention addresses substance in its
“permanent establishment” and “beneficial ownership” rules.
Revisiting the prior examples of Prevost and Indofood, we see two
examples where courts treat similar situations differently. What
occurred in Prevost could have been characterized as treaty-shopping.
In 2011, the OECD introduced new language intended to address the
ambiguities of the term “beneficial owner” contained in the model
convention. In its summary, the OECD provided that in the case of
the conduit company,
the recipient of the dividend is not the “beneficial
owner” because that recipient does not have the full
right to use and enjoy the dividend that it receives and
this dividend is not its own; the powers of that
recipient over that dividend are indeed constrained in
that the recipient is obliged (because of a contractual,
fiduciary or other duty) to pass the payment received
to another person. 135

134 Joseph Peters, Netherlands: Worldwide Developments in the Tax Concept of
Substance,
(Nov.
23,
2012),
http://www.mondaq.com/x/207914/tax+treaties/Worldwide+Developments+In
+The+Tax+Concept+Of+Substance (last visited July 8, 2015).
135 Clarification of the Meaning of “Beneficial Owner” in the Model Tax
Convention,
OECD
(Apr.
29
–
July
15,
2011),
http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/47643872.pdf (last visited July 8, 2015).
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The European Commission has recently devoted a lot of
attention to the Netherlands and whether by allowing the IP
structures discussed herein they are creating harmful tax competition
within the European Union. In response to European pressure, the
Netherlands has also implemented its own national regime for
holding companies and conduit companies that are established for
the purpose of lessoning the tax liability incurred from capital gains,
dividends, and interest and royalty payments. These rules are as
follows:
1.

The entity should have sufficient equity (transfer pricing
study required).

2.

The equity should actually be at risk (no non-recourse
situations).

3.

The entity's gross profit margin should beat arm's length
standards (transfer pricing study required).

4.

At least 50% of the directors should be permanent
Dutch residents (nationality irrelevant).

5.

The directors should have proper professional
qualifications in order to manage not only the entity but
also its money flows; no 'dummies' allowed.

6.

The books must be kept, and the annual accounts should
be prepared, in the Netherlands.136

Additionally, in order to avail itself of treaty benefits, an entity
must have a “permanent establishment” in the jurisdiction of one of
the treaty parties. The OECD applies a “fixed place of business”
test.137 To wit: there must be a “fixed place of business through
which the business of an enterprise is wholly or partly carried on.” 138

Id.
OECD: Revised Proposals on Article 5 (Permanent Establishment) of the
OECD
Model
Tax
Convention,
PwC
(Nov.
6,
2012),
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•

Fixed means that there is a link between the place of
business and the specific location, as well as a degree of
permanence. An "office hotel" or “virtual office” may
constitute a fixed place for a business for an enterprise
that regularly uses different offices within the space.
Contrarily, where there is no commercial coherence, the
fact that activities may be conducted within a limited
geographic area should not result in that area being
considered a fixed place of business.

•

A place of business. Means facilities used by an
enterprise for carrying out its business. The premises
must be at the disposal of the enterprise. The mere
presence of the enterprise at that place does not
necessarily mean that it is a place of business of the
enterprise. The facilities need not be the exclusive
location, and they need not be used exclusively by that
enterprise or for that business. However, the facilities
must be those of the taxpayer, not another unrelated
person. Thus, regular use of a customer's premises does
not generally constitute a place of business.

Business of the enterprise must be carried on wholly or
partly at the fixed place.139
The European Union also has repeatedly upheld the
“Freedom of Establishment” as one of the four fundamental
freedoms available to E.U. citizens pursuant to the European Union
treaty. According to the European Court of Justice’s holding in
Cadbury Schweppes v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue:
“[F]reedom of establishment is intended to allow the
nationals of the EMBL States to participate, on a
bulletin/assets/pwc-revised-proposals-article-5-oecd-model-tax-convention.pdf
(last visited July 9, 2015).
138 Id.
139 Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital: Condensed Version,
Commentary, OECD (2014), http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/model-taxconvention-on-income-and-on-capital-condensed-version-2014_mtc_cond-2014-en
(last visited July 9, 2015).

599

2017

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

5:2

stable and continuing basis, in the economic life of
another State” meaning “the concept of establishment
involves the actual pursuit of an economic activity
through a fixed establishment for an indefinite
period.”140
Only the establishment in the host State and the pursuit of
genuine economic activity falls within the scope of the provisions on
freedom of establishment. The Court in Cadbury found that concept
of establishment has a specific meaning and must not be interpreted
narrowly. Any person or entity that pursues economic activities that
are real and genuine must be regarded as taking advantage of its right
of establishment.141
In order to determine whether or not an entity pursues real
and genuine business activity in the host country, the Court must
look to:
“[T]he extent to which the CFC physically exists in
terms of premises, staff and equipment . . . If
checking those factors leads to the finding that the
CFC is a fictitious establishment not carrying out any
genuine economic activity in the territory of the host
Member State, the creation of that CFC must be
regarded as having the characteristics of a wholly
artificial arrangement.”142
As a final catchall measure, many jurisdictions have sought to
combat the types of tax structures analyzed herein using what is
known as a General Anti-Avoidance Rule (“GAAR”). Although there
is no uniform or model GAAR, there are consistencies in their
formulation.
1. Identification of a scheme (Australia) or arrangement as is seen
in China, Ireland, South Africa and New Zealand.
Cadbury Schweppes, ECJ C-196/04, para. 53 and 54.
Id. at para. 68.
142 Id. at para. 67; Robert Agresta, Written Observations by the Principality of
Liechtenstein to the EMBL Moot Court in Cases E-28/13 and E-30/13 Sailorman a.o. v.
Norway, Sept. 22, 2014.
140
141
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2. Quantification of a tax benefit (Australia, Canada, Hong
Kong and South Africa) or tax advantage (for example in Ireland)
associated with that arrangement.
3. A purpose test. Identification of a sole purpose (Brazil), dominant
purpose (Australia) or main purpose (South Africa) of obtaining a tax
benefit associated with the arrangement. 143
The United Kingdom however, only applies targeted antiavoidance rules and has not enacted a catchall measure. The United
States does not have any form of GAAR and relies upon commonlaw doctrines of statutory interpretation to prevent certain types of
arrangements. “In 2011, the judicially developed economic substance
doctrine, under which certain types of tax benefits are disallowed if
the impugned transaction lacks economic substance or lacks a
business purpose, was codified in legislation”. 144
VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSALS
In light of the forthcoming OECD BEPS proposals as well as
the promulgation of GAARs and clarification of Model Treaty
provisions, the core question becomes: will tax be a business driver in
the future? In this Author’s opinion, tax will always be a business
driver, however it will not drive business in the same way it does
today. Sovereign nations want to attract major corporations to their
tax base. Although their abilities to freely adapt laws to do so may be
hamstrung by their existing obligations in treaties, or subjected to
international pressures, countries will always want to compete in this
regard.
The author cannot discount the success that the OECD has
had in obtaining ratification of the Model Convention among major
world powers. However, internal political pressures as described in

143 General Anti-Avoidance Rules: What are key elements to a balanced approach?,
PWC TAX CONTROVERSY AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION ALERT (2012),

http://www.pwc.com/en_GX/gx/tax/newsletters/tax-controversydispute-resolution/assets/pwc-general-anti-avoidance-rules.pdf (last accessed
July 8, 2015).
144
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the United States have successfully preserved seemingly absurd
loopholes like “check-the-box.” These indicators seem to be contrary
to the ideals presented by the OECD in the BEPS project. While
diplomatic relations seem to drive international discussions for an
equitable tax system in one direction, domestic pressures demand
attention. Even the Netherland’s revised substance rules take little
effort for a large multi-national to fulfill. Moreover, the incentive has
proven fruitful to low-tax countries. The prevalence of inversions
and tax driven cross-border mergers are proof of this.
In introducing this topic, this Article broke tax into
categories, e.g. taxes on consumption and taxes on income. However,
what if both taxes could be replaced with another option. Felix
Bolliger, lic.oec., HSG argues in his whitepaper “Micro Tax on All
Monetary Transaction / Automatic Micro Tax on Debiting
(AMTD)” that an automated tax could be implemented “free of any
ideology and extremely abundant.” Bolliger argues that this type of
tax “relieves stress and strain on producers and individual tax payers.
Existing direct and indirect taxes become obsolete. The automatic
micro tax on debiting helps to resolve the current international debt
crisis.”.145 Moreover, the AMTD would force intra-European tax
compliance with the E.U. principles against state aid and in favor of a
free internal market.
Bolliger argues that the AMTD fulfills the goals of a tax
system to be “fair, easy to understand and easy to apply,” and better
than any other presently available tax methodology. Bolliger states:
In Switzerland, total fiscal income for year 2011
amounts to CHF 170 billion, which represent 30% of
CHF 585 billion gross domestic product. A micro tax
of 0.2% on CHF 95’000 billion monetary transactions
equally generates a national tax income of CHF 190 billion.
****

Felix Bolliger, Reinvent the System: Micro Tax on all Monetary Transactions
/ Automatic Micro Tax on Debiting (AMTD) (working paper, Jan. 2013),
http://www.microtax.ch/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/AMTDC-AutomaticMicro-Tax-Concept-English-07.12.2016.pdf.
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Statistics issued by NYSE, Nasdaq, London Metal
Exchange (LME) give a first idea about the size of
international money flows. We are confronted with
figures beyond common understanding. Foreign
exchange transactions (Forex) alone amount to a daily
volume of USD 4’000 billion, or roughly 7% of world
GNP.146
While the proposal is radical, it addresses the fundamental
paradigm laid out in the Introduction hereto. As long as there have
been governments – there have been taxes. As long as there have
been taxes – there have been strategies to avoid them. By eliminating
pressures, automating the collection of taxes, and taking
responsibility for their payment, the ability to avoid taxes is
effectively eliminated. To the knowledge of this author, the AMTD
has never been proposed to the OECD as an alternative solution.
The tax is however, fair, equitable and international. If the OECD
were braver and more innovative, it would take-on the AMTD or
another similar automated means of taxation as a goal and abandon
the BEPS project, which in the opinion of this Author, will ultimately
be largely ignored at the last moment by the United States because of
its own internal political pressures.

146

Id. (emphasis added).
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